Socrates : I certainly have a great desire, Hippias, to investigate what we are just at present talking about, namely which are better, those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily. Now I think the best way to go at the investigation is this. Just answer. Do you call some one a good runner ?
[373d] Hippias : I do.Socrates : And a bad one ?
Hippias : Yes.
Socrates : Now, he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs badly a bad one ; is it not so ?
Hippias : Yes.
Socrates : Then does not he who runs slowly run badly, and he who runs fast run well ?
Hippias : Yes.
Socrates : In a race, then, and in running, rapidity is a good thing, and slowness an evil.
Hippias : Why, of course.
Socrates : Which, then, is the better runner, he who runs slowly voluntarily or he who does so involuntarily ?
Hippias : He who does it voluntarily.
Socrates : Well, then, is not running doing something ?
Hippias : Yes, it is doing.
[373e] Socrates : And if doing, is it not also performing some act ?Hippias : Yes.
Socrates : Then he who runs badly performs a bad and disgraceful act in a race ?
Hippias : Yes, a bad act of course.
Socrates : But he runs badly who runs slowly ?
Hippias : Yes.
Socrates : Then the good runner performs this bad and disgraceful act voluntarily, and the bad runner involuntarily ?
Hippias : So it seems.
Socrates : In running, then, he who does bad acts involuntarily is worse than he who does them voluntarily ?
Hippias : Yes, in running.
[374a] Socrates : And how is it in wrestling ? Which is the better wrestler, he who is thrown voluntarily, or involuntarily ?Hippias : He who is thrown voluntarily, as it seems.
Socrates : But is it worse and more disgraceful in a wrestling match to be thrown or to throw one’s opponent ?
Hippias : To be thrown.
Socrates : In wrestling also, then, he who performs bad and disgraceful acts voluntarily is a better wrestler than he who performs them involuntarily.
Hippias : So it seems.
Socrates : And how is it in every other bodily exercise ? Is not he who is the better man in respect to his body able to perform both kinds of acts, the strong and the weak, the disgraceful and the fine, [374b] so that whenever he performs bad acts of a bodily kind, he who is the better man in respect to his body does them voluntarily, but he who is worse does them involuntarily ?
Hippias : That seems to be the case in matters of strength also.
Socrates : And how about grace, Hippias ? Does not the better body take ugly and bad postures voluntarily, and the worse body involuntarily ? Or what is your opinion ?
Hippias : That is my opinion.
Socrates : Then ungracefulness when voluntary is associated with excellence of the body, [374c] but when involuntary with faultiness.
Hippias : Apparently.
Socrates : And what do you say about the voice ? Which do you say is the better ? That which sings out of tune voluntarily, or involuntarily ?
Hippias : That which does it voluntarily.
Socrates : And that which does it involuntarily is the worse ?
Hippias : Yes.
Socrates : Would you choose to possess good or bad things ?
Hippias : Good ones.
Socrates : Would you, then, choose to possess feet that limp voluntarily, or involuntarily ?
Hippias : Voluntarily.
[374d] Socrates : But is not a limp faultiness and ungracefulness of the feet ?Hippias : Yes.
Socrates : Well, is not dimness of sight faultiness of the eyes ?
Hippias : Yes.
Socrates : Which eyes, then, would you choose to possess and live with ? Those with which one would see dimly and incorrectly voluntarily, or involuntarily ?
Hippias : Those with which one would do so voluntarily.
Socrates : Those parts, then, of yourself which voluntarily act badly you consider better than those which do so involuntarily ?
Hippias : Yes ; that is, in matters of that sort.
Socrates : Well, then, one statement embraces all alike, such as ears and nose and mouth and all the senses [374e] — that those which act badly involuntarily are undesirable because they are bad, and those which do so voluntarily are desirable because they are good.
Hippias : I think so.
Socrates : Well now, which instruments are better to have to do with, those with which a man does bad work voluntarily, or involuntarily ? For instance, is a rudder better with which a man will involuntarily steer badly, or one with which he will do so voluntarily ?
Hippias : One with which he will do so voluntarily.
Socrates : And is not the same true of a bow and a lyre and flutes and all the rest ?
Hippias : Quite true.