Socrates : Then the beautiful is the cause of the good.
(297a) Hippias : Yes, it is.
Socrates : But surely, Hippias, the cause and that of which the cause is the cause are different ; for the cause could not well be the cause of the cause. But look at it in this way was not the cause seen to be creating ?
Hippias : Yes, certainly.
Socrates : By that which creates, then, only that is created which comes into being, but not that which creates. Is not that true ?
Hippias : That is true.
Socrates : The cause, then, is not the cause of the cause, but of that which comes into being through it.
(297b) Hippias : Certainly.
Socrates : If, then, the beautiful is the cause of good, the good would come into being through the beautiful ; and this is why we are eager for wisdom and all the other beautiful things, because their offspring, the good, is worthy of eagerness, and, from what we are finding, it looks as if the beautiful were a sort of father of the good.
Hippias : Certainly for what you say is well said, Socrates.
Socrates : Then is this well said, too, that the father is not the son, and the son not father ?
(297c) Hippias : To be sure it is well said.
Socrates : And neither is the cause that which comes into being, nor is that which comes into being the cause.
Hippias : True.
Socrates : By Zeus, my good friend, then neither is the beautiful good, nor the good beautiful ; or does it seem to you possible, after what has been said ?
Hippias : No, by Zeus, it does not appear so to me.
Socrates : Does it please us, and should we be willing to say that the beautiful is not good, and the good not beautiful ?
Hippias : No, by Zeus, it does not please me at all.
Socrates : Right, by Zeus, Hippias ! (297d) And it pleases me least of all the things we have said.
Hippias : Yes, that is likely.
Socrates : Then there is a good chance that the statement that the beneficial and the useful and the powerful to create something good are beautiful, is not, as it appeared to be, the most beautiful of of statements, but, if that be possible, is even more ridiculous than those first ones in which we thought the maiden was the beautiful, and each of the various other things we spoke of before.
Hippias : That is likely.
Socrates : And Hippias, I no longer know where to turn ; I am at a loss ; but have you anything to say ?
(297e) Hippias : Not at the moment, but, as I said just now, I am sure I shall find it after meditation.