Socrates : “Then tell us again,” he will say, “from the beginning, (303e) since you failed this time ; what do you say that this ‘beautiful’, belonging to both the pleasures, is, on account of which you honored them before the rest and called them beautiful ?” It seems to me, Hippias, inevitable that we say that these are the most harmless and the best of pleasures, both of them collectively and each of them individually ; or have you anything else to suggest, by which they excel the rest ?
Hippias : Not at all ; for really they are the best.
Socrates : “This, then,” he will say, “you say is the beautiful, beneficial pleasure ?” “It seems that we do,” I shall say ; and you ?
Hippias : I also.
Socrates : “Well, then,” he will say, “beneficial is that which creates the good, but that which creates and that which is created were just now seen to be different, and our argument has come round to the earlier argument, has it not ? For neither could the good be beautiful nor the beautiful good, (304a) if each of them is different from the other.” “Absolutely true,” we shall say, if we are reasonable ; for it is inadmissible to disagree with him who says what is right.
Hippias : But now, Socrates, what do you think all this amounts to ? It is mere scrapings and shavings of discourse, as I said a while ago, divided into bits ; but that other ability is beautiful and of great worth, the ability to produce a discourse well and beautifully in a court of law or a council-house or before any other public body before which the discourse may be delivered, (304b) to convince the audience and to carry off, not the smallest, but the greatest of prizes, the salvation of oneself, one’s property, and one’s friends. For these things, therefore, one must strive, renouncing these petty arguments, that one may not, by busying oneself, as at present, with mere talk and nonsense, appear to be a fool.
Socrates : My dear Hippias, you are blessed because you know the things a man ought to practise, and have, as you say, practised them satisfactorily. But I, as it seems, am possessed by some accursed fortune, (304c) so that I am always wandering and perplexed, and, exhibiting my perplexity to you wise men, am in turn reviled by you in speech whenever I exhibit it. For you say of me, what you are now saying, that I busy myself with silly little matters of no account ; but when in turn I am convinced by you and say what you say, that it is by far the best thing to be able to produce a discourse well and beautifully and gain one’s end in a court of law or in any other assemblage, (304d) I am called everything that is bad by some other men here and especially by that man who is continually refuting me ; for he is a very near relative of mine and lives in the same house. So whenever I go home to my own house, and he hears me saying these things, he asks me if I am not ashamed that I have the face to talk about beautiful practices, when it is so plainly shown, to my confusion, that I do not even know what the beautiful itself is. “And yet how are you to know,” he will say, “either who produced a discourse, (304e) or anything else whatsoever, beautifully, or not, when you are ignorant of the beautiful ? And when you are in such a condition, do you think it is better for you to be alive than dead ?” So it has come about, as I say, that I am abused and reviled by you and by him. But perhaps it is necessary to endure all this, for it is quite reasonable that I might be benefited by it. So I think, Hippias, that I have been benefited by conversation with both of you ; for I think I know the meaning of the proverb “beautiful things are difficult”.