Ath. Thus, after digressing from the original subject of laws into music and drinking-bouts, the argument has, providentially, come back to the same point, and presents to us another handle. For we have reached the settlement of Lacedaemon ; which, as you truly say, is in laws and in institutions the sister of Crete. And we are all the better for the digression, because we have gone through various governments and settlements, and have been present at the foundation of a first, second, and third state, succeeding one another in infinite time. And now there appears on the horizon a fourth state or nation which was once in process of settlement and has continued settled to this day. If, out of all this, we are able to discern what is well or ill settled, and what laws are the salvation and what are the destruction of cities, and what changes would make a state happy, O Megillus and Cleinias, we may now begin again, unless we have some fault to find with the previous discussion.
Meg. If some God, Stranger, would promise us that our new enquiry about legislation would be as good and full as the present, I would go a great way to hear such another, and would think that a day as long as this — and we are now approaching the longest day of the year — was too short for the discussion.
Ath. Then I suppose that we must consider this subject ?
Meg. Certainly.
Ath. Let us place ourselves in thought at the moment when Lacedaemon and Argos and Messene and the rest of the Peloponnesus were all in complete subjection, Megillus, to your ancestors ; for afterwards, as the legend informs us, they divided their army into three portions, and settled three cities, Argos, Messene, Lacedaemon.
Meg. True.
Ath. Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.
Meg. Certainly.
Ath. To these kings all the men of that day made oath that they would assist them, if any one subverted their kingdom.
Meg. True.
Ath. But can a kingship be destroyed, or was any other form of government ever destroyed, by any but the rulers themselves ? No indeed, by Zeus. Have we already forgotten what was said a little while ago ?
Meg. No.
Ath. And may we not now further confirm what was then mentioned ? For we have come upon facts which have brought us back again to the same principle ; so that, in resuming the discussion, we shall not be enquiring about an empty theory, but about events which actually happened. The case was as follows : — Three royal heroes made oath to three cities which were under a kingly government, and the cities to the kings, that both rulers and subjects should govern and be governed according to the laws which were common to all of them : the rulers promised that as time and the race went forward they would not make their rule more arbitrary ; and the subjects said that, if the rulers observed these conditions, they would never subvert or permit others to subvert those kingdoms ; the kings were to assist kings and peoples when injured, and the peoples were to assist peoples and kings in like manner. Is not this the fact ?
Meg. Yes.
Ath. And the three states to whom these laws were given, whether their kings or any others were the authors of them, had therefore the greatest security for the maintenance of their constitutions ?
Meg. What security ?
Ath. That the other two states were always to come to the rescue against a rebellious third.
Meg. True.
Ath. Many persons say that legislators ought to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive ; but this is just as if one were to command gymnastic masters or physicians to treat or cure their pupils or patients in an agreeable manner.
Meg. Exactly.
Ath. Whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore health, and make the body whole, without any very great infliction of pain.
Meg. Certainly.
Ath. There was also another advantage possessed by the men of that day, which greatly lightened the task of passing laws.
Meg. What advantage ?
Ath. The legislators of that day, when they equalized property, escaped the great accusation which generally arises in legislation, if a person attempts to disturb the possession of land, or to abolish debts, because he sees that without this reform there can never be any real equality. Now, in general, when the legislator attempts to make a new settlement of such matters, every one meets him with the cry, that “he is not to disturb vested interests” — declaring with imprecations that he is introducing agrarian laws and cancelling of debts, until a man is at his wits end ; whereas no one could quarrel with the Dorians for distributing the land — there was nothing to hinder them ; and as for debts, they had none which were considerable or of old standing.
Meg. Very true.
Ath. But then, my good friends, why did the settlement and legislation of their country turn out so badly ?
Meg. How do you mean ; and why do you blame them ?
Ath. There were three kingdoms, and of these, two quickly corrupted their original constitution and laws, and the only one which remained was the Spartan.
Meg. The question which you ask is not easily answered.
Ath. And yet must be answered when we are enquiring about laws, this being our old man’s sober game of play, whereby we beguile the way, as I was saying when we first set out on our journey.
Meg. Certainly ; and we must find out why this was.
Ath. What laws are more worthy of our attention than those which have regulated such cities ? or what settlements of states are greater or more famous ?
Meg. I know of none.
Ath. Can we doubt that your ancestors intended these institutions not only for the protection of Peloponnesus, but of all the Hellenes. in case they were attacked by the barbarian ? For the inhabitants of the region about Ilium, when they provoked by their insolence the Trojan war, relied upon the power of the Assyrians and the Empire of Ninus, which still existed and had a great prestige ; the people of those days fearing the united Assyrian Empire just as we now fear the Great King. And the second capture of Troy was a serious offence against them, because Troy was a portion of the Assyrian Empire. To meet the danger the single army was distributed between three cities by the royal brothers, sons of Heracles — a fair device, as it seemed, and a far better arrangement than the expedition against Troy. For, firstly, the people of that day had, as they thought, in the Heraclidae better leaders than the Pelopidae ; in the next place, they considered that their army was superior in valour to that which went against Troy ; for, although the latter conquered the Trojans, they were themselves conquered by the Heraclidae — Achaeans by Dorians. May we not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the constitutions of their states ?
Meg. Quite true.
Ath. And would not men who had shared with one another many dangers, and were governed by a single race of royal brothers, and had taken the advice of oracles, and in particular of the Delphian Apollo, be likely to think that such states would be firmly and lastingly established ?
Meg. Of course they would.
Ath. Yet these institutions, of which such great expectations were entertained, seem to have all rapidly vanished away ; with the exception, as I was saying, of that small part of them which existed in yourland.And this third part has never to this day ceased warring against the two others ; whereas, if the original idea had been carried out, and they had agreed to be one, their power would have been invincible in war.
Meg. No doubt.
Ath. But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy ? Here is a subject well worthy of consideration.
Meg. Certainly, no one will ever find more striking instances of laws or governments being the salvation or destruction of great and noble interests, than are here presented to his view.
Ath. Then now we seem to have happily arrived at a real and important question.
Meg. Very true.
Ath. Did you never remark, sage friend, that all men, and we ourselves at this moment, often fancy that they see some beautiful thing which might have effected wonders if any one had only known how to make a right use of it in some way ; and yet this mode of looking at things may turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature, either in our own case or in any other ?
Meg. To what are you referring, and what do you mean ?
Ath. I was thinking of my own admiration of the aforesaid Heracleid expedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful results for the Hellenes, if only rightly used ; and I was just laughing at myself.
Meg. But were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we in assenting to you ?
Ath. Perhaps ; and yet I cannot help observing that any one who sees anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that — ”If the owner only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy would he be, and what great results would he achieve !”
Meg. And would he not be justified ?
Ath. Reflect ; in what point of view does this sort of praise appear just : First, in reference to the question in hand : — If the then commanders had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they have attained success ? Would not this have been the way ? They would have bound them all firmly together and preserved them for ever, giving them freedom and dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing in the whole world, Hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their descendants desired. What other aim would they have had ?
Meg. Very good.
Ath. Suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the greater and chief part of what he desires.
Meg. He would.
Ath. Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind ?
Meg. What is it ?
Ath. The desire which a man has, that all things, if possible — at any rate, things human — may come to pass in accordance with his soul’s desire.
Meg. Certainly.
Ath. And having this desire always, and at every time of life, in youth, in manhood, in age, he cannot help always praying for the fulfilment of it.
Meg. No doubt.
Ath. And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them what they ask for themselves.
Meg. We do.
Ath. Dear is the son to the father — the younger to the elder.
Meg. Of course.
Ath. And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father prays that he may not obtain.
Meg. When the son is young and foolish, you mean ?
Ath. Yes ; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, under the influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursed the unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of right and justice, will join in his father’s prayers ?
Meg. I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in a hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at variance with his reason. But every state and every individual ought to pray and strive for wisdom.
Ath. Yes ; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said at first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view to wisdom ; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all with a view to war. And to this I replied that there were four virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of legislation ; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the leader of all the rest — I mean wisdom and mind and opinion, having affection and desire in their train. And now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full of danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you should ; and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not cowardice was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of their subjects ; but their misfortunes were due to their general degeneracy, and especially to their ignorance of the most important human affairs. That was then, and is still, and always will be the case, as I will endeavour, if you will allow me, to make out and demonstrate as well as I am able to you who are my friends, in the course of the argument.
Cle. Pray go on, Stranger ; — compliments are troublesome, but we will show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words, for we will give them our best attention ; and that is the way in which a freeman best shows his approval or disapproval.
Meg. Excellent, Cleinias ; let us do as you say.
Cle. By all means, if Heaven wills. Go on.
Ath. Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, I say that the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that now, as then, ignorance is ruin. And if this be true, the legislator must endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the utmost of his power.
Cle. That is evident.
Ath. Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what I am about to say ; for my opinion is —
Cle. What ?
Ath. That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst ignorance ; and also the greatest, because affecting the great mass of the human soul ; for the principle which feels pleasure and pain in the individual is like the mass or populace in a state. And when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are her natural lords, that I call folly, just as in the state, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws ; or, again, in the individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term the worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. You will understand, Stranger, that I am speaking of something which is very different from the ignorance of handicraftsmen.
Cle. Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.
Ath. Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of authority entrusted to him : he must be stigmatized as ignorant, even though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity ; and the opposite are to be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know neither how to read nor how to swim ; and to them, as to men of sense, authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony ? There is none ; but the noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom ; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason ; whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the very opposite of a saviour of the state : he is utterly ignorant of political wisdom. Let this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us.
Cle. Let it be so laid down.
Ath. I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states ?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in cities, whether great or small ; and similarly in families ? What are they, and how many in number ? Is there not one claim of authority which is always just — that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors to rule over their offspring ?
Cle. There is.
Ath. Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the ignoble ; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey ?
Cle. To be sure.
Ath. And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters rule ?
Cle. Of course.
Ath. Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled ?
Cle. That is a rule not to be disobeyed.
Ath. Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures, and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once said ; and the sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the wise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey ; and yet, O thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply him, this surely is not contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion.
Cle. Most true.
Ath. There is a seventh kind of rule which is awarded by lot, and is dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune : he on whom the lot falls is a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the subject ; and this we affirm to be quite just.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. “Then now,” as we say playfully to any of those who lightly undertake the making of laws, “you see, legislator, the principles of government, how many they are, and that they are naturally opposed to each other. There we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to which you must attend. And, first, we will ask you to consider with us, how and in what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated these our maxims, and ruined themselves and the great and famous Hellenic power of the olden time. Was it because they did not know how wisely Hesiod spoke when he said that the half is often more than the whole ? His meaning was, that when to take the whole would be dangerous, and to take the half would be the safe and moderate course, then the moderate or better was more than the immoderate or worse.”
Cle. Very true.
Ath. And may we suppose this immoderate spirit to be more fatal when found among kings than when among peoples ?
Cle. The probability is that ignorance will be a disorder especially prevalent among kings, because they lead a proud and luxurious life.
Ath. Is it not palpable that the chief aim of the kings of that time was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in harmony with the principles which they had agreed to observe by word and oath ? This want of harmony may have had the appearance of wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire by dissonance and harsh discord.
Cle. Very likely.
Ath. Good ; and what measures ought the legislator to have then taken in order to avert this calamity ? Truly there is no great wisdom in knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil has happened ; but to have foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a much wiser head than ours.
Meg. What do you mean ?
Ath. Any one who looks at what has occurred with you Lacedaemonians, Megillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have been done at that time.
Meg. Speak a little more clearly.
Ath. Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I am about to make.
Meg. What is it ?
Ath. That if any one gives too great a power to anything, too large a sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the mind, and does not observe the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess runs in the one case to disorders, and in the other to injustice, which is the child of excess. I mean to say, my dear friends, that there is no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power — no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends : when this happens, his kingdom is undermined, and all his power vanishes from him. And great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger. As far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows : —
Meg. What ?
Ath. A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one ; and thus brought you more within the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power, observing that the constitution of your government was still feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age, making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in the most important matters. But your third saviour, perceiving that your government was still swelling and foaming, and desirous to impose a curb upon it, instituted the Ephors, whose power he made to resemble that of magistrates elected by lot ; and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved, and was the means of preserving all the rest. Since, if there had been only the original legislators, Temenus, Cresphontes, and their contemporaries, as far as they were concerned not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been preserved ; for they had no proper experience in legislation, or they would surely not have imagined that oaths would moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which might be converted into a tyranny. Now that God has instructed us what sort of government would have been or will be lasting, there is no wisdom, as I have already said, in judging after the event ; there is no difficulty in learning from an example which has already occurred. But if any one could have foreseen all this at the time, and had been able to moderate the government of the three kingdoms and unite them into one, he might have saved all the excellent institutions which were then conceived ; and no Persian or any other armament would have dared to attack us, or would have regarded Hellas as a power to be despised.
Cle. True.
Ath. There was small credit to us, Cleinias, in defeating them ; and the discredit was, not that the conquerors did not win glorious victories both by land and sea, but what, in my opinion, brought discredit was, first of all, the circumstance that of the three cities one only fought on behalf of Hellas, and the two others were so utterly good for nothing that the one was waging a mighty war against Lacedaemon, and was thus preventing her from rendering assistance, while the city of Argos, which had the precedence at the time of the distribution, when asked to aid in repelling the barbarian, would not answer to the call, or give aid. Many things might be told about Hellas in connection with that war which are far from honourable ; nor, indeed, can we rightly say that Hellas repelled the invader ; for the truth is, that unless the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, acting in concert, had warded off the impending yoke, all the tribes of Hellas would have been fused in a chaos of Hellenes mingling with one another, of barbarians mingling with Hellenes, and Hellenes with barbarians ; just as nations who are now subject to the Persian power, owing to unnatural separations and combinations of them, are dispersed and scattered, and live miserably. These, Cleinias and Megillus, are the reproaches which we have to make against statesmen and legislators, as they are called, past and present, if we would analyse the causes of their failure, and find out what else might have been done. We said, for instance, just now, that there ought to be no great and unmixed powers ; and this was under the idea that a state ought to be free and wise and harmonious, and that a legislator ought to legislate with a view to this end. Nor is there any reason to be surprised at our continually proposing aims for the legislator which appear not to be always the same ; but we should consider when we say that temperance is to be the aim, or wisdom is to be the aim, or friendship is to be the aim, that all these aims are really the same ; and if so, a variety in the modes of expression ought not to disturb us.