Cle. What makes you say, Stranger, that a theft is all one, whether the thief may have taken much or little, and either from sacred or secular places — and these are not the only differences in thefts : — seeing, then, that they are of many kinds, ought not the legislator to adapt himself to them, and impose upon them entirely different penalties ?
Ath. Excellent. I was running on too fast, Cleinias, and you impinged upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what, indeed, had occurred to mind already, that legislation was never yet rightly worked out, as I may say in passing. — Do you remember the image in which I likened the men for whom laws are now made to slaves who are doctored by slaves ? For of this you may be very sure, that if one of those empirical physicians, who practise medicine without science, were to come upon the gentleman physician talking to his gentleman patient, and using the language almost of philosophy, beginning at the beginning of the disease and discoursing about the whole nature of the body, he would burst into a hearty laugh — he would say what most of those who are called doctors always have at their tongue’s end : — Foolish fellow, he would say, you are not healing the sick man, but you are educating him ; and he does not want to be made a doctor, but to get well.
Cle. And would he not be right ?
Ath. Perhaps he would ; and he might remark upon us that he who discourses about laws, as we are now doing, is giving the citizens education and not laws ; that would be rather a telling observation.
Cle. Very true.
Ath. But we are fortunate.
Cle. In what way ?
Ath. Inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take into consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is best and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into execution ; and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose what is best, or, if we prefer, what is most necessary — which shall we do ?
Cle. There is something ridiculous, Stranger, in our proposing such an alternative as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as I may by grace of Heaven affirm, like, gatherers of stones or beginners of some composite work, may gather a heap of materials, and out of this, at our leisure, select what is suitable for our projected construction. Let us then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building, but rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly putting them together. And we may truly say that some of our laws, like stones, are already fixed in their places, and others lie at hand.
Ath. Certainly, in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will be more in accordance with nature. For there is another matter affecting legislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.
Cle. What is it ?
Ath. There are many writings to be found in cities, and among them there, are composed by legislators as well as by other persons.
Cle. To be sure.
Ath. Shall we give heed rather to the writings of those others — poets and the like, who either in metre or out of metre have recorded their advice about the conduct of life, and not to the writings of legislators ? or shall we give heed to them above all ?
Cle. Yes ; to them far above all others.
Ath. And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his opinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not to teach what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be happy ?
Cle. Certainly not.
Ath. And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the pursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and others who were legislators as well as writers ? Is it not true that of all the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the best ? and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, be deemed ridiculous ? We should consider whether the laws of states ought not to have the character of loving and wise parents, rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways ; and whether, in discoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable — at any rate, we will show our readiness to entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result. And may the result be good, and if God be gracious, it will be good !
Cle. Excellent ; let us do as you say.
Ath. Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offences in general ; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation, we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some others ; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us, if you please, consider these matters.
Cle. By all means.
Ath. Concerning all things honourable and just, let us then endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how far we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we should profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves.
Cle. What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us ?
Ath. I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this.
Cle. They would be quite right.
Ath. Perhaps ; but let us consider further, that if all things which are just are fair and honourable, in the term “all” we must include just sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.
Cle. And what is the inference ?
Ath. The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the argument is consistently carried out ?
Cle. True.
Ath. But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable, and the term “dishonourable” is applied to justice, will not the just and the honourable disagree ?
Cle. What do you mean ?
Ath. A thing not difficult to understand ; the laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying.
Cle. To what ?
Ath. We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature. But we stopped short, because we saw that these sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at once, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings. And if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition ?
Cle. Such appears to be the case.
Ath. In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.
Cle. Very true, Stranger.
Ath. Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are consistent about these matters.
Cle. Consistent in what ?
Ath. I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion, but if I did not, let me now state —
Cle. What ?
Ath. That all bad men are always involuntarily bad ; and from this must proceed to draw a further inference.
Cle. What is it ?
Ath. That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction ; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily. I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me — Well, Stranger, if all this be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes — shall we legislate or not — what do you advise ? Certainly we will, I should reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary ? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime ?
Cle. Very good, Stranger ; and what shall we say in answer to these objections ?
Ath. That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us —
Cle. Do what ?
Ath. Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another ? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions have been distinguished — the one, voluntary, the other, involuntary ; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself ? How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation ? Impossible. Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.
Cle. I agree with you, Stranger ; for one of two things is certain : either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement.
Ath. Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable — not to speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other distinction between them.
Cle. Very true, Stranger ; there cannot be two opinions among us upon that point.
Ath. Reflect, then ; there are hurts of various kinds done by the citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are injuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds — one, voluntary, and the other, involuntary ; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite as many and as great as the voluntary ? And please to consider whether I am right or quite wrong in what I am going to say ; for I deny, Cleinias and Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea that I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all ; and, on the other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred, the author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O my friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be described either as just or unjust ; but the legislator has to consider whether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle and intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his eye ; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the hurt good by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that which is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when compensation has been given for injustice, the law must always seek to win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity to those of friendship.
Cle. Very good.
Ath. Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the injustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul ; and the cure of injustice will take the following direction.
Cle. What direction ?
Ath. When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree ; and he must in addition pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained by word or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges, by means of fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just — this is quite the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees any one who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty. He knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in the continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to the rest of mankind if they would take their departure, inasmuch as they would be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve the city of bad citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only, the legislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences.
Cle. What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but will you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference between hurt and injustice, and the various complications of the voluntary and involuntary which enter into them ?
Ath. I will endeavour to do as you wish : — Concerning the soul, thus much would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature is passion, which may be described either as a state or a part of her, and is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational force overturns many things.
Cle. Very true.
Ath. And pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite power, working her will by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all things.
Cle. Quite true.
Ath. A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes. Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into two sorts : there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter offences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of wisdom ; and he who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he knows all about matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of ignorance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous times, but when attended with weakness, will only result in the errors of children and old men ; and these he will treat as errors, and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them, which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws.
Cle. You are perfectly right.
Ath. We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure and passion, and of another that he is inferior to them ; and this is true.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is superior and another inferior to ignorance.
Cle. Very true.
Ath. We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment of their will ; although an individual may be often drawn by them in opposite directions at the same time.
Cle. Yes, often.
Ath. And now I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them : — When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do any harm or not — I call all this injustice. But when the opinion of the best, in whatever part of human nature states or individuals may suppose that to dwell, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, the principle in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called just ; although the hurt done by mistake is thought by many to be involuntary injustice. Leaving the question of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having already delineated three sources of error, we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our memory : — One of them was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear.
Cle. Quite right.
Ath. There was a second consisting of pleasures and desires, and a third of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best. The latter being subdivided into three, we now get five sources of actions ; and for these five we will make laws of two kinds.
Cle. What are the two kinds ?
Ath. There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light of day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with secret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit ; the laws concerning these last ought to have a character of severity.
Cle. Naturally.
Ath. And now let us return from this digression and complete the work of legislation. Laws have been already enacted by us concerning the robbers of the Gods, and concerning traitors, and also concerning those who corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government. A man may very likely commit some of these crimes, either in a state of madness or when affected by disease, or under the influence of extreme old age, or in a fit of childish wantonness, himself no better than a child. And if this be made evident to the judges elected to try the cause, on the appeal of the criminal or his advocate, and he be judged to have been in this state when he committed the offence, he shall simply pay for the hurt which he may have done to another ; but he shall be exempt from other penalties, unless he have slain some one, and have on his hands the stain of blood. And in that case he shall go to another land and country, and there dwell for a year ; and if he return before the expiration of the time which the law appoints, or even set his foot at all on his native land, he shall be bound by the guardians of the law in the public prison for two years, and then go free.