Soc. Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together into the nature of virtue ?
Men. By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in some other way ?
Soc. Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained “what it is.” But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself, — such being your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question “Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,” to be argued upon hypothesis ? As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle, will reply : “I cannot tell you as yet ; but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion : If the figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it, the given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part produced, then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other ; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle” : — that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or not taught, under a hypothesis : as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not ? Let the first hypothesis be — that virtue is or is not knowledge, — in that case will it be taught or not ? or, as we were just now saying, “remembered” ? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not ? or rather, does not everyone see that knowledge alone is taught ?
Men. I agree.
Soc. Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught ?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. Then now we have made a quick end of this question : if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught ; and if not, not ?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species ?
Men. Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order.
Soc. Do we not say that virtue is a good ? — This is a hypothesis which is not set aside.
Men. Certainly.
Soc. Now, if there be any sort-of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good ; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in think in that virtue is knowledge ?
Men. True.
Soc. And virtue makes us good ?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And if we are good, then we are profitable ; for all good things are profitable ?
Men. Yes.
Soc. Then virtue is profitable ?
Men. That is the only inference.
Soc. Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth — these, and the like of these, we call profitable ?
Men. True.
Soc. And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm : would you not think so ?
Men. Yes.