Soc. And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse ? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used ?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. Next, let us consider the goods of the soul : they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like ?
Men. Surely.
Soc. And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful ; as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence ? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited ?
Men. True.
Soc. And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension ; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful ?
Men. Very true.
Soc. And in general, all that the attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness ; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite ?
Men. That appears to be true.
Soc. If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly ; and therefore and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence ?
Men. I quite agree.
Soc. And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly ; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly ?
Men. True.
Soc. And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly.
Men. Yes.
Soc. And is not this universally true of human nature ? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good ; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits — and virtue, as we say, is profitable ?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom ?
Men. I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.
Soc. But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good ?
Men. I think not.
Soc. If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men ; and on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might tamper with them ; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state ?
Men. Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.