Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides ; that is because you are still young ; the time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things ; at your age, you are too much disposed to regard opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names ; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity ; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness ; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty ?
Yes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning.
Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea ? Can there be any other mode of participation ?
There cannot be, he said.
Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many ?
Why not, Parmenides ? said Socrates.
Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself.
Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with itself ; in this way each idea may be one ; and the same in all at the same time.
I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many — is not that your meaning ?
I think so.
And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men ?
The latter.
Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them ?
That seems to follow.
Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one ?
Certainly not, he said.
Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than absolute greatness — is that conceivable ?
No.
Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of equality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of that portion only ?
Impossible.
Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness ; this is but a part of the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater ; if the absolutely small be greater, that to which the part of the small is added will be smaller and not greater than before.
How absurd !
Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes ?
Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.
Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question ?
What question ?
I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind is as follows : — You see a number of great objects, and when you look at them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them all ; hence you conceive of greatness as one.
Very true, said Socrates.
And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and to compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of all these ?
It would seem so.
Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it ; and then another, over and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each idea instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied.
But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides ? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.
And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing ?
Impossible, he said.
The thought must be of something ?
Yes.
Of something which is or which is not ?
Of something which is.
Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature ?
Yes.
And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, be an idea ?
From that, again, there is no escape.
Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and that all things think ; or that they are thoughts but have no thought ?
The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other things are like them, and resemblances of them — what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.
But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea ? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of like.
Impossible.
And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea ?
They must.
And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself ?
Certainly.
Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the idea ; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another ; and new ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it ?
Quite true.
The theory, then that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised ?
It would seem so.
Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute ?
Yes, indeed.