Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis ; let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears.
I shall be very happy to do so.
We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is ?
Yes.
Then we will begin at the beginning : — If one is, can one be, and not partake of being ?
Impossible.
Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the one ; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one ; nor would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one ; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is : — am I not right ?
Quite right.
We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one ?
Of course.
And when we put them together shortly, and say “One is,” that is equivalent to saying, “partakes of being” ?
Quite true.
Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts ?
How so ?
In this way : — If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being, if being is one ; and if being and one are not the same ; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being ?
Certainly.
And is each of these parts — one and being to be simply called a part, or must the word “part” be relative to the word “whole” ?
The latter.
Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part ?
Certainly.
Again, of the parts of the one, if it is — I mean being and one — does either fail to imply the other ? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one ?
Impossible.
Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at the least made up of two parts ; and the same principle goes on for ever, and every part whatever has always these two parts ; for being always involves one, and one being ; so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two.
Certainly.
And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity ?
Clearly.
Let us take another direction.
What direction ?
We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is ?
Yes.
And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many ?
True.
But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it partakes — will this abstract one be one only or many ?
One, I think.
Let us see : — Must not the being of one be other than one ? for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being ?
Certainly.
If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is one that it is other than being ; nor because being is being that it is other than the one ; but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness and difference.
Certainly.
So that the other is not the same either with the one or with being ?
Certainly not.
And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which may be rightly called both.
How so.
In this way — you may speak of being ?
Yes.
And also of one ?
Yes.
Then now we have spoken of either of them ?
Yes.
Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both ?
Certainly.
And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other — in any such case do I not speak of both ?
Yes.
And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two ?
Undoubtedly.
And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one ?
It cannot.
Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one ?
Clearly.
And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three ?
Yes.
And three are odd, and two are even ?
Of course.
And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice ; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three ?
Certainly.
There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two ; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three ?
Of course.
If there are three and twice, there is twice three ; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two ?
Undoubtedly.
Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.
True.
And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be ?
None whatever.
Then if one is, number must also be ?
It must.
But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity of being ; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and partakes also of being : am I not right ?
Certainly.
And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate ?
Yes.
Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it ? And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being ?
In no way.
And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things ; the divisions of it have no limit.
True.
Then it has the greatest number of parts ?
Yes, the greatest number.
Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part ?
Impossible.
But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be none ?
Certainly.
Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it ?
True.
But reflect : — an one in its entirety, be in many places at the same time ?
No ; I see the impossibility of that.
And if not in its entirety, then it is divided ; for it cannot be present with all the parts of being, unless divided.
True.
And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are ?
Certainly.
Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than the one, into parts equal to the one ; the one is never wanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and coextensive.
Certainly that is true.
The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite ?
True.
Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many ?
Certainly.
Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited ; for are not the parts contained the whole ?
Certainly.
And that which contains, is a limit ?
Of course.
Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number ?
Clearly.
And because having limits, also having extremes ?
Certainly.
And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three ? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole ?
No.
Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.
It will.
But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes ; or it would not be in the middle ?
Yes.
Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two ?
True.
And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.
How ?
Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.
True.
And all the parts are contained by the whole ?
Yes.
And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all ?
No.
And the one is the whole ?
Of course.
But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained by the one ; and thus the one will be in itself.
That is true.
But then, again, the whole is not in the parts — neither in all the parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one ; for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts ; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all ?
It cannot.
Nor can the whole be in some of the parts ; for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.
Yes, impossible.
But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all ?
Certainly.
If it were nowhere, it would be nothing ; but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.
Very true.
The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all its parts, is in itself ; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and also in another.
Certainly.
The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion ?
How ?
The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.
True.
And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest ?
Certainly.
Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be in the same ; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest, in motion ?
True.
Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion ?
Clearly.
And must be the same with itself, and other than itself ; and also the same with the others, and other than the others ; this follows from its previous affections.
How so ?
Every thing in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other ; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.
Clearly.
And is the one a part of itself ?
Certainly not.
Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself as whole to part ?
It cannot.
But is the one other than one ?
No.
And therefore not other than itself ?
Certainly not.
If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself ?
Certainly.
But then, again, a thing which is in another place from “itself,” if this “itself” remains in the same place with itself, must be other than “itself,” for it will be in another place ?
True.
Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another ?
Yes.
Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself ?
True.
Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other ?
Certainly.
And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not-one ?
Of course.
Then the one will be other than the others ?
True.
But, consider : — Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another ?
Of course.
Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same ?
They will not.
If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time ; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the game. Is not that true ?
Yes. And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is.
True.
Then the other will never be either in the not one, or in the one ?
Certainly not.
Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one.
No.
Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.
How can they be ?
But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another ?
They will.
Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one ; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.
True.
Nor can the not-one be number ; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all.
It would not.
Again, is the not-one part of the one ; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one ?
It would.
If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one ?
No.
But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another : — so we said ?
Yes.
Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it ?
Let us say so.
Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others.
That appears to be the inference. And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others ?
Perhaps.
Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one.
Yes.
And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less ?
True.
And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree ?
Yes.
In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one.
How do you mean ?
I may take as an illustration the case of names : You give a name to a thing ?
Yes.
And you may say the name once or oftener ?
Yes.
And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name ? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention ? or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once ?
Of course it is the same.
And is not “other” a name given to a thing ?
Certainly.
Whenever, then, you use the word “other,” whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name ?
True.
Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, in repeating the word “other” we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other ?
Quite true.
Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, in that the word “other” is applied to both, will be in the same condition ; and that which is in the same condition is like ?
Yes.
Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every thing.
True.
Again, the like is opposed to the unlike ?
Yes.
And the other to the same ?
True again.
And the one was also shown to be the same with the others ?
Yes.
And to be, the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others ?
Certainly.
And in that it was other it was shown to be like ?
Yes.
But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it and this was the affection of otherness.
Yes.
The same then will make it unlike ; otherwise it will not be the opposite of the other.
True.
Then the one will be both like and unlike the others ; like in so far as it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.
Yes, that argument may be used.
And there is another argument.
What ?
In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like ; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.
True.
Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like and unlike the others ?
Certainly.
And in the same way as being other than itself, and the same with itself on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike itself.
Of course.
Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others ? — Consider.
I am considering.
The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole ?
True.
And also in other things ?
Yes.
In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and would touch itself only.
Clearly.
Then the inference is that it would touch both ?
It would.
But what do you say to a new point of view ? Must not that which is to touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated ?
True.
Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is ?
It ought.
And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at once, and this, while it is one, will never happen.
No.
Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two ?
It cannot.
Neither can it touch others.
Why not ?
The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be between them.
True.
Two things, then, at the least ate necessary to make contact possible ?
They are.
And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two ?
Yes.
And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms ; the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner ; and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added to the contacts.
True.
Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one less.
True.
But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact ?
How can there be ?
And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one ?
True.
Then they have no number, if they have no one in them ?
Of course not.
Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number ?
No.
One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist ?
Clearly not.
And if there are not two, there is no contact ?
There is not.
Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact ?
Certainly not.
For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others ?
True.
Further is the one equal and unequal to itself and others ?
How do you mean ?
If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in virtue of their being the one and the others ; but, if in addition to their being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another, or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had greatness and the others smallness — whichever kind had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller ?
Certainly.
Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness ; for if they were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which is.
How could they ?
If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole ?
Certainly.
Suppose the first ; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one ?
Clearly.
If it be co-extensive with the one it will be coequal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one ?
Of course.
But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions ?
Impossible.
Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only ?
Yes.
And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will recur ; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.
Certainly.
Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part ; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.
True.
Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely, that in which greatness is ; and this too when the small itself is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed ; this, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.
True.
But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.
Very true.
Then other things not greater or less than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness ; nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to one another ; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it has neither greatness nor smallness.
Clearly not.
Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them ?
Certainly not.
And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality ; and being on an equality, must be equal.
Of course.
And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself ; having neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.
Certainly.
Then the one will be equal to both itself and the others ?
Clearly so.
And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without itself ; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself ; and, as contained in itself, will be less ; and will thus be greater and less than itself.
It will.
Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others ?
Of course not.
But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere ?
Yes.
But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be greater ; in no other way can one thing be in another.
True.
And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere ?
That is clear.
But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others, because it is contained in them ; and inasmuch as the others are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.
True.
The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others ?
Clearly.
And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of measures, also of parts ?
Of course.
And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others ?
How is that ?
It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as many parts as measures ; and so with that to which it is equal, and that than which it is less.
True.
And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself ; and if of measures then also of parts ?
It will.
And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself ; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself ?
Certainly.
And the same will hold of its relation to other things ; inasmuch as it is greater than them, it will be more in number than them ; and inasmuch as it is smaller, it will be less in number ; and inasmuch as it is equal in size to other things, it will be equal to them in number.
Certainly.
Once more then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things.
It will.
Does the one also partake of time ? And is it and does it become older and younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, by virtue of participation in time ?
How do you mean ?
If one is, being must be predicated of it ?
Yes.
But to be (einai) is only participation of being in present time, and to have been is the participation of being at a past time, and to be about to be is the participation of being at a future time ?
Very true.
Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time ?
Certainly.
And is not time always moving forward ?
Yes.
Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward in time ?
Certainly.
And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger ?
I remember.
Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time ?
Certainly.
Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself ?
Yes.
And it is older (is it not ?) when in becoming, it gets to the point of time. between “was” and “will be,” which is “now” : for surely in going from the past to the future, it cannot skip the present ?
No.
And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be reached by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to touch both the present and the future, letting go the present and seizing the future, while in process of becoming between them.
True.
But that which is becoming cannot skip the present ; when it reaches the present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming.
Clearly.
And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become, and is then older.
Certainly.
And it is older than that than which it was becoming older, and it was becoming older than itself.
Yes.
And that which is older is older than that which is younger ?
True.
Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present ?
Certainly.
But the present is always present with the one during all its being ; for whenever it is it is always now.
Certainly.
Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself ?
Truly.
And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself ?
An equal time.
But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same age with itself ?
Of course.
And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger ?
No.
The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself ?
I should say not.
And what are its relations to other things ? Is it or does it become older or younger than they ?
I cannot tell you.
You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the one-other would have been one, but the others have multitude, and are more than one ?
They will have multitude.
And a multitude implies a number larger than one ?
Of course.
And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence ?
The lesser.
Then the least is the first ? And that is the one ?
Yes.
Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into being ; but all other things have also number, being plural and not singular.
They have.
And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into being prior to the others, and the others later ; and the things which came into being later, are younger than that which preceded them ? And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things ?
True.
What would you say of another question ? Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible ?
Impossible.
And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts ; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end ?
Yes.
And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into being first of all ; and after the beginning, the others follow, until you reach the end ?
Certainly.
And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one ?
Yes ; that is what we shall say.
But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into being with the last ; and, since the one cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.
Clearly.
Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.
That also is clear in my judgment.
Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one ?
Certainly.
And will not the one come into being together with each part — together with the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is added to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole ; it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on ?
True.
Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous ; and according to this argument the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.
Certainly.
After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older. nor younger, what shall we say ? Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise ?
I cannot answer.
But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger than another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it was at first ; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.
Of course. Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is, since the difference of age is always the same ; the one is and has become older and the other younger ; but they are no longer becoming so.
True.
And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than the others which are
No.
But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way.
In what way ?
Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.
And what of that ?
If the one is older than the others, has come into being a longer time than the others.
Yes.
But consider again ; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion than before ?
By a smaller portion.
Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age ?
Yes.
And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was older ?
Yes, younger.
And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than they were before, in relation to the one.
Certainly.
Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which previously had become and was older ; it never really is older, but is always becoming, for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger ; for as they are always going in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another, the younger older than the older and the older younger than the younger. They cannot, however have become ; for if they had already become they would be and not merely become. But that is impossible ; for they are always becoming both older and younger than one another : the one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others become older than the one because they came into being later ; and in the same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were seen to be older, and prior to the one.
That is clear.
Inasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than another, in that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the other than the one ; but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion — in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the one, and the one than the others.
Certainly.
For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or the others.
Certainly.
But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future ?
Of course it must.
Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become ?
Certainly.
And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it ?
True.
And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it ?
Quite right.
Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other : things appertains to the one.
Certainly, that is true.