What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge ? — is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, a hinderer or a helper ? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them ? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses ? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses ? — for you will allow that they are the best of them ?
Certainly, he replied.
Then when does the soul attain truth ? — for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.
Yes, that is true.
Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all ?
Yes.
And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her — neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure — when she has as little as possible to do with the body, and has no bodily sense or feeling, but is aspiring after being ?
That is true.
And in this the philosopher dishonors the body ; his soul runs away from the body and desires to be alone and by herself ?
That is true.
Well, but there is another thing, Simmias : Is there or is there not an absolute justice ?
Assuredly there is.
And an absolute beauty and absolute good ?
Of course.
But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes ?
Certainly not.
Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense ? (and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything). Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs ? or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of that which he considers ?
Certainly.
And he attains to the knowledge of them in their highest purity who goes to each of them with the mind alone, not allowing when in the act of thought the intrusion or introduction of sight or any other sense in the company of reason, but with the very light of the mind in her clearness penetrates into the very fight of truth in each ; he has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of the whole body, which he conceives of only as a disturbing element, hindering the soul from the acquisition of knowledge when in company with her — is not this the sort of man who, if ever man did, is likely to attain the knowledge of existence ?
There is admirable truth in that, Socrates, replied Simmias.