But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals ? and what is the impression produced by them ? Are they equals in the same sense as absolute equality ? or do they fall short of this in a measure ?
Yes, he said, in a very great measure, too.
And must we not allow that when I or anyone look at any object, and perceive that the object aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot attain to it — he who makes this observation must have had previous knowledge of that to which, as he says, the other, although similar, was inferior ?
Certainly.
And has not this been our case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality ?
Precisely.
Then we must have known absolute equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals aim at this absolute equality, but fall short of it ?
That is true.
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other sense. And this I would affirm of all such conceptions.
Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.
And from the senses, then, is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an idea of equality of which they fall short — is not that true ?
Yes.
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that the equals which are derived from the senses — for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short ?
That, Socrates, is certainly to be inferred from the previous statements.
And did we not see and hear and acquire our other senses as soon as we were born ?
Certainly.
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of the ideal equal at some time previous to this ?
Yes.
That is to say, before we were born, I suppose ?
True.
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas ; for we are not speaking only of equality absolute, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, when we ask and answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth ?
That is true.
But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten that which we acquired, then we must always have been born with knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts — for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge ?
Quite true, Socrates.
But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered that which we previously knew, will not that which we call learning be a process of recovering our knowledge, and may not this be rightly termed recollection by us ?
Very true.
For this is clear, that when we perceived something, either by the help of sight or hearing, or some other sense, there was no difficulty in receiving from this a conception of some other thing like or unlike which had been forgotten and which was associated with this ; and therefore, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows : either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life ; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is recollection only.
Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.
And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer ? Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we remember afterwards the things which we knew previously to our birth ?
I cannot decide at the moment.
At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge ought or ought not to be able to give a reason for what he knows.
Certainly, he ought.
But do you think that every man is able to give a reason about these very matters of which we are speaking ?
I wish that they could, Socrates, but I greatly fear that to-morrow at this time there will be no one able to give a reason worth having.
Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things ?
Certainly not.
Then they are in process of recollecting that which they learned before.
Certainly.
But when did our souls acquire this knowledge ? — not since we were born as men ?
Certainly not.
And therefore previously ?
Yes.
Then, Simmias, our souls must have existed before they were in the form of man — without bodies, and must have had intelligence.
Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions were given us at the moment of birth ; for this is the only time that remains.
Yes, my friend, but when did we lose them ? for they are not in us when we are born — that is admitted. Did we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or at some other time ?
No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.
Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and essence in general, and to this, which is now discovered to be a previous condition of our being, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them — assuming this to have a prior existence, then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument ? There can be no doubt that if these absolute ideas existed before we were born, then our souls must have existed before we were born, and if not the ideas, then not the souls.
Yes, Socrates ; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the existence of the soul before birth, and of the essence of which you are speaking : and the argument arrives at a result which happily agrees with my own notion. For there is nothing which to my mind is so evident as that beauty, goodness, and other notions of which you were just now speaking have a most real and absolute existence ; and I am satisfied with the proof.