Pro. Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of pleasures.
Soe. You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain ?
Pro. Exactly.
Soc. There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul ; while there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains.
Pro. How is that ?
Soc. Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a man experiences two opposite feelings ; for example, when he is cold and is growing warm, or again ; when he is hot and is becoming cool, and he wants to have the one and be rid of the other ; — the sweet has a bitter, as the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and create irritation and in time drive him to distraction.
Pro. That description is very true to nature.
Soc. And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates ?
Pro. True.
Soc. Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the parts affected ; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or pain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts ; and this is due to the forcible separation of what is united, or to the union of what is separated, and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain.
Pro. Quite so.
Soc. Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle irritation ; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an excitement in him, — he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations.
Pro. Yes, indeed.
Soc. He will say of himself, and others will of him, that he is dying with these delights ; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way ; of all pleasures he declares them to be the greatest ; and he reckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind.
Pro. That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of the majority about pleasures.
Soc. Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body ; there are also cases in which the mind contributes an, opposite element to the body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and form one mixture. Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a man is empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. But now I must further add what I omitted before, that in all these and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one.
Pro. I believe that to be quite true.
Soc. There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and pains.
Pro. What is that ?
Soc. The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences of purely mental feelings.
Pro. What do you mean ?
Soc. Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only ?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful pleasures ? need I remind you of the anger
Which stirs even a wise man to violence,
And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb ? And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and bereavement ?
Pro. Yes, there is a natural connection between them.
Soc. And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their tear ?
Pro. Certainly I do.
Soc. And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure ?
Pro. I do not quite understand you.
Soc. I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy.
Pro. There is, I think.
Soc. And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable the examination of it because the difficulty in detecting other cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less.
Pro. Proceed.
Soc. I have just mentioned envy ; would you not call that a pain of the soul ?
Pro. Yes
Soc. And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbours at which he is pleased ?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil ?
Pro. To be sure.
Soc. From these considerations learn to know the nature of the ridiculous.
Pro. Explain.
Soc. The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to describe the vicious form of a certain habit ; and of vice in general it is that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at DelPhi.
Pro. You mean, Socrates, “Know thyself.”
Soc. I do ; and the opposite would be, “Know not thyself.”
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three.
Pro. Indeed I am afraid that I cannot.
Soc. Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you ?
Pro. Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will.
Soc. Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown ?
Pro. What are they ?
Soc. In the first place, about money ; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he is.
Pro. Yes, that is a very common error.
Soc. And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really has not.
Pro. Of course.
Soc. And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind ; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are.
Pro. Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion.
Soc. And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom ?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And may not all this be truly called an evil condition ?
Pro. Very evil.
Soc But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure and pain.
Pro. How can we make the further division which you suggest ?
Soc. All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two classes — one having power and might ; and the other the reverse.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Let this, then, be the principle of division ; those of them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable ; for ignorance in the powerul is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous.
Pro. That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and pains.
Soc. Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy.
Pro. Proceed.
Soc. Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain ?
Pro. Most true.
Soc. There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies ?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends’ misfortunes — is not that wrong ?
Pro. Undoubtedly.
Soc. Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil ?
Pro. True.
Soc. And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated — the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful : May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous ?
Pro. They are ridiculous.
Soc. And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune ?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it ?
Pro. Clearly we feel pleasure.
Soc. And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends ?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant ; and so we envy and laugh at the same instant.
Pro. True.
Soc. And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, but on the greater stage of human life ; and so in endless other cases.
Pro. I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion.
Soc. I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the two elements so often named ; did I not ?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger.
Pro. I see.
Soc. Then many other cases still remain ?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in comedy ? Why but to convince you that there was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar affections ; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains ; and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart ; or will you keep me here until midnight ? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words ; — if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which Philebus demands.
Pro. Very good, Socrates ; in what remains take your own course.
Soc. Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn ; this is the natural and necessary order.
Pro. Excellent.
Soc. These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate ; for with the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and mind.
Pro. Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving to be true ?
Soc. True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of of those which arise from smells ; those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain.
Pro. Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean.
Soc. My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning ; but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles ; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures ; now do you understand my meaning ?
Pro. I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will try to make your meaning dearer.
Soc. When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.
Pro. Yes, there are such pleasures.
Soc. The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they have no necessary admixture of pain ; and all pleasures, however and wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.
Pro. I understand.
Soc. To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them.
Pro. And this is the case.
Soc. Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, are there not pains of forgetting ?
Pro. Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.
Soc. Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.
Pro. In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain.
Soc. These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain ; and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.
Pro. Quite true.
Soc. And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have measure ; the great, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and soul alike ; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure.
Pro. Quite right, Socrates.
Soc. Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures.
Pro. What is it ?
Soc. When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth ?
Pro. Why do you ask, Socrates ?
Soc. Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and by all of us.
Pro. Most true.
Soc. Let us investigate all the pure kinds ; first selecting for consideration a single instance.
Pro. What instance shall we select ?
Soc. Suppose that we first of all take whiteness.
Pro. Very good.
Soc. How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity ? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours ?
Pro. Clearly that which is most unadulterated.
Soc. True, Protarchus ; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful ?
Pro. Right.
Soc. And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.
Pro. Perfectly right.
Soc. There is no need of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about pleasures ; one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure or unalloyed with pain. is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.
Pro. Assuredly ; and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.