Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going ? and what will he make of you ? If, for example, you had thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to give him your money, and some one had said to you : You are paying money to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates ; tell me, what is he that you give him money ? how would you have answered ?
I should say, he replied, that I gave money to him as a physician.
And what will he make of you ?
A physician, he said.
And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the Athenian, and were intending to give them money, and some one had asked you : What are Polycleitus and Pheidias ? and why do you give them this money ? — how would you have answered ?
I should have answered, that they were statuaries.
And what will they make of you ?
A statuary, of course.
Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to pay him money on your behalf. If our own means are sufficient, and we can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad ; but if not, then we are to spend the money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to us : Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and why are you going to pay him money, — how should we answer ? I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet ; but what appellation is given to Protagoras ? how is he designated ?
They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied.
Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist ?
Certainly.
But suppose a person were to ask this further question : And how about yourself ? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him ?
He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to dawn, so that I could see him) : Unless this differs in some way from the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.
By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist ?
Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am.
But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras is of this nature : may you not learn of him in the same way that you learned the arts of the grammarian, musician, or trainer, not with the view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part of education, and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them ?
Just so, he said ; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the teaching of Protagoras.
I said : I wonder whether you know what you are doing ?
And what am I doing ?
You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is ; and if not, then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and whether the thing to which you commit yourself be good or evil.
I certainly think that I do know, he replied.
Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is ?
I take him to be one who knows wise things, he replied, as his name implies.
And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also : Do not they, too, know wise things ? But suppose a person were to ask us : In what are the painters wise ? We should answer : In what relates to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were further to ask : What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides ? — how should we answer him ?
How should we answer him, Socrates ? What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent ?
Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough ; for in the answer a further question is involved : Of what does the Sophist make a man talk eloquently ? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk eloquently about that which he makes him understand, that is about playing the lyre. Is not that true ?
Yes.
Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent ? Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands ?
Yes, that may be assumed.
And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know ?
Indeed, he said, I cannot tell.
Then I proceeded to say : Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring ? If you were going to commit your body to some one, who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body ? But when the soul is in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all, — about this never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never deliberating or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not ; — you have quite made up your mind that you will at all hazards be a pupil of Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken with him : and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is ; and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping.
When he heard me say this, he replied : No other inference, Socrates, can be drawn from your words.
I proceeded : Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul ? To me that appears to be his nature.
And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul ?
Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul ; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body ; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful : neither do their customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike ; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul ; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one ; but if not, then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink : the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how much, and when ; and then the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry them away in another vessel ; when you have paid for them you must receive them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or greatly benefited ; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with our elders ; for we are still young — too young to determine such a matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras ; and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of others ; for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but there is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and several other wise men.