Protagoras ended, and in my ear
So charming left his voice, that I the while
Thought him still speaking ; still stood fixed to hear. At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at Hippocrates, I said to him : O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither ; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good ; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse ; but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask ; and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them ; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly ; and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer ; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question, which if you will only answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught ; — that I will take upon your authority, and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men ; and several times while you were speaking, justice, and temperance, and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts ; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing : that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.
There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one.
And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face ; or are they like the parts of gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger or smaller ?
I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way ; they are related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole face.
And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue ? Of if a man has one part, must he also have all the others ?
By no means, he said ; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and not wise.
You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue ?
Most undoubtedly they are, he answered ; and wisdom is the noblest of the parts.
And they are all different from one another ? I said.
Yes.
And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face ; — the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions ; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their functions, or in any other way ? I want to know whether the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one another in themselves and in their functions ? For that is clearly what the simile would imply.
Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.
Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness ?
No, he answered.