This proposal was received by the company with universal approval ; Callias said that he would not let me off, and they begged me to choose an arbiter. But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly ; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better ; or if he was equal, neither would that be well ; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him ? And if you say, “Let us have a better then,” — to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him ; not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer ; and I will endeavour to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer : and when I have answered as many questions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner answer me ; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise question asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this will require no special arbiter — all of you shall be arbiters.
This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions ; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows : —
I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal part of education ; and this I conceive to be the power of knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry ; we will speak as before of virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian :
Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good, built four-square in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw. Do you know the poem ? or shall I repeat the whole ?
There is no need, I said ; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the ode — I have made a careful study of it.
Very well, he said. And do you think that the ode is a good composition, and true ?
Yes, I said, both good and true.
But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true ?
No, not in that case, I replied.
And is there not a contradiction ? he asked. Reflect.
Well, my friend, I have reflected.
And does not the poet proceed to say, “I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man : Hardly can a man be good” ? Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet.
I know it.
And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent ?
Yes, I said, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that there might be something in what he said). And you think otherwise ?
Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both ? First of all, premising as his own thought, “Hardly can a man become truly good” ; and then a little further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him, when he says, “Hardly can a man be good,” which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he blames himself ; so that he must be wrong either in his first or his second assertion.
Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first giddy and faint, as if I had received a blow from the hand of an expert boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering ; and to confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when beleaguered by Achilles, summons the Simois to aid him, saying :
Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero. And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application of your philosophy of synonyms, which enables you to distinguish “will” and “wish,” and make other charming distinctions like those which you drew just now. And I should like to know whether you would agree with me ; for I am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of Simonides. And first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your opinion, Prodicus, “being” is the same as “becoming.”
Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus.
Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that “Hardly can a man become truly good” ?
Quite right, said Prodicus.
And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating that which he says himself, but for saying something different from himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man become good, but hardly can a man be good : and our friend Prodicus would maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming ; and if they are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. I dare say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says,
On the one hand, hardly can a man become good,
For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil,
But on the other hand, when you have climbed the height,
Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy.
Prodicus heard and approved ; but Protagoras said : Your correction, Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence which you are correcting.
Alas ! I said, Protagoras ; then I am a sorry physician, and do but aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to cure.
Such is the fact, he said.
How so ? I asked.
The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say that virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all things, can be easily retained.
Well, I said, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at the right moment ; for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine, is more than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides or even older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear to know nothing of this ; but I know, for I am a disciple of his. And now, if I am not mistaken, you do not understand the word “hard” (chalepon) in the sense which Simonides intended ; and I must correct you, as Prodicus corrects me when I use the word “awful” (deinon) as a term of praise. If I say that Protagoras or any one else is an “awfully” wise man, he asks me if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good “awful” ; and then he explains to me that the term “awful” is always taken in a bad sense, and that no one speaks of being “awfully” healthy or wealthy, or “awful” peace, but of “awful” disease, “awful” war, “awful” poverty, meaning by the term “awful,” evil. And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the Ceans, when they spoke of “hard” meant “evil,” or something which you do not understand. Let us ask Prodicus, for he ought to be able to answer questions about the dialect of Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term “hard ?”
Evil, said Prodicus.
And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, “Hard is the good,” just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.
Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning ; and he is twitting Pittacus with ignorance of the use of terms, which in a Lesbian, who has been accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural.
Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying ? And have you an answer for him ?
You are entirely mistaken, Prodicus, said Protagoras ; and I know very well that Simonides in using the word “hard” meant what all of us mean, not evil, but that which is not easy — that which takes a great deal of trouble : of this I am positive.
I said : I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware, but he thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your thesis ; for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly proved by the context, in which he says that God only has this gift. Now he cannot surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards proceeds to say that God only has this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus would impute to Simonides a character of recklessness which is very unlike his countrymen. And I should like to tell you, I said, what I imagine to be the real meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will test what, in your way of speaking, would be called my skill in poetry ; or if you would rather, I will be the listener.
To this proposal Protagoras replied : As you please ; — and Hippias, Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed.