May I employ an illustration ? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring into the health or some other bodily quality of another : — he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better view : — that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you : Uncover your mind to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule, or of command : their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear, — just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view ? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him ?
I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras ; and not only so, but I, above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.
Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind ; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might ? And most persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning.
Yes, Socrates, he replied ; and that is not the only point about which mankind are in error.
Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this affection which they call “being overcome by pleasure,” and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always do what is best. When we say to them : Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not true, they would probably reply : Socrates and Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called “being overcome by pleasure,” pray, what is it, and by what name would you describe it ?
But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them ?
I believe, I said, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think, our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow ; but if not, never mind.
You are quite right, he said ; and I would have you proceed as you have begun.
Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed being overcome by pleasure ? I should answer thus : Listen, and Protagoras and I will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were overcome by pleasure ? They will not deny this. And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again : “In what way do you say that they are evil — in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in the future ? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature ?” — Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences-diseases and the like ?
I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as you do.
And in causing diseases do they not cause pain ? and in causing poverty do they not cause pain ; — they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken ?
Protagoras assented.
Then I should say to them, in my name and yours : Do you think them evil for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures : — there again they would agree ?
We both of us thought that they would.
And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and say : “Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and the physician’s use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving ? Are these the things which are good but painful ?” — they would assent to me ?
He agreed.
“And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain ; or because, afterwards, they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and power over others and wealth ?” — they would agree to the latter alternative, if I am not mistaken ?
He assented.
“Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain ? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good ?” — they would acknowledge that they were not ?
I think so, said Protagoras.
“And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil ?”
He assented.
“Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good : and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.”
I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.
“And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain ? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains : then if you have some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.”
True, said Protagoras.