Jowett: REP VI 497a-502c — Forma ideal do Estado

The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained : the injustice of the charges against her has been shown — is there anything more which you wish to say ?

Nothing more on that subject, he replied ; but I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.

Not any of them, I said ; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them — not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and estranged ; as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of persisting, degenerates and receives another character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human ; and now, I know that you are going to ask, What that State is :

No, he said ; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question — whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some other ?

Yes, I replied, ours in most respects ; but you may remember my saying before, that some living authority would always be required in the State having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were laying down the laws.

That was said, he replied. Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner ; you frightened us by interposing objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult ; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.

What is there remaining ?

The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the ruin of the State : All great attempts are attended with risk ; “hard is the good,” as men say.

Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the inquiry will then be complete. I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want of power : my zeal you may see for yourselves ; and please to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.

In what manner ?

At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young ; beginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from money-making and housekeeping to such pursuits ; and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take themselves off. In after life, when invited by someone else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business : at last, when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than Heracleitus’s sun, inasmuch as they never light up again.

But what ought to be their course ?

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years : during this period while they are growing up toward manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy ; as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul ; but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labor, as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another.

How truly in earnest you are, Socrates ! he said ; I am sure of that ; and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced ; Thrasymachus least of all.

Do not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have recently become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies ; for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.

You are speaking of a time which is not very near.

Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe ; for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking realized ; they have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue — such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them — do you think that they ever did ?

No indeed.

No, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments ; such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.

They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.

And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor States nor individuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers whom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity be laid on the State to obey them ; or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm : if they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right ?

Quite right.

If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, that this our constitution has been, and is — yea, and will be whenever the muse of philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this ; that there is a difficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.

My opinion agrees with yours, he said.

But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude ?

I should imagine not, he replied.

O my friends, I said, do not attack the multitude : they will change their minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of over-education, you show them your philosophers as they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and profession, and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed — if they view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves him, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy ? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper may be found, but not in the majority of mankind.

I quite agree with you, he said.

And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many entertain toward philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in uninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation ? and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.

It is most unbecoming.

For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men ; his eye is ever directed toward things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason ; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse ?

Impossible.

And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows ; but like everyone else, he will suffer from detraction.

Of course.

And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will be, think you, be an unskilful artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue ?

Anything but unskilful.

And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy ? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that no State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern ?

They will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they draw out the plan of which you are speaking ?

They will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as from a tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator — they will have nothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.

They will be very right, he said.

Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution ?

No doubt.

And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upward and downward : I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy ; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man ; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.

Very true, he said.

And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God ?

Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.

And now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is such a one as we were praising ; at whom they were so very indignant because to his hands we committed the State ; and are they growing a little calmer at what they have just heard ?

Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.

Why, where can they still find any ground for objection ? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being ?

They would not be so unreasonable.

Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good ?

Neither can they doubt this.

But again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favorable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was ? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected ?

Surely not.

Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear rule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized ?

I think that they will be less angry.

Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason, cannot refuse to come to terms ?

By all means, he said.

Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will anyone deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers ?

Surely no man, he said.

And when they have come into being will anyone say that they must of necessity be destroyed ; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us ; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape — who will venture to affirm this ?

Who indeed !

But, said I, one is enough ; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous.

Yes, one is enough.

The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them ?

Certainly.

And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility ?

I think not.

But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

We have.

And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not impossible.

Very good.