Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal ; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.
Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear — otherwise, not.
By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent.
I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only ; take, however, this latter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.
Yes, we will take all the care that we can : proceed.
Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.
What ?
The old story, that there is many a beautiful and many a good, and so of other things which we describe and define ; to all of them the term “many” is implied.
True, he said.
And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term “many” is applied there is an absolute ; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.
Very true.
The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.
Exactly.
And what is the organ with which we see the visible things ?
The sight, he said.
And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense ?
True.
But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived ?
No, I never have, he said.
Then reflect : has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard ?
Nothing of the sort.
No, indeed, I replied ; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses — you would not say that any of them requires such an addition ?
Certainly not.
But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen ?
How do you mean ?
Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see ; color being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colors will be invisible.
Of what nature are you speaking ?
Of that which you term light, I replied.
True, he said.
Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature ; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing ?
Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.
And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element ? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear ?