Good

Is it any explanation to say that desire is vested in a Faculty-of-desire and anger in the Irascible-Faculty and, collectively, that all tendency is seated in the Appetitive-Faculty? Such a statement of the facts does not help towards making the affections common to the Couplement; they might still be seated either in the Soul alone or in the body alone. On the one hand if the appetite is to be stirred, as in the carnal passion, there must be a heating of the blood and the bile, a well-defined state of the body; on the other hand, the impulse towards The GOOD cannot be a joint affection, but, like certain others too, it would belong necessarily to the Soul alone. Enneads I,1,

And, further, these Civic Virtues – measured and ordered themselves and acting as a principle of measure to the Soul which is as Matter to their forming – are like to the measure reigning in the over-world, and they carry a trace of that Highest GOOD in the Supreme; for, while utter measurelessness is brute Matter and wholly outside of Likeness, any participation in Ideal-Form produces some corresponding degree of Likeness to the formless Being There. And participation goes by nearness: the Soul nearer than the body, therefore closer akin, participates more fully and shows a godlike presence, almost cheating us into the delusion that in the Soul we see God entire. Enneads I,2,

If before the impurity entered there was GOODness, the GOODness suffices; but even so, not the act of cleansing but the cleansed thing that emerges will be The GOOD. And it remains to establish what this emergent is. Enneads I,2,

It can scarcely prove to be The GOOD: The Absolute GOOD cannot be thought to have taken up its abode with Evil. We can think of it only as something of the nature of good but paying a double allegiance and unable to rest in the Authentic GOOD. Enneads I,2,

The Soul’s true GOOD is in devotion to the Intellectual-Principle, its kin; evil to the Soul lies in frequenting strangers. There is no other way for it than to purify itself and so enter into relation with its own; the new phase begins by a new orientation. Enneads I,2,

For it is to the Gods, not to the GOOD, that our Likeness must look: to model ourselves upon good men is to produce an image of an image: we have to fix our gaze above the image and attain Likeness to the Supreme Exemplar. Enneads I,2,

What art is there, what method, what discipline to bring us there where we must go? The Term at which we must arrive we may take as agreed: we have established elsewhere, by many considerations, that our journey is to the GOOD, to the Primal-Principle; and, indeed, the very reasoning which discovered the Term was itself something like an initiation. Enneads I,3,

Dialectic treats also of the GOOD and the not-GOOD, and of the particulars that fall under each, and of what is the Eternal and what the not Eternal – and of these, it must be understood, not by seeming-knowledge (“sense-knowledge”) but with authentic science. Enneads I,3,

By sensation can be meant only perception of state, and the state of well-being must be GOOD in itself quite apart from the perception: to be a part of the natural plan is good whether knowingly or without knowledge: there is good in the appropriate state even though there be no recognition of its fitness or desirable quality – for it must be in itself desirable. Enneads I,4,

This GOOD exists, then; is present: that in which it is present has well-being without more ado: what need then to ask for sensation into the bargain? Perhaps, however, the theory is that the good of any state consists not in the condition itself but in the knowledge and perception of it. Enneads I,4,

But at this rate the GOOD is nothing but the mere sensation, the bare activity of the sentient life. And so it will be possessed by all that feel, no matter what. Perhaps it will be said that two constituents are needed to make up the GOOD, that there must be both feeling and a given state felt: but how can it be maintained that the bringing together of two neutrals can produce the GOOD? They will explain, possibly, that the state must be a state of GOOD and that such a condition constitutes well-being on the discernment of that present good; but then they invite the question whether the well-being comes by discerning the presence of the GOOD that is there, or whether there must further be the double recognition that the state is agreeable and that the agreeable state constitutes the GOOD. Enneads I,4,

If well-being demands this recognition, it depends no longer upon sensation but upon another, a higher faculty; and well-being is vested not in a faculty receptive of pleasure but in one competent to discern that pleasure is the GOOD. Enneads I,4,

Then the cause of the well-being is no longer pleasure but the faculty competent to pronounce as to pleasure’s value. Now a judging entity is nobler than one that merely accepts a state: it is a principle of Reason or of Intellection: pleasure is a state: the reasonless can never be closer to the GOOD than reason is. How can reason abdicate and declare nearer to good than itself something lying in a contrary order? No: those denying the good of life to the vegetable world, and those that make it consist in some precise quality of sensation, are in reality seeking a loftier well-being than they are aware of, and setting their highest in a more luminous phase of life. Enneads I,4,

Until these people light upon some nobler principle than any at which they still halt, they must be left where they are and where they choose to be, never understanding what the GOOD of Life is to those that can make it theirs, never knowing to what kind of beings it is accessible. Enneads I,4,

Now in common use this word “Life” embraces many forms which shade down from primal to secondary and so on, all massed under the common term – life of plant and life of animal – each phase brighter or dimmer than its next: and so it evidently must be with the GOOD-of-Life. And if thing is ever the image of thing, so every GOOD must always be the image of a higher GOOD. Enneads I,4,

And such a one will possess not merely the good, but the Supreme GOOD if, that is to say, in the realm of existents the Supreme GOOD can be no other than the authentically living, no other than Life in its greatest plenitude, life in which the good is present as something essential not as something brought from without, a life needing no foreign substance called in from a foreign realm, to establish it in good. Enneads I,4,

For what could be added to the fullest life to make it the best life? If anyone should answer, “The nature of GOOD” (The GOOD, as a Divine Hypostasis), the reply would certainly be near our thought, but we are not seeking the Cause but the main constituent. Enneads I,4,

To the man in this state, what is the GOOD? He himself by what he has and is. Enneads I,4,

And the author and principle of what he is and holds is the Supreme, which within Itself is the GOOD but manifests Itself within the human being after this other mode. Enneads I,4,

Now if happiness did indeed require freedom from pain, sickness, misfortune, disaster, it would be utterly denied to anyone confronted by such trials: but if it lies in the fruition of the Authentic GOOD, why turn away from this Term and look to means, imagining that to be happy a man must need a variety of things none of which enter into happiness? If, in fact, felicity were made up by heaping together all that is at once desirable and necessary we must bid for these also. But if the Term must be one and not many; if in other words our quest is of a Term and not of Terms; that only can be elected which is ultimate and noblest, that which calls to the tenderest longings of the soul. Enneads I,4,

Anything which, present, has no charm and adds nothing to happiness, which when lacking is desired because of the presence of an annoying opposite, may reasonably be called a necessity but not a GOOD. Enneads I,4,

Then why are these conditions sought and their contraries repelled by the man established in happiness? Here is our answer: These more pleasant conditions cannot, it is true, add any particle towards the Sage’s felicity: but they do serve towards the integrity of his being, while the presence of the contraries tends against his Being or complicates the Term: it is not that the Sage can be so easily deprived of the Term achieved but simply that he that holds the highest good desires to have that alone, not something else at the same time, something which, though it cannot banish the GOOD by its incoming, does yet take place by its side. Enneads I,4,

The pleasure demanded for the life cannot be in the enjoyments of the licentious or in any gratifications of the body – there is no place for these, and they stifle happiness – nor in any violent emotions – what could so move the Sage? – it can be only such pleasure as there must be where GOOD is, pleasure that does not rise from movement and is not a thing of process, for all that is good is immediately present to the Sage and the Sage is present to himself: his pleasure, his contentment, stands, immovable. Enneads I,4,

Those that refuse to place the Sage aloft in the Intellectual Realm but drag him down to the accidental, dreading accident for him, have substituted for the Sage we have in mind another person altogether; they offer us a tolerable sort of man and they assign to him a life of mingled good and ill, a case, after all, not easy to conceive. But admitting the possibility of such a mixed state, it could not be deserved to be called a life of happiness; it misses the Great, both in the dignity of Wisdom and in the integrity of GOOD. The life of true happiness is not a thing of mixture. And Plato rightly taught that he who is to be wise and to possess happiness draws his good from the Supreme, fixing his gaze on That, becoming like to That, living by That. Enneads I,4,

Hence the Soul heightened to the Intellectual-Principle is beautiful to all its power. For Intellection and all that proceeds from Intellection are the Soul’s beauty, a graciousness native to it and not foreign, for only with these is it truly Soul. And it is just to say that in the Soul’s becoming a good and beautiful thing is its becoming like to God, for from the Divine comes all the Beauty and all the GOOD in beings. Enneads I,6,

We may even say that Beauty is the Authentic-Existents and Ugliness is the Principle contrary to Existence: and the Ugly is also the primal evil; therefore its contrary is at once good and beautiful, or is GOOD and Beauty: and hence the one method will discover to us the Beauty-GOOD and the Ugliness-Evil. Enneads I,6,

And Beauty, this Beauty which is also The GOOD, must be posed as The First: directly deriving from this First is the Intellectual-Principle which is pre-eminently the manifestation of Beauty; through the Intellectual-Principle Soul is beautiful. The beauty in things of a lower order-actions and pursuits for instance – comes by operation of the shaping Soul which is also the author of the beauty found in the world of sense. For the Soul, a divine thing, a fragment as it were of the Primal Beauty, makes beautiful to the fulness of their capacity all things whatsoever that it grasps and moulds. Enneads I,6,

Therefore we must ascend again towards the GOOD, the desired of every Soul. Anyone that has seen This, knows what I intend when I say that it is beautiful. Even the desire of it is to be desired as a GOOD. To attain it is for those that will take the upward path, who will set all their forces towards it, who will divest themselves of all that we have put on in our descent: – so, to those that approach the Holy Celebrations of the Mysteries, there are appointed purifications and the laying aside of the garments worn before, and the entry in nakedness – until, passing, on the upward way, all that is other than the God, each in the solitude of himself shall behold that solitary-dwelling Existence, the Apart, the Unmingled, the Pure, that from Which all things depend, for Which all look and live and act and know, the Source of Life and of Intellection and of Being. Enneads I,6,

Therefore, first let each become godlike and each beautiful who cares to see God and Beauty. So, mounting, the Soul will come first to the Intellectual-Principle and survey all the beautiful Ideas in the Supreme and will avow that this is Beauty, that the Ideas are Beauty. For by their efficacy comes all Beauty else, but the offspring and essence of the Intellectual-Being. What is beyond the Intellectual-Principle we affirm to be the nature of GOOD radiating Beauty before it. So that, treating the Intellectual-Kosmos as one, the first is the Beautiful: if we make distinction there, the Realm of Ideas constitutes the Beauty of the Intellectual Sphere; and The GOOD, which lies beyond, is the Fountain at once and Principle of Beauty: the Primal GOOD and the Primal Beauty have the one dwelling-place and, thus, always, Beauty’s seat is There. Enneads I,6,

We can scarcely conceive that for any entity the GOOD can be other than the natural Act expressing its life-force, or in the case of an entity made up of parts the Act, appropriate, natural and complete, expressive of that in it which is best. Enneads I,7,

For the Soul, then, the GOOD is its own natural Act. Enneads I,7,

Now, given an Existent which – as being itself the best of existences and even transcending the existences – directs its Act towards no other, but is the object to which the Act of all else is directed, it is clear that this must be at once the GOOD and the means through which all else may participate in GOOD. Enneads I,7,

This Absolute GOOD other entities may possess in two ways – by becoming like to It and by directing the Act of their being towards It. Enneads I,7,

Now, if all aspiration and Act whatsoever are directed towards the GOOD, it follows that the Essential-GOOD neither need nor can look outside itself or aspire to anything other than itself: it can but remain unmoved, as being, in the constitution of things, the wellspring and firstcause of all Act: whatsoever in other entities is of the nature of GOOD cannot be due to any Act of the Essential-GOOD upon them; it is for them on the contrary to act towards their source and cause. The GOOD must, then, be the GOOD not by any Act, not even by virtue of its Intellection, but by its very rest within Itself. Enneads I,7,

For, again, that only can be named the GOOD to which all is bound and itself to none: for only thus is it veritably the object of all aspiration. It must be unmoved, while all circles around it, as a circumference around a centre from which all the radii proceed. Another example would be the sun, central to the light which streams from it and is yet linked to it, or at least is always about it, irremoveably; try all you will to separate the light from the sun, or the sun from its light, for ever the light is in the sun. Enneads I,7,

But the Universe outside; how is it aligned towards the GOOD? The soulless by direction toward Soul: Soul towards the GOOD itself, through the Intellectual-Principle. Enneads I,7,

Everything has something of the GOOD, by virtue of possessing a certain degree of unity and a certain degree of Existence and by participation in Ideal-Form: to the extent of the Unity, Being, and Form which are present, there is a sharing in an image, for the Unity and Existence in which there is participation are no more than images of the Ideal-Form. Enneads I,7,

With Soul it is different; the First-Soul, that which follows upon the Intellectual-Principle, possesses a life nearer to the Verity and through that Principle is of the nature of good; it will actually possess the GOOD if it orientate itself towards the Intellectual-Principle, since this follows immediately upon the GOOD. Enneads I,7,

In sum, then, life is the GOOD to the living, and the Intellectual-Principle to what is intellective; so that where there is life with intellection there is a double contact with the GOOD. Enneads I,7,

If it be taken into the All-Soul – what evil can reach it There? And as the Gods are possessed of GOOD and untouched by evil – so, certainly is the Soul that has preserved its essential character. And if it should lose its purity, the evil it experiences is not in its death but in its life. Suppose it to be under punishment in the lower world, even there the evil thing is its life and not its death; the misfortune is still life, a life of a definite character. Enneads I,7,

In a word, life in the body is of itself an evil but the Soul enters its GOOD through Virtue, not living the life of the Couplement but holding itself apart, even here. Enneads I,7,

But a difficulty arises. By what faculty in us could we possibly know Evil? All knowing comes by likeness. The Intellectual-Principle and the Soul, being Ideal-Forms, would know Ideal-Forms and would have a natural tendency towards them; but who could imagine Evil to be an Ideal-Form, seeing that it manifests itself as the very absence of GOOD? If the solution is that the one act of knowing covers contraries, and that as Evil is the contrary to GOOD the one act would grasp GOOD and Evil together, then to know Evil there must be first a clear perception and understanding of GOOD, since the nobler existences precede the baser and are Ideal-Forms while the less good hold no such standing, are nearer to Non-Being. Enneads I,8,

No doubt there is a question in what precise way GOOD is contrary to Evil – whether it is as First-Principle to last of things or as Ideal-Form to utter Lack: but this subject we postpone. Enneads I,8,

For the moment let us define the nature of the GOOD as far as the immediate purpose demands. Enneads I,8,

The GOOD is that on which all else depends, towards which all Existences aspire as to their source and their need, while Itself is without need, sufficient to Itself, aspiring to no other, the measure and Term of all, giving out from itself the Intellectual-Principle and Existence and Soul and Life and all Intellective-Act. Enneads I,8,

All until The GOOD is reached is beautiful; The GOOD is beyond-beautiful, beyond the Highest, holding kingly state in the Intellectual-Kosmos, that sphere constituted by a Principle wholly unlike what is known as Intelligence in us. Our intelligence is nourished on the propositions of logic, is skilled in following discussions, works by reasonings, examines links of demonstration, and comes to know the world of Being also by the steps of logical process, having no prior grasp of Reality but remaining empty, all Intelligence though it be, until it has put itself to school. Enneads I,8,

And the First Act is the Act of The GOOD stationary within Itself, and the First Existence is the self-contained Existence of The GOOD; but there is also an Act upon It, that of the Intellectual-Principle which, as it were, lives about It. Enneads I,8,

Such is the untroubled, the blissful, life of divine beings, and Evil has no place in it; if this were all, there would be no Evil but GOOD only, the first, the second and the third GOOD. All, thus far, is with the King of All, unfailing Cause of GOOD and Beauty and controller of all; and what is GOOD in the second degree depends upon the Second-Principle and tertiary GOOD upon the Third. Enneads I,8,

In what substantial-form (hypostasis) then is all this to be found – not as accident but as the very substance itself? For if Evil can enter into other things, it must have in a certain sense a prior existence, even though it may not be an essence. As there is GOOD, the Absolute, as well as GOOD, the quality, so, together with the derived evil entering into something not itself, there must be the Absolute Evil. Enneads I,8,

For, wholly without part in GOOD, the negation of GOOD, unmingled Lack, this Matter-Kind makes over to its own likeness whatsoever comes in touch with it. Enneads I,8,

No: Evil is not in any and every lack; it is in absolute lack. What falls in some degree short of the GOOD is not Evil; considered in its own kind it might even be perfect, but where there is utter dearth, there we have Essential Evil, void of all share in GOOD; this is the case with Matter. Enneads I,8,

Matter has not even existence whereby to have some part in GOOD: Being is attributed to it by an accident of words: the truth would be that it has Non-Being. Enneads I,8,

Still we may reasonably ask how can vice in man be a contrary to The GOOD in the Supernal: for vice is the contrary to virtue and virtue is not The GOOD but merely the good thing by which Matter is brought to order. Enneads I,8,

How can there any contrary to the Absolute GOOD, when the absolute has no quality? Besides, is there any universal necessity that the existence of one of two contraries should entail the existence of the other? Admit that the existence of one is often accompanied by the existence of the other – sickness and health, for example – yet there is no universal compulsion. Enneads I,8,

Perhaps, however, our author did not mean that this was universally true; he is speaking only of The GOOD. Enneads I,8,

But then, if The GOOD is an essence, and still more, if It is that which transcends all existence, how can It have any contrary? That there is nothing contrary to essence is certain in the case of particular existences – established by practical proof – but not in the quite different case of the Universal. Enneads I,8,

But of what nature would this contrary be, the contrary to universal existence and in general to the Primals? To essential existence would be opposed the non-existence; to the nature of GOOD, some principle and source of evil. Both these will be sources, the one of what is good, the other of what is evil; and all within the domain of the one<one principle is opposed, as contrary, to the entire domain of the other, and this in a contrariety more violent than any existing between secondary things. Enneads I,8,

But why does the existence of the Principle of GOOD necessarily comport the existence of a Principle of Evil? Is it because the All necessarily comports the existence of Matter? Yes: for necessarily this All is made up of contraries: it could not exist if Matter did not. The Nature of this Kosmos is, therefore, a blend; it is blended from the Intellectual-Principle and Necessity: what comes into it from God is good; evil is from the Ancient Kind which, we read, is the underlying Matter not yet brought to order by the Ideal-Form. Enneads I,8,

Given that The GOOD is not the only existent thing, it is inevitable that, by the outgoing from it or, if the phrase be preferred, the continuous down-going or away-going from it, there should be produced a Last, something after which nothing more can be produced: this will be Evil. Enneads I,8,

To resume: the Measureless is evil primarily; whatever, either by resemblance or participation, exists in the state of unmeasure, is evil secondarily, by force of its dealing with the Primal – primarily, the darkness; secondarily, the darkened. Now, Vice, being an ignorance and a lack of measure in the Soul, is secondarily evil, not the Essential Evil, just as Virtue is not the Primal GOOD but is Likeness to The GOOD, or participation in it. Enneads I,8,

But what approach have we to the knowing of GOOD and Evil? And first of the Evil of soul: Virtue, we may know by the Intellectual-Principle and by means of the philosophic habit; but Vice? A a ruler marks off straight from crooked, so Vice is known by its divergence from the line of Virtue. Enneads I,8,

This objection may be answered by applying the principle to the case of Evil in the Soul; the Evil, the Vice, will be a Negation and not anything having a separate existence; we come to the doctrine which denies Matter or, admitting it, denies its Evil; we need not seek elsewhere; we may at once place Evil in the Soul, recognising it as the mere absence of GOOD. But if the negation is the negation of something that ought to become present, if it is a denial of the GOOD by the Soul, then the Soul produces vice within itself by the operation of its own Nature, and is devoid of good and, therefore, Soul though it be, devoid of life: the Soul, if it has no life, is soulless; the Soul is no Soul. Enneads I,8,

No; the Soul has life by its own nature and therefore does not, of its own nature, contain this negation of The GOOD: it has much good in it; it carries a happy trace of the Intellectual-Principle and is not essentially evil: neither is it primally evil nor is that Primal Evil present in it even as an accidental, for the Soul is not wholly apart from the GOOD. Enneads I,8,

But if this were so, part of the Soul must possess The GOOD, part be without it; the Soul will have a mingled nature and the Evil within it will not be unblended: we have not yet lighted on the Primal, Unmingled Evil. The Soul would possess the GOOD as its Essence, the Evil as an Accidental. Enneads I,8,

But such an evil in the eyes is no more than an occasion of evil, the Absolute Evil is something quite different. If then Vice is an impediment to the Soul, Vice is an occasion of evil but not Evil-Absolute. Virtue is not the Absolute GOOD, but a co-operator with it; and if Virtue is not the Absolute GOOD neither is Vice the Absolute Evil. Virtue is not the Absolute Beauty or the Absolute GOOD; neither, therefore, is Vice the Essential Ugliness or the Essential Evil. Enneads I,8,

We teach that Virtue is not the Absolute GOODGOOD and Beauty, because we know that These are earlier than Virtue and transcend it, and that it is good and beautiful by some participation in them. Now as, going upward from virtue, we come to the Beautiful and to the GOOD, so, going downward from Vice, we reach Essential Evil: from Vice as the starting-point we come to vision of Evil, as far as such vision is possible, and we become evil to the extent of our participation in it. We are become dwellers in the Place of Unlikeness, where, fallen from all our resemblance to the Divine, we lie in gloom and mud: for if the Soul abandons itself unreservedly to the extreme of viciousness, it is no longer a vicious Soul merely, for mere vice is still human, still carries some trace of good: it has taken to itself another nature, the Evil, and as far as Soul can die it is dead. And the death of Soul is twofold: while still sunk in body to lie down in Matter and drench itself with it; when it has left the body, to lie in the other world until, somehow, it stirs again and lifts its sight from the mud: and this is our “going down to Hades and slumbering there.” Enneads I,8,

To deny Evil a place among realities is necessarily to do away with the GOOD as well, and even to deny the existence of anything desirable; it is to deny desire, avoidance and all intellectual act; for desire has GOOD for its object, aversion looks to Evil; all intellectual act, all Wisdom, deals with GOOD and Bad, and is itself one of the things that are good. Enneads I,8,

There must then be The GOOD – good unmixed – and the Mingled GOOD and Bad, and the Rather Bad than GOOD, this last ending with the Utterly Bad we have been seeking, just as that in which Evil constitutes the lesser part tends, by that lessening, towards the GOOD. Enneads I,8,

Evil is not alone: by virtue of the nature of GOOD, the power of GOOD, it is not Evil only: it appears, necessarily, bound around with bonds of Beauty, like some captive bound in fetters of gold; and beneath these it is hidden so that, while it must exist, it may not be seen by the gods, and that men need not always have evil before their eyes, but that when it comes before them they may still be not destitute of Images of the GOOD and Beautiful for their Remembrance. Enneads I,8,

Further, why should any distress of theirs work harm to us? No: we cannot think of them as grieving at all or as being cheerful upon occasions: they must be continuously serene, happy in the good they enjoy and the Vision before them. Each lives its own free life; each finds its GOOD in its own Act; and this Act is not directed towards us. Enneads II,3,

We have seen elsewhere that the GOOD, the Principle, is simplex, and, correspondingly, primal – for the secondary can never be simplex – that it contains nothing: that it is an integral Unity. Enneads: II VIII.

Now the same Nature belongs to the Principle we know as The One. just as the goodness of The GOOD is essential and not the outgrowth of some prior substance so the Unity of The One is its essential. Enneads: II VIII.

Therefore: When we speak of The One and when we speak of The GOOD we must recognize an Identical Nature; we must affirm that they are the same – not, it is true, as venturing any predication with regard to that (unknowable) Hypostasis but simply as indicating it to ourselves in the best terms we find. Enneads: II VIII.

We need not, then, go seeking any other Principles; this – the One and the GOOD – is our First; next to it follows the Intellectual Principle, the Primal Thinker; and upon this follows Soul. Such is the order in nature. The Intellectual Realm allows no more than these and no fewer. Enneads: II VIII.

Our fire, however, is a thing of limited scope: given powers that have no limitation and are never cut off from the Authentic Existences, how imagine anything existing and yet failing to receive from them? It is of the essence of things that each gives of its being to another: without this communication, The GOOD would not be GOOD, nor the Intellectual-Principle an Intellective Principle, nor would Soul itself be what it is: the law is, “some life after the Primal Life, a second where there is a first; all linked in one unbroken chain; all eternal; divergent types being engendered only in the sense of being secondary.” Enneads: II VIII.

And do not think that, while earth is ornate with all its growths and with living things of every race, and while the very sea has answered to the power of Soul, do not think that the great air and the ether and the far-spread heavens remain void of it: there it is that all good Souls dwell, infusing life into the stars and into that orderly eternal circuit of the heavens which in its conscious movement ever about the one Centre, seeking nothing beyond, is a faithful copy of the divine Mind. And all that is within me strives towards the GOOD; and each, to the measure of its faculty, attains. For from that GOOD all the heavens depend, with all my own Soul and the Gods that dwell in my every part, and all that lives and grows, and even all in me that you may judge inanimate. Enneads III,2,

Similarly, the very wronging of man by man may be derived from an effort towards the GOOD; foiled, in their weakness, of their true desire, they turn against each other: still, when they do wrong, they pay the penalty – that of having hurt their Souls by their evil conduct and of degradation to a lower place – for nothing can ever escape what stands decreed in the law of the Universe. Enneads III,2,

The principle is that evil by definition is a falling short in good, and good cannot be at full strength in this Sphere where it is lodged in the alien: the good here is in something else, in something distinct from the GOOD, and this something else constitutes the falling short for it is not good. And this is why evil is ineradicable: there is, first, the fact that in relation to this principle of GOOD, thing will always stand less than thing, and, besides, all things come into being through it and are what they are by standing away from it. Enneads III,2,

What would Providence have to provide for? Certainly not for itself or for the GOOD: when we speak of a Providence above, we mean an act upon something below. Enneads III,3,

It is sound, I think, to find the primal source of Love in a tendency of the Soul towards pure beauty, in a recognition, in a kinship, in an unreasoned consciousness of friendly relation. The vile and ugly is in clash, at once, with Nature and with God: Nature produces by looking to the GOOD, for it looks towards Order – which has its being in the consistent total of the good, while the unordered is ugly, a member of the system of evil – and besides Nature itself, clearly, springs from the divine realm, from GOOD and Beauty; and when anything brings delight and the sense of kinship, its very image attracts. Enneads III,5,

But besides this purest Soul, there must be also a Soul of the All: at once there is another Love – the eye with which this second Soul looks upwards – like the supernal Eros engendered by force of desire. This Aphrodite, the secondary Soul, is of this Universe – not Soul unmingled alone, not Soul, the Absolute, giving birth, therefore, to the Love concerned with the universal life; no, this is the Love presiding over marriages; but it, also, has its touch of the upward desire; and, in the degree of that striving, it stirs and leads upwards the Souls of the young and every Soul with which it is incorporated in so far as there is a natural tendency to remembrance of the divine. For every Soul is striving towards The GOOD, even the mingling Soul and that of particular beings, for each holds directly from the divine Soul, and is its offspring. Enneads III,5,

This Love, then, leader of particular Souls to The GOOD, is twofold: the Love in the loftier Soul would be a god ever linking the Soul to the divine; the Love in the mingling Soul will be a celestial spirit. Enneads III,5,

The drunkenness of the father Poros or Possession is caused by Nectar, “wine yet not existing”; Love is born before the realm of sense has come into being: Penia had participation in the Intellectual before the lower image of that divine Realm had appeared; she dwelt in that Sphere, but as a mingled being consisting partly of Form but partly also of that indetermination which belongs to the Soul before she attains the GOOD and when all her knowledge of Reality is a fore-intimation veiled by the indeterminate and unordered: in this state Poverty brings forth the Hypostasis, Love. Enneads III,5,

We understand, now, why good men have no other Love other Eros of life – than that for the Absolute and Authentic GOOD, and never follow the random attractions known to those ranged under the lower Spirit Kind. Enneads III,5,

On this principle we have, here, Soul dwelling with the divine Intelligence, breaking away from it, and yet again being filled to satiety with the divine Ideas – the beautiful abounding in all plenty, so that every splendour become manifest in it with the images of whatever is lovely – Soul which, taken as one all, is Aphrodite, while in it may be distinguished the Reason-Principles summed under the names of Plenty and Possession, produced by the downflow of the Nectar of the over realm. The splendours contained in Soul are thought of as the garden of Zeus with reference to their existing within Life; and Poros sleeps in this garden in the sense of being sated and heavy with its produce. Life is eternally manifest, an eternal existent among the existences, and the banqueting of the gods means no more than that they have their Being in that vital blessedness. And Love – “born at the banquet of the gods” – has of necessity been eternally in existence, for it springs from the intention of the Soul towards its Best, towards the GOOD; as long as Soul has been, Love has been. Enneads III,5,

It is said then to spring from Poverty and Possession in the sense that Lack and Aspiration and the Memory of the Ideal Principles, all present together in the Soul, produce that Act towards The GOOD which is Love. Its Mother is Poverty, since striving is for the needy; and this Poverty is Matter, for Matter is the wholly poor: the very ambition towards the good is a sign of existing indetermination; there is a lack of shape and of Reason in that which must aspire towards the GOOD, and the greater degree of effort implies the lower depth of materiality. A thing aspiring towards the GOOD is an Ideal-principle only when the striving (with attainment) will leave it still unchanged in Kind: when it must take in something other than itself, its aspiration is the presentment of Matter to the incoming power. Enneads III,5,

Thus Love is at once, in some degree a thing of Matter and at the same time a Celestial, sprung of the Soul; for Love lacks its GOOD but, from its very birth, strives towards It. Enneads III,5,

We conclude that Matter’s participation in Idea is not by way of modification within itself: the process is very different; it is a bare seeming. Perhaps we have here the solution of the difficulty as to how Matter, essentially evil, can be reaching towards The GOOD: there would be no such participation as would destroy its essential nature. Given this mode of pseudo-participation – in which Matter would, as we say, retain its nature, unchanged, always being what it has essentially been – there is no longer any reason to wonder as to how while essentially evil, it yet participates in Idea: for, by this mode, it does not abandon its own character: participation is the law, but it participates only just so far as its essence allows. Under a mode of participation which allows it to remain on its own footing, its essential nature stands none the less, whatsoever the Idea, within that limit, may communicate to it: it is by no means the less evil for remaining immutably in its own order. If it had authentic participation in The GOOD and were veritably changed, it would not be essentially evil. Enneads III,6,

In a word, when we call Matter evil we are right only if we mean that it is not amenable to modification by The GOOD; but that means simply that it is subject to no modification whatever. Enneads III,6,

This alien base exists and the myth represents it as a pauper to exhibit its nature, to show that Matter is destitute of The GOOD. The claimant does not ask for all the Giver’s store, but it welcomes whatever it can get; in other words, what appears in Matter is not Reality. Enneads III,6,

It is discerned as present essentially in that Nature like everything else that we can predicate There – all immanent, springing from that Essence and inherent to that Essence. For whatsoever has primal Being must be immanent to the Firsts and be a First-Eternity equally with The GOOD that is among them and of them and equally with the truth that is among them. Enneads III,7,

What will This be; under what character can we picture It? It must be either Intellective or without Intellection: if Intellective it is the Intellectual-Principle; if not, it will be without even knowledge of itself – so that, either way, what is there so august about it? If we define it as The GOOD and the wholly simplex, we will, no doubt, be telling the truth, but we will not be giving any certain and lucid account of it as long as we have in mind no entity in which to lodge the conception by which we define it. Enneads III,8,

Now as our sight requires the world of sense for its satisfaction and realization, so the vision in the Intellectual-Principle demands, for its completion, The GOOD. Enneads III,8,

It cannot be, itself, The GOOD, since then it would not need to see or to perform any other Act; for The GOOD is the centre of all else, and it is by means of The GOOD that every thing has Act, while the GOOD is in need of nothing and therefore possesses nothing beyond itself. Enneads III,8,

Once you have uttered “The GOOD,” add no further thought: by any addition, and in proportion to that addition, you introduce a deficiency. Enneads III,8,

Do not even say that it has Intellection; you would be dividing it; it would become a duality, Intellect and the GOOD. The GOOD has no need of the Intellectual-Principle which, on the contrary, needs it, and, attaining it, is shaped into GOODness and becomes perfect by it: the Form thus received, sprung from the GOOD, brings it to likeness with the GOOD. Enneads III,8,

Thus the traces of the GOOD discerned upon it must be taken as indication of the nature of that Archetype: we form a conception of its Authentic Being from its image playing upon the Intellectual-Principle. This image of itself, it has communicated to the Intellect that contemplates it: thus all the striving is on the side of the Intellect, which is the eternal striver and eternally the attainer. The Being beyond neither strives, since it feels no lack, nor attains, since it has no striving. And this marks it off from the Intellectual-Principle, to which characteristically belongs the striving, the concentrated strain towards its Form. Enneads III,8,

These are very near to the un-needing, to that which has no need of Knowing, they have abundance and intellection authentically, as being the first to possess. But, there is that before them which neither needs nor possesses anything, since, needing or possessing anything else, it would not be what it is – the GOOD. Enneads III,8,

(F)… But the First is not to be envisaged as made up from Gods of a transcendent order: no; the Authentic Existents constitute the Intellectual-Principle with Which motion and rest begin. The Primal touches nothing, but is the centre round which those other Beings lie in repose and in movement. For Movement is aiming, and the Primal aims at nothing; what could the Summit aspire to? Has It, even, no Intellection of Itself? It possesses Itself and therefore is said in general terms to know itself… But intellection does not mean self-ownership; it means turning the gaze towards the Primal: now the act of intellection is itself the Primal Act, and there is therefore no place for any earlier one. The Being projecting this Act transcends the Act so that Intellection is secondary to the Being in which it resides. Intellection is not the transcendently venerable thing – neither Intellection in general nor even the Intellection of The GOOD. Apart from and over any Intellection stands The GOOD itself. Enneads III,8,

The GOOD therefore needs no consciousness. Enneads III,8,

What sort of consciousness can be conceived in it? Consciousness of the GOOD as existent or non-existent? If of existent GOOD, that GOOD exists before and without any such consciousness: if the act of consciousness produces that GOOD, then The GOOD was not previously in existence – and, at once, the very consciousness falls to the ground since it is, no longer consciousness of The GOOD. Enneads III,8,

In that realm it has also vision, through the Intellectual-Principle, of The GOOD which does not so hold to itself as not to reach the soul; what intervenes between them is not body and therefore is no hindrance – and, indeed, where bodily forms do intervene there is still access in many ways from the primal to the tertiaries. Enneads IV,4,

The total scheme may be summarized in the illustration of The GOOD as a centre, the Intellectual-Principle as an unmoving circle, the Soul as a circle in motion, its moving being its aspiration: the Intellectual-Principle possesses and has ever embraced that which is beyond being; the soul must seek it still: the sphere of the universe, by its possession of the soul thus aspirant, is moved to the aspiration which falls within its own nature; this is no more than such power as body may have, the mode of pursuit possible where the object pursued is debarred from entrance; it is the motion of coiling about, with ceaseless return upon the same path – in other words, it is circuit. Enneads IV,4,

The will of any organic thing is one; but the distinct powers which go to constitute it are far from being one: yet all the several wills look to the object aimed at by the one will of the whole: for the desire which the one member entertains for another is a desire within the All: a part seeks to acquire something outside itself, but that external is another part of which it feels the need: the anger of a moment of annoyance is directed to something alien, growth draws on something outside, all birth and becoming has to do with the external; but all this external is inevitably something included among fellow members of the system: through these its limbs and members, the All is bringing this activity into being while in itself it seeks – or better, contemplates – The GOOD. Right will, then, the will which stands above accidental experience, seeks The GOOD and thus acts to the same end with it. When men serve another, many of their acts are done under order, but the good servant is the one whose purpose is in union with his master’s. Enneads IV,4,

When, on the contrary, the agent falls in love with what is good in those actions, and, cheated by the mere track and trace of the Authentic GOOD makes them his own, then, in his pursuit of a lower good, he is the victim of magic. For all dalliance with what wears the mask of the authentic, all attraction towards that mere semblance, tells of a mind misled by the spell of forces pulling towards unreality. Enneads IV,4,

To know the nature of a thing we must observe it in its unalloyed state, since any addition obscures the reality. Clear, then look: or, rather, let a man first purify himself and then observe: he will not doubt his immortality when he sees himself thus entered into the pure, the Intellectual. For, what he sees is an Intellectual-Principle looking on nothing of sense, nothing of this mortality, but by its own eternity having intellection of the eternal: he will see all things in this Intellectual substance, himself having become an Intellectual Kosmos and all lightsome, illuminated by the truth streaming from The GOOD, which radiates truth upon all that stands within that realm of the divine. Enneads IV,7,

There is, besides, no principle that can prevent anything from partaking, to the extent of its own individual receptivity in the Nature of GOOD. If therefore Matter has always existed, that existence is enough to ensure its participation in the being which, according to each receptivity, communicates the supreme good universally: if on the contrary, Matter has come into being as a necessary sequence of the causes preceding it, that origin would similarly prevent it standing apart from the scheme as though it were out of reach of the principle to whose grace it owes its existence. Enneads IV,8,

The Kind, then, with which we are dealing is twofold, the Intellectual against the sensible: better for the soul to dwell in the Intellectual, but, given its proper nature, it is under compulsion to participate in the sense-realm also. There is no grievance in its not being, through and through, the highest; it holds mid-rank among the authentic existences, being of divine station but at the lowest extreme of the Intellectual and skirting the sense-known nature; thus, while it communicates to this realm something of its own store, it absorbs in turn whenever – instead of employing in its government only its safeguarded phase – it plunges in an excessive zeal to the very midst of its chosen sphere; then it abandons its status as whole soul with whole soul, though even thus it is always able to recover itself by turning to account the experience of what it has seen and suffered here, learning, so, the greatness of rest in the Supreme, and more clearly discerning the finer things by comparison with what is almost their direct antithesis. Where the faculty is incapable of knowing without contact, the experience of evil brings the dearer perception of GOOD. Enneads IV,8,

He teaches, also, that there is an author of the Cause, that is of the Intellectual-Principle, which to him is the Creator who made the Soul, as he tells us, in the famous mixing bowl. This author of the causing principle, of the divine mind, is to him the GOOD, that which transcends the Intellectual-Principle and transcends Being: often too he uses the term “The Idea” to indicate Being and the Divine Mind. Thus Plato knows the order of generation – from the GOOD, the Intellectual-Principle; from the Intellectual-Principle, the Soul. These teachings are, therefore, no novelties, no inventions of today, but long since stated, if not stressed; our doctrine here is the explanation of an earlier and can show the antiquity of these opinions on the testimony of Plato himself. Enneads: V I

Thus we come, once more, to a Being above the Intellectual-Principle and, since the sequent amounts to no less than the All, we recognise, again, a Being above the All. This assuredly cannot be one of the things to which it is prior. We may not call it “Intellect”; therefore, too, we may not call it “the GOOD,” if “the GOOD” is to be taken in the sense of some one member of the universe; if we mean that which precedes the universe of things, the name may be allowed. Enneads V,3,

Still, how can a Reason-Principle (the Intellectual), characteristically a manifold, a total, derive from what is obviously no Reason-Principle? But how, failing such origin in the simplex, could we escape (what cannot be accepted) the derivation of a Reason-Principle from a Reason-Principle? And how does the secondarily good (the imaged GOOD) derive from The GOOD, the Absolute? What does it hold from the Absolute GOOD to entitle it to the name? Similarity to the prior is not enough, it does not help towards goodness; we demand similarity only to an actually existent GOOD: the goodness must depend upon derivation from a Prior of such a nature that the similarity is desirable because that Prior is good, just as the similarity would be undesirable if the Prior were not good. Enneads V,3,

All life belongs to it, life brilliant and perfect; thus all in it is at once life-principle and Intellectual-Principle, nothing in it aloof from either life or intellect: it is therefore self-sufficing and seeks nothing: and if it seeks nothing this is because it has in itself what, lacking, it must seek. It has, therefore, its GOOD within itself, either by being of that order – in what we have called its life and intellect – or in some other quality or character going to produce these. Enneads V,3,

If this (secondary principle) were The GOOD (The Absolute), nothing could transcend these things, life and intellect: but, given the existence of something higher, this Intellectual-Principle must possess a life directed towards that Transcendent, dependent upon it, deriving its being from it, living towards it as towards its source. The First, then, must transcend this principle of life and intellect which directs thither both the life in itself, a copy of the Reality of the First, and the intellect in itself which is again a copy, though of what original there we cannot know. Enneads V,3,

How then could the most perfect remain self-set – the First GOOD, the Power towards all, how could it grudge or be powerless to give of itself, and how at that would it still be the Source? If things other than itself are to exist, things dependent upon it for their reality, it must produce since there is no other source. And further this engendering principle must be the very highest in worth; and its immediate offspring, its secondary, must be the best of all that follows. Enneads V,4,

If we are told that they are self-standing entities – the distinct beings Justice and GOOD – then (supposing them to be outside) the Intellectual Realm will not be a unity nor be included in any unity: all is sundered individuality. Where, then, are they and what spatial distinction keeps them apart? How does the Intellectual-Principle come to meet with them as it travels round; what keeps each true to its character; what gives them enduring identity; what conceivable shape or character can they have? They are being presented to us as some collection of figures, in gold or some other material substance, the work of some unknown sculptor or graver: but at once the Intellectual-Principle which contemplates them becomes sense-perception; and there still remains the question how one of them comes to be Justice and another something else. Enneads V,5,

Consider our universe. There is none before it and therefore it is not, itself, in a universe or in any place – what place was there before the universe came to be? – its linked members form and occupy the whole. But Soul is not in the universe, on the contrary the universe is in the Soul; bodily substance is not a place to the Soul; Soul is contained in Intellectual-Principle and is the container of body. The Intellectual-Principle in turn is contained in something else; but that prior principle has nothing in which to be: the First is therefore in nothing, and, therefore, nowhere. But all the rest must be somewhere; and where but in the First? This can mean only that the First is neither remote from things nor directly within them; there is nothing containing it; it contains all. It is The GOOD to the universe if only in this way, that towards it all things have their being, all dependent upon it, each in its mode, so that thing rises above thing in goodness according to its fuller possession of authentic being. Enneads V,5,

Still, do not, I urge you, look for The GOOD through any of these other things; if you do, you will see not itself but its trace: you must form the idea of that which is to be grasped cleanly standing to itself not in any combination, the unheld in which all have hold: for no other is such, yet one such there must be. Enneads V,5,

You who make the venture will throw forward all your being but you will never tell it entire – for that, you must yourself be the divine Intellect in Act – and at your utmost success it will still pass from you or, rather, you from it. In ordinary vision you may think to see the object entire: in this intellective act, all, less or more, that you can take to mind you may set down as The GOOD. Enneads V,5,

It is The GOOD since, being a power (being effective outwardly), it is the cause of the intelligent and intellective life as of life and intellect: for these grow from it as from the source of essence and of existence, the Source as being One, simplex and first because before it was nothing. All derives from this: it is the origin of the primal movement which it does not possess and of the repose which is but its absence of need; for neither rest nor movement can belong to that which has no place in which either could occur; centre, object, ground, all are alike unknown to it, for it is before all. Yet its Being is not limited; what is there to set bounds to it? Nor, on the other hand, is it infinite in the sense of magnitude; what place can there be to which it must extend, or why should there be movement where there is no lacking? All its infinitude resides in its power: it does not change and will not fail; and in it all that is unfailing finds duration. Enneads V,5,

The perception of Beauty and the awe and the stirring of passion towards it are for those already in some degree knowing and awakened: but the GOOD, as possessed long since and setting up a natural tendency, is inherently present to even those asleep and brings them no wonder when some day they see it, since it is no occasional reminiscence but is always with them though in their drowse they are not aware of it: the love of Beauty on the contrary sets up pain when it appears, for those that have seen it must pursue. This love of Beauty then is later than the love of GOOD and comes with a more sophisticated understanding; hence we know that Beauty is a secondary: the more primal appetition, not patent to sense, our movement towards our good, gives witness that The GOOD is the earlier, the prior. Enneads V,5,

Again; all that have possessed themselves of The GOOD feel it sufficient: they have attained the end: but Beauty not all have known and those that have judge it to exist for itself and not for them, as in the charm of this world the beauty belongs only to its possessor. Enneads V,5,

Then, too, it is thought enough to appear loveable whether one is so or not: but no one wants his GOOD in semblance only. All are seeking The First as something ranking before aught else, but they struggle venomously for beauty as something secondary like themselves: thus some minor personage may perhaps challenge equal honour with the King’s right-hand man on pretext of similar dependence, forgetting that, while both owe their standing to the monarch, the other holds the higher rank. Enneads V,5,

The source of the error is that while both The GOOD and The Beautiful participate in the common source, The One precedes both; and that, in the Supreme also, The GOOD has no need of The Beautiful, while the Beautiful does need The GOOD. Enneads V,5,

The GOOD is gentle and friendly and tender, and we have it present when we but will. Beauty is all violence and stupefaction; its pleasure is spoiled with pain, and it even draws the thoughtless away from The GOOD as some attraction will lure the child from the father’s side: these things tell of youth. The GOOD is the older – not in time but by degree of reality – and it has the higher and earlier power, all power in fact, for the sequent holds only a power subordinate and delegated of which the prior remains sovereign. Enneads V,5,

The Supreme, as the Absolute GOOD and not merely a good being or thing, can contain nothing, since there is nothing that could be its good. Enneads V,5,

Anything it could contain must be either good to it or not good; but in the supremely and primally GOOD there can be nothing not good; nor can the Absolute GOOD be a container to the GOOD: containing, then, neither the good nor the not good it contains nothing and, containing nothing, it is alone: it is void of all but itself. Enneads V,5,

If the rest of being either is good – without being the absolute good – or is not good, while on the other hand the Supreme contains neither what is good nor what is not good, then, containing nothing, it is The GOOD by that very absence of content. Enneads V,5,

Thus we rob it of its very being as The Absolute GOOD if we ascribe anything to it, existence or intellect or goodness. The only way is to make every denial and no assertion, to feign no quality or content there but to permit only the “It is” in which we pretend to no affirmation of non-existent attribute: there is an ignorant praise which, missing the true description, drags in qualities beneath the real worth and so abases; philosophy must guard against attaching to the Supreme what is later and lower: moving above all that order, it is the cause and source of all these, and is none of them. Enneads V,5,

For, once more, the nature of the GOOD is not such as to make it all things or a thing among all: that would range it under the same classification with them all and it would differ, thus, only by its individual quality, some specialty, some addition. At once it becomes not a unity but a duality; there is one common element not good and another element that is good; but a combination so made up of good and not good cannot be the purely good, the primarily good; the primarily good must be that principle in which the better element has more effectively participated and so attained its goodness. Any good thing has become so by communion; but that in which it has communion is not a thing among the things of the all; therefore the GOOD is not a thing of the All. Enneads V,5,

Since there is this GOOD in any good thing – the specific difference by which the combination becomes good – it must enter from elsewhere than the world of things: that source must be a GOOD absolute and isolated. Enneads V,5,

Thus is revealed to us the Primarily existent, the GOOD, above all that has being, good unalloyed, containing nothing in itself, utterly unmingling, all-transcending, cause of all. Enneads V,5,

Another consideration is that if The GOOD (and First) is simplex and without need, it can neither need the intellective act nor possess what it does not need: it will therefore not have intellection. (Interpolation or corruption: It is without intellection because, also, it contains no duality.) Enneads V,6,

Again; an Intellectual-Principle is distinct from The GOOD and takes a certain goodness only by its intellection of The GOOD. Enneads V,6,

And again: the multiple must be always seeking its identity, desiring self-accord and self-awareness: but what scope is there within what is an absolute unity in which to move towards its identity or at what term may it hope for self-knowing? It holds its identity in its very essence and is above consciousness and all intellective act. Intellection is not a primal either in the fact of being or in the value of being; it is secondary and derived: for there exists The GOOD; and this moves towards itself while its sequent is moved and by that movement has its characteristic vision. The intellective act may be defined as a movement towards The GOOD in some being that aspires towards it; the effort produces the fact; the two are coincident; to see is to have desired to see: hence again the Authentic GOOD has no need of intellection since itself and nothing else is its good. Enneads V,6,

The intellective act is a movement towards the unmoved GOOD: thus the self-intellection in all save the Absolute GOOD is the working of the imaged GOOD within them: the intellectual principle recognises the likeness, sees itself as a good to itself, an object of attraction: it grasps at that manifestation of The GOOD and, in holding that, holds self-vision: if the state of goodness is constant, it remains constantly self-attractive and self-intellective. The self-intellection is not deliberate: it sees itself as an incident in its contemplation of The GOOD; for it sees itself in virtue of its Act; and, in all that exists, the Act is towards The GOOD. Enneads V,6,

If this reasoning is valid, The GOOD has no scope whatever for intellection which demands something attractive from outside. The GOOD, then, is without Act. What Act indeed, could be vested in Activity’s self? No activity has yet again an activity; and whatever we may add to such Activities as depend from something else, at least we must leave the first Activity of them all, that from which all depend, as an uncontaminated identity, one to which no such addition can be made. Enneads V,6,

What stands above Being stands above intellection: it is no weakness in it not to know itself, since as pure unity it contains nothing which it needs to explore. But it need not even spend any knowing upon things outside itself: this which was always the GOOD of all gives them something greater and better than its knowledge of them in giving them in their own identity to cling, in whatever measure be possible, to a principle thus lofty. Enneads V,6,

But does even this suffice for our First? No; we must look still inward beyond the Intellectual, which, from our point of approach, stands before the Supreme Beginning, in whose forecourt, as it were, it announces in its own being the entire content of the GOOD, that prior of all, locked in unity, of which this is the expression already touched by multiplicity. Enneads V,8,

Oratory and generalship, administration and sovereignty – under any forms in which their activities are associated with GOOD and when they look to that – possess something derived thence and building up their knowledge from the knowledge There. Enneads V,8,

It is true that we do not hesitate to speak of the goodness inherent in Being” when we are thinking of that Act by which Being tends, of its nature, towards the One: thus, we affirm goodness of it in the sense that it is thereby moulded into the likeness of The GOOD. But if this “goodness inherent in Being” is an Act directed toward The GOOD, it is the life of Being: but this life is Motion, and Motion is already one of the genera. Enneads VI,2,

In virtue of that unity the GOOD may be regarded as truly inherent. Hence the GOOD is not to be sought outside; it could not have fallen outside of what is; it cannot possibly be found in non-Being; within Being the GOOD must lie, since it is never a non-Being. Enneads VI,5,

If that GOOD has Being and is within the realm of Being, then it is present, self-contained, in everything: we, therefore, need not look outside of Being; we are in it; yet that GOOD is not exclusively ours: therefore all beings are one. Enneads VI,5,

It remains, then, poised in wisdom within itself; it could not enter into any other; those others look to it and in their longing find it where it is. This is that “Love Waiting at the Door,” ever coming up from without, striving towards the beautiful, happy when to the utmost of its power it attains. Even here the lover does not so much possess himself of the beauty he has loved as wait before it; that Beauty is abidingly self-enfolded but its lovers, the Many, loving it as an entire, possess it as an entire when they attain, for it was an entire that they loved. This seclusion does not prevent its sufficing to all, but is the very reason for its adequacy; because it is thus entire for all it can be The GOOD to all. Enneads VI,5,

It is with Number as with GOOD. When we pronounce things to be good either we mean that they are in their own nature so or we affirm goodness as an accidental in them. Dealing with the primals, the goodness we have in mind is that First Hypostasis; where the goodness is an accidental we imply the existence of a Principle of GOOD as a necessary condition of the accidental presence; there must be some source of that good which is observed elsewhere, whether this source be an Absolute GOOD or something that of its own nature produces the good. Similarly with number; in attributing the decad to things we affirm either the truly existent decad or, where the decadhood is accidental, we necessarily posit the self-subsistent decad, decad not associated; if things are to be described as forming a decad, then either they must be of themselves the decad or be preceded by that which has no other being than that of decadhood. Enneads VI,6,

Seventh tractate – How the multiplicity of the ideal-forms came into being: and upon the GOOD. Enneads VI,7,

That Life, the various, the all-including, the primal and one, who can consider it without longing to be of it, disdaining all the other? All other life is darkness, petty and dim and poor; it is unclean and polluting the clean for if you do but look upon it you no longer see nor live this life which includes all living, in which there is nothing that does not live and live in a life of purity void of all that is ill. For evil is here where life is in copy and Intellect in copy; There is the archetype, that which is good in the very Idea – we read – as holding The GOOD in the pure Idea. That Archetype is good; Intellectual-Principle is good as holding its life by contemplation of the archetype; and it sees also as good the objects of its contemplation because it holds them in its act of contemplating the Principle of GOOD. But these objects come to it not as they are There but in accord with its own condition, for it is their source; they spring thence to be here, and Intellectual-Principle it is that has produced them by its vision There. In the very law, never, looking to That, could it fail of Intellectual Act; never, on the other hand, could it produce what is There; of itself it could not produce; Thence it must draw its power to bring forth, to teem with offspring of itself; from the GOOD it takes what itself did not possess. From that Unity came multiplicity to Intellectual-Principle; it could not sustain the power poured upon it and therefore broke it up; it turned that one power into variety so as to carry it piecemeal. Enneads VI,7,

All its production, effected in the power of The GOOD, contains goodness; it is good, itself, since it is constituted by these things of good; it is GOOD made diverse. It might be likened to a living sphere teeming with variety, to a globe of faces radiant with faces all living, to a unity of souls, all the pure souls, not faulty but the perfect, with Intellect enthroned over all so that the place entire glows with Intellectual splendour. Enneads VI,7,

But even there we are not to remain always, in that beauty of the multiple; we must make haste yet higher, above this heaven of ours and even that; leaving all else aside we ask in awe “Who produced that realm and how?” Everything There is a single Idea in an individual impression and, informed by The GOOD, possesses the universal good transcendent over all. Each possessing that Being above, possesses also the total Living-Form in virtue of that transcendent life, possesses, no doubt, much else as well. Enneads VI,7,

But what is the Nature of this Transcendent in view of which and by way of which the Ideas are good? The best way of putting the question is to ask whether, when Intellectual-Principle looked towards The GOOD, it had Intellection of that unity as a multiplicity and, itself a unity, plied its Act by breaking into parts what it was too feeble to know as a whole. Enneads VI,7,

No: that would not be Intellection looking upon the GOOD; it would be a looking void of Intellection. We must think of it not as looking but as living; dependent upon That, it kept itself turned Thither; all the tendance taking place There and upon That must be a movement teeming with life and must so fill the looking Principle; there is no longer bare Act, there is a filling to saturation. Forthwith Intellectual-Principle becomes all things, knows that fact in virtue of its self-knowing and at once becomes Intellectual-Principle, filled so as to hold within itself that object of its vision, seeing all by the light from the Giver and bearing that Giver with it. Enneads VI,7,

In this way the Supreme may be understood to be the cause at once of essential reality and of the knowing of reality. The sun, cause of the existence of sense-things and of their being seen, is indirectly the cause of sight, without being either the faculty or the object: similarly this Principle, The GOOD, cause of Being and Intellectual-Principle, is a light appropriate to what is to be seen There and to their seer; neither the Beings nor the Intellectual-Principle, it is their source and by the light it sheds upon both makes them objects of Intellection. This filling procures the existence; after the filling, the being; the existence achieved, the seeing followed: the beginning is that state of not yet having been filled, though there is, also, the beginning which means that the Filling Principle was outside and by that act of filling gave shape to the filled. Enneads VI,7,

But in what way is the content of Intellectual-Principle participant in good? Is it because each member of it is an Idea or because of their beauty or how? Anything coming from The GOOD carries the image and type belonging to that original or deriving from it, as anything going back to warmth or sweetness carries the memory of those originals: Life entered into Intellectual-Principle from The Supreme, for its origin is in the Activity streaming Thence; Intellectual-Principle springs from the Supreme, and with it the beauty of the Ideas; at once all these, Life, Intellectual-Principle, Idea, must inevitably have goodness. Enneads VI,7,

But what is the common element in them? Derivation from the First is not enough to procure identical quality; there must be some element held in common by the things derived: one source may produce many differing things as also one outgoing thing may take difference in various recipients: what enters into the First Act is different from what that Act transmits and there is difference, again, in the effect here. Nonetheless every item may be good in a degree of its own. To what, then, is the highest degree due? But first we must ask whether Life is a good, bare Life, or only the Life streaming Thence, very different from the Life known here? Once more, then, what constitutes the goodness of Life? The Life of The GOOD, or rather not its Life but that given forth from it. Enneads VI,7,

But if in that higher Life there must be something from That, something which is the Authentic Life, we must admit that since nothing worthless can come Thence Life in itself is good; so too we must admit, in the case of Authentic Intellectual-Principle, that its Life because good derives from that First; thus it becomes clear that every Idea is good and informed by the GOOD. The Ideas must have something of good, whether as a common property or as a distinct attribution or as held in some distinct measure. Enneads VI,7,

Is The GOOD, then, inherent in the Ideas essentially? Each of them is good but the goodness is not that of the Unity-GOOD. How, then, is it present? By the mode of parts. Enneads VI,7,

But The GOOD is without parts? No doubt The GOOD is a unity; but here it has become particularized. The First Activity is good and anything determined in accord with it is good as also is any resultant. There is the good that is good by origin in The First, the good that is in an ordered system derived from that earlier, and the good that is in the actualization (in the thing participant). Derived, then, not identical – like the speech and walk and other characteristics of one man, each playing its due part. Enneads VI,7,

Why not halt, then – it will be asked – at Intellectual-Principle and make that The GOOD? Soul and life are traces of Intellectual-Principle; that principle is the Term of Soul which on judgement sets itself towards Intellectual-Principle, pronouncing right preferable to wrong and virtue in every form to vice, and thus ranking by its choosing. Enneads VI,7,

Now what in all these objects of desire is the fundamental making them good? We must be bold: Intellectual-Principle and that life are of the order of good and hold their desirability, even they, in virtue of belonging to that order; they have their goodness, I mean, because Life is an Activity in The GOOD, – Or rather, streaming from The GOOD – while Intellectual-Principle is an Activity already defined Therein; both are of radiant beauty and, because they come Thence and lead Thither, they are sought after by the soul-sought, that is, as things congenial though not veritably good while yet, as belonging to that order not to be rejected; the related, if not good, is shunned in spite of that relationship, and even remote and ignobler things may at times prove attractive. Enneads VI,7,

That light known, then indeed we are stirred towards those Beings in longing and rejoicing over the radiance about them, just as earthly love is not for the material form but for the Beauty manifested upon it. Every one of those Beings exists for itself but becomes an object of desire by the colour cast upon it from The GOOD, source of those graces and of the love they evoke. The soul taking that outflow from the divine is stirred; seized with a Bacchic passion, goaded by these goads, it becomes Love. Before that, even Intellectual-Principle with all its loveliness did not stir the soul; for that beauty is dead until it take the light of The GOOD, and the soul lies supine, cold to all, unquickened even to Intellectual-Principle there before it. But when there enters into it a glow from the divine, it gathers strength, awakens, spreads true wings, and however urged by its nearer environing, speeds its buoyant way elsewhere, to something greater to its memory: so long as there exists anything loftier than the near, its very nature bears it upwards, lifted by the giver of that love. Beyond Intellectual-Principle it passes but beyond The GOOD it cannot, for nothing stands above That. Let it remain in Intellectual-Principle and it sees the lovely and august, but it is not there possessed of all it sought; the face it sees is beautiful no doubt but not of power to hold its gaze because lacking in the radiant grace which is the bloom upon beauty. Enneads VI,7,

Why else is there more of the glory of beauty upon the living and only some faint trace of it upon the dead, though the face yet retains all its fulness and symmetry? Why are the most living portraits the most beautiful, even though the others happen to be more symmetric? Why is the living ugly more attractive than the sculptured handsome? It is that the one is more nearly what we are looking for, and this because there is soul there, because there is more of the Idea of The GOOD, because there is some glow of the light of The GOOD and this illumination awakens and lifts the soul and all that goes with it so that the whole man is won over to goodness, and in the fullest measure stirred to life. Enneads VI,7,

That which soul must quest, that which sheds its light upon Intellectual-Principle, leaving its mark wherever it falls, surely we need not wonder that it be of power to draw to itself, calling back from every wandering to rest before it. From it came all, and so there is nothing mightier; all is feeble before it. Of all things the best, must it not be The GOOD? If by The GOOD we mean the principle most wholly self-sufficing, utterly without need of any other, what can it be but this? Before all the rest, it was what it was, when evil had yet no place in things. Enneads VI,7,

If evil is a Later, there found where there is no trace of This – among the very ultimates, so that on the downward side evil has no beyond – then to This evil stands full contrary with no linking intermediate: This therefore is The GOOD: either good there is none, or if there must be, This and no other is it. Enneads VI,7,

But ourselves – how does it touch us? We may recall what we have said of the nature of the light shining from it into Intellectual-Principle and so by participation into the soul. But for the moment let us leave that aside and put another question: Does The GOOD hold that nature and name because some outside thing finds it desirable? May we put it that a thing desirable to one is good to that one and that what is desirable to all is to be recognised as The GOOD? No doubt this universal questing would make the goodness evident but still there must be in the nature something to earn that name. Enneads VI,7,

Further, is the questing determined by the hope of some acquisition or by sheer delight? If there is acquisition, what is it? If it is a matter of delight, why here rather than in something else? The question comes to this: Is goodness in the appropriate or in something apart, and is The GOOD good as regards itself also or good only as possessed? Any good is such, necessarily, not for itself but for something outside. Enneads VI,7,

And we must not overlook what some surly critic will surely bring up against us: What’s all this: you scatter praises here, there and everywhere: Life is good, Intellectual-Principle is good: and yet The GOOD is above them; how then can Intellectual-Principle itself be good? Or what do we gain by seeing the Ideas themselves if we see only a particular Idea and nothing else (nothing “substantial”)? If we are happy here we may be deceived into thinking life a good when it is merely pleasant; but suppose our lot unhappy, why should we speak of good? Is mere personal existence good? What profit is there in it? What is the advantage in existence over utter non-existence – unless goodness is to be founded upon our love of self? It is the deception rooted in the nature of things and our dread of dissolution that lead to all the “goods” of your positing. Enneads VI,7,

It is in view, probably, of this difficulty that Plato, in the Philebus, makes pleasure an element in the Term; the good is not defined as a simplex or set in Intellectual-Principle alone; while he rightly refrains from identifying the good with the pleasant, yet he does not allow Intellectual-Principle, foreign to pleasure, to be The GOOD, since he sees no attractive power in it. He may also have had in mind that the good, to answer to its name, must be a thing of delight and that an object of pursuit must at least hold some pleasure for those that acquire and possess it, so that where there is no joy the good too is absent, further that pleasure, implying pursuit, cannot pertain to the First and that therefore good cannot. Enneads VI,7,

All this was very well; there the enquiry was not as to the Primal GOOD but as to ours; the good dealt with in that passage pertains to very different beings and therefore is a different good; it is a good falling short of that higher; it is a mingled thing; we are to understand that good does not hold place in the One and Alone whose being is too great and different for that. Enneads VI,7,

The solution, it would seem, lies in priority: To the lowest of things the good is its immediate higher; each step represents the good to what stands lower so long as the movement does not tend awry but advances continuously towards the superior: thus there is a halt at the Ultimate, beyond which no ascent is possible: that is the First GOOD, the authentic, the supremely sovereign, the source of good to the rest of things. Enneads VI,7,

Matter would have Forming-Idea for its good, since, were it conscious, it would welcome that; body would look to soul, without which it could not be or endure; soul must look to virtue; still higher stands Intellectual-Principle; above that again is the principle we call the Primal. Each of these progressive priors must have act upon those minors to which they are, respectively, the good: some will confer order and place, others life, others wisdom and the good life: Intellectual-Principle will draw upon the Authentic GOOD which we hold to be coterminous with it, both as being an Activity put forth from it and as even now taking light from it. This good we will define later. Enneads VI,7,

But why should the Form which makes a thing good be a good to that thing? As being most appropriate? No: but because it is, itself, a portion of the GOOD. This is why the least alloyed and nearest to the good are most at peace within themselves. Enneads VI,7,

If we are asked how the evil thing can have tendency towards the good, we answer that we have not attributed tendency to Matter; our argument needed the hypothesis of sensation in Matter – in so far as possible consistently with retention of its character – and we asserted that the entry of Form, that dream of the GOOD, must raise it to a nobler order. If then Matter is Evil, there is no more to be said; if it is something else – a wrong thing, let us say – then in the hypothesis that its essence acquire sensation would not the appropriate upon the next or higher plane be its good, as in the other cases? But not what is evil in Matter would be the quester of good but that element in it (lowest Form) which in it is associated with evil. Enneads VI,7,

But if Matter by very essence is evil how could it choose the good? This question implies that if Evil were self-conscious it would admire itself: but how can the unadmirable be admired; and did we not discover that the good must be apt to the nature? There that question may rest. But if universally the good is Form and the higher the ascent the more there is of Form-Soul more truly Form than body is and phases of soul progressively of higher Form and Intellectual-Principle standing as Form to soul collectively – then the GOOD advances by the opposite of Matter and, therefore, by a cleansing and casting away to the utmost possible at each stage: and the greatest good must be there where all that is of Matter has disappeared. The Principle of GOOD rejecting Matter entirely – or rather never having come near it at any point or in any way – must hold itself aloft with that Formless in which Primal Form takes its origin. But we will return to this. Enneads VI,7,

But all this will become clear on the solution of our remaining difficulties and the rebuttal of the argument brought up against us. This takes the form of the question: “What gain is there in the GOOD to one who, fully conscious, feels nothing when he hears of these things, whether because he has no grasp of them but takes merely the words or because he holds to false values, perhaps being all in search of sense, finding his good in money or such things?” Enneads VI,7,

Now to found the good upon the Intellect and upon that state of soul or mind which springs from wisdom does not imply that the end or the absolute good is the conjunction (of Intellect and state): it would follow merely that Intellect is the good and that we feel happy in possession of that good. That is one theory; another associates pleasure with Intellect in the sense that the GOOD is taken to be some one thing founded upon both but depending upon our attaining or at least contemplating an Intellect so modified; this theory would maintain that the isolated and unrelated could be the good, could be an object of desire. Enneads VI,7,

But since Thence come the beauty and light in all, it is Thence that Intellectual-Principle took the brilliance of the Intellectual Energy which flashed Nature into being; Thence soul took power towards life, in virtue of that fuller life streaming into it. Intellectual-Principle was raised thus to that Supreme and remains with it, happy in that presence. Soul too, that soul which as possessing knowledge and vision was capable, clung to what it saw; and as its vision so its rapture; it saw and was stricken; but having in itself something of that principle it felt its kinship and was moved to longing like those stirred by the image of the beloved to desire of the veritable presence. Lovers here mould themselves to the beloved; they seek to increase their attraction of person and their likeness of mind; they are unwilling to fall short in moral quality or in other graces lest they be distasteful to those possessing such merit – and only among such can true love be. In the same way the soul loves the Supreme GOOD, from its very beginnings stirred by it to love. The soul which has never strayed from this love waits for no reminding from the beauty of our world: holding that love – perhaps unawares – it is ever in quest, and, in its longing to be borne Thither, passes over what is lovely here and with one glance at the beauty of the universe dismisses all; for it sees that all is put together of flesh and Matter, befouled by its housing, made fragmentary by corporal extension, not the Authentic Beauty which could never venture into the mud of body to be soiled, annulled. Enneads VI,7,

The Intellectual-Principle is the less for seeing things as distinct even in its act of grasping in unity the multiple content of its Intellectual realm; in its knowing of the particular it possesses itself of one Intellectual shape; but, even thus, in this dealing with variety as unity, it leaves us still with the question how we are to envisage that which stands beyond this all-lovely, beyond this principle at once multiple and above multiplicity, the Supreme for which the soul hungers though unable to tell why such a being should stir its longing-reason, however, urging that This at last is the Authentic Term because the Nature best and most to be loved may be found there only where there is no least touch of Form. Bring something under Form and present it so before the mind; immediately we ask what Beyond imposed that shape; reason answers that while there exists the giver having shape to give – a giver that is shape, idea, an entirely measured thing – yet this is not alone, is not adequate in itself, is not beautiful in its own right but is a mingled thing. Shape and idea and measure will always be beautiful, but the Authentic Beauty and the Beyond-Beauty cannot be under measure and therefore cannot have admitted shape or be Idea: the primal existent, The First, must be without Form; the beauty in it must be, simply, the Nature of the Intellectual GOOD. Enneads VI,7,

The GOOD spreading out above them and adapting itself to that union which it hastens to confirm is present to them as giver of a blessed sense and sight; so high it lifts them that they are no longer in space or in that realm of difference where everything is root,ed in some other thing; for The GOOD is not in place but is the container of the Intellectual place; The GOOD is in nothing but itself. Enneads VI,7,

Knowledge of The GOOD or contact with it, is the all-important: this – we read – is the grand learning, the learning we are to understand, not of looking towards it but attaining, first, some knowledge of it. We come to this learning by analogies, by abstractions, by our understanding of its subsequents, of all that is derived from The GOOD, by the upward steps towards it. Purification has The GOOD for goal; so the virtues, all right ordering, ascent within the Intellectual, settlement therein, banqueting upon the divine – by these methods one becomes, to self and to all else, at once seen and seer; identical with Being and Intellectual-Principle and the entire living all, we no longer see the Supreme as an external; we are near now, the next is That and it is close at hand, radiant above the Intellectual. Enneads VI,7,

And yet this “He Is” does not truly apply: the Supreme has no need of Being: even “He is good” does not apply since it indicates Being: the “is” should not suggest something predicated of another thing; it is to state identity. The word “good” used of him is not a predicate asserting his possession of goodness; it conveys an identification. It is not that we think it exact to call him either good or The GOOD: it is that sheer negation does not indicate; we use the term The GOOD to assert identity without the affirmation of Being. Enneads VI,7,

If that intellection were the GOOD, then the intellection would not be self-intellection but intellection of the GOOD; not the Supreme but that intellection would be the GOOD: if on the contrary that intellection of the GOOD is distinct from the GOOD, at once the GOOD exists before its knowing; all-sufficiently good in itself, it needs none of that knowing of its own nature. Enneads VI,7,

Thus the Supreme does not know itself as GOOD. Enneads VI,7,

That all-transcending cannot have had an activity by which to produce this activity – acting before act existed – or have had thought in order to produce thinking – applying thought before thought exists – all intellection, even of the GOOD, is beneath it. Enneads VI,7,

In sum, this intellection of the GOOD is impossible: I do not mean that it is impossible to have intellection of the GOOD – we may admit the possibility but there can be no intellection by The GOOD itself, for this would be to include the inferior with the GOOD. Enneads VI,7,

If intellection is the lower, then it will be bound up with Being; if intellection is the higher, its object is lower. Intellection, then, does not exist in the GOOD; as a lesser, taking its worth through that GOOD, it must stand apart from it, leaving the GOOD unsoiled by it as by all else. Immune from intellection the GOOD remains incontaminably what it is, not impeded by the presence of the intellectual act which would annul its purity and unity. Enneads VI,7,

Anyone making the GOOD at once Thinker and Thought identifies it with Being and with the Intellection vested in Being so that it must perform that act of intellection: at once it becomes necessary to find another principle, one superior to that GOOD: for either this act, this intellection, is a completing power of some such principle, serving as its ground, or it points, by that duality, to a prior principle having intellection as a characteristic. It is because there is something before it that it has an object of intellection; even in its self-intellection, it may be said to know its content by its vision of that prior. Enneads VI,7,

“Know yourself” is a precept for those who, being manifold, have the task of appraising themselves so as to become aware of the number and nature of their constituents, some or all of which they ignore as they ignore their very principle and their manner of being. The First on the contrary if it have content must exist in a way too great to have any knowledge, intellection, perception of it. To itself it is nothing; accepting nothing, self-sufficing, it is not even a good to itself: to others it is good for they have need of it; but it could not lack itself: it would be absurd to suppose The GOOD standing in need of goodness. Enneads VI,7,

Soul dependent upon Intellectual-Principle and Intellectual-Principle upon the GOOD, all is linked to the Supreme by intermediaries, some close, some nearing those of the closer attachment, while the order of sense stands remotest, dependent upon soul. Enneads VI,7,

In a principle, act and essence must be free. No doubt Intellectual-Principle itself is to be referred to a yet higher; but this higher is not extern to it; Intellectual-Principle is within the GOOD; possessing its own good in virtue of that indwelling, much more will it possess freedom and self-disposal which are sought only for the sake of the good. Acting towards the good, it must all the more possess self-disposal for by that Act it is directed towards the Principle from which it proceeds, and this its act is self-centred and must entail its very greatest good. Enneads VI,8,

Soul becomes free when it moves, through Intellectual-Principle, towards The GOOD; what it does in that spirit is its free act; Intellectual-Principle is free in its own right. That principle of GOOD is the sole object of desire and the source of self-disposal to the rest, to soul when it fully attains, to Intellectual-Principle by connate possession. Enneads VI,8,

This state of freedom belongs in the absolute degree to the Eternals in right of that eternity and to other beings in so far as without hindrance they possess or pursue The GOOD which, standing above them all, must manifestly be the only good they can reasonably seek. Enneads VI,8,

To say that The GOOD exists by chance must be false; chance belongs to the later, to the multiple; since the First has never come to be, we cannot speak of it either as coming by chance into being or as not master of its being. Absurd also the objection that it acts in accordance with its being if this is to suggest that freedom demands act or other expression against the nature. Neither does its nature as the unique annul its freedom when this is the result of no compulsion but means only that The GOOD is no other than itself, is self-complete and has no higher. Enneads VI,8,

The objection would imply that where there is most good there is least freedom. If this is absurd, still more absurd to deny freedom to The GOOD on the ground that it is good and self-concentred, not needing to lean upon anything else but actually being the Term to which all tends, itself moving to none. Enneads VI,8,

Where – since we must use such words – the essential act is identical with the being – and this identity must obtain in The GOOD since it holds even in Intellectual-Principle – there the act is no more determined by the Being than the Being by the Act. Thus “acting according to its nature” does not apply; the Act, the Life, so to speak, cannot be held to issue from the Being; the Being accompanies the Act in an eternal association: from the two (Being and Act) it forms itself into The GOOD, self-springing and unspringing. Enneads VI,8,

All the rest waits for the appearing of the king to hail him for himself, not a being of accident and happening but authentically king, authentically Principle, The GOOD authentically, not a being that acts in conformity with goodness – and so, recognisably, a secondary – but the total unity that he is, no moulding upon goodness but the very GOOD itself. Enneads VI,8,

Consider also that every being in its pursuit of its good seeks to be that good rather than what it is it judges itself most truly to be when it partakes of its good: in so far as it thus draws on its good its being is its choice: much more, then, must the very Principle, The GOOD, be desirable in itself when any fragment of it is very desirable to the extern and becomes the chosen essence promoting that extern’s will and identical with the will that gave the existence? As long as a thing is apart from its good it seeks outside itself; when it holds its good it itself as it is: and this is no matter of chance; the essence now is not outside of the will; by the good it is determined, by the good it is in self-possession. Enneads VI,8,

If then this Principle is the means of determination to everything else, we see at once that self-possession must belong primally to it, so that, through it, others in their turn may be self-belonging: what we must call its essence comports its will to possess such a manner of being; we can form no idea of it without including in it the will towards itself as it is. It must be a consistent self willing its being and being what it wills; its will and itself must be one thing, all the more one from the absence of distinction between a given nature and one which would be preferred. What could The GOOD have wished to be other than what it is? Suppose it had the choice of being what it preferred, power to alter the nature, it could not prefer to be something else; it could have no fault to find with anything in its nature, as if that nature were imposed by force; The GOOD is what from always it wished and wishes to be. For the really existent GOOD is a willing towards itself, towards a good not gained by any wiles or even attracted to it by force of its nature; The GOOD is what it chose to be and, in fact, there was never anything outside it to which it could be drawn. Enneads VI,8,

It may be added that nothing else contains in its essence the principle of its own satisfaction; there will be inner discord: but this hypostasis of the GOOD must necessarily have self-option, the will towards the self; if it had not, it could not bring satisfaction to the beings whose contentment demands participation in it or imagination of it. Enneads VI,8,

Once more, we must be patient with language; we are forced to apply to the Supreme terms which strictly are ruled out; everywhere we must read “So to speak.” The GOOD, then, exists; it holds its existence through choice and will, conditions of its very being: yet it cannot be a manifold; therefore the will and the essential being must be taken as one identity; the act of the will must be self-determined and the being self-caused; thus reason shows the Supreme to be its own Author. For if the act of will springs from God Himself and is as it were His operation and the same will is identical with His essence, He must be self-established. He is not, therefore, “what He has happened to be” but what He has willed to be. Enneads VI,8,

Of things carrying their causes within, none arises at hazard or without purpose; this “So it happened to be” is applicable to none. All that they have comes from The GOOD; the Supreme itself, then, as author of reason, of causation, and of causing essence – all certainly lying far outside of chance – must be the Principle and as it were the examplar of things, thus independent of hazard: it is, the First, the Authentic, immune from chance, from blind effect and happening: God is cause of Himself; for Himself and of Himself He is what He is, the first self, transcendently The Self. Enneads VI,8,

Ninth tractate – On the GOOD, or the One. Enneads VI,8,

There is no other way of stating Intellectual-Principle than as that which, holding itself in the presence of The GOOD and First and looking towards That, is self-present also, self-knowing and Knowing itself as All-Being: thus manifold, it is far from being The Unity. Enneads VI,8,

We are in search of unity; we are to come to know the principle of all, the GOOD and First; therefore we may not stand away from the realm of Firsts and lie prostrate among the lasts: we must strike for those Firsts, rising from things of sense which are the lasts. Cleared of all evil in our intention towards The GOOD, we must ascend to the Principle within ourselves; from many, we must become one; only so do we attain to knowledge of that which is Principle and Unity. We shape ourselves into Intellectual-Principle; we make over our soul in trust to Intellectual-Principle and set it firmly in That; thus what That sees the soul will waken to see; it is through the Intellectual-Principle that we have this vision of The Unity; it must be our care to bring over nothing whatever from sense, to allow nothing even of soul to enter into Intellectual-Principle: with Intellect pure, and with the summit of Intellect, we are to see the All-Pure. Enneads VI,8,

The sovranly self-sufficing principle will be Unity-Absolute, for only in this Unity is there a nature above all need, whether within itself or in regard to the rest of things. Unity seeks nothing towards its being or its well-being or its safehold upon existence; cause to all, how can it acquire its character outside of itself or know any good outside? The good of its being can be no borrowing: This is The GOOD. Nor has it station; it needs no standing ground as if inadequate to its own sustaining; what calls for such underpropping is the soulless, some material mass that must be based or fall. This is base to all, cause of universal existence and of ordered station. All that demands place is in need; a First cannot go in need of its sequents: all need is effort towards a first principle; the First, principle to all, must be utterly without need. If the Unity be seeking, it must inevitably be seeking to be something other than itself; it is seeking its own destroyer. Whatever may be said to be in need of a good is needing a preserver; nothing can be a good to The Unity, therefore. Enneads VI,8,

This Principle is not, therefore, to be identified with the good of which it is the source; it is good in the unique mode of being The GOOD above all that is good. Enneads VI,8,

In this choiring, the soul looks upon the wellspring of Life, wellspring also of Intellect, beginning of Being, fount of GOOD, root of Soul. It is not that these are poured out from the Supreme lessening it as if it were a thing of mass. At that the emanants would be perishable; but they are eternal; they spring from an eternal principle, which produces them not by its fragmentation but in virtue of its intact identity: therefore they too hold firm; so long as the sun shines, so long there will be light. Enneads VI,8,