I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an IDEA of likeness in itself, and another IDEA of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate — things which participate in likeness become in that degree and manner like ; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both ? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation ? — Where is the wonder ? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a wonder ; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest : I should be surprised to hear that the natures or IDEAs themselves had these opposite qualities ; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude ; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that such things as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the coexistence the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many ; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to abstract simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar IDEAs, and then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner ; but, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if any one found in the IDEAs themselves which are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown to exist in visible objects. PARMENIDES
Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy ; tell me now, was this your own distinction between IDEAs in themselves and the things which partake of them ? and do you think that there is an IDEA of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many, and of the other things which Zeno mentioned ? PARMENIDES
And would you make an IDEA of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water ? PARMENIDES
And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the mention may provoke a smile ? — I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry ; would you suppose that each of these has an IDEA distinct from the actual objects with which we come into contact, or not ? PARMENIDES
Certainly not, said Socrates ; visible things like these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any IDEA of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an IDEA ; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish ; and so I return to the IDEAs of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them. PARMENIDES
Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the IDEA or else of a part of the IDEA ? Can there be any other mode of participation ? PARMENIDES
Then do you think that the whole IDEA is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many ? PARMENIDES
Nay, but the IDEA may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with itself ; in this way each IDEA may be one ; and the same in all at the same time. PARMENIDES
Then, Socrates, the IDEAs themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole IDEA existing in each of them ? PARMENIDES
Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one IDEA is really divisible and yet remains one ? PARMENIDES
I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one IDEA of each kind is as follows : — You see a number of great objects, and when you look at them there seems to you to be one and the same IDEA (or nature) in them all ; hence you conceive of greatness as one. PARMENIDES
And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view the IDEA of greatness and of great things which are not the IDEA, and to compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of all these ? PARMENIDES
Then another IDEA of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it ; and then another, over and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each IDEA instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied. PARMENIDES
But may not the IDEAs, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides ? For in that case each IDEA may still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication. PARMENIDES
And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, be an IDEA ? PARMENIDES
But if, said he, the individual is like the IDEA, must not the IDEA also be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the IDEA ? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of like. PARMENIDES
And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same IDEA ? PARMENIDES
And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the IDEA itself ? PARMENIDES
Then the IDEA cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the IDEA ; for if they are alike, some further IDEA of likeness will always be coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another ; and new IDEAs will be always arising, if the IDEA resembles that which partakes of it ? PARMENIDES
And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single IDEA, parting it off from other things. PARMENIDES
I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides : — A master has a slave ; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is simply a relation of one man to another. But there is also an IDEA of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the IDEA of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them ; they are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning ? PARMENIDES
And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute IDEA of knowledge ? PARMENIDES
And we have not got the IDEA of knowledge ? PARMENIDES
And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his attention on these and the like difficulties, does away with IDEAs of things and will not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate IDEA which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest ; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted. PARMENIDES
And if we were to abstract from them in IDEA the very smallest fraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a multitude and not one ? PARMENIDES