In sum, then, life is the Good to the living, and the Intellectual-Principle to what is intellective; so that where there is life with INTELLECTION there is a double contact with the Good. Enneads I,7,
All knowledge comes by Reason and the Intellectual Act; in this case Reason conveys information in any account it gives, but the act which aims at being intellectual is, here, not INTELLECTION but rather its failure: therefore the representation of Matter must be spurious, unreal, something sprung of the Alien, of the unreal, and bound up with the alien reason. Enneads II,4,
But is not such a void precisely what the Soul experiences when it has no INTELLECTION whatever? No: in that case it affirms nothing, or rather has no experience: but in knowing Matter, it has an experience, what may be described as the impact of the shapeless; for in its very consciousness of objects that have taken shape and size it knows them as compounds (i.e., as possessing with these forms a formless base) for they appear as things that have accepted colour and other quality. Enneads II,4,
There is in the Intellectual Principle no progression from some power capable of INTELLECTION to the Actuality of INTELLECTION: such a progression would send us in search of a Prior Principle not progressing from Power to Act; there all stands ever realized. Potentiality requires an intervention from outside itself to bring it to the actualization which otherwise cannot be; but what possesses, of itself, identity unchangeable for ever is an actualization: all the Firsts then are actualizations, simply because eternally and of themselves they possess all that is necessary to their completion. Enneads: II V.
To increase the Primals by making the Supreme Mind engender the Reason-Principle, and this again engender in the Soul a distinct power to act as mediator between Soul and the Supreme Mind, this is to deny INTELLECTION to the Soul, which would no longer derive its Reason from the Intellectual-Principle but from an intermediate: the Soul then would possess not the Reason-Principle but an image of it: the Soul could not know the Intellectual-Principle; it could have no INTELLECTION. Enneads: II VIII.
The relationship may be presented thus: The authentic and primal Kosmos is the Being of the Intellectual Principle and of the Veritable Existent. This contains within itself no spatial distinction, and has none of the feebleness of division, and even its parts bring no incompleteness to it since here the individual is not severed from the entire. In this Nature inheres all life and all intellect, a life living and having INTELLECTION as one act within a unity: every part that it gives forth is a whole; all its content is its very own, for there is here no separation of thing from thing, no part standing in isolated existence estranged from the rest, and therefore nowhere is there any wronging of any other, any opposition. Everywhere one and complete, it is at rest throughout and shows difference at no point; it does not make over any of its content into any new form; there can be no reason for changing what is everywhere perfect. Enneads III,2,
In the same way, human beings, when weak on the side of contemplation, find in action their trace of vision and of reason: their spiritual feebleness unfits them for contemplation; they are left with a void, because they cannot adequately seize the vision; yet they long for it; they are hurried into action as their way to the vision which they cannot attain by INTELLECTION. They act from the desire of seeing their action, and of making it visible and sensible to others when the result shall prove fairly well equal to the plan. Everywhere, doing and making will be found to be either an attenuation or a complement of vision-attenuation if the doer was aiming only at the thing done; complement if he is to possess something nobler to gaze upon than the mere work produced. Enneads III,8,
These are very near to the un-needing, to that which has no need of Knowing, they have abundance and INTELLECTION authentically, as being the first to possess. But, there is that before them which neither needs nor possesses anything, since, needing or possessing anything else, it would not be what it is – the Good. Enneads III,8,
The Intelligible Object is the Intellectual-Principle itself in its repose, unity, immobility: the Intellectual-Principle, contemplator of that object – of the Intellectual-Principle thus in repose is an active manifestation of the same Being, an Act which contemplates its unmoved phase and, as thus contemplating, stands as Intellectual-Principle to that of which it has the INTELLECTION: it is Intellectual-Principle in virtue of having that INTELLECTION, and at the same time is Intellectual Object, by assimilation. Enneads III,8,
(C) When we exercise INTELLECTION upon ourselves, we are, obviously, observing an intellective nature, for otherwise we would not be able to have that INTELLECTION. Enneads III,8,
We know, and it is ourselves that we know; therefore we know the reality of a knowing nature: therefore, before that INTELLECTION in Act, there is another INTELLECTION, one at rest, so to speak. Enneads III,8,
Similarly, that self-INTELLECTION is an act upon a reality and upon a life; therefore, before the Life and Real-Being concerned in the INTELLECTION, there must be another Being and Life. In a word, INTELLECTION is vested in the activities themselves: since, then, the activities of self-INTELLECTION are intellective-forms, We, the Authentic We, are the Intelligibles and self-INTELLECTION conveys the Image of the Intellectual Sphere. Enneads III,8,
(D) The Primal is a potentiality of Movement and of Repose – and so is above and beyond both – its next subsequent has rest and movement about the Primal. Now this subsequent is the Intellectual-Principle – so characterized by having INTELLECTION of something not identical with itself whereas the Primal is without INTELLECTION. A knowing principle has duality (that entailed by being the knower of something) and, moreover, it knows itself as deficient since its virtue consists in this knowing and not in its own bare Being. Enneads III,8,
(F)… But the First is not to be envisaged as made up from Gods of a transcendent order: no; the Authentic Existents constitute the Intellectual-Principle with Which motion and rest begin. The Primal touches nothing, but is the centre round which those other Beings lie in repose and in movement. For Movement is aiming, and the Primal aims at nothing; what could the Summit aspire to? Has It, even, no Intellection of Itself? It possesses Itself and therefore is said in general terms to know itself… But INTELLECTION does not mean self-ownership; it means turning the gaze towards the Primal: now the act of INTELLECTION is itself the Primal Act, and there is therefore no place for any earlier one. The Being projecting this Act transcends the Act so that Intellection is secondary to the Being in which it resides. Intellection is not the transcendently venerable thing – neither Intellection in general nor even the Intellection of The Good. Apart from and over any Intellection stands The Good itself. Enneads III,8,
Our opponents will probably deny the validity of our arguments against the theory that the human soul is a mere segment of the All-Soul – the considerations, namely, that it is of identical scope, and that it is intellective in the same degree, supposing them, even, to admit that equality of INTELLECTION. Enneads IV,3,
No memory, therefore, can be ascribed to any divine being, or to the Authentic-Existent or the Intellectual-Principle: these are intangibly immune; time does not approach them; they possess eternity centred around Being; they know nothing of past and sequent; all is an unbroken state of identity, not receptive of change. Now a being rooted in unchanging identity cannot entertain memory, since it has not and never had a state differing from any previous state, or any new INTELLECTION following upon a former one, so as to be aware of contrast between a present perception and one remembered from before. Enneads IV,3,
This explains, also, another fact: the soul is unfailingly intent upon INTELLECTION; only when it acts upon this image-taking faculty does its INTELLECTION become a human perception: INTELLECTION is one thing, the perception of an INTELLECTION is another: we are continuously intuitive but we are not unbrokenly aware: the reason is that the recipient in us receives from both sides, absorbing not merely INTELLECTIONs but also sense-perceptions. Enneads IV,3,
When we seize anything in the direct intellectual act there is room for nothing else than to know and to contemplate the object; and in the knowing there is not included any previous knowledge; all such assertion of stage and progress belongs to the lower and is a sign of the altered; this means that, once purely in the Intellectual, no one of us can have any memory of our experience here. Further; if all INTELLECTION is timeless – as appears from the fact that the Intellectual beings are of eternity not of time – there can be no memory in the intellectual world, not merely none of earthly things but none whatever: all is presence There; for nothing passes away, there is no change from old to new. Enneads IV,4,
Enough on that point: we come now to the question of memory of the personality? There will not even be memory of the personality; no thought that the contemplator is the self – Socrates, for example – or that it is Intellect or Soul. In this connection it should be borne in mind that, in contemplative vision, especially when it is vivid, we are not at the time aware of our own personality; we are in possession of ourselves but the activity is towards the object of vision with which the thinker becomes identified; he has made himself over as matter to be shaped; he takes ideal form under the action of the vision while remaining, potentially, himself. This means that he is actively himself when he has INTELLECTION of nothing. Enneads IV,4,
Or, if he is himself (pure and simple), he is empty of all: if, on the contrary, he is himself (by the self-possession of contemplation) in such a way as to be identified with what is all, then by the act of self-INTELLECTION he has the simultaneous INTELLECTION of all: in such a case self-intuition by personal activity brings the INTELLECTION, not merely of the self, but also of the total therein embraced; and similarly the intuition of the total of things brings that of the personal self as included among all. Enneads IV,4,
Nature, being thus a mere communicator, does not possess even the imaging act. There is (within the Soul) INTELLECTION, superior to imagination; and there is imagination standing midway between that INTELLECTION and the impression of which alone Nature is capable. For Nature has no perception or consciousness of anything; imagination (the imaging faculty) has consciousness of the external, for it enables that which entertains the image to have knowledge of the experience encountered, while Nature’s function is to engender – of itself though in an act derived from the active principle (of the soul). Enneads IV,4,
Thus the Intellectual-Principle possesses: the Soul of the All eternally receives from it; this is the soul’s life; its consciousness is its INTELLECTION of what is thus eternally present to it; what proceeds from it into Matter and is manifested there is Nature, with which – or even a little before it – the series of real being comes to an end, for all in this order are the ultimates of the intellectual order and the beginnings of the imitative. Enneads IV,4,
Isolated, self-acting, how is it possible? Self-acting, it has knowledge of its own content, and this is not perception but INTELLECTION: if it is also to know things outside itself it can grasp them only in one of two ways: either it must assimilate itself to the external objects, or it must enter into relations with something that has been so assimilated. Enneads IV,4,
If sensation is apprehension by means of the soul’s employment of the body, INTELLECTION cannot be a similar use of the body or it would be identical with sensation. If then INTELLECTION is apprehension apart from body, much more must there be a distinction between the body and the intellective principle: sensation for objects of sense, INTELLECTION for the intellectual object. And even if this be rejected, it must still be admitted that there do exist INTELLECTIONs of intellectual objects and perceptions of objects not possessing magnitude: how, we may then ask, can a thing of magnitude know a thing that has no magnitude, or how can the partless be known by means of what has parts? We will be told “By some partless part.” But, at this, the intellective will not be body: for contact does not need a whole; one point suffices. If then it be conceded – and it cannot be denied – that the primal INTELLECTIONs deal with objects completely incorporeal, the principle of INTELLECTION itself must know by virtue of being, or becoming, free from body. Even if they hold that all INTELLECTION deals with the ideal forms in Matter, still it always takes place by abstraction from the bodies (in which these forms appear) and the separating agent is the Intellectual-Principle. For assuredly the process by which we abstract circle, triangle, line or point, is not carried through by the aid of flesh or Matter of any kind; in all such acts the soul or mind must separate itself from the material: at once we see that it cannot be itself material. Similarly it will be agreed that, as beauty and justice are things without magnitude, so must be the intellective act that grasps them. Enneads IV,7,
A. (sometimes appearing as 9) There are those who insist on the activities observed in bodies – warming, chilling, thrusting, pressing – and class soul with body, as it were to assure its efficacy. This ignores the double fact that the very bodies themselves exercise such efficiency by means of the incorporeal powers operating in them, and that these are not the powers we attribute to soul: INTELLECTION, perception, reasoning, desire, wise and effective action in all regards, these point to a very different form of being. Enneads IV,7,
If they treat God as they do the Intellectual-Principle – as later, engendered and deriving INTELLECTION from without – soul and intellect and God may prove to have no existence: this would follow if a potentiality could not come to existence, or does not become actual, unless the corresponding actuality exists. And what could lead it onward if there were no separate being in previous actuality? Even on the absurd supposition that the potentially existent brings itself to actuality, it must be looking to some Term, and that must be no potentiality but actual. Enneads IV,7,
Now; if the soul has been so injected as to be assimilated into the body as the design of a statue is worked into the bronze, it will follow that, upon any dividing of the body, the soul is divided with it, and if any part of the body is cut away a fragment of soul must go with it. Since an Entelechy must be inseparable from the being of which it is the accomplished actuality, the withdrawal of the soul in sleep cannot occur; in fact sleep itself cannot occur. Moreover if the soul is an Entelechy, there is an end to the resistance offered by reason to the desires; the total (of body and Entelechy-Soul) must have one-uniform experience throughout, and be aware of no internal contradiction. Sense-perception might occur; but INTELLECTION would be impossible. The very upholders of the Entelechy are thus compelled to introduce another soul, the Intellect, to which they ascribe immortality. The reasoning soul, then, must be an Entelechy – if the word is to be used at all – in some other mode. Enneads IV,7,
To know the nature of a thing we must observe it in its unalloyed state, since any addition obscures the reality. Clear, then look: or, rather, let a man first purify himself and then observe: he will not doubt his immortality when he sees himself thus entered into the pure, the Intellectual. For, what he sees is an Intellectual-Principle looking on nothing of sense, nothing of this mortality, but by its own eternity having INTELLECTION of the eternal: he will see all things in this Intellectual substance, himself having become an Intellectual Kosmos and all lightsome, illuminated by the truth streaming from The Good, which radiates truth upon all that stands within that realm of the divine. Enneads IV,7,
Each is a principle of motion, each is self-living, each touches the same sphere by the same tentacles, each has INTELLECTION of the celestial order and of the super-celestial, each is seeking to win to what has essential being, each is moving upwards to the primal source. Enneads IV,7,
Many times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself; becoming external to all other things and self-encentered; beholding a marvellous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with the loftiest order; enacting the noblest life, acquiring identity with the divine; stationing within It by having attained that activity; poised above whatsoever within the Intellectual is less than the Supreme: yet, there comes the moment of descent from INTELLECTION to reasoning, and after that sojourn in the divine, I ask myself how it happens that I can now be descending, and how did the soul ever enter into my body, the soul which, even within the body, is the high thing it has shown itself to be. Enneads IV,8,
No doubt the task of the soul, in its more emphatically reasoning phase, is INTELLECTION: but it must have another as well, or it would be undistinguishable from the Intellectual-Principle. To its quality of being intellective it adds the quality by which it attains its particular manner of being: remaining, therefore, an Intellectual-Principle, it has thenceforth its own task too, as everything must that exists among real beings. Enneads IV,8,
It looks towards its higher and has INTELLECTION; towards itself and conserves its peculiar being; towards its lower and orders, administers, governs. Enneads IV,8,
Soul, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a secondary, an image of the Intellectual-Principle: reason uttered is an image of the reason stored within the soul, and in the same way soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle: it is even the total of its activity, the entire stream of life sent forth by that Principle to the production of further being; it is the forthgoing heat of a fire which has also heat essentially inherent. But within the Supreme we must see energy not as an overflow but in the double aspect of integral inherence with the establishment of a new being. Sprung, in other words, from the Intellectual-Principle, Soul is intellective, but with an INTELLECTION operation by the method of reasonings: for its perfecting it must look to that Divine Mind, which may be thought of as a father watching over the development of his child born imperfect in comparison with himself. Enneads: V I
That archetypal world is the true Golden Age, age of Kronos, who is the Intellectual-Principle as being the offspring or exuberance of God. For here is contained all that is immortal: nothing here but is Divine Mind; all is God; this is the place of every soul. Here is rest unbroken: for how can that seek change, in which all is well; what need that reach to, which holds all within itself; what increase can that desire, which stands utterly achieved? All its content, thus, is perfect, that itself may be perfect throughout, as holding nothing that is less than the divine, nothing that is less than intellective. Its knowing is not by search but by possession, its blessedness inherent, not acquired; for all belongs to it eternally and it holds the authentic Eternity imitated by Time which, circling round the Soul, makes towards the new thing and passes by the old. Soul deals with thing after thing – now Socrates; now a horse: always some one entity from among beings – but the Intellectual-Principle is all and therefore its entire content is simultaneously present in that identity: this is pure being in eternal actuality; nowhere is there any future, for every then is a now; nor is there any past, for nothing there has ever ceased to be; everything has taken its stand for ever, an identity well pleased, we might say, to be as it is; and everything, in that entire content, is Intellectual-Principle and Authentic Existence; and the total of all is Intellectual-Principle entire and Being entire. Intellectual-Principle by its intellective act establishes Being, which in turn, as the object of INTELLECTION, becomes the cause of INTELLECTION and of existence to the Intellectual-Principle – though, of course, there is another cause of INTELLECTION which is also a cause to Being, both rising in a source distinct from either. Enneads: V I
Now while these two are coalescents, having their existence in common, and are never apart, still the unity they form is two-sided; there is Intellectual-Principle as against Being, the intellectual agent as against the object of INTELLECTION; we consider the intellective act and we have the Intellectual-Principle; we think of the object of that act and we have Being. Enneads: V I
Such difference there must be if there is to be any INTELLECTION; but similarly there must also be identity (since, in perfect knowing, subject and object are identical.) Enneads: V I
So too the objects of INTELLECTION (the ideal content of the Divine Mind) – identical in virtue of the self-concentration of the principle which is their common ground – must still be distinct each from another; this distinction constitutes Difference. Enneads: V I
Thus by what we call the Number and the Dyad of that higher realm, we mean Reason Principles and the Intellectual-Principle: but while the Dyad is, as regards that sphere, undetermined – representing, as it were, the underly (or Matter) of The One – the later Number (or Quantity) – that which rises from the Dyad (Intellectual-Principle) and The One – is not Matter to the later existents but is their forming-Idea, for all of them take shape, so to speak, from the ideas rising within this. The determination of the Dyad is brought about partly from its object – The One – and partly from itself, as is the case with all vision in the act of sight: INTELLECTION (the Act of the Dyad) is vision occupied upon The One. Enneads: V I
We must be more explicit: The Intellectual-Principle stands as the image of The One, firstly because there is a certain necessity that the first should have its offspring, carrying onward much of its quality, in other words that there be something in its likeness as the sun’s rays tell of the sun. Yet The One is not an Intellectual-Principle; how then does it engender an Intellectual-Principle? Simply by the fact that in its self-quest it has vision: this very seeing is the Intellectual-Principle. Any perception of the external indicates either sensation or INTELLECTION, sensation symbolized by a line, INTELLECTION by a circle… (corrupt passage). Enneads: V I
The items of this potentiality the divine INTELLECTION brings out, so to speak, from the unity and knows them in detail, as it must if it is to be an intellectual principle. Enneads: V I
It has besides a consciousness, as it were, within itself of this same potentiality; it knows that it can of itself beget an hypostasis and can determine its own Being by the virtue emanating from its prior; it knows that its nature is in some sense a definite part of the content of that First; that it thence derives its essence, that its strength lies there and that its Being takes perfection as a derivative and a recipient from the First. It sees that, as a member of the realm of division and part, it receives life and INTELLECTION and all else it has and is, from the undivided and partless, since that First is no member of existence, but can be the source of all on condition only of being held down by no one distinctive shape but remaining the undeflected unity. Enneads: V I
“Knowing and Being are one thing he says, and this unity is to him motionless in spite of the INTELLECTION he attributes to it: to preserve its unchanging identity he excludes all bodily movement from it; and he compares it to a huge sphere in that it holds and envelops all existence and that its INTELLECTION is not an outgoing act but internal. Still, with all his affirmation of unity, his own writings lay him open to the reproach that his unity turns out to be a multiplicity. Enneads: V I
But taking Primal Intellection and its intellectual object to be a unity, how does that give an Intellective Being knowing itself? An INTELLECTION enveloping its object or identical with it is far from exhibiting the Intellectual-Principle as self-knowing. Enneads V,3,
All turns on the identity. The intellectual object is itself an activity, not a mere potentiality; it is not lifeless; nor are the life and INTELLECTION brought into it as into something naturally devoid of them, some stone or other dead matter; no, the intellectual object is essentially existent, the primal reality. As an active force, the first activity, it must be, also itself, the noblest INTELLECTION, INTELLECTION possessing real being since it is entirely true; and such an INTELLECTION, primal and primally existent, can be no other than the primal principle of Intellection: for that primal principle is no potentiality and cannot be an agent distinct from its act and thus, once more, possessing its essential being as a mere potentiality. As an act – and one whose very being is an act – it must be undistinguishably identical with its act: but Being and the Intellectual object are also identical with that act; therefore the Intellectual-Principle, its exercise of INTELLECTION and the object of INTELLECTION all are identical. Given its INTELLECTION identical with intellectual object and the object identical with the Principle itself, it cannot but have self-knowledge: its INTELLECTION operates by the intellectual act which is itself upon the intellectual object which similarly is itself. It possesses self-knowing, thus, on every count; the act is itself; and the object seen in that act – self, is itself. Enneads V,3,
The soul therefore (to attain self-knowledge) has only to set this image (that is to say, its highest phase) alongside the veritable Intellectual-Principle which we have found to be identical with the truths constituting the objects of INTELLECTION, the world of Primals and Reality: for this Intellectual-Principle, by very definition, cannot be outside of itself, the Intellectual Reality: self-gathered and unalloyed, it is Intellectual-Principle through all the range of its being – for unintelligent intelligence is not possible – and thus it possesses of necessity self-knowing, as a being immanent to itself and one having for function and essence to be purely and solely Intellectual-Principle. This is no doer; the doer, not self-intent but looking outward, will have knowledge, in some kind, of the external, but, if wholly of this practical order, need have no self-knowledge; where, on the contrary, there is no action – and of course the pure Intellectual-Principle cannot be straining after any absent good – the intention can be only towards the self; at once self-knowing becomes not merely plausible but inevitable; what else could living signify in a being immune from action and existing in Intellect? Enneads V,3,
Anyone not of the strength to lay hold of the first soul, that possessing pure INTELLECTION, must grasp that which has to do with our ordinary thinking and thence ascend: if even this prove too hard, let him turn to account the sensitive phase which carries the ideal forms of the less fine degree, that phase which, too, with its powers, is immaterial and lies just within the realm of Ideal-principles. Enneads V,3,
The intellective power, therefore, when occupied with the intellectual act, must be in a state of duality, whether one of the two elements stand actually outside or both lie within: the intellectual act will always comport diversity as well as the necessary identity, and in the same way its characteristic objects (the Ideas) must stand to the Intellectual-Principle as at once distinct and identical. This applies equally to the single object; there can be no INTELLECTION except of something containing separable detail and, since the object is a Reason-principle (a discriminated Idea) it has the necessary element of multiplicity. The Intellectual-Principle, thus, is informed of itself by the fact of being a multiple organ of vision, an eye receptive of many illuminated objects. If it had to direct itself to a memberless unity, it would be dereasoned: what could it say or know of such an object? The self-affirmation of (even) a memberless unity implies the repudiation of all that does not enter into the character: in other words, it must be multiple as a preliminary to being itself. Enneads V,3,
It is now Intellectual-Principle since it actually holds its object, and holds it by the act of INTELLECTION: before, it was no more than a tendance, an eye blank of impression: it was in motion towards the transcendental; now that it has attained, it has become Intellectual-Principle henceforth absorbed; in virtue of this INTELLECTION it holds the character of Intellectual-Principle, of Essential Existence and of Intellectual Act where, previously, not possessing the Intellectual Object, it was not Intellectual Perception, and, not yet having exercised the Intellectual Act, it was not Intellectual-Principle. Enneads V,3,
The Intellectual-Principle is established in multiplicity; its INTELLECTION, self-sprung though it be, is in the nature of something added to it (some accidental dualism) and makes it multiple: the utterly simplex, and therefore first of all beings, must, then, transcend the Intellectual-Principle; and, obviously, if this had INTELLECTION it would no longer transcend the Intellectual-Principle but be it, and at once be a multiple. Enneads V,3,
Now if these activities arise from some unexplained first activity in that principle, then it too contains the manifold: if, on the contrary, they are the very earliest activities and the source and cause of any multiple product and the means by which that Principle is able, before any activity occurs, to remain self-centred, then they are allocated to the product of which they are the cause; for this principle is one thing, the activities going forth from it are another, since it is not, itself, in act. If this be not so, the first act cannot be the Intellectual-Principle: the One does not provide for the existence of an Intellectual-Principle which thereupon appears; that provision would be something (an Hypostasis) intervening between the One and the Intellectual-Principle, its offspring. There could, in fact, be no such providing in The One, for it was never incomplete; and such provision could name nothing that ought to be provided. It cannot be thought to possess only some part of its content, and not the whole; nor did anything exist to which it could turn in desire. Clearly anything that comes into being after it, arises without shaking to its permanence in its own habit. It is essential to the existence of any new entity that the First remain in self-gathered repose throughout: otherwise, it moved before there was motion and had intellectual act before any INTELLECTION – unless, indeed, that first act (as motionless and without intelligence) was incomplete, nothing more than a tendency. And what can we imagine it lights upon to become the object of such a tendency? The only reasonable explanation of act flowing from it lies in the analogy of light from a sun. The entire intellectual order may be figured as a kind of light with the One in repose at its summit as its King: but this manifestation is not cast out from it: we may think, rather, of the One as a light before the light, an eternal irradiation resting upon the Intellectual Realm; this, not identical with its source, is yet not severed from it nor of so remote a nature as to be less than Real-Being; it is no blind thing, but is seeing and knowing, the primal knower. Enneads V,3,
If we make it knowable, an object of affirmation, we make it a manifold; and if we allow INTELLECTION in it we make it at that point indigent: supposing that in fact INTELLECTION accompanies it, INTELLECTION by it must be superfluous. Enneads V,3,
Self-INTELLECTION – which is the truest – implies the entire perception of a total self formed from a variety converging into an integral; but the Transcendent knows neither separation of part nor any such enquiry; if its intellectual act were directed upon something outside, then, the Transcendent would be deficient and the INTELLECTION faulty. Enneads V,3,
Consciousness, as the very word indicates, is a conperception, an act exercised upon a manifold: and even INTELLECTION, earlier (nearer to the divine) though it is, implies that the agent turns back upon itself, upon a manifold, then. If that agent says no more than “I am a being,” it speaks (by the implied dualism) as a discoverer of the extern; and rightly so, for being is a manifold; when it faces towards the unmanifold and says, “I am that being,” it misses both itself and the being (since the simplex cannot be thus divided into knower and known): if it is (to utter) truth it cannot indicate by “being” something like a stone; in the one phrase multiplicity is asserted; for the being thus affirmed – (even) the veritable, as distinguished from such a mere container of some trace of being as ought not to be called a being since it stands merely as image to archetype – even this must possess multiplicity. Enneads V,3,
But will not each item in that multiplicity be an object of INTELLECTION to us? Taken bare and single, no: but Being itself is manifold within itself, and whatever else you may name has Being. Enneads V,3,
How, then, do we ourselves come to be speaking of it? No doubt we deal with it, but we do not state it; we have neither knowledge nor INTELLECTION of it. Enneads V,3,
But why is the Intellectual-Principle not the generating source? Because (it is not a self-sufficing simplex): the Act of the Intellectual-Principle is INTELLECTION, which means that, seeing the intellectual object towards which it has turned, it is consummated, so to speak, by that object, being in itself indeterminate like sight (a vague readiness for any and every vision) and determined by the intellectual object. This is why it has been said that “out of the indeterminate dyad and The One arise the Ideas and the numbers”: for the dyad is the Intellectual-Principle. Enneads V,4,
Thus it is not a simplex; it is manifold; it exhibits a certain composite quality – within the Intellectual or divine order, of course – as the principle that sees the manifold. It is, further, itself simultaneously object and agent of INTELLECTION and is on that count also a duality: and it possesses besides another object of INTELLECTION in the Order following upon itself. Enneads V,4,
But if something comes to being within an entity which in no way looks outside itself – and especially within a being which is the sum of being – that entity must be the source of the new thing: stable in its own identity, it produces; but the product is that of an unchanged being: the producer is unchangeably the intellectual object, the product is produced as the Intellectual Act, an Act taking INTELLECTION of its source – the only object that exists for it – and so becoming Intellectual-Principle, that is to say, becoming another intellectual being, resembling its source, a reproduction and image of that. Enneads V,4,
And if this is all things, that must be above and outside of all, so, must transcend real being. And again, if that secondary is all things, and if above its multiplicity there is a unity not ranking among those things, once more this unity transcends Real Being and therefore transcends the Intellectual-Principle as well. There is thus something transcending Intellectual-Principle, for we must remember that real being is no corpse, the negation of life and of INTELLECTION, but is in fact identical with the Intellectual-Principle. The Intellectual-Principle is not something taking cognisance of things as sensation deals with sense objects existing independently of sense: on the contrary, it actually is the things it knows: the ideas constituting them it has not borrowed: whence could it have taken them? No: it exists here together with the things of the universe, identical with them, making a unity with them; and the collective knowledge (in the divine mind) of the immaterial is the universe of things. Enneads V,4,
Knowing demands the organ fitted to the object; eyes for one kind, ears for another: similarly some things, we must believe, are to be known by the Intellectual-Principle in us. We must not confuse INTELLECTION with hearing or seeing; this would be trying to look with the ears or denying sound because it is not seen. Certain people, we must keep in mind, have forgotten that to which, from the beginning onwards, their longing and effort are pointed: for all that exists desires and aspires towards the Supreme by a compulsion of nature, as if all had received the oracle that without it they cannot be. Enneads V,5,
Sixth tractate – That the principle transcending being has no intellectual act. What being has INTELLECTION primally and what being has it secondarily. Enneads V,6,
There is a principle having INTELLECTION of the external and another having self-INTELLECTION and thus further removed from duality. Enneads V,6,
In the self-intellective, there is not even this distinction of being: self-conversing, the subject is its own object, and thus takes the double form while remaining essentially a unity. The INTELLECTION is the more profound for this internal possession of the object. Enneads V,6,
This principle is the primally intellective since there can be no INTELLECTION without duality in unity. If there is no unity, perceiving principle and perceived object will be different, and the INTELLECTION, therefore, not primal: a principle concerned with something external cannot be the primally intellective since it does not possess the object as integrally its own or as itself; if it does possess the object as itself – the condition of true INTELLECTION – the two are one. Thus (in order to primal INTELLECTION) there must be a unity in duality, while a pure unity with no counterbalancing duality can have no object for its INTELLECTION and ceases to be intellective: in other words the primally intellective must be at once simplex and something else. Enneads V,6,
We can imagine the Soul as a double light, a lesser corresponding to the soul proper, a purer representing its intellective phase; if now we suppose this intellective light equal to the light which is to be its object, we no longer distinguish between them; the two are recognised as one: we know, indeed, that there are two, but as we see them they have become one: this gives us the relation between the intellective subject and the object of INTELLECTION (in the duality and unity required by that primal INTELLECTION): in our thought we have made the two into one; but on the other hand the one thing has become two, making itself into a duality at the moment of INTELLECTION, or, to be more exact, being dual by the fact of INTELLECTION and single by the fact that its intellectual object is itself. Enneads V,6,
Thus there is the primally intellective and there is that in which INTELLECTION has taken another mode; but this indicates that what transcends the primarily intellective has no INTELLECTION; for, to have INTELLECTION, it must become an Intellectual-Principle, and, if it is to become that, it must possess an intellectual object and, as primarily intellective, it must possess that intellectual object as something within itself. Enneads V,6,
But it is not inevitable that every intellectual object should both possess the intellective principle in itself and exercise INTELLECTION: at that, it would be not merely object but subject as well and, besides, being thus dual, could not be primal: further, the intellectual principle that is to possess the intellectual object could not cohere unless there existed an essence purely intellectual, something which, while standing as intellectual object to the intellectual principle, is in its own essence neither an agent nor an object of INTELLECTION. The intellectual object points to something beyond itself (to a percipient); and the intellectual agent has its INTELLECTION in vain unless by seizing and holding an object – since, failing that, it can have no INTELLECTION but is consummated only when it possesses itself of its natural term. Enneads V,6,
There must have been something standing consummate independently of any intellectual act, something perfect in its own essence: thus that in which this completion is inherent must exist before INTELLECTION; in other words it has no need of INTELLECTION, having been always self-sufficing: this, then, will have no intellectual act. Enneads V,6,
Thus we arrive at: a principle having no INTELLECTION, a principle having INTELLECTION primarily, a principle having it secondarily. Enneads V,6,
It may be added that, supposing The First to be intellective, it thereby possesses something (some object, some attribute): at once it ceases to be a first; it is a secondary, and not even a unity; it is a many; it is all of which it takes intellectual possession; even though its INTELLECTION fell solely upon its own content, it must still be a manifold. Enneads V,6,
Once there is any manifold, there must be a precedent unity: since any INTELLECTION implies multiplicity in the intellective subject, the non-multiple must be without INTELLECTION; that non-multiple will be the First: INTELLECTION and the Intellectual-Principle must be characteristic of beings coming later. Enneads V,6,
Another consideration is that if The Good (and First) is simplex and without need, it can neither need the intellective act nor possess what it does not need: it will therefore not have INTELLECTION. (Interpolation or corruption: It is without INTELLECTION because, also, it contains no duality.) Enneads V,6,
Again; an Intellectual-Principle is distinct from The Good and takes a certain goodness only by its INTELLECTION of The Good. Enneads V,6,
And again: the multiple must be always seeking its identity, desiring self-accord and self-awareness: but what scope is there within what is an absolute unity in which to move towards its identity or at what term may it hope for self-knowing? It holds its identity in its very essence and is above consciousness and all intellective act. Intellection is not a primal either in the fact of being or in the value of being; it is secondary and derived: for there exists The Good; and this moves towards itself while its sequent is moved and by that movement has its characteristic vision. The intellective act may be defined as a movement towards The Good in some being that aspires towards it; the effort produces the fact; the two are coincident; to see is to have desired to see: hence again the Authentic Good has no need of INTELLECTION since itself and nothing else is its good. Enneads V,6,
If this reasoning is valid, The Good has no scope whatever for INTELLECTION which demands something attractive from outside. The Good, then, is without Act. What Act indeed, could be vested in Activity’s self? No activity has yet again an activity; and whatever we may add to such Activities as depend from something else, at least we must leave the first Activity of them all, that from which all depend, as an uncontaminated identity, one to which no such addition can be made. Enneads V,6,
That primal Activity, then, is not an INTELLECTION, for there is nothing upon which it could Exercise INTELLECTION since it is The First; besides, INTELLECTION itself does not exercise the intellective act; this belongs to some principle in which INTELLECTION is vested. There is, we repeat, duality in any thinking being; and the First is wholly above the dual. Enneads V,6,
But all this may be made more evident by a clearer recognition of the twofold principle at work wherever there is INTELLECTION: When we affirm the reality of the Real Beings and their individual identity of being and declare that these Real Beings exist in the Intellectual Realm, we do not mean merely that they remain unchangeably self-identical by their very essence, as contrasted with the fluidity and instability of the sense-realm; the sense-realm itself may contain the enduring. No; we mean rather that these principles possess, as by their own virtue, the consummate fulness of being. The Essence described as the primally existent cannot be a shadow cast by Being, but must possess Being entire; and Being is entire when it holds the form and idea of INTELLECTION and of life. In a Being, then, the existence, the INTELLECTION, the life are present as an aggregate. When a thing is a Being, it is also an Intellectual-Principle, when it is an Intellectual-Principle it is a Being; INTELLECTION and Being are co-existents. Therefore INTELLECTION is a multiple not a unitary and that which does not belong to this order can have no Intellection. And if we turn to the partial and particular, there is the Intellectual form of man, and there is man, there is the Intellectual form of horse and there is horse, the Intellectual form of Justice, and Justice. Enneads V,6,
What stands above Being stands above INTELLECTION: it is no weakness in it not to know itself, since as pure unity it contains nothing which it needs to explore. But it need not even spend any knowing upon things outside itself: this which was always the Good of all gives them something greater and better than its knowledge of them in giving them in their own identity to cling, in whatever measure be possible, to a principle thus lofty. Enneads V,6,
This is why in that other sphere, when we are deepest in that knowledge by INTELLECTION, we are aware of none; we are expecting some impression on sense, which has nothing to report since it has seen nothing and never could in that order see anything. The unbelieving element is sense; it is the other, the Intellectual-Principle, that sees; and if this too doubted, it could not even credit its own existence, for it can never stand away and with bodily eyes apprehend itself as a visible object. Enneads V,8,
Now a principle whose wisdom is not borrowed must derive from itself any INTELLECTION it may make; and anything it may possess within itself it can hold only from itself: it follows that, intellective by its own resource and upon its own content, it is itself the very things on which its INTELLECTION acts. Enneads V,8,
For supposing its essence to be separable from its INTELLECTION and the objects of its INTELLECTION to be not itself, then its essence would be unintellectual; and it would be intellectual not actually but potentially. The INTELLECTION and its object must then be inseparable – however the habit induced by our conditions may tempt us to distinguish, There too, the thinker from the thought. Enneads V,8,
What then is its characteristic Act and what the INTELLECTION which makes knower and known here identical? Clearly, as authentic Intellection, it has authentic INTELLECTION of the authentically existent, and establishes their existence. Therefore it is the Authentic Beings. Enneads V,8,
Not by its thinking God does God come to be; not by its thinking Movement does Movement arise. Hence it is an error to call the Ideas INTELLECTIONs in the sense that, upon an intellectual act in this Principle, one such Idea or another is made to exist or exists. No: the object of this INTELLECTION must exist before the intellective act (must be the very content not the creation of the Intellectual-Principle). How else could that Principle come to know it: certainly not (as an external) by luck or by haphazard search. Enneads V,8,
If the Intellectual-Principle were envisaged as preceding Being, it would at once become a principle whose expression, its intellectual Act, achieves and engenders the Beings: but, since we are compelled to think of existence as preceding that which knows it, we can but think that the Beings are the actual content of the knowing principle and that the very act, the INTELLECTION, is inherent to the Beings, as fire stands equipped from the beginning with fire-act; in this conception, the Beings contain the Intellectual-Principle as one and the same with themselves, as their own activity. Thus, Being is itself an activity: there is one activity, then, in both or, rather, both are one thing. Enneads V,8,
Wisdom too is generally admitted to exist There. Obviously, if it shares only its name with our wisdom, it is not to be reckoned among things of this sphere; if, however, the import is in both cases the same, then Quality is common to both realms – unless, of course, it be maintained that everything There, including even INTELLECTION, is Substance. Enneads: VI I
Soul, then, is one and many – as many as are manifested in that oneness – one in its nature, many in those other things. A single Existent, it makes itself many by what we may call its motion: it is one entire, but by its striving, so to speak, to contemplate itself, it is a plurality; for we may imagine that it cannot bear to be a single Existent, when it has the power to be all that it in fact is. The cause of its appearing as many is this contemplation, and its purpose is the Act of the Intellect; if it were manifested as a bare unity, it could have no INTELLECTION, since in that simplicity it would already be identical with the object of its thought. Enneads VI,2,
Being, the most firmly set of all things, that in virtue of which all other things receive Stability, possesses this Stability not as from without but as springing within, as inherent. Stability is the goal of INTELLECTION, a Stability which had no beginning, and the state from which INTELLECTION was impelled was Stability, though Stability gave it no impulsion; for Motion neither starts from Motion nor ends in Motion. Again, the Form-Idea has Stability, since it is the goal of Intellect: INTELLECTION is the Form’s Motion. Enneads VI,2,
How then does the universal Intellect produce the particulars while, in virtue of its Reason-Principle, remaining a unity? In other words, how do the various grades of Being, as we call them, arise from the four primaries? Here is this great, this infinite Intellect, not given to idle utterance but to sheer INTELLECTION, all-embracing, integral, no part, no individual: how, we ask, can it possibly be the source of all this plurality? Number at all events it possesses in the objects of its contemplation: it is thus one and many, and the many are powers, wonderful powers, not weak but, being pure, supremely great and, so to speak, full to overflowing powers in very truth, knowing no limit, so that they are infinite, infinity, Magnitude-Absolute. Enneads VI,2,
Admitted, then – it will be said – for the nobler forms of life; but how can the divine contain the mean, the unreasoning? The mean is the unreasoning, since value depends upon reason and the worth of the intellective implies worthlessness where INTELLECTION is lacking. Yet how can there be question of the unreasoning or unintellective when all particulars exist in the divine and come forth from it? In taking up the refutation of these objections, we must insist upon the consideration that neither man nor animals here can be thought of as identical with the counterparts in the higher realm; those ideal forms must be taken in a larger way. And again the reasoning thing is not of that realm: here the reasoning, There the pre-reasoning. Enneads VI,7,
But surely he may affirm merely the goodness, adding nothing: the goodness would be taken without the being and all duality avoided? No: such self-awareness as good must inevitably carry the affirmation “I am the Good”; otherwise there would be merely the unattached conception of goodness with no recognition of identity; any such INTELLECTION would inevitably include the affirmation “I am.” Enneads VI,7,
If that INTELLECTION were the Good, then the INTELLECTION would not be self-INTELLECTION but INTELLECTION of the Good; not the Supreme but that INTELLECTION would be the Good: if on the contrary that INTELLECTION of the Good is distinct from the Good, at once the Good exists before its knowing; all-sufficiently good in itself, it needs none of that knowing of its own nature. Enneads VI,7,
Again, if the Supreme is to have INTELLECTION it cannot know only itself; that would not be INTELLECTION, for, if it did know itself, nothing could prevent it knowing all things; but this is impossible. With self-INTELLECTION it would no longer be simplex; any INTELLECTION, even in the Supreme, must be aware of something distinct; as we have been saying, the inability to see the self as external is the negation of INTELLECTION. That act requires a manifold-agent, object, movement and all the other conditions of a thinking principle. Further we must remember what has been indicated elsewhere that, since every intellectual act in order to be what it must be requires variety, every movement simple and the same throughout, though it may comport some form of contact, is devoid of the intellective. Enneads VI,7,
As regards Providence, that is sufficiently saved by the fact that This is the source from which all proceeds; the dependent he cannot know when he has no knowledge of himself but keeps that august repose. Plato dealing with essential Being allows it INTELLECTION but not this august repose: INTELLECTION then belongs to Essential Being; this august repose to the Principle in which there is no INTELLECTION. Repose, of course, is used here for want of a fitter word; we are to understand that the most august, the truly so, is That which transcends (the movement of) Intellection. Enneads VI,7,
That there can be no INTELLECTION in the First will be patent to those that have had such contact; but some further confirmation is desirable, if indeed words can carry the matter; we need overwhelming persuasion. Enneads VI,7,
It must be borne in mind that all INTELLECTION rises in some principle and takes cognisance of an object. But a distinction is to be made: There is the INTELLECTION that remains within its place of origin; it has that source as substratum but becomes a sort of addition to it in that it is an activity of that source perfecting the potentiality there, not by producing anything but as being a completing power to the principle in which it inheres. There is also the INTELLECTION inbound with Being – Being’s very author – and this could not remain confined to the source since there it could produce nothing; it is a power to production; it produces therefore of its own motion and its act is Real-Being and there it has its dwelling. In this mode the INTELLECTION is identical with Being; even in its self-INTELLECTION no distinction is made save the logical distinction of thinker and thought with, as we have often observed, the implication of plurality. Enneads VI,7,
At the earliest activity and earliest INTELLECTION, it can be preceded by no act or INTELLECTION: if we pass beyond this being and this INTELLECTION we come not to more being and more INTELLECTION but to what overpasses both, to the wonderful which has neither, asking nothing of these products and standing its unaccompanied self. Enneads VI,7,
That all-transcending cannot have had an activity by which to produce this activity – acting before act existed – or have had thought in order to produce thinking – applying thought before thought exists – all INTELLECTION, even of the Good, is beneath it. Enneads VI,7,
In sum, this INTELLECTION of the Good is impossible: I do not mean that it is impossible to have INTELLECTION of the Good – we may admit the possibility but there can be no INTELLECTION by The Good itself, for this would be to include the inferior with the Good. Enneads VI,7,
If INTELLECTION is the lower, then it will be bound up with Being; if INTELLECTION is the higher, its object is lower. Intellection, then, does not exist in the Good; as a lesser, taking its worth through that Good, it must stand apart from it, leaving the Good unsoiled by it as by all else. Immune from INTELLECTION the Good remains incontaminably what it is, not impeded by the presence of the intellectual act which would annul its purity and unity. Enneads VI,7,
Anyone making the Good at once Thinker and Thought identifies it with Being and with the Intellection vested in Being so that it must perform that act of INTELLECTION: at once it becomes necessary to find another principle, one superior to that Good: for either this act, this INTELLECTION, is a completing power of some such principle, serving as its ground, or it points, by that duality, to a prior principle having INTELLECTION as a characteristic. It is because there is something before it that it has an object of INTELLECTION; even in its self-INTELLECTION, it may be said to know its content by its vision of that prior. Enneads VI,7,
What has no prior and no external accompaniment could have no INTELLECTION, either of itself or of anything else. What could it aim at, what desire? To essay its power of knowing? But this would make the power something outside itself; there would be, I mean, the power it grasped and the power by which it grasped: if there is but the one power, what is there to grasp at? Enneads VI,7,
Intellection seems to have been given as an aid to the diviner but weaker beings, an eye to the blind. But the eye itself need not see Being since it is itself the light; what must take the light through the eye needs the light because of its darkness. If, then, INTELLECTION is the light and light does not need the light, surely that brilliance (The First) which does not need light can have no need of INTELLECTION, will not add this to its nature. Enneads VI,7,
What could it do with INTELLECTION? What could even INTELLECTION need and add to itself for the purpose of its act? It has no self-awareness; there is no need. It is no duality but, rather, a manifold, consisting of itself, its intellective act, distinct from itself, and the inevitable third, the object of INTELLECTION. No doubt since knower, knowing, and known, are identical, all merges into a unity: but the distinction has existed and, once more, such a unity cannot be the First; we must put away all otherness from the Supreme which can need no such support; anything we add is so much lessening of what lacks nothing. Enneads VI,7,
To us INTELLECTION is a boon since the soul needs it; to the Intellectual-Principle it is appropriate as being one thing with the very essence of the principle constituted by the intellectual Act so that principle and act coincide in a continuous self-consciousness carrying the assurance of identity, of the unity of the two. But pure unity must be independent, in need of no such assurance. Enneads VI,7,
“Know yourself” is a precept for those who, being manifold, have the task of appraising themselves so as to become aware of the number and nature of their constituents, some or all of which they ignore as they ignore their very principle and their manner of being. The First on the contrary if it have content must exist in a way too great to have any knowledge, INTELLECTION, perception of it. To itself it is nothing; accepting nothing, self-sufficing, it is not even a good to itself: to others it is good for they have need of it; but it could not lack itself: it would be absurd to suppose The Good standing in need of goodness. Enneads VI,7,
It does not see itself: seeing aims at acquisition: all this it abandons to the subsequent: in fact nothing found elsewhere can be There; even Being cannot be There. Nor therefore has it INTELLECTION which is a thing of the lower sphere where the first INTELLECTION, the only true, is identical with Being. Reason, perception, intelligence, none of these can have place in that Principle in which no presence can be affirmed. Enneads VI,7,
The contemplating Intellect, the first or highest, has self-disposal to the point that its operation is utterly independent; it turns wholly upon itself; its very action is itself; at rest in its good it is without need, complete, and may be said to live to its will; there the will is INTELLECTION: it is called will because it expresses the Intellectual-Principle in the willing-phase and, besides, what we know as will imitates this operation taking place within the Intellectual-Principle. Will strives towards the good which the act of Intellectual-Principle realizes. Thus that principle holds what will seeks, that good whose attainment makes will identical with Intellection. Enneads VI,8,
To what could its Intellection be directed? To itself? But that would imply a previous ignorance; it would be dependent upon that Intellection in order to knowledge of itself; but it is the self-sufficing. Yet this absence of self-knowing does not comport ignorance; ignorance is of something outside – a knower ignorant of a knowable – but in the Solitary there is neither knowing nor anything unknown. Unity, self-present, it has no need of self-INTELLECTION: indeed this “self-presence” were better left out, the more surely to preserve the unity; we must eliminate all knowing and all association, all INTELLECTION whether internal or external. It is not to be though of as having but as being Intellection; Intellection does not itself perform the intellective act but is the cause of the act in something else, and cause is not to be identified with caused: most assuredly the cause of all is not a thing within that all. Enneads VI,8,