Hence they are all the same, it seems, — king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the JUST MAN ; and it is all one art, — the kingly, the despotic, the statesman’s, the master’s, the house-manager’s, and justice and temperance. LOVERS
Then he who was reputed to be their most powerful exponent of these matters answered me and said that this art is precisely that which, said he, you hear Socrates describing, — nothing else than justice. I then replied — “Do not explain to me merely its name, but like this : — There is an art called medicine ; and of this the effects are two-fold, the one being (409b) to produce constantly new doctors in addition to those already existing, and the other to produce health. And of these the latter result is no longer in itself an art but an effect of that art which both teaches and is taught, which effect we term ‘health’. So likewise the operations of the joiner’s art are a house and joinery, of which the one is an effect, the other a doctrine. In like manner let it be granted that the one effect of justice is to produce just men, as of the other arts their several artists ; but as to the other, the operation which the JUST MAN is capable of performing for us, what do we say that is ? Tell us.” (409c) The reply of your exponent was, I think, “The beneficial” ; while another said “The right” ; a third “The useful” ; and yet another “The profitable.” So I resumed my inquiry and said : “In the former case also we find these names in each one of the arts — doing ‘the right’, ‘the profitable’, ‘the useful’, and the rest of such terms ; but as regards the object at which all these operations aim, each art will declare that which is peculiar to itself ; for example, the art of joinery will assert that the result of good, beautiful, and right action is the production of wooden vessels, which in themselves are not an art. So let the operation of justice (409d) be stated in the same way.” CLEITOPHON
Finally, Socrates, I put these questions to you yourself also, and you told me that it belonged to justice (410b) to injure one’s enemies and to do well to one’s friends. But later on it appeared that the JUST MAN never injures anyone, for in all his acts he aims at benefiting all. So after repeated questionings — not once only or twice but spending quite a long time at it — I gave it up, concluding that though you were better than any man at the task of exhorting men to devote themselves to virtue, yet of these two alternatives one must be true : either you are capable of effecting thus much only and nothing more, — a thing which might happen also in respect of any other art whatsoever, as for example a man who was no steersman might practice composing an eulogy of that art (410c) as one of high value to mankind, and so too with all the other arts ; so against you too one might perhaps bring the same charge in regard to justice, that you are none the more an expert about justice because you eulogize it finely. Not that this is the complaint I make myself ; but it must be one or other of these two alternatives, — either you do not possess the knowledge or else you refuse to let me share it. CLEITOPHON
Companion : Rhadamanthus, they do say, Socrates, was a JUST MAN ; but Minos was a savage sort of person, harsh and unjust. MINOS
But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill ? There is nothing very wonderful in this ; for, as I have been saying, the existence of a state implies that virtue is not any man’s private possession. If so — and nothing can be truer — then I will further ask you to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them — for all of us have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one is so ready to teach justice and the laws ; — suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good flute players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones ? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing ? In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a JUST MAN and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practise virtue — with the savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year’s Lenaean festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality of this part of the world. you, Socrates, are discontented, and why ? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability ; and you say, Where are the teachers ? You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek ? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers ? He and his fellow-workmen have taught them to the best of their ability, — but who will carry them further in their arts ? And you would certainly have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them ; but there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of anything else ; if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good ; and I give my pupils their money’s-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment : — When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion ; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value. PROTAGORAS
Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unJUST MAN can be temperate in his injustice ? PROTAGORAS
Well, but is a JUST MAN the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad ? LYSIS
Soc. And must not the JUST MAN always desire to do what is just ? GORGIAS
Soc. Surely, then, the JUST MAN will never consent to do injustice ? GORGIAS
Soc. And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a JUST MAN ? GORGIAS
Soc. I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the unJUST MAN is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation ? I cannot admit a word which you have been saying. GORGIAS
And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of another like an outlaw to whom anyone may do what he likes — he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of yours ; or take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me ; a condition which, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil ; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in the previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted by us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which are like bonds of iron and adamant ; and unless you or some other still more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how these things are, but that I have never met any one who could say otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my position still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils, in an unJUST MAN not suffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous ? Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils ? And will not worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends ? — and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil ; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil ; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles ? GORGIAS
Ath. Let us see whether we understand one another : — Are not the principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows : you compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and just, is fortunate and happy ; and this whether he be great and strong or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor ; and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery ? As the poet says, and with truth : I sing not, I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things, not having justice ; let him who “draws near and stretches out his hand against his enemies be a JUST MAN.” But if he be unjust, I would not have him “look calmly upon bloody death,” nor “surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas” ; and let no other thing that is called good ever be his. For the goods of which the many speak are not really good : first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third ; and then innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect ; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like ; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things, and when you have acquired them to become at once immortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth, to have sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal ; but not so great, if the bad man lives only a very short time. These are the truths which, if I am not mistaken, you will persuade or compel your poets to utter with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these they must train up your youth. Am I not right ? For I plainly declare that evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the evil. Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this ? LAWS BOOK II
Ath. How ! Then may Heaven make us to be of one mind, for now we are of two. To me, dear Cleinias, the truth of what I am saying is as plain as the fact that Crete is an island. And, if I were a lawgiver, I would try to make the poets and all the citizens speak in this strain, and I would inflict the heaviest penalties on any one in all the land who should dare to say that there are bad men who lead pleasant lives, or that the profitable and gainful is one thing, and the just another ; and there are many other matters about which I should make my citizens speak in a manner different from the Cretans and Lacedaemonians of this age, and I may say, indeed, from the world in general. For tell me, my good friends, by Zeus and Apollo tell me, if I were to ask these same Gods who were your legislators — Is not the most just life also the pleasantest ? or are there two lives, one of which is the justest and the other the pleasantest ? — and they were to reply that there are two ; and thereupon I proceeded to ask, (that would be the right way of pursuing the enquiry), Which are the happier — those who lead the justest, or those who lead the pleasantest life ? and they replied, Those who lead the pleasantest — that would be a very strange answer, which I should not like to put into the mouth of the Gods. The words will come with more propriety from the lips of fathers and legislators, and therefore I will repeat my former questions to one of them, and suppose him to say again that he who leads the pleasantest life is the happiest. And to that I rejoin : — O my father, did you not wish me to live as happily as possible ? And yet you also never ceased telling me that I should live as justly as possible. Now, here the giver of the rule, whether he be legislator or father, will be in a dilemma, and will in vain endeavour to be consistent with himself. But if he were to declare that the justest life is also the happiest, every one hearing him would enquire, if I am not mistaken, what is that good and noble principle in life which the law approves, and which is superior to pleasure. For what good can the JUST MAN have which is separated from pleasure ? Shall we say that glory and fame, coming from Gods and men, though good and noble, are nevertheless unpleasant, and infamy pleasant ? Certainly not, sweet legislator. Or shall we say that the not-doing of wrong and there being no wrong done is good and honourable, although there is no pleasure in it, and that the doing wrong is pleasant, but evil and base ? LAWS BOOK II
Ath. The view which identifies the pleasant and the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator, and is, in his opinion, infamous ; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy, especially in childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth ; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are shadows only, and that injustice, which seems opposed to justice, when contemplated by the unjust and evil man appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant ; but that from the JUST MAN’s point of view, the very opposite is the appearance of both of them. LAWS BOOK II
Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to Gods and men ; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted ; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condition is enviable, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane : so that, whether his children or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary. — Worthy of honour is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honour, if he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doing any ; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet more highly to be esteemed is he who co-operates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can — he shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for himself ; he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men, and he who is willing, yet is not able, may be allowed the second place ; but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame : the good, however, which he has, is not to be undervalued by us because it is possessed by him, but must be acquired by us also to the utmost of our power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states — he himself contends in the race, blasting the fair fame of no man ; but the envious, who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And so he makes the whole city to enter the arena untrained in the practice of virtue, and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies. Now every man should be valiant, but he should also be gentle. From the cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether incurable acts of injustice done to him by others, a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them ; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. As to the actions of those who do evil, but whose evil is curable, in the first place, let us remember that the unJUST MAN is not unjust of his own free will. For no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils, and least of all in the most honourable part of himself. And the soul, as we said, is of a truth deemed by all men the most honourable. In the soul, then, which is the most honourable part of him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils. The unrighteous and vicious are always to be pitied in any case ; and one can afford to forgive as well as pity him who is curable, and refrain and calm one’s anger, not getting into a passion, like a woman, and nursing ill-feeling. But upon him who is incapable of reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be poured out ; wherefore I say that good men ought, when occasion demands, to be both gentle and passionate. LAWS BOOK V
Ath. That the unJUST MAN may be bad, but that he is bad against his will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction ; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily. I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me — Well, Stranger, if all this be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes — shall we legislate or not — what do you advise ? Certainly we will, I should reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary ? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime ? LAWS BOOK IX
And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the JUST MAN most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
But is the JUST MAN or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
And in the laying of bricks and stones is the JUST MAN a more useful or better partner than the builder ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Then in what sort of partnership is the JUST MAN a better partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harpplayer is certainly a better partner than the JUST MAN ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money ; for you do not want a JUST MAN to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse ; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the JUST MAN is to be preferred ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Then if the JUST MAN is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Then after all, the JUST MAN has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer ; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favorite of his, affirms that THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Then to injure a friend or anyone else is not the act of a JUST MAN, but of the opposite, who is the unjust ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a JUST MAN owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies — to say this is not wise ; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master ; and you further imagine that the rulers of States, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no ; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another’s good ; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant ; and injustice the opposite ; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just : he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts : wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unJUST MAN has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State : when there is an income-tax, the JUST MAN will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income ; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office ; there is the JUST MAN neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just ; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unJUST MAN. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent ; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable — that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale ; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public ; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace — they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice ; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man’s own profit and interest. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, Thrasymachus — whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself ; we are a large party ; and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unJUST MAN who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong ; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Very true, I said ; that is what I have to do : But will you be so good as answer yet one more question ? Does the JUST MAN try to gain any advantage over the just ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the JUST MAN, while refusing to have more than another JUST MAN, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
And what of the unjust — does he claim to have more than the JUST MAN and to do more than is just ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
And the unJUST MAN will strive and struggle to obtain more than the JUST MAN or action, in order that he may have more than all ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Then the just soul and the JUST MAN will live well, and the unJUST MAN will live ill ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle toward me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained ; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that inquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly ; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the JUST MAN is happy or unhappy. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind : having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them ; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unJUST MAN to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the King of Lydia ; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he, stooping and looking in, saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human and having nothing on but a gold ring ; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the King ; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outward and reappeared ; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result — when he turned the collet inward he became invisible, when outward he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court ; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the Queen, and with her help conspired against the King and slew him and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other ; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with anyone at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust ; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine anyone obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another’s, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another’s faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II
Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them ; there is no other way ; and how is the isolation to be effected ? I answer : Let the unJUST MAN be entirely unjust, and the JUST MAN entirely just ; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft ; like the skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody) : for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unJUST MAN we must assume the most perfect injustice ; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself ; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the JUST MAN in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honor and rewards ; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering ; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst ; then he will have been put to the proof ; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death ; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II
I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This I will proceed to describe ; but as you may think the description a little too coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine. Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice : They will tell you that the JUST MAN who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound — will have his eyes burnt out ; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled. Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, and not to be, just ; the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality ; he does not live with a view to appearances — he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only — THE REPUBLIC BOOK II
The JUST MAN then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV
Will the JUST MAN or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV
But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned, however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man : for the JUST MAN does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others — he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself ; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals — when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business ; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV
Very good ; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the JUST MAN and the just State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV
True, he replied ; but what of that ? I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to require that the JUST MAN should in nothing fail of absolute justice ; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK V
Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce that the son of Ariston (the best) has decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal man and king over himself ; and that the worst and most unJUST MAN is also the most miserable, and that this is he who being the greatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX
Twice in succession, then, has the JUST MAN overthrown the unjust in this conflict ; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus the saviour : a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure — all others are a shadow only ; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX
Then if the good and JUST MAN be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in beauty and virtue ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX
The assumption that the JUST MAN should appear unjust and the unjust just : for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK X
Then this must be our notion of the JUST MAN, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death ; for the gods have a care of anyone whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK X