justice

Justice

So it was nothing to their purpose to sacrifice and pay tribute of gifts in vain, when they were hated by the gods. For it is not, I imagine, the way of the gods to be seduced with gifts, like a base insurer. And indeed it is but silly talk of ours, if we claim to surpass the Spartans on this score. For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and (150a) JUSTICE that may be found in any of us. Far rather at these, I believe, do they look than at those costly processions and sacrifices which are offered, it well may be, by individual and state, year in, year out, though they may have offended greatly against the gods, or as greatly against their neighbors. But the gods are not to be won by bribes, and so they despise all these things, as Ammon and the holy prophet say. Certainly it would seem that JUSTICE and wisdom are held in especial honor both by the gods and by men of intelligence ; (150b) and wise and just are they alone who know what acts and words to use towards gods and men. But I should like now to hear what may be your opinion on the subject. ALCIBIADES II

And is it any other art than this that you call JUSTICE ? LOVERS

So this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription — that one is to practise temperance and JUSTICE. LOVERS

Then that whereby we know how to punish rightly (138b) is JUSTICE, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others’ quality is temperance ? LOVERS

Then JUSTICE and temperance are the same thing ? LOVERS

Then would he also govern his house well by JUSTICE, or by some other art ? LOVERS

By JUSTICE. LOVERS

Hence they are all the same, it seems, — king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man ; and it is all one art, — the kingly, the despotic, the statesman’s, the master’s, the house-manager’s, and JUSTICE and temperance. LOVERS

(407b) “Whither haste ye, O men ? Yea, verily ye know not that ye are doing none of the things ye ought, seeing that ye spend your whole energy on wealth and the acquiring of it ; while as to your sons to whom ye will bequeath it, ye neglect to ensure that they shall understand how to use it justly, and ye find for them no teachers of JUSTICE, if so be that it is teachable — or if it be a matter of training and practice, instructors who can efficiently practice and train them — nor have ye even begun by reforming yourselves in this respect. Yet when ye perceive that ye yourselves and your children, though adequately instructed in letters and music and gymnastic — (407c) which ye, forsooth, regard as a complete education in virtue — are in consequence none the less vicious in respect of wealth, how is it that ye do not contemn this present mode of education nor search for teachers who will put an end to this your lack of culture ? Yet truly it is because of this dissonance and sloth, and not because of failure to keep in step with the lyre that brother with brother and city with city clash together without measure or harmony (407d) and are at strife, and in their warring perpetrate and suffer the uttermost horrors. But ye assert that the unjust are unjust not because of their lack of education and lack of knowledge but voluntarily, while on the other hand ye have the face to affirm that inJUSTICE is a foul thing, and hateful to Heaven. Then how, pray, could any man voluntarily choose an evil of such a kind ? Any man, you reply, who is mastered by his pleasures. But is not this condition also involuntary, if the act of mastering be voluntary ? Thus in every way the argument proves that unjust action is involuntary, and that every man privately (407e) and all the cities publicly ought to pay more attention than they do now to this matter.” CLEITOPHON

So then, Socrates, when I hear you constantly making these speeches I admire you immensely and praise you to the skies. So too when you state the next point in your argument, that those who train their bodies but neglect their souls are guilty of another action of the same sort — neglecting the part that should rule, and attending to that which should be ruled. Also when you declare that whatsoever object a man knows not how to make use of, it is better for him to refrain from making use thereof ; thus, suppose a man knows not how to use his eyes or his ears or the whole of his body, it is better for such a man not to hear nor to see nor to employ his body for any other use rather than to use it in any way whatsoever. (408a) So too, likewise, with respect to art : it is surely plain that a man who does not know how to use his own lyre does not know either how to use his neighbor’s, and that one who does not know how to use the lyre of others does not know how to use his own either, — nor yet any other instrument or chattel. Moreover, the conclusion of this argument of yours is a fine one, — how that for every man<man who knows not how to make use of his soul it is better to have his soul at rest and not to live, than to live acting according to his own caprice ; but if it is necessary for him to live, (408b) it is better after all for such an one to spend his life as a slave rather than a free man, handing over the rudder of his will, as it were of a ship, to another man who has learnt the art of steering men — which is the name that you, Socrates, frequently give to politics, when you declare that this very same art is that of judging and JUSTICE. CLEITOPHON

Against these arguments and others of a like kind, exceedingly numerous and couched in exceedingly noble language, showing that virtue can be taught and that a man should care above all else for himself, I have hardly uttered a word up till now, nor do I suppose that I ever shall utter a word against them (408c) in the future, for I regard them as most valuable admonitions and most useful, literally capable of waking us up, as it were, out of our slumber. So I gave my attention with a view to hear what was to follow next, although I did not at first question you yourself, Socrates, but some of your contemporaries and fellow-students or companions — or whatever name one ought to give to the relation in which they stand towards you. Of these I questioned first those who are specially held in regard by yourself, (408d) asking them what was your next argument, and propounding the matter to them somewhat after your own fashion : “I ask you, my very good Sirs, in what sense do we now accept the exhortation to virtue which Socrates has given us. Are we to regard it as all there is, and suppose it to be impossible to pursue the object further and grasp it fully ; and is this to be our lifelong task, just to exhort those who have not as yet been exhorted, and that they in turn should exhort others ? Or, when we have agreed that this is exactly what a man should do, ought we to ask Socrates, and one another, (408e) the further question — “What is the next step ?” What do we say is the way in which we ought to begin the study of JUSTICE ? Just as if a man were exhorting us to devote care to our bodies, observing that we like children had as yet no notion of the existence of the arts of gymnastics and medicine ; and were then to reproach us and say that it is disgraceful to spend all one’s care on wheat and barley and vines and all the goods which we labor to acquire for the sake of the body, and yet make no effort to discover some art or device for securing that the body itself shall be in the best possible condition — and that in spite of the fact that such an art exists. Suppose then that we had put to the man who was thus exhorting us this further question — (409a) “What arts do you say these are ?” His answer, no doubt, would be — “Gymnastics and medicine.” So now, in the case before us, what do we say is the art which deals with the virtue of the soul ? Let it be stated.” CLEITOPHON

Then he who was reputed to be their most powerful exponent of these matters answered me and said that this art is precisely that which, said he, you hear Socrates describing, — nothing else than JUSTICE. I then replied — “Do not explain to me merely its name, but like this : — There is an art called medicine ; and of this the effects are two-fold, the one being (409b) to produce constantly new doctors in addition to those already existing, and the other to produce health. And of these the latter result is no longer in itself an art but an effect of that art which both teaches and is taught, which effect we term ‘health’. So likewise the operations of the joiner’s art are a house and joinery, of which the one is an effect, the other a doctrine. In like manner let it be granted that the one effect of JUSTICE is to produce just men, as of the other arts their several artists ; but as to the other, the operation which the just man is capable of performing for us, what do we say that is ? Tell us.” (409c) The reply of your exponent was, I think, “The beneficial” ; while another said “The right” ; a third “The useful” ; and yet another “The profitable.” So I resumed my inquiry and said : “In the former case also we find these names in each one of the arts — doing ‘the right’, ‘the profitable’, ‘the useful’, and the rest of such terms ; but as regards the object at which all these operations aim, each art will declare that which is peculiar to itself ; for example, the art of joinery will assert that the result of good, beautiful, and right action is the production of wooden vessels, which in themselves are not an art. So let the operation of JUSTICE (409d) be stated in the same way.” CLEITOPHON

Finally, Socrates, one of your companions, who was reputed to be a most accomplished speaker, made answer that the peculiar effect of JUSTICE, which was effected by no other art, was to produce friendship in States. And he, in turn, when questioned declared that friendship is a good thing and never an evil ; while as to the friendships of children and those of wild beasts, which we call by this name, he refused to admit — when questioned upon the point — that they were friendships ; since, as a result of the argument, he was forced to say that such relations were for the most part harmful (409e) rather than good. So to avoid such an admission he denied that such relations were friendships at all, and said that those who give them this name name them falsely ; and real and true friendship, he said, is most exactly described as “unanimity.” And when asked about “unanimity,” whether he declared it to be unity of opinion or “knowledge,” he rejected the expression “unity of opinion,” for of necessity many cases of “unity of opinion” occurred amongst men that were harmful, whereas he had agreed that friendship was wholly a good thing and an effect of JUSTICE ; consequently he affirmed that unanimity was the same, and was not opinion, but knowledge. CLEITOPHON

Finally, Socrates, I put these questions to you yourself also, and you told me that it belonged to JUSTICE (410b) to injure one’s enemies and to do well to one’s friends. But later on it appeared that the just man never injures anyone, for in all his acts he aims at benefiting all. So after repeated questionings — not once only or twice but spending quite a long time at it — I gave it up, concluding that though you were better than any man at the task of exhorting men to devote themselves to virtue, yet of these two alternatives one must be true : either you are capable of effecting thus much only and nothing more, — a thing which might happen also in respect of any other art whatsoever, as for example a man who was no steersman might practice composing an eulogy of that art (410c) as one of high value to mankind, and so too with all the other arts ; so against you too one might perhaps bring the same charge in regard to JUSTICE, that you are none the more an expert about JUSTICE because you eulogize it finely. Not that this is the complaint I make myself ; but it must be one or other of these two alternatives, — either you do not possess the knowledge or else you refuse to let me share it. CLEITOPHON

Socrates : And again, the just are just by JUSTICE ? MINOS

Socrates : And JUSTICE and law are most noble ? MINOS

Socrates : I thought, Hippias, they appeared to be so to you also. But now once more answer me : Is not JUSTICE either a sort of power or knowledge, or both ? Or must not JUSTICE inevitably be one or other of these ? LESSER HIPPIAS

Socrates : Whenever, then, it does disgraceful acts, it does them voluntarily, by reason of power and art ; and these, either one or both of them, are attributes of JUSTICE. LESSER HIPPIAS

Socrates : Oh how good that is ! But come, since you tell me to do so, now let me try to play that man’s part, so far as possible, and ask you questions. For if you were to deliver for him this discourse that you mention, the one about beautiful pursuits, when he had heard it, after you had stopped speaking, the very first thing he would ask about would be the beautiful ; (287c) for he has that sort of habit, and he would say, “Stranger from Elis, is it not by JUSTICE that the just are just ?” So answer, Hippias, as though he were asking the question. GREATER HIPPIAS

Hippias : I shall answer that it is by JUSTICE. GREATER HIPPIAS

Socrates : “Then this — I mean JUSTICE — is something ?” GREATER HIPPIAS

Socrates : “And JUSTICE, wisdom, and so forth are something ; for the just, wise, and so forth would not be such by them, if they were not something.” GREATER HIPPIAS

Hippias : What ? Is the fellow some sort of master of yours, and if he does that, will he not be arrested and have to pay for it ? Or does your city disregard JUSTICE (292b) and allow the citizens to beat one another unjustly ? GREATER HIPPIAS

Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred ; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing articulate speech and names ; and he also constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts, for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient to provide them with the means of life, and did not enable them to carry on war against the animals : food they had, but not as yet the art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self-preservation gathered them into cities ; but when they were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil intreated one another, and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the entire race would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and JUSTICE to be the ordering principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart JUSTICE and reverence among men : — Should he distribute them as the arts are distributed ; that is to say, to a favoured few only, one skilled individual having enough of medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones ? “Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute JUSTICE and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all ?” “To all,” said Zeus ; “I should like them all to have a share ; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and JUSTICE shall be put to death, for he is a plague of the state.” PROTAGORAS

And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations ; and when any one else interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not of the favoured few ; which, as I reply, is very natural. But when they meet to deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only by way of JUSTICE and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks of them, as is also natural, because they think that every man ought to share in this sort of virtue, and that states could not exist if this were otherwise. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon. PROTAGORAS

And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of JUSTICE or honesty and of every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is this. In other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad and go and admonish him ; but when honesty is in question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty, then, what in the other case was held by them to be good sense, they now deem to be madness. They say that all men ought to profess honesty whether they are honest or not, and that a man is out of his mind who says anything else. Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of honesty ; and that if he has none at all he ought not to be in the world. PROTAGORAS

There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves ? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and resume the argument. Please to consider : Is there or is there not some one quality of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all ? In the answer to this question is contained the only solution of your difficulty ; there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith, or the potter, but JUSTICE and temperance and holiness and, in a word, manly virtue — if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers, and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything else, and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable — if what I am saying be true, good men have their sons taught other things and not this, do consider how extraordinary their conduct would appear to be. For we have shown that they think virtue capable of being taught and cultivated both in private and public ; and, notwithstanding, they have their sons taught lesser matters, ignorance of which does not involve the punishment of death : but greater things, of which the ignorance may cause death and exile to those who have no training or knowledge of them — aye, and confiscation as well as death, and, in a word, may be the ruin of families — those things, I say, they are supposed not to teach them — not to take the utmost care that they should learn. How improbable is this, Socrates ! PROTAGORAS

Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are vying with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is able to understand what is being said to him : he cannot say or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just and that is unjust ; this is honourable, that is dishonourable ; this is holy, that is unholy ; do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and good ; if not, he is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of bent or warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading and music ; and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters and is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school ; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and encomia of ancient famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them. Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief ; and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, they introduce him to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the lyric poets ; and these they set to music, and make their harmonies ana rhythms quite familiar to the children’s souls, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and action ; for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm. Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that they may not be compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on any other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the means, and those who have the means are the rich ; their children begin to go to school soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters, the state again compels them to learn the laws, and live after the pattern which they furnish, and not after their own fancies ; and just as in learning to write, the writing-master first draws lines with a style for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes him follow the lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the invention of good lawgivers living in the olden time ; these are given to the young man, in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is commanding or obeying ; and he who transgresses them is to be corrected, or, in other words, called to account, which is a term used not only in your country, but also in many others, seeing that JUSTICE calls men to account. Now when there is all this care about virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught ? Cease to wonder, for the opposite would be far more surprising. PROTAGORAS

But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill ? There is nothing very wonderful in this ; for, as I have been saying, the existence of a state implies that virtue is not any man’s private possession. If so — and nothing can be truer — then I will further ask you to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches JUSTICE and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them — for all of us have a mutual interest in the JUSTICE and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one is so ready to teach JUSTICE and the laws ; — suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good flute players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones ? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing ? In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of JUSTICE if he were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of JUSTICE, or laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practise virtue — with the savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year’s Lenaean festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality of this part of the world. you, Socrates, are discontented, and why ? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability ; and you say, Where are the teachers ? You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek ? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers ? He and his fellow-workmen have taught them to the best of their ability, — but who will carry them further in their arts ? And you would certainly have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them ; but there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of anything else ; if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good ; and I give my pupils their money’s-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment : — When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion ; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value. PROTAGORAS

Thought him still speaking ; still stood fixed to hear. At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at Hippocrates, I said to him : O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither ; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good ; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse ; but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask ; and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them ; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly ; and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer ; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question, which if you will only answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught ; — that I will take upon your authority, and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending JUSTICE and reverence to men ; and several times while you were speaking, JUSTICE, and temperance, and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which JUSTICE and temperance and holiness are parts ; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing : that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind. PROTAGORAS

Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like JUSTICE, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness ? PROTAGORAS

Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And first, you would agree with me that JUSTICE is of the nature of a thing, would you not ? That is my opinion : would it not be yours also ? PROTAGORAS

And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, “O Protagoras, and you, Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling JUSTICE, is it just or unjust ?” — and I were to answer, just : would you vote with me or against me ? PROTAGORAS

Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that JUSTICE is of the nature of the just : would not you ? PROTAGORAS

Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this ; and now supposing that he proceeded to say further, “Then holiness is not of the nature of JUSTICE, nor JUSTICE of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness ; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy” : how shall we answer him ? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that JUSTICE is holy, and that holiness is just ; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that JUSTICE is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same ; and above all I would assert that JUSTICE is like holiness and holiness is like JUSTICE ; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree with me. PROTAGORAS

He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that JUSTICE is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter ? if you please I please ; and let us assume, if you will I, that JUSTICE is holy, and that holiness is just. PROTAGORAS

Well, he said, I admit that JUSTICE bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other thing ; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common ; even the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another ; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike. PROTAGORAS

And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that JUSTICE and holiness have but a small degree of likeness ? PROTAGORAS

Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before JUSTICE and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his inJUSTICE ? PROTAGORAS

For I am satisfied (he says) when a man is neither bad nor very stupid ; and when he knows JUSTICE (which is the health of states), and is of sound mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to finding fault, and there are innumerable fools (implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant opportunity of finding fault). PROTAGORAS

Sees a thing when he is alone, he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you ? — who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet have not the power of making others good whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you ? I must, indeed. And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this : Are wisdom and temperance and courage and JUSTICE and holiness five names of the same thing ? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them ? And you replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether this is still your opinion ; or if not, I will ask you to define your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me. PROTAGORAS

My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the desire to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue ; for if this were clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great length by both of us — you affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught — would also become clear. The result of our discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying : “Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings ; there are you, Socrates, who were saying that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that all things are knowledge, including JUSTICE, and temperance, and courage, — which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught ; for if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught ; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to prove it to be anything rather than knowledge ; and if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught.” Now I, Protagoras, perceiving this terrible confusion of our ideas, have a great desire that they should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the discussion until we ascertain what virtue is, whether capable of being taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in the argument, as he forgot us in the story ; I prefer your Prometheus to your Epimetheus, for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the enquiry. PROTAGORAS

How you have felt, O men of Athens, at hearing the speeches of my accusers, I cannot tell ; but I know that their persuasive words almost made me forget who I was — such was the effect of them ; and yet they have hardly spoken a word of truth. But many as their falsehoods were, there was one of them which quite amazed me ; — I mean when they told you to be upon your guard, and not to let yourselves be deceived by the force of my eloquence. They ought to have been ashamed of saying this, because they were sure to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and displayed my deficiency ; they certainly did appear to be most shameless in saying this, unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth ; for then I do indeed admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs ! Well, as I was saying, they have hardly uttered a word, or not more than a word, of truth ; but you shall hear from me the whole truth : not, however, delivered after their manner, in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No indeed ! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment ; for I am certain that this is right, and that at my time of life I ought not to be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile orator — let no one expect this of me. And I must beg of you to grant me one favor, which is this — If you hear me using the same words in my defence which I have been in the habit of using, and which most of you may have heard in the agora, and at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to be surprised at this, and not to interrupt me. For I am more than seventy years of age, and this is the first time that I have ever appeared in a court of law, and I am quite a stranger to the ways of the place ; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country ; — that I think is not an unfair request. Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good ; but think only of the JUSTICE of my cause, and give heed to that : let the judge decide justly and the speaker speak truly. APOLOGY

I can give you as proofs of this, not words only, but deeds, which you value more than words. Let me tell you a passage of my own life, which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to inJUSTICE from any fear of death, and that if I had not yielded I should have died at once. I will tell you a story — tasteless, perhaps, and commonplace, but nevertheless true. The only office of state which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of senator ; the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae ; and you proposed to try them all together, which was illegal, as you all thought afterwards ; but at the time I was the only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you ; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and have me taken away, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having law and JUSTICE with me, rather than take part in your inJUSTICE because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to execute him. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes ; and then I showed, not in words only, but in deed, that, if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my only fear was the fear of doing an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong ; and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And to this many will witness. APOLOGY

Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I had led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always supported the right and had made JUSTICE, as I ought, the first thing ? No, indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other. But I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples or to any other. For the truth is that I have no regular disciples : but if anyone likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be young or old, he may freely come. Nor do I converse with those who pay only, and not with those who do not pay ; but anyone, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me and listen to my words ; and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one, that cannot be justly laid to my charge, as I never taught him anything. And if anyone says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all the world has not heard, I should like you to know that he is speaking an untruth. APOLOGY

But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing with you ? I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth about this : they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom ; there is amusement in this. And this is a duty which the God has imposed upon me, as I am assured by oracles, visions, and in every sort of way in which the will of divine power was ever signified to anyone. This is true, O Athenians ; or, if not true, would be soon refuted. For if I am really corrupting the youth, and have corrupted some of them already, those of them who have grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers and take their revenge ; and if they do not like to come themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil their families suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself ; and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettus, who is the father of Aeschines — he is present ; and also there is Antiphon of Cephisus, who is the father of Epignes ; and there are the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is Nicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek to stop him) ; and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus, who had a brother Theages ; and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present ; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I also see. I might mention a great many others, any of whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech ; and let him still produce them, if he has forgotten — I will make way for him. And let him say, if he has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the destroyer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me ; not the corrupted youth only — there might have been a motive for that — but their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony ? Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth and JUSTICE, and because they know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is lying. APOLOGY

But, setting aside the question of dishonor, there seems to be something wrong in petitioning a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of JUSTICE, but to give judgment ; and he has sworn that he will judge according to the laws, and not according to his own good pleasure ; and neither he nor we should get into the habit of perjuring ourselves — there can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonorable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty, I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and convict myself, in my own defence, of not believing in them. But that is not the case ; for I do believe that there are gods, and in a far higher sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me. APOLOGY

Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good, for one of two things : — either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by the sight of dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private man, but even the great king, will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death is like this, I say that to die is gain ; for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead are, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this ? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of JUSTICE in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer ? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I, too, shall have a wonderful interest in a place where I can converse with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and other heroes of old, who have suffered death through an unjust judgment ; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge ; as in this world, so also in that ; I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition ; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too ! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions ! For in that world they do not put a man to death for this ; certainly not. For besides being happier in that world than in this, they will be immortal, if what is said is true. APOLOGY

Still I have a favor to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them ; and I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue ; or if they pretend to be something when they are really nothing, — then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And if you do this, I and my sons will have received JUSTICE at your hands. APOLOGY

Finally, they exhort him to think of JUSTICE first, and of life and children afterwards. He may now depart in peace and innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil. But if he breaks agreements, and returns evil for evil, they will be angry with him while he lives ; and their brethren, the laws of the world below, will receive him as an enemy. Such is the mystic voice which is always murmuring in his ears. CRITO

Soc. Very good ; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate ? In the matter of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them ; or the opinion of the one<one man who has understanding, and whom we ought to fear and reverence more than all the rest of the world : and whom deserting we shall destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by JUSTICE and deteriorated by inJUSTICE ; is there not such a principle ? CRITO

Soc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be depraved, which is improved by JUSTICE and deteriorated by inJUSTICE ? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do with JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, to be inferior to the body ? Cr. Certainly not. CRITO

Soc. Then the laws will say : “Consider, Socrates, if this is true, that in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For, after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good that we had to give, we further proclaim and give the right to every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him ; and none of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods with him. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order JUSTICE and administer the State, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong : first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents ; secondly, because we are the authors of his education ; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands ; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong ; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us ; that is what we offer, and he does neither. These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions ; you, above all other Athenians.” Suppose I ask, why is this ? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the agreement. “There is clear proof,” they will say, “Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military service ; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other States or their laws : your affections did not go beyond us and our State ; we were your special favorites, and you acquiesced in our government of you ; and this is the State in which you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the trial — the State which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile, and that you were not grieved at death. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us, the laws, of whom you are the destroyer ; and are doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all answer this very question : Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only ? Is that true or not ?” How shall we answer that, Crito ? Must we not agree ? CRITO

“For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, what good will you do, either to yourself or to your friends ? That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain ; and you yourself, if you fly to one of the neighboring cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the JUSTICE of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws is more than likely to be corrupter of the young and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men ? and is existence worth having on these terms ? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates ? And what will you say to them ? What you say here about virtue and JUSTICE and institutions and laws being the best things among men ? Would that be decent of you ? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed States to Crito’s friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and license, they will be charmed to have the tale of your escape from prison, set off with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the fashion of runaways is — that is very likely ; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you violated the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little more life ? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper ; but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things ; you will live, but how ? — as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men ; and doing what ? — eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine sentiments about JUSTICE and virtue then ? Say that you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them — will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship ? Is that the benefit which you would confer upon them ? Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them ; for that your friends will take care of them ? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world they will not take care of them ? Nay ; but if they who call themselves friends are truly friends, they surely will. CRITO

“Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of JUSTICE afterwards, but of JUSTICE first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil ; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy ; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.” CRITO

Socrates : Not how to play, or not to play, draughts ; and yet that, I imagine, is a slight matter compared with JUSTICE. What ? Do you not think so ? ALCIBIADES I

Socrates : But on questions of JUSTICE or inJUSTICE I am sure you have ; (112b) and if you have not seen them, at any rate you have heard of them from many people, especially Homer. For you have heard the Odyssey and the Iliad ? ALCIBIADES I

Socrates : Hence it is not licence or authority for doing what one pleases that you have to secure to yourself or the state, but JUSTICE and temperance. ALCIBIADES I

Alcibiades : Well, that is the position, and I shall begin here and now to take pains over JUSTICE. ALCIBIADES I

But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of JUSTICE ? CHARMIDES

And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of knowledge, and has no further knowledge of health and JUSTICE, the probability is that he will only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether concerning himself or other men. CHARMIDES

And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of JUSTICE ? CHARMIDES

Soc. Do you agree with me about the parts ? For I say that JUSTICE, temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would you not say the same ? LACHES

Soc. But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how. they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether JUSTICE, or temperance, or holiness ? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers’ and which were not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural ; and he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or men. LACHES

Soc. That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just ; and whether there may not be JUSTICE where there is not piety ; for JUSTICE is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent ? EUTHYPHRO

Soc. Then, if piety is a part of JUSTICE, I suppose that we should enquire what part ? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases ; for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree ? EUTHYPHRO

Soc. In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of JUSTICE is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me inJUSTICE, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites. EUTHYPHRO

Euth. Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of JUSTICE which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of JUSTICE which attends to men. EUTHYPHRO

Euth. You do me JUSTICE, Socrates ; that is not the sort of attention which I mean. EUTHYPHRO

Soc. I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about JUSTICE, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen ; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do inJUSTICE. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this. GORGIAS

Polus. And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric ? What ! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction — the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious questions — (do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this ?) For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of JUSTICE ? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass. GORGIAS

Soc. And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean : The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them : there is the art of politics attending on the soul ; and another art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as JUSTICE does to medicine ; and the two parts run into one another, JUSTICE having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two on the soul for their highest good ; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them ; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men’s highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body ; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art ; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them. GORGIAS

as cookery : medicine : : rhetoric : JUSTICE. And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up together ; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide : “Chaos” would come again, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length ; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair : And now you may do what you please with my answer. GORGIAS

Soc. And I should speak the truth ; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and JUSTICE. GORGIAS

Soc. And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of JUSTICE ? GORGIAS

Soc. Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty ; medicine from disease ; and JUSTICE from intemperance and inJUSTICE ? GORGIAS

Soc. Money-making, medicine, and JUSTICE. GORGIAS

Soc. And JUSTICE, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both ? GORGIAS

Soc. And JUSTICE punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice ? GORGIAS

Soc. He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour ; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade JUSTICE, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body ; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils ; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form ? GORGIAS

Soc. And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to harm another, whether an enemy or not — I except the case of self-defence — then I have to be upon my guard — but if my enemy injures a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge ; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment : if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion and JUSTICE ; and if he has done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness ; or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any use to him who is not intending to commit inJUSTICE ; at least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion. GORGIAS

Cal. O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused Gorgias : — for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know JUSTICE, he would teach him JUSTICE, Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would be displeased if he answered “No” ; and then in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you deservedly, as I think ; but now he has himself fallen into the same trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer inJUSTICE, for this was the admission which led to his being entangled by you ; and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another : and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself ; and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the rule of nature ; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip away to custom : as, for instance, you did in this very discussion about doing and suffering inJUSTICE. When Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature ; for by the rule of nature, to suffer inJUSTICE is the greater disgrace because the greater evil ; but conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of inJUSTICE is hot the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live ; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak ; and they, make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests ; and they : terrify the stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them in order that they may not get the better of them ; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust ; meaning, by the word inJUSTICE, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbours ; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called inJUSTICE, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker ; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that JUSTICE consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what principle of JUSTICE did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians ? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these are the men who act according to nature ; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of nature : not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions, — charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this ; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against nature : the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural JUSTICE would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, when he says in his poem, that GORGIAS

Neither in a court of JUSTICE could you state a case, or give any reason or proof, offer valiant counsel on another’s behalf. GORGIAS

Soc. Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evilevil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities — knowledge, good-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you are ; others are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because they have not the same interest in me which you have ; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having received an excellent education ; to this many Athenians can testify. And are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so ? I know that you, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together : there were four of you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be overwise ; you were afraid that too much wisdom might unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends, I have a sufficient evidence of your real goodwill to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference in the present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument about any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us, and will not require to be submitted to any further test. For you could not have agreed with me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me for making, — What ought the character of a man to be, and what his pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth ? For be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call me “dolt,” and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural JUSTICE : Do you not mean that the superior should take the property of the inferior by force ; that the better should rule the worse, the noble have more than the mean ? Am I not right in my recollection ? GORGIAS

Soc. And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that JUSTICE is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer inJUSTICE ? — is that so or not ? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be : found to come in the way ; do the many think, or do they not think thus ? — I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an authority. GORGIAS

Soc. Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer inJUSTICE, and that JUSTICE is equality ; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the argument is about custom ? GORGIAS

Cal. Yes ; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural JUSTICE — that the better and wiser should rule have more than the inferior. GORGIAS

Cal. I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and courageous in the administration of a state — they ought to be the rulers of their states, and JUSTICE consists in their having more than their subjects. GORGIAS

Cal. Quite so, Socrates ; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything ? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them ; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural JUSTICE and nobility. To this however the many cannot attain ; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and JUSTICE out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance — to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him ? — must not he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of JUSTICE and temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city ? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this : — that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they be provided with means, are virtue and happiness — all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth. GORGIAS

Soc. And “lawful” and “law” are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and orderly : — and so we have temperance and JUSTICE : have we not ? GORGIAS

Soc. And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away ? Will not his aim be to implant JUSTICE in the souls of his citizens mind take away inJUSTICE, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice ? Do you not agree ? GORGIAS

And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men ; — for he would not be temperate if he did not ? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just ; See and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy ; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy ? Very true. And must he not be courageous ? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought ; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does ; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable : now this latter is he whom you were applauding — the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him : he had better order his life so as not to need punishment ; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then JUSTICE must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and JUSTICE present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a robber’s life. Such ; one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and JUSTICE bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men ; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry. — Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of JUSTICE and temperance, and the miserable the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the consequences ? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric — all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, to do inJUSTICE, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse ; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of JUSTICE, has also turned out to be true. GORGIAS

And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the pleader ? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that no other profession is worth thinking about ; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what JUSTICE or reason is there in your refusal ? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning ? I know that you will say, “I am better, better born.” But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend ! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved : — May not he who is truly a man cease to care about living a certain time ? — he knows, as women say, that no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond of life ; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term — whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which he lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to have power in the state ; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us — I would not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callides ; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes’ darling who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator : for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say ? GORGIAS

And that, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the swollen And ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder statesmen ; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for JUSTICE and temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real authors of their calamities ; and if you are not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original possessions ; not that you are the authors of these misfortunes of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old ; about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to them ; “after all their many services to the State, that they should unjustly perish” — so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie ; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist ; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly ; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose inJUSTICE has been taken away from them, and who have had JUSTICE implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the inJUSTICE which is not in them ? Can anything be more irrational, my friends, than this ? You, Callicles, compel me to be a mob-orator, because you will not answer. GORGIAS

Cal. How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm ! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be brought into a court of JUSTICE, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and mean person. GORGIAS

Soc. I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who practises the true art of politics ; I am the only politician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the JUSTICE court. And you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus : — I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What Would he reply under such circumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, “O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you : he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do ; he gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you !” What do you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament ? If he told the truth he could only say, “All these evil things, my boys, I did for your health,” and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury like that ? How they would cry out ! GORGIAS

Soc. And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might : — “All this I do for the sake of JUSTICE, and with a view to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.” And therefore there is no saying what may happen to me. GORGIAS

Soc. Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. Homer tells us, how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of Cronos there existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has always been, and still continues to be in Heaven — that he who has lived all his life in JUSTICE and holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the reach of evil ; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die ; the judges were alive, and the men were alive ; and the consequence was that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities from the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said : “I shall put a stop to this ; the judgments are not well given, because the persons who are judged have their clothes on, for they are alive ; and there are many who, having evil souls, are apparelled in fair bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment arrives, numerous witnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that they have lived righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too have their clothes on when judging ; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies are interposed as a well before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to them ; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged — What is to be done ? I will tell you : — In the first place, I will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess at present : this power which they have Prometheus has already received my orders to take from them : in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead ; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead — he with his naked soul shall pierce into the other naked souls ; and they shall die suddenly and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their brave attire strewn upon the earth — conducted in this manner, the judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before any of you, and therefore I have made my sons judges ; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall give judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways, whence the two roads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the two others are in any doubt : — then the judgment respecting the last journey of men will be as just as possible.” GORGIAS

Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife’s tale, which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer : but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do inJUSTICE is more to be avoided than to suffer inJUSTICE, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life ; and that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished ; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others, of the few or of the many : and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with a view to JUSTICE. GORGIAS

Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind ; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm in the practise of virtue, if you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together, we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds ; so utterly stupid are we ! Let us, then, take the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best way of life is to practise JUSTICE and every virtue in life and death. This way let us go ; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you ; for that way, Callicles, is nothing worth. GORGIAS

Our country is deserving of praise, not only from us but from all men, on many grounds, but first and foremost because she is god-beloved. The strife of the gods who contended over her and their judgement testify to the truth of our statement. (237d) And how should not she whom the gods praised deserve to be praised by all mankind ? And a second just ground of praise would be this, — that during that period in which the whole earth was putting forth and producing animals of every kind, wild and tame, our country showed herself barren and void of wild animals, but chose for herself and gave birth to man, who surpasses all other animals in intelligence and alone of animals regards JUSTICE and the gods. (237e) And we have a signal proof of this statement in that this land of ours has given birth to the forefathers both of these men and of ourselves. For every creature that brings forth possesses a suitable supply of nourishment for its offspring ; and by this test it is manifest also whether a woman be truly a mother or no, if she possesses no founts of nourishment for her child. Now our land, which is also our mother, furnishes to the full this proof of her having brought forth men ; for, of all the lands that then existed, she was the first and the only one to produce human nourishment, (238a) namely the grain of wheat and barley, whereby the race of mankind is most richly and well nourished, inasmuch as she herself was the true mother of this creature. And proofs such as this one ought to accept more readily on behalf of a country than on behalf of a woman ; for it is not the country that imitates the woman in the matter of conception and birth, but the woman the country. But this her produce of grain she did not begrudge to the rest of men, but dispensed it to them also. And after it she brought to birth for her children the olive, sore labor’s balm. And when she had nurtured and reared them up to man’s estate, (238b) she introduced gods to be their governors and tutors ; the names of whom it behoves us to pass over in this discourse, since we know them ; and they set in order our mode of life, not only in respect of daily business, by instructing us before all others in the arts, but also in respect of the guardianship of our country, by teaching us how to acquire and handle arms. MENEXENUS

(246d) “O children, that ye are born of valiant sires is clearly shown by the facts now before you : we, who might have ignobly lived choose rather to die nobly, before we bring you and those after you to disgrace, and before we bring shame upon our own fathers and all our earlier forebears, since we deem that life is unworthy to be lived for the man who brings shame upon his own, and that such an one has no friend amongst gods or man, either here on earth, or under the earth when he is dead. Wherefore ye must bear in mind our words, (246e) and whatsoever else ye practice ye must practice it in union with valor, being well assured that when divorced from this all possessions and pursuits are base and ignoble. For neither does wealth bring honor to its possessor if combined with cowardice — for such an one is rich for another rather than for himself, — nor do beauty and strength appear comely, but rather uncomely, when they are attached to one that is cowardly and base, since they make their possessor more conspicuous and show up his cowardice ; and every form of knowledge (247a) when sundered from JUSTICE and the rest of virtue is seen to be plain roguery rather than wisdom. For these reasons do ye make it your endeavor, first and last and always, in every way to show all zeal that ye may exceed, if possible, both us and those who went before us in renown ; but if not, be ye well assured that if we vanquish you in virtue our victory brings us shame, whereas, if we are defeated, our defeat brings happiness. And most of all would we be the vanquished, you the victors, if ye are careful in your conduct not to trade upon the glory of your ancestors (247b) nor yet to squander it, believing that for a man who holds himself of some account there is nothing more shameful than to find himself held in honor not for his own sake but because of the glory of his ancestors. In the honors which belong to their parents, the children truly possess a noble and splendid treasure ; but to use up one’s treasure, whether of wealth or of honor, and bequeath none to one’s children, is the base and unmanly act of one who lacks all wealth and distinctions of his own. And if ye practise these precepts (247c) ye will come unto us as friends unto friends whensoever the appointed doom shall convey you hither ; but if ye neglect them and play the coward, ye will be welcomed graciously by none. Let such, then, be the words we address to our children. MENEXENUS

Soc. And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without JUSTICE ? MENO

Soc. Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and JUSTICE ? MENO

Soc. Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and JUSTICE ? MENO

Men. Yes, Socrates ; I agree there ; for JUSTICE is virtue. MENO

Men. Quite right ; and that is just what I am saying about virtue — that there are other virtues as well as JUSTICE. MENO

Soc. Then JUSTICE or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue. MENO

Soc. Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by JUSTICE or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of JUSTICE is vice. MENO

Soc. And were we not saying just now that JUSTICE, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue ? MENO

Soc. Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame your answer ; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with JUSTICE ; and JUSTICE you acknowledge to be a part of virtue. MENO

Soc. Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue ; for JUSTICE and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue. MENO

Soc. What of that ! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole ? And you are very far from telling me this ; but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue ; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question : What is virtue ? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue ; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with JUSTICE is virtue ? Ought I not to ask the question over again ; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue ? MENO

Soc. Next, let us consider the goods of the soul : they are temperance, JUSTICE, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like ? MENO

And what other goods are there ? I said. What do you say of temperance, JUSTICE, courage : do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods ? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say ? EUTHYDEMUS

Her. I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming words — wisdom, understanding, JUSTICE, and the rest of them ? CRATYLUS

Soc. Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify Phoras kai rhou noesis (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps Phoras onesis (the blessing of motion), but is at any rate connected with Pheresthai (motion) ; gnome (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration (nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider ; or, if you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which is neou esis (the desire of the new) ; the word neos implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express his longing of the soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not noesis. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of that wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them ; wherefor the word should rather be read as epistemene, inserting en. Sunesis (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion ; the word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and, like epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native growth ; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed) ; and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by sophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name which is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature ; for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion ; some are swifter, some slower ; but there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune (JUSTICE) is clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just) ; but the actual word dikaion is more difficult : men are only agreed to a certain extent about JUSTICE, and then they begin to disagree. CRATYLUS

For those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere receptacle ; and they say that there is a penetrating power which passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element ; for if it were not the subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all things and pieces (diaion) all, is rightly called dikaion ; the letter k is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a general agreement about the nature of JUSTICE ; but I, Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that the JUSTICE of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world : now a cause is that because of which anything is created ; and some one comes and whispers in my ear that JUSTICE is rightly so called because partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he has said, to interrogate him gently : “Well, my excellent friend,” say I, “but if all this be true, I still want to know what is JUSTICE.” Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of them says that JUSTICE is the sun, and that he only is the piercing (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the satirical remark, “What, is there no JUSTICE in the world when the sun is down ?” And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he says, “Fire in the abstract” ; but this is not very intelligible. Another says, “No, not fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.” Another man professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that JUSTICE is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of JUSTICE than I was before I began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led me into this digression, was given to JUSTICE for the reasons which I have mentioned. CRATYLUS

Soc. Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in the originality of the rest. What remains after JUSTICE ? I do not think that we have as yet discussed courage (andreia), — inJUSTICE (adikia), which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle (diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of andreia seems to imply a battle ; — this battle is in the world of existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (enantia rhon) : if you extract the d from andreia, the name at once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that andreia is not the stream opposed to every stream, but only to that which is contrary to JUSTICE, for otherwise courage would not have been praised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun (birth) : thelu (female) appears to be partly derived from thele (the teat), because the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish (tethelenai). CRATYLUS

The course of the seasons is also full of both these principles ; and when, as I was saying, the elements of hot and cold, moist and dry, attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony, they bring to men, animals, and plants health and plenty, and do them no harm ; whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand and affecting the seasons of the year, is very destructive and injurious, being the source of pestilence, and bringing many other kinds of diseases on animals and plants ; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, which to know in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the seasons of the year is termed astronomy. Furthermore all sacrifices and the whole province of divination, which is the art of communion between gods and men — these, I say, are concerned with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all manner of impiety is likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honouring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honours the other love, whether in his feelings towards gods or parents, towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, working by a knowledge of the religious or irreligious tendencies which exist in human loves. Such is the great and mighty, or rather omnipotent force of love in general. And the love, more especially, which is concerned with the good, and which is perfected in company with temperance and JUSTICE, whether among gods or men, has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and harmony, and makes us friends with the gods who are above us, and with one another. I dare say that I too have omitted several things which might be said in praise of Love, but this was not intentional, and you, Aristophanes, may now supply the omission or take some other line of commendation ; for I perceive that you are rid of the hiccough. SYMPOSIUM

herein is an excellent proof of her tenderness — that she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love ; for he walks not upon the earth, nor yet upon skulls of men, which are not so very soft, but in the hearts and souls of both god, and men, which are of all things the softest : in them he walks and dwells and makes his home. Not in every soul without exception, for Where there is hardness he departs, where there is softness there he dwells ; and nestling always with his feet and in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he be other than the softest of all things ? Of a truth he is the tenderest as well as the youngest, and also he is of flexile form ; for if he were hard and without flexure he could not enfold all things, or wind his way into and out of every soulsoul of man undiscovered. And a proof of his flexibility and symmetry of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in an especial manner the attribute of Love ; ungrace and love are always at war with one another. The fairness of his complexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers ; for he dwells not amid bloomless or fading beauties, whether of body or soul or aught else, but in the place of flowers and scents, there he sits and abides. Concerning the beauty of the god I have said enough ; and yet there remains much more which I might say. Of his virtue I have now to speak : his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer wrong to or from any god or any man ; for he suffers not by force if he suffers ; force comes not near him, neither when he acts does he act by force. For all men in all things serve him of their own free will, and where there is voluntary agreement, there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is JUSTICE. And not only is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no pleasure ever masters Love ; he is their master and they are his servants ; and if he conquers them he must be temperate indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for him ; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs ; and the master is stronger than the servant. And if he conquers the bravest of all others, he must be himself the bravest. SYMPOSIUM

Of his courage and JUSTICE and temperance I have spoken, but I have yet to speak of his wisdom — and according to the measure of my ability I must try to do my best. In the first place he is a poet (and here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art), and he is also the source of poesy in others, which he could not be if he were not himself a poet. And at the touch of him every one becomes a poet, even though he had no music in him before ; this also is a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the fine arts ; for no one can give to another that which he has not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge. Who will deny that the creation of the animals is his doing ? Are they not all the works his wisdom, born and begotten of him ? And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires has the light of fame ? — he whom Love touches riot walks in darkness. The arts of medicine and archery and divination were discovered by Apollo, under the guidance of love and desire ; so that he too is a disciple of Love. Also the melody of the Muses, the metallurgy of Hephaestus, the weaving of Athene, the empire of Zeus over gods and men, are all due to Love, who was the inventor of them. And so Love set in order the empire of the gods — the love of beauty, as is evident, for with deformity Love has no concern. In the days of old, as I began by saying, dreadful deeds were done among the gods, for they were ruled by Necessity ; but now since the birth of Love, and from the Love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things. And there comes into my mind a line of poetry in which he is said to be the god who SYMPOSIUM

“Those who are pregnant in the body only, betake themselves to women and beget children — this is the character of their love ; their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their memory and giving them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future. But souls which are pregnant — for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or contain. And what are these conceptions ? — wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and JUSTICE. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate. He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring — for in deformity he will beget nothing — and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body ; above all when he finds fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man ; and he tries to educate him ; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth ; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones ? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory ? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say ? There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws ; and many others there are in many other places, both among hellenes and barbarians, who have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind ; and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of children such as theirs ; which were never raised in honour of any one, for the sake of his mortal children. SYMPOSIUM

Well, but there is another thing, Simmias : Is there or is there not an absolute JUSTICE ? PHAEDO

Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, which are measured like coins, the greater with the less, is not the exchange of virtue. O my dear Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to exchange ? — and that is wisdom ; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or JUSTICE. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her ? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her ; but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and JUSTICE, and courage, and wisdom herself are a purgation of them. And I conceive that the founders of the mysteries had a real meaning and were not mere triflers when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will live in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For “many,” as they say in the mysteries, “are the thyrsus bearers, but few are the mystics,” — meaning, as I interpret the words, the true philosophers. In the number of whom I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place during my whole life ; whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world : that is my belief. And now, Simmias and Cebes, I have answered those who charge me with not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world ; and I am right in not repining, for I believe that I shall find other masters and friends who are as good in the world below. But all men cannot believe this, and I shall be glad if my words have any more success with you than with the judges of the Athenians. PHAEDO

And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas ; for we are not speaking only of equality absolute, but of beauty, goodness, JUSTICE, holiness, and all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, when we ask and answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth ? PHAEDO

Even among them some are happier than others ; and the happiest both in themselves and their place of abode are those who have practised the civil and social virtues which are called temperance and JUSTICE, and are acquired by habit and attention without philosophy and mind. PHAEDO

I do not mean to affirm that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true — a man of sense ought hardly to say that. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like these, which is the reason why lengthen out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him, and rather hurtful in their effects, and has followed after the pleasures of knowledge in this life ; who has adorned the soul in her own proper jewels, which are temperance, and JUSTICE, and courage, and nobility, and truth — in these arrayed she is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her time comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison ; and I think that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead. PHAEDO

Phaedr. What do you mean, my good Socrates ? How can you imagine that my unpractised memory can do JUSTICE to an elaborate work, which the greatest rhetorician of the age spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot ; I would give a great deal if I could. PHAEDRUS

Soc. Only think, my good Phaedrus, what an utter want of delicacy was shown in the two discourses ; I mean, in my own and in that which you recited out of the book. Would not any one who was himself of a noble and gentle nature, and who loved or ever had loved a nature like his own, when we tell of the petty causes of lovers’ jealousies, and of their exceeding animosities, and of the injuries which they do to their beloved, have imagined that our ideas of love were taken from some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown — he would certainly never have admitted the JUSTICE of our censure ? PHAEDRUS

The wing is the corporeal element which is most akin to the divine, and which by nature tends to soar aloft and carry that which gravitates downwards into the upper region, which is the habitation of the gods. The divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like ; and by these the wing of the soul is nourished, and grows apace ; but when fed upon evil and foulness and the opposite of good, wastes and falls away. Zeus, the mighty lord, holding the reins of a winged chariot, leads the way in heaven, ordering all and taking care of all ; and there follows him the array of gods and demigods, marshalled in eleven bands ; Hestia alone abides at home in the house of heaven ; of the rest they who are reckoned among the princely twelve march in their appointed order. They see many blessed sights in the inner heaven, and there are many ways to and fro, along which the blessed gods are passing, every one doing his own work ; he may follow who will and can, for jealousy has no place in the celestial choir. But when they go to banquet and festival, then they move up the steep to the top of the vault of heaven. The chariots of the gods in even poise, obeying the rein, glide rapidly ; but the others labour, for the vicious steed goes heavily, weighing down the charioteer to the earth when his steed has not been thoroughly trained : — and this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul. For the immortals, when they are at the end of their course, go forth and stand upon the outside of heaven, and the revolution of the spheres carries them round, and they behold the things beyond. But of the heaven which is above the heavens, what earthly poet ever did or ever will sing worthily ? It is such as I will describe ; for I must dare to speak the truth, when truth is my theme. There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned ; the colourless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul. The divine intelligence, being nurtured upon mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving the food proper to it, rejoices at beholding reality, and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution of the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds JUSTICE, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute ; and beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home ; and there the charioteer putting up his horses at the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink. PHAEDRUS

Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul of each one can return to the place from whence she came, for she cannot grow her wings in less ; only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not devoid of philosophy, may acquire wings in the third of the recurring periods of a thousand years ; he is distinguished from the ordinary good man who gains wings in three thousand years : — and they who choose this life three times in succession have wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished ; others to some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by JUSTICE, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they please. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For a man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason ; — this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God — when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being. And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings ; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him ; they do not see that he is inspired. PHAEDRUS

Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty ; he would like to fly away, but he cannot ; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below ; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as has been already said, every soulsoul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being ; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recall the things of the other world ; they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the memory of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them ; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement ; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of JUSTICE or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of them : they are seen through a glass dimly ; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and these only with difficulty. There was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in brightness — we philosophers following in the train of Zeus, others in company with other gods ; and then we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining impure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the memory of scenes which have passed away. PHAEDRUS

Phaedr. And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true JUSTICE, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgment ; nor with the truly good or honourable, but only with opinion about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion, and not from the truth. PHAEDRUS

Soc. But when any one speaks of JUSTICE and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves ? PHAEDRUS

Soc. He will argue that is no use in putting a solemn face on these matters, or in going round and round, until you arrive at first principles ; for, as I said at first, when the question is of JUSTICE and good, or is a question in which men are concerned who are just and good, either by nature or habit, he who would be a skilful rhetorician has ; no need of truth — for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, but only about conviction : and this is based on probability, to which who would be a skilful orator should therefore give his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts, if they are improbable, ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should be told either in accusation or defence, and that always in speaking, the orator should keep probability in view, and say good-bye to the truth. And the observance, of this principle throughout a speech furnishes the whole art. PHAEDRUS

Phaedr. I acknowledge the JUSTICE of your rebuke ; and I think that the Theban is right in his view about letters. PHAEDRUS

Phaedr. A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, the pastime of a man who can be amused by serious talk, and can discourse merrily about JUSTICE and the like. PHAEDRUS

Soc. That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was or will be, whether private man or statesman, proposes laws and so becomes the author of a political treatise, fancying that there is any great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of his so writing is only a disgrace to him, whatever men may say. For not to know the nature of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, and good and evil, and not to be able to distinguish the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be otherwise than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of the whole world. PHAEDRUS

Soc. But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written, is of any great value, if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or instruction ; and who thinks that even the best of writings are but a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of JUSTICE and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and graven in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness, and that such principles are a man’s own and his legitimate offspring ; — being, in the first place, the word which he finds in his own bosom ; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his others ; — and who cares for them and no others — this is the right sort of man ; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become like him. PHAEDRUS

Soc. And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two-brats, had been alive ; he would have had a great deal to say on their behalf. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child ; and even the guardians whom he left, and of whom our friend Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and therefore I suppose that must take up his cause myself, and see JUSTICE done ? THEAETETUS

Soc. Or again, in politics, while affirming that just and unjust, honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not deny that in determining what is or is not expedient for the community one state is wiser and one counsellor better that another — they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city enacts in the belief that it is expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other case, I mean when they speak of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, piety and impiety, they are confident that in nature these have no existence or essence of their own — the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts ; and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras. Here arises a new question, Theodorus, which threatens to be more serious than the last. THEAETETUS

Soc. But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things ; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of a king or of a rich man to the consideration of government, and of human happiness and misery in general — what they are, and how a man is to attain the one and avoid the other — when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge ; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he looks down into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, and stammering broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up a slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus : the one of the freeman, who has becomes trained in liberty and leisure, whom you call the philosopher — him we cannot blame because he appears simple and of no account when he has to perform some menial task, such as packing up bed-clothes, or flavouring a sauce or fawning speech ; the other character is that of the man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman ; still less with the music of discourse can he hymn the true life aright which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven. THEAETETUS

Soc. Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux, who say that things are as they seem to each one, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded 2nd thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force ; this was especially asserted of JUSTICE ; but as to the good, no one had any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good that these, while they were in force, were really good ; — he who said so would be playing with the name “good,” and would, not touch the real question — it would be a mockery, would it not ? THEAETETUS

Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides ; that is because you are still young ; the time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things ; at your age, you are too much disposed to regard opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names ; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity ; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness ; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of JUSTICE and beauty ? PARMENIDES

Str. But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute about JUSTICE and inJUSTICE in their own nature, and about things in general, we have been accustomed to call argumentation (Eristic) ? SOPHIST

Str. And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by the possession of JUSTICE and wisdom, and the opposite under opposite circumstances ? SOPHIST

Str. And, allowing that JUSTICE, wisdom, the other virtues, and their opposites exist, as well as a soul in which they inhere, do they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they all invisible ? SOPHIST

Theaet. They would distinguish : the soul would be said by them to have a body ; but as to the other qualities of JUSTICE, wisdom, and the like, about which you asked, they would not venture either to deny their existence, or to maintain that they were all corporeal. SOPHIST

Str. And what would you say of the figure or form of JUSTICE or of virtue in general ? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed ? SOPHIST

Str. And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State by killing some, or exiling some ; whether they reduce the size of the body corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens, or, by introducing persons from without, increase it ; while they act according to the rules of wisdom and JUSTICE, and use their power with a view to the general security and improvement, the city over which they rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as the only true State. All other governments are not genuine or real ; but only imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are worse ; the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere imitations like the others. STATESMAN

Str. And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over the herd, and to enforce JUSTICE in their dealings with one another, will not be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly what is suitable for each particular case. STATESMAN

Str. And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust ? May not any man, rich or poor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their interest ? Is not this the true principle of government, according to which the wise and good man will order the affairs of his subjects ? As the pilot, by watching continually over the interests of the ship and of the crew — not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law — preserves the lives of his fellow-sailors, even and in the self-same way, may there not be a true form of polity created by those who are able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show a strength of art which is superior to the law ? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they, observing the one great rule of distributing JUSTICE to the citizens with intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as may be, to make them better from being worse. STATESMAN

Str. In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred nature has been left ; there remain the nobler arts of the general and the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal art, and persuades men to do JUSTICE, and assists in guiding the helm of States : — How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek alone and unalloyed ? STATESMAN

Str. The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of JUSTICE ; but when not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true ? STATESMAN

Str. The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls short of the former in JUSTICE and caution, but has the power of action in a remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is wanting, there cities. cannot altogether prosper either in their public or private life. STATESMAN

Now, when all of them, both those who visibly appear in their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature, had come into being, the creator of the universe addressed them in these words : “Gods, children of gods, who are my works, and of whom I am the artificer and father, my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound may be undone, but only an evil being would wish to undo that which is harmonious and happy. Wherefore, since ye are but creatures, ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble, but ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of death, having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those with which ye were bound at the time of your birth. And now listen to my instructions : — Three tribes of mortal beings remain to be created — without them the universe will be incomplete, for it will not contain every kind of animal which it ought to contain, if it is to be perfect. On the other hand, if they were created by me and received life at my hands, they would be on an equality with the gods. In order then that they may be mortal, and that this universe may be truly universal, do ye, according to your natures, betake yourselves to the formation of animals, imitating the power which was shown by me in creating you. The part of them worthy of the name immortal, which is called divine and is the guiding principle of those who are willing to follow JUSTICE and you — of that divine part I will myself sow the seed, and having made a beginning, I will hand the work over to you. And do ye then interweave the mortal with the immortal, and make and beget living creatures, and give them food, and make them to grow, and receive them again in death.” TIMAEUS

Pro. May none of this befall us, except the deliverance ! Yet I like the even-handed JUSTICE which is applied to both our arguments. Let us assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and different sciences. PHILEBUS

Soc. Let us suppose a man who understands JUSTICE, and has reason as well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other things. PHILEBUS

Cle. Yes, that is our tradition ; and there was Rhadamanthus, a brother of his, with whose name you are familiar ; he is reputed to have been the justest of men, and we Cretans are of opinion that he earned this reputation from his righteous administration of JUSTICE when he was alive. LAWS BOOK I

And such an one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a more difficult kind of war, much in the same degree as JUSTICE and temperance and wisdom, when united with courage, are better than courage only ; for a man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife without having all virtue. But in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary soldier will take his stand and be ready to die at his post, and yet they are generally and almost without exception insolent, unjust, violent men, and the most senseless of human beings. You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove : I maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is worthy of consideration, will always and above all things in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue ; which, according to Theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect JUSTICE. Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was praised by the poet at the right time, yet in place and dignity may be said to be only fourth rate. LAWS BOOK I

Ath. What truth and what JUSTICE require of us, if I am not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence ; — at the legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes of laws answering to the kinds of virtue ; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws make the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws whenever a want is felt, and one man has a class of laws about allotments and heiresses, another about assaults ; others about ten thousand other such matters. But we maintain that the right way of examining into laws is to proceed as we have now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition ; for you were quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you went wrong when you added that all his legislation had a view only to a part, and the least part of virtue, and this called forth my subsequent remarks. Will you allow me then to explain how I should have liked to have heard you expound the matter ? LAWS BOOK I

Ath. You ought to have said, Stranger — The Cretan laws are with reason famous among the Hellenes ; for they fulfil the object of laws, which is to make those who use them happy ; and they confer every sort of good. Now goods are of two kinds : there are human and there are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine ; and the state which attains the greater, at the same time acquires the less, or, not having the greater, has neither. Of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god (Pluto), but one who is keen of sight, if only he has wisdom for his companion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine dass of goods, and next follows temperance ; and from the union of these two with courage springs JUSTICE, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage. All these naturally take precedence of the other goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens with a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind. Some of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage which they make one with another, and then to the procreation and education of children, both male and female ; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give them punishments and rewards ; and in reference to all their intercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions ; he should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves. Also with regard to anger and terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the opposite of these ; in all these states he should determine and teach what is the good and evil of the condition of each. In the next place, the legislator has to be careful how the citizens make their money and in what way they spend it, and to have an eye to their mutual contracts and dissolutions of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary : he should see how they order all this, and consider where JUSTICE as well as inJUSTICE is found or is wanting in their several dealings with one another ; and honour those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey, until the round of civil life is ended, and the time has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead. And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these things — some who walk by intelligence, others by true opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and JUSTICE, and not with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which I was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. And I want to know the nature of all these things, and how they are arranged in the laws of Zeus, as they are termed, and in those of the Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus gave ; and how the order of them is discovered to his eyes, who has experience in laws gained either by study or habit, although they are far from being self-evident to the rest of mankind like ourselves. LAWS BOOK I

Ath. Let me put the matter thus : — Suppose a person to praise the keeping of goats, and the creatures themselves as capital things to have, and then some one who had seen goats feeding without a goatherd in cultivated spots, and doing mischief, were to censure a goat or any other animal who has no keeper, or a bad keeper, would there be any sense or JUSTICE in such censure ? LAWS BOOK I

Ath. Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name ; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and JUSTICE, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good : to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives. LAWS BOOK I

Ath. Let us see whether we understand one another : — Are not the principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows : you compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and just, is fortunate and happy ; and this whether he be great and strong or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor ; and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery ? As the poet says, and with truth : I sing not, I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things, not having JUSTICE ; let him who “draws near and stretches out his hand against his enemies be a just man.” But if he be unjust, I would not have him “look calmly upon bloody death,” nor “surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas” ; and let no other thing that is called good ever be his. For the goods of which the many speak are not really good : first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third ; and then innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect ; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like ; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things, and when you have acquired them to become at once immortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth, to have sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without JUSTICE and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal ; but not so great, if the bad man lives only a very short time. These are the truths which, if I am not mistaken, you will persuade or compel your poets to utter with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these they must train up your youth. Am I not right ? For I plainly declare that evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the evil. Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this ? LAWS BOOK II

Ath. The view which identifies the pleasant and the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator, and is, in his opinion, infamous ; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy, especially in childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth ; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are shadows only, and that inJUSTICE, which seems opposed to JUSTICE, when contemplated by the unjust and evil man appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant ; but that from the just man’s point of view, the very opposite is the appearance of both of them. LAWS BOOK II

Ath. Yes ; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of youth, having no sense of right and JUSTICE, prays with fervour, under the influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursed the unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of right and JUSTICE, will join in his father’s prayers ? LAWS BOOK III

Ath. And surely JUSTICE does not grow apart from temperance ? LAWS BOOK III

Ath. I will do as you suggest. There is a tradition of the happy life of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant. And of this the reason is said to have been as follows : — Cronos knew what we ourselves were declaring, that no human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities ; he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals. For we do not appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen, or goats of goats ; but we ourselves are a superior race, and rule over them. In like manner God, in his love of mankind, placed over us the demons, who are a superior race, and they with great case and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care us and giving us peace and reverence and order and JUSTICE never failing, made the tribes of men happy and united. And this tradition, which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not God is the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils. Still we must do all that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken, both in private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by the very term “law,” the distribution of mind. But if either a single person or an oligarchy or a democracy has a soul eager after pleasures and desires — wanting to be filled with them, yet retaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted with an endless and insatiable disorder ; and this evil spirit, having first trampled the laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or of an individual — then, as I was saying, salvation is hopeless. And now, Cleinias, we have to consider whether you will or will not accept this tale of mine. LAWS BOOK IV

Ath. You are aware — are you not ? — that there are of said to be as many forms of laws as there are of governments, and of the latter we have already mentioned all those which are commonly recognized. Now you must regard this as a matter of first-rate importance. For what is to be the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue. Men say that the law ought not to regard either military virtue, or virtue in general, but only the interests and power and preservation of the established form of government ; this is thought by them to be the best way of expressing the natural definition of JUSTICE. LAWS BOOK IV

Ath. “This, then, is always the mode and fashion in which JUSTICE exists.” LAWS BOOK IV

Ath. That when there has been a contest for power, those who gain the upper hand so entirely monopolize the government, as to refuse all share to the defeated party and their descendants — they live watching one another, the ruling class being in perpetual fear that some one who has a recollection of former wrongs will come into power and rise up against them. Now, according to our view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws right which are passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole state. States which have such laws are not polities but parties, and their notions of JUSTICE are simply unmeaning. I say this, because I am going to assert that we must not entrust the government in your state to any one because he is rich, or because he possesses any other advantage, such as strength, or stature, or again birth : but he who is most obedient to the laws of the state, he shall win the palm ; and to him who is victorious in the first degree shall be given the highest office and chief ministry of the gods ; and the second to him who bears the second palm ; and on a similar principle shall all the other be assigned to those who come next in order. And when I call the rulers servants or ministers of the law, I give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because I certainly believe that upon such service or ministry depends the well- or ill-being of the state. For that state in which the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the highway to ruin ; but I see that the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the Gods can confer. LAWS BOOK IV

Ath. “Friends,” we say to them, — “God, as the old tradition declares, holding in his hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, travels according to his nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of his end. Justice always accompanies him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To JUSTICE, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows in her company with all humility and order ; but he who is lifted up with pride, or elated by wealth or rank, or beauty, who is young and foolish, and has a soul hot with insolence, and thinks that he has no need of any guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted of God ; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which JUSTICE cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think ? LAWS BOOK IV

Ath. Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in his followers ? One only, expressed once for all in the old saying that “like agrees with like, with measure measure,” but things which have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have. Now God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man, as men commonly say (Protagoras) : the words are far more true of him. And he who would be dear to God must, as far as is possible, be like him and such as he is. Wherefore the temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like him ; and the intemperate man is unlike him, and different from him, and unjust. And the same applies to other things ; and this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all sayings — that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and hold converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet. But with the bad man, the opposite of this is true : for the bad man has an impure soul, whereas the good is pure ; and from one who is polluted, neither good man nor God can without impropriety receive gifts. Wherefore the unholy do only waste their much service upon the Gods, but when offered by any holy man, such service is most acceptable to them. This is the mark at which we ought to aim. But what weapons shall we use, and how shall we direct them ? In the first place, we affirm that next after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the State, honour should be given to the Gods below ; they should receive everything in even and of the second choice, and ill omen, while the odd numbers, and the first choice, and the things of lucky omen, are given to the Gods above, by him who would rightly hit the mark of piety. Next to these Gods, a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the private and ancestral Gods, who are worshipped as the law prescribes in the places which are sacred to them. Next comes the honour of living parents, to whom, as is meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those who gave him birth and brought him up, and that he must do all that he can to minister to them, first, in his property, secondly, in his person, and thirdly, in his soul, in return for the endless care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is now to pay back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need. And all his life long he ought never to utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them ; for of light and fleeting words the penalty is most severe ; Nemesis, the messenger of JUSTICE, is appointed to watch over all such matters. When they are angry and want to satisfy their feelings in word or deed, he should give way to them ; for a father who thinks that he has been wronged by his son may be reasonably expected to be very angry. At their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the honour which has been usually shown by the former generation to their parents. And let a man not forget to pay the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honouring them chiefly by omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our reward from the Gods and those who are above us (i.e., the demons) ; and we shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. And how a man ought to order what relates to his descendants and his kindred and friends and fellow-citizens, and the rites of hospitality taught by Heaven, and the intercourse which arises out of all these duties, with a view to the embellishment and orderly regulation of his own life — these things, I say, the laws, as we proceed with them, will accomplish, partly persuading, and partly when natures do not yield to the persuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right, and will thus render our state, if the Gods co-operate with us, prosperous and happy. But of what has to be said, and must be said by the legislator who is of my way of thinking, and yet, if said in the form of law, would be out of place — of this I think that he may give a sample for the instruction of himself and of those for whom he is legislating ; and then when, as far as he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he may proceed to the work of legislation. Now, what will be the form of such prefaces ? There may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a single form, but I think that we may get some notion of them if we can guarantee one thing. LAWS BOOK IV

Athenian Stranger. Listen, all ye who have just now heard the laws about Gods, and about our dear forefathers : — Of all the things which a man has, next to the Gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own. Now in every man there are two parts : the better and superior, which rules, and the worse and inferior, which serves ; and the ruling part of him is always to be preferred to the subject. Wherefore I am right in bidding every one next to the Gods, who are our masters, and those who in order follow them (i.e., the demons), to honour his own soul, which every one seems to honour, but no one honours as he ought ; for honour is a divine good, and no evil thing is honourable ; and he who thinks that he can honour the soul by word or gift, or any sort of compliance, without making her in any way better, seems to honour her, but honours her not at all. For example, every man, from his very boyhood, fancies that he is able to know everything, and thinks that he honours his soul by praising her, and he is very ready to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to say that in acting thus he injures his soul, and is far from honouring her ; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honour her as second only to the Gods. Again, when a man thinks that others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which he has committed from time to time, and the many and great evils which befell him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be exempt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honouring his soul ; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really injuring her. And when, disregarding the word and approval of the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far from honouring her ; he only dishonours her, and fills her full of evil and remorse ; or when he does not endure to the end the labours and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he does not honour the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonourable ; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, does he honour her, but yet once more he dishonours her ; for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below, instead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonour of the soul ? For such a preference implies that the body is more honourable than the soul ; and this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more honourable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful possession ; nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to acquire dishonest gains, does he then honour his soul with gifts — far otherwise ; he sells her glory and honour for a small piece of gold ; but all the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in exchange for virtue. In a word, I may say that he who does not estimate the base and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator, and abstain in every possible way from the one and practise the other to the utmost of his power, does not know that in all these respects he is most foully and disgracefully abusing his soul, which is the divinest part of man ; for no one, as I may say, ever considers that which is declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing — namely, to grow into the likeness of bad men, and growing like them to fly from the conversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of the bad. And he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another — a suffering which is not JUSTICE but retribution ; for JUSTICE and the just are noble, whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon inJUSTICE ; and whether a man escape or endure this, he is miserable — in the former case, because he is not cured ; while in the latter, he perishes in order that the rest of mankind may be saved. LAWS BOOK V

Another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, which, as we were saying, the Heraclid colony had, and which is also ours — that we have escaped division of land and the abolition of debts ; for these are always a source of dangerous contention, and a city which is driven by necessity to legislate upon such matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet venture to alter them. We must have recourse to prayers, so to speak, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously effected in a length of time. And such a change can be accomplished by those who have abundance of land, and having also many debtors, are willing, in a kindly spirit, to share with those who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving, holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to be the increase of a man’s desires and not the diminution of his property. For this is the great beginning of salvation to a state, and upon this lasting basis may be erected afterwards whatever political order is suitable under the circumstances ; but if the change be based upon an unsound principle, the future administration of the country will be full of difficulties. That is a danger which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had better say how, if we had not escaped, we might have escaped ; and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow or broad, can be devised but freedom from avarice and a sense of JUSTICE — upon this rock our city shall be built ; for there ought to be no disputes among citizens about property. If there are quarrels of long standing among them, no legislator of any degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the state until they are settled. But that they to whom God has given, as he has to us, to be the founders of a new state as yet free from enmity — that they should create themselves enmities by their mode of distributing lands and houses, would be superhuman folly and wickedness. LAWS BOOK V

How then can we rightly order the distribution of the land ? In the first place, the number of the citizens has to be determined, and also the number and size of the divisions into which they will have to be formed ; and the land and the houses will then have to be apportioned by us as fairly as we can. The number of citizens can only be estimated satisfactorily in relation to the territory and the neighbouring states. The territory must be sufficient to maintain a certain number of inhabitants in a moderate way of life — more than this is not required ; and the number of citizens should be sufficient to defend themselves against the inJUSTICE of their neighbours, and also to give them the power of rendering efficient aid to their neighbours when they are wronged. After having taken a survey of theirs and their neighbours’ territory, we will determine the limits of them in fact as well as in theory. And now, let us proceed to legislate with a view to perfecting the form and outline of our state. The number of our citizens shall be 5040 — this will be a convenient number ; and these shall be owners of the land and protectors of the allotment. The houses and the land will be divided in the same way, so that every man may correspond to a lot. Let the whole number be first divided into two parts, and then into three ; and the number is further capable of being divided into four or five parts, or any number of parts up to ten. Every legislator ought to know so much arithmetic as to be able to tell what number is most likely to be useful to all cities ; and we are going to take that number which contains the greatest and most regular and unbroken series of divisions. The whole of number has every possible division, and the number 5040 can be divided by exactly fifty-nine divisors, and ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten : this will furnish numbers for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and divisions of the land. These properties of number should be ascertained at leisure by those who are bound by law to know them ; for they are true, and should be proclaimed at the foundation of the city, with a view to use. Whether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old and decayed one, in respect of Gods and temples — the temples which are to be built in each city, and the Gods or demi-gods after whom they are to be called — if he be a man of sense, he will make no change in anything which the oracle of Delphi, or Dodona, or the God Ammon, or any ancient tradition has sanctioned in whatever manner, whether by apparitions or reputed inspiration of Heaven, in obedience to which mankind have established sacrifices in connection with mystic rites, either originating on the spot, or derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus or some other place, and on the strength of which traditions they have consecrated oracles and images, and altars and temples, and portioned out a sacred domain for each of them. The least part of all these ought not to be disturbed by the legislator ; but he should assign to the several districts some God, or demi-god, or hero, and, in the distribution of the soil, should give to these first their chosen domain and all things fitting, that the inhabitants of the several districts may meet at fixed times, and that they may readily supply their various wants, and entertain one another with sacrifices, and become friends and acquaintances ; for there is no greater good in a state than that the citizens should be known to one another. When not light but darkness and ignorance of each other’s characters prevails among them, no one will receive the honour of which he is deserving, or the power or the JUSTICE to which he is fairly entitled : wherefore, in every state, above all things, every man should take heed that he have no deceit in him, but that he be always true and simple ; and that no deceitful person take any advantage of him. LAWS BOOK V

The mode of election which has been described is in a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean the state ought always to observe ; for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, merely because they are declared to have equal privileges. For to unequals equals become unequal, if they are not harmonized by measure ; and both by reason of equality, and by reason of inequality, cities are filled with seditions. The old saying, that “equality makes friendship,” is happy and also true ; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. For there are two equalities which are called by the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another ; one of them may be introduced without difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honours : this is the rule of measure, weight, and number, which regulates and apportions them. But there is another equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not so easily recognized. This is the judgment of Zeus ; among men it avails but little ; that little, however, is the source of the greatest good to individuals and states. For it gives to the greater more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to the nature of each ; and, above all, greater honour always to the greater virtue, and to the less less ; and to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue and education. And this is JUSTICE, and is ever the true principle of states, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the new city which is now being founded, and any other city which may be hereafter founded. To this the legislator should look — not to the interests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to JUSTICE always ; which, as I was saying, the distribution of natural equality among unequals in each case. But there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words, “just,” “equal,” in a secondary sense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. For equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of JUSTICE. And this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot, in order to avoid the discontent of the people ; and so we invoke God and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme JUSTICE. And therefore, although we are compelled to use both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible. LAWS BOOK VI

Now the establishment of courts of JUSTICE may be regarded as a choice of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a judge of some things ; and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet in certain respects is a very important magistrate on the day on which he is determining a suit. Regarding then the judges also as magistrates, let us say who are fit to be judges, and of what they are to be judges, and how many of them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme tribunal which the litigants appoint in common for themselves, choosing certain persons by agreement. And let there be two other tribunals : one for private causes, when a citizen accuses another of wronging him and wishes to get a decision ; the other for public causes, in which some citizen is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individual, and is willing to vindicate the common interests. And we must not forget to mention how the judges are to be qualified, and who they are to be. In the first place, let there be a tribunal open to all private persons who are trying causes one against another for the third time, and let this be composed as follows : — All the officers of state, as well annual as those holding office for a longer period, when the new year is about to commence, in the month following after the summer solstice, on the last day but one of the year, shall meet in some temple, and calling God to witness, shall dedicate one judge from every magistracy to be their first-fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest manner. And when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected another shall be chosen in the same manner. Those who have undergone the scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior courts, and shall give their vote openly. The councillors and other magistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and spectators of the causes ; and any one else may be present who pleases. If one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them, and he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the injured party equal to half the injury ; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, and how much more he ought to pay to the public treasury, and to the party who brought the suit. LAWS BOOK VI

In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to participate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision. Such causes ought to originate with the people, and the ought also to have the final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place before three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the defendant shall agree ; and if they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share ; for he who has no share in the administration of JUSTICE, is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all. And for this reason there shall be a court of law in every tribe, and the judges shall be chosen by lot ; — they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties. The final judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most incorruptible form of which human things admit : this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of neighbours or of the tribes. LAWS BOOK VI

Ath. He is a troublesome piece of goods, as has been often shown by the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves who speak the same language, and the numerous robberies and lawless life of the Italian banditti, as they are called. A man who considers all this is fairly at a loss. Two remedies alone remain to us — not to have the slaves of the same country, nor if possible, speaking the same language ; in this way they will more easily be held in subjection : secondly, we should tend them carefully, not only out of regard to them, but yet more out of respect to ourselves. And the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more JUSTICE than to those who are our equals ; for he who naturally and genuinely reverences JUSTICE, and hates inJUSTICE, is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and inJUSTICE, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them ; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors. Slaves ought to be punished as they deserve, and not admonished as if they were freemen, which will only make them conceited. The language used to a servant ought always to be that of a command, and we ought not to jest with them, whether they are males or females — this is a foolish way which many people have of setting up their slaves, and making the life of servitude more disagreeable both for them and for their masters. LAWS BOOK VI

Ath. I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all agreed that JUSTICE, and just men and things and actions, are all fair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent JUSTICE of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this. LAWS BOOK IX

Ath. But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable, and the term “dishonourable” is applied to JUSTICE, will not the just and the honourable disagree ? LAWS BOOK IX

Ath. Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our ideas of JUSTICE are in the highest degree confused and contradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another ? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions have been distinguished — the one, voluntary, the other, involuntary ; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself ? How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation ? Impossible. Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted. LAWS BOOK IX

Whoever shall wrongfully and of design slay with his own hand any of his kinsmen, shall in the first place be deprived of legal privileges ; and he shall not pollute the temples, or the agora, or the harbours, or any other place of meeting, whether he is forbidden of men or not ; for the law, which represents the whole state, forbids him, and always is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him. And if a cousin or nearer relative of the deceased, whether on the male or female side, does not prosecute the homicide when he ought, and have him proclaimed an outlaw, he shall in the first place be involved in the pollution, and incur the hatred of the Gods, even as the curse of the law stirs up the voices of men against him ; and in the second place he shall be liable to be prosecuted by any one who is willing to inflict retribution on behalf of the dead. And he who would avenge a murder shall observe all the precautionary ceremonies of lavation, and any others which the God commands in cases of this kind. Let him have proclamation made, and then go forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of JUSTICE according to the law. Now the legislator may easily show that these things must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods, who are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. But who these Gods are, and what should be the true manner of instituting such trials with due regard to religion, the guardians of the law, aided by the interpreters, and the prophets, and the God, shall determine, and when they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law. The cause shall have the same judges who are appointed to decide in the case of those who plunder temples. Let him who is convicted be punished with death, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man, for this would be shameless as well as impious. But if he fly and will not stand his trial, let him fly for ever ; or, if he set foot anywhere on any part of the murdered man’s country, let any relation of the deceased, or any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him, kill him with impunity, or bind and deliver him to those among the judges of the case who are magistrates, that they may put him to death. And let the prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes ; three sureties sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause shall be provided by him, and they shall undertake to produce him at the trial. But if he be unwilling or unable to provide sureties, then the magistrates shall take him and keep him in bonds, and produce him at the day of trial. LAWS BOOK IX

If a man do not commit a murder with his own hand, but contrives the death of another, and is the author of the deed in intention and design, and he continues to dwell in the city, having his soul not pure of the guilt of murder, let him be tried in the same way, except in what relates to the sureties ; and also, if he be found guilty, his body after execution may have burial in his native land, but in all other respects his case shall be as the former ; and whether a stranger shall kill a citizen, or a citizen a stranger, or a slave a slave, there shall be no difference as touching murder by one’s own hand or by contrivance, except in the matter of sureties ; and these, as has been said, shall be required of the actual murderer only, and he who brings the accusation shall bind them over at the time. If a slave be convicted of slaying a freeman voluntarily, either by his own hand or by contrivance, let the public executioner take him in the direction of the sepulchre, to a place whence he can see the tomb of the dead man, and inflict upon him as many stripes as the person who caught him orders, and if he survive, let him put him to death. And if any one kills a slave who has done no wrong, because he is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil deeds of his own, or for any similar reason, in such a case let him pay the penalty of murder, as he would have done if he had slain a citizen. There are things about which it is terrible and unpleasant to legislate, but impossible not to legislate. If, for example, there should be murders of kinsmen, either perpetrated by the hands of kinsmen, or by their contrivance, voluntary and purely malicious, which most often happen in ill-regulated and ill-educated states, and may perhaps occur even in a country where a man would not expect to find them, we must repeat once more the tale which we narrated a little while ago, in the hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain voluntarily on these grounds from murders which are utterly abominable. For the myth, or saying, or whatever we ought to call it, has been plainly set forth by priests of old ; they have pronounced that the JUSTICE which guards and avenges the blood of kindred, follows the law of retaliation, and ordains that he who has done any murderous act should of necessity suffer that which he has done. He who has slain a father shall himself be slain at some time or other by his children — if a mother, he shall of necessity take a woman’s nature, and lose his life at the hands of his offspring in after ages ; for where the blood of a family has been polluted there is no other purification, nor can the pollution be washed out until the homicidal soul which the deed has given life for life, and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath of the whole family. These are the retributions of Heaven, and by such punishments men should be deterred. But if they are not deterred, and any one should be incited by some fatality to deprive his father or mother, or brethren, or children, of life voluntarily and of purpose, for him the earthly lawgiver legislates as follows : — There shall be the same proclamations about outlawry, and there shall be the same sureties which have been enacted in the former cases. But in his case, if he be convicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him at an appointed place without the city where three ways meet, and there expose his body naked, and each of the magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall take a stone and cast it upon the head of the dead man, and so deliver the city from pollution ; after that, they shall bear him to the borders of the land, and cast him forth unburied, according to law. And what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend ? I mean the suicide, who deprives himself by violence of his appointed share of life, not because the law of the state requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of some painful and inevitable misfortune which has come upon him, nor because he has had to suffer from irremediable and intolerable shame, but who from sloth or want of manliness imposes upon himself an unjust penalty. For him, what ceremonies there are to be of purification and burial God knows, and about these the next of kin should enquire of the interpreters and of the laws thereto relating, and do according to their injunctions. They who meet their death in this way shall be buried alone, and none shall be laid by their side ; they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders of the twelve portions the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their interment. And if a beast of burden or other animal cause the death of any one, except in the case of anything of that kind happening to a competitor in the public contests, the kinsmen of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such, and so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and let the beast when condemned be slain by them, and let them cast it beyond the borders. And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the Gods — whether a man is killed by lifeless objects, falling upon him, or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border, as has been said about the animals. LAWS BOOK IX

Cle. Yes, Stranger ; but then how often have we repeated already that on the present occasion there is no reason why brevity should be preferred to length ; who is “at our heels” ? — as the saying goes, and it would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better. It is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove that there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard JUSTICE more than men do. The demonstration of this would be the best and noblest prelude of all our laws. And therefore, without impatience, and without hurry, let us unreservedly consider the whole matter, summoning up all the power of persuasion which we possess. LAWS BOOK X

Ath. In the first place, my dear friend, these people would say that the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them ; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of JUSTICE have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them ; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made. — These, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might, and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine ; and hence arise factions, these philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others, and not in legal subjection to them. LAWS BOOK X

This is the JUSTICE of the Gods who inhabit Olympus. O youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by the Gods, know that if you become worse you shall go to the worse souls, or if better to the better, and in every succession of life and death you will do and suffer what like may fitly suffer at the hands of like. This is the JUSTICE of heaven, which neither you nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in escaping, and which the ordaining powers have specially ordained ; take good heed thereof, for it will be sure to take heed of you. If you say : — I am small and will creep into the depths of the earth, or I am high and will fly up to heaven, you are not so small or so high but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, either here or in the world below or in some still more savage place whither you shall be conveyed. This is also the explanation of the fate of those whom you saw, who had done unholy and evil deeds, and from small beginnings had grown great, and you fancied that from being miserable they had become happy ; and in their actions, as in a mirror, you seemed to see the universal neglect of the Gods, not knowing how they make all things work together and contribute to the great whole. And thinkest thou, bold man, that thou needest not to know this ? — he who knows it not can never form any true idea of the happiness or unhappiness of life or hold any rational discourse respecting either. If Cleinias and this our reverend company succeed in bringing to you that you know not what you say of the Gods, then will God help you ; but should you desire to hear more, listen to what we say to the third opponent, if you have any understanding whatsoever. For I think that we have sufficiently proved the existence of the Gods, and that they care for men : — The other notion that they are appeased by the wicked, and take gifts, is what we must not concede to any one, and what every man should disprove to the utmost of his power. LAWS BOOK X

Ath. And to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to them ? How in the less can we find an image of the greater ? Are they charioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels ? Perhaps they might be compared to the generals of armies, or they might be likened to physicians providing against the diseases which make war upon the body, or to husbandmen observing anxiously the effects of the seasons on the growth of plants ; or I perhaps, to shepherds of flocks. For as we acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness ; and in that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property. InJUSTICE and insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and JUSTICE and temperance and wisdom are our salvation ; and the place of these latter is in the life of the Gods, although some vestige of them may occasionally be discerned among mankind. But upon this earth we know that there dwell souls possessing an unjust spirit, who may be compared to brute animals, which fawn upon their keepers, whether dogs or shepherds, or the best and most perfect masters ; for they in like manner, as the voices of the wicked declare, prevail by flattery and prayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with impunity. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is an evil of the same kind as what is termed disease in living bodies or pestilence in years or seasons of the year, and in cities and governments has another name, which is inJUSTICE. LAWS BOOK X

Ath. And shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests, and are the best of guardians, are inferior in virtue to dogs, and to men even of moderate excellence, who would never betray JUSTICE for the sake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them ? LAWS BOOK X

In the next place, dealings between man and man require to be suitably regulated. The principle of them is very simple : — Thou shalt not, if thou canst help, touch that which is mine, or remove the least thing which belongs to me without my consent ; and may I be of a sound mind, and do to others as I would that they should do to me. First, let us speak of treasure trove : — May I never pray the Gods to find the hidden treasure, which another has laid up for himself and his family, he not being one of my ancestors, nor lift, if I should find, such a treasure. And may I never have any dealings with those who are called diviners, and who in any way or manner counsel me to take up the deposit entrusted to the earth, for I should not gain so much in the increase of my possessions, if I take up the prize, as I should grow in JUSTICE and virtue of soul, if I abstain ; and this will be a better possession to me than the other in a better part of myself ; for the possession of JUSTICE in the soul is preferable to the possession of wealth. And of many things it is well said — “Move not the immovables,” and this may be regarded as one of them. And we shall do well to believe the common tradition which says that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. Now as to him who is careless about having children and regardless of the legislator, taking up that which neither he deposited, nor any ancestor of his, without the consent of the depositor, violating the simplest and noblest of laws which was the enactment of no mean man : — “Take not up that which was not laid down by thee” — of him, I say, who despises these two legislators, and takes up, not small matter which he has not deposited, but perhaps a great heap of treasure, what he ought to suffer at the hands of the Gods, God only knows ; but I would have the first person who sees him go and tell the wardens of the city, if the occurrence has taken place in the city, or if the occurrence has taken place in the agora he shall tell the wardens of the agora, or if in the country he shall tell the wardens of the country and their commanders. When information has been received the city shall send to Delphi, and, whatever the God answers about the money and the remover of the money, that the city shall do in obedience to the oracle ; the informer, if he be a freeman, shall have the honour of doing rightly, and he who informs not, the dishonour of doing wrongly ; and if he be a slave who gives information, let him be freed, as he ought to be, by the state, which shall give his master the price of him ; but if he do not inform he shall be punished with death. Next in order shall follow a similar law, which shall apply equally to matters great and small : — If a man happens to leave behind him some part of his property, whether intentionally or unintentionally, let him who may come upon the left property suffer it to remain, reflecting that such things are under the protection of the Goddess of ways, and are dedicated to her by the law. But if any one defies the law, and takes the property home with him, let him, if the thing is of little worth, and the man who takes it a slave, be beaten with many stripes by him, being a person of not less than thirty years of age. Or if he be a freeman, in addition to being thought a mean person and a despiser of the laws, let him pay ten times the value of the treasure which he has moved to the leaver. And if some one accuses another of having anything which belongs to him, whether little or much, and the other admits that he has this thing, but denies that the property in dispute belongs to other, if the property be registered with the magistrates according to law, the claimant shall summon the possessor, who shall bring it before the magistrates ; and when it is brought into court, if it be registered in the public registers, to which of the litigants it belonged, let him take it and go his way. Or if the property be registered as belonging to some one who is not present, whoever will offer sufficient surety on behalf of the absent person that he will give it up to him, shall take it away as the representative of the other. But if the property which is deposited be not registered with the magistrates, let it remain until the time of trial with three of the eldest of the magistrates ; and if it be an animal which is deposited, then he who loses the suit shall pay the magistrates for its keep, and they shall determine the cause within three days. LAWS BOOK XI

If a man is mad he shall not be at large in the city, but his relations shall keep him at home in any way which they can ; or if not, let them pay a penalty — he who is of the highest class shall pay a penalty of one hundred drachmae, whether he be a slave or a freeman whom he neglects ; and he of the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina ; and he of the third class three-fifths ; and he of the fourth class two-fifths. Now there are many sorts of madness, some arising out of disease, which we have already mentioned ; and there are other kinds, which originate in an evil and passionate temperament, and are increased by bad education ; out of a slight quarrel this class of madmen will often raise a storm of abuse against one another, and nothing of that sort ought to be allowed to occur in a well-ordered state. Let this, then, be the law about abuse, which shall relate to all cases : — No one shall speak evil of another ; and when a man disputes with another he shall teach and learn of the disputant and the company, but he shall abstain from evilspeaking ; for out of the imprecations which men utter against one another, and the feminine habit of casting aspersions on one another, and using foul names, out of words light as air, in very deed the greatest enmities and hatreds spring up. For the speaker gratifies his anger, which is an ungracious element of his nature ; and nursing up his wrath by the entertainment of evil thoughts, and exacerbating that part of his soul which was formerly civilized by education, he lives in a state of savageness and moroseness, and pays a bitter penalty for his anger. And in such cases almost all men take to saying something ridiculous about their opponent, and there is no man who is in the habit of laughing at another who does not miss virtue and earnestness altogether, or lose the better half of greatness. Wherefore let no one utter any taunting word at a temple, or at the public sacrifices, or at games, or in the agora, or in a court of JUSTICE, or in any public assembly. And let the magistrate who presides on these occasions chastise an offender, and he shall be blameless ; but if he fails in doing so, he shall not claim the prize of virtue ; for he is one who heeds not the laws, and does not do what the legislator commands. And if in any other place any one indulges in these sort of revilings, whether he has begun the quarrel or is only retaliating, let any elder who is present support the law, and control with blows those who indulge in passion, which is another great evil ; and if he do not, let him be liable to pay the appointed penalty. And we say now, that he who deals in reproaches against others cannot reproach them without attempting to ridicule them ; and this, when done in a moment of anger, is what we make matter of reproach against him. But then, do we admit into our state the comic writers who are so fond of making mankind ridiculous, if they attempt in a good-natured manner to turn the laugh against our citizens ? or do we draw the distinction of jest and earnest, and allow a man to make use of ridicule in jest and without anger about any thing or person ; though as we were saying, not if he be angry have a set purpose ? We forbid earnest — that is unalterably fixed ; but we have still to say who are to be sanctioned or not to be sanctioned by the law in the employment of innocent humour. A comic poet, or maker of iambic or satirical lyric verse, shall not be permitted to ridicule any of the citizens, either by word or likeness, either in anger or without anger. And if any one is disobedient, the judges shall either at once expel him from the country, or he shall pay a fine of three minae, which shall be dedicated to the God who presides over the contests. Those only who have received permission shall be allowed to write verses at one another, but they shall be without anger and in jest ; in anger and in serious earnest they shall not be allowed. The decision of this matter shall be left to the superintendent of the general education of the young, and whatever he may license, the writer shall be allowed to produce, and whatever he rejects let not the poet himself exhibit, or ever teach anybody else, slave or freeman, under the penalty of being dishonoured, and held disobedient to the laws. LAWS BOOK XI

There are many noble things in human life, but to most of them attach evils which are fated to corrupt and spoil them. Is not JUSTICE noble, which has been the civilizer of humanity ? How then can the advocate of JUSTICE be other than noble ? And yet upon this profession which is presented to us under the fair name of art has come an evil reputation. In the first place ; we are told that by ingenious pleas and the help of an advocate the law enables a man to win a particular cause, whether just or unjust ; and the power of speech which is thereby imparted, are at the service of him sho is willing to pay for them. Now in our state this so-called art, whether really an art or only an experience and practice destitute of any art, ought if possible never to come into existence, or if existing among us should litten to the request of the legislator and go away into another land, and not speak contrary to JUSTICE. If the offenders obey we say no more ; but those who disobey, the voice of the law is as follows : — If anyone thinks that he will pervert the power of JUSTICE in the minds of the judges, and unseasonably litigate or advocate, let any one who likes indict him for malpractices of law and dishonest advocacy, and let him be judged in the court of select judges ; and if he be convicted, let the court determine whether he may be supposed to act from a love of money or from contentiousness. And if he is supposed to act from contentiousness, the court shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to institute or plead a cause ; and if he is supposed to act as be does from love of money, in case he be a stranger, he shall leave the country, and never return under penalty of death ; but if he be a citizen, he shall die, because he is a lover of money, in whatever manner gained ; and equally, if he be judged to have acted more than once from contentiousness, he shall die. LAWS BOOK XI

Now every man who is engaged in any suit ought to be very careful of bringing false witness against any one, either intentionally or unintentionally, if he can help ; for JUSTICE is truly said to be an honourable maiden, and falsehood is naturally repugnant to honour and JUSTICE. A witness ought to be very careful not to sift against JUSTICE, as for example in what relates to the throwing away of arms — he must distinguish the throwing them away when necessary, and not make that a reproach, or bring in action against some innocent person on that account. To make the distinction maybe difficult ; but still the law must attempt to define the different kinds in some way. Let me endeavour to explain my meaning by an ancient tale : — If Patroclus had been brought to the tent still alive but without his arms (and this has happened to innumerable persons), the original arms, which the poet says were presented to Peleus by the Gods as a nuptial gift when he married. Thetis, remaining in the hands of Hector, then the base spirits of that day might have reproached the son of Menoetius with having cast away his arms. Again, there is the case of those who have been thrown down precipices and lost their arms ; and of those who at sea, and in stormy places, have been suddenly overwhelmed by floods of water ; and there are numberless things of this kind which one might adduce by way of extenuation, and with the view of justifying a misfortune which is easily misrepresented. We must, therefore, endeavour to divide to the best of our power the greater and more serious evil from the lesser. And a distinction may be drawn in the use of terms of reproach. A man does not always deserve to be called the thrower away of his shield ; he may be only the loser of his arms. For there is a great or rather absolute difference between him who is deprived of his arms by a sufficient force, and him who voluntarily lets his shield go. Let the law then be as follows : — If a person having arms is overtaken by the enemy and does not turn round and defend himself, but lets them go voluntarily or throws them away, choosing a base life and a swift escape rather than a courageous and noble and blessed death — in such a case of the throwing away of arms let JUSTICE be done, but the judge need take no note of the case just now mentioned ; for the bad man ought always to be punished, in the hope that he may be improved, but not the unfortunate, for there is no advantage in that. And what shall be the punishment suited to him who has thrown away his weapons of defence ? Tradition says that Caeneus, the Thessalian, was changed by a God from a woman into a man ; but the converse miracle cannot now be wrought, or no punishment would be more proper than that the man who throws away his shield should be changed into a woman. This however is impossible, and therefore let us make a law as nearly like this as we can — that he who loves his life too well shall be in no danger for the remainder of his days, but shall live for ever under the stigma of cowardice. And let the law be in the following terms : — When a man is found guilty of disgracefully throwing away his arms in war, no general or military officer shall allow him to serve as a soldier, or give him any place at all in the ranks of soldiers ; and the officer who gives the coward any place, shall suffer a penalty which the public examiner shall exact of him ; and if he be of the highest dass, he shall pay a thousand drachmae ; or if he be of the second class, five minae ; or if he be of the third, three minae ; or if he be of the fourth class, one mina. And he who is found guilty of cowardice, shall not only be dismissed from manly dangers, which is a disgrace appropriate to his nature, but he shall pay a thousand drachmae, if he be of the highest class, and five minae if he be of the second class, and three if he be of the third class, and a mina, like the preceding, if he be of the fourth class. LAWS BOOK XII

What regulations will be proper about examiners, seeing that some of our magistrates are elected by lot, and for a year, and some for a longer time and from selected persons ? Of such magistrates, who will be a sufficient censor or examiner, if any of them, weighed down by the pressure of office or his own inability to support the dignity of his office, be guilty of any crooked practice ? It is by no means easy to find a magistrate who excels other magistrates in virtue, but still we must endeavour to discover some censor or examiner who is more than man. For the truth is, that there are many elements of dissolution in a state, as there are also in a ship, or in an animal ; they all have their cords, and girders, and sinews — one nature diffused in many places, and called by many names ; and the office of examiner is a most important element in the preservation and dissolution of states. For if the examiners are better than the magistrates, and their duty is fulfilled justly and without blame, then the whole state and country flourishes and is happy ; but if the examination of the magistrates is carried on in a wrong way, then, by the relaxation of that JUSTICE which is the uniting principle of all constitutions, every power in the state is rent asunder from every other ; they no longer incline in the same direction, but fill the city with faction, and make many cities out of one, and soon bring all to destruction. Wherefore the examiners ought to be admirable in every sort of virtue. Let us invent a mode of creating them, which shall be as follows : — Every year, after the summer solstice, the whole city shall meet in the common precincts of Helios and Apollo, and shall present to the God three men out of their own number in the manner following : — Each citizen shall select, not himself, but some other citizen whom he deems in every way the best, and who is not less than fifty years of age. And out of the selected persons who have the greatest number of votes, they shall make a further selection until they reduce them to one-half, if they are an even number ; but if they are not an even number, they shall subtract the one who has the smallest number of votes, and make them an even number, and then leave the half which have the great number of votes. And if two persons have an equal number of votes, and thus increase the number beyond one-half, they shall withdraw the younger of the two and do away with the excess ; and then including all the rest they shall again vote, until there are left three having an unequal number of votes. But if all the three, or two out of the three, have equal votes, let them commit the election to good fate and fortune, and separate off by lot the first, and the second, and the third ; these they shall crown with an olive wreath and give them the prize of excellence, at the same time proclaiming to all the world that the city of the Magnetes, by providence of the Gods, is again preserved, and presents to the Sun and to Apollo her three best men as first-fruits, to be a common offering to them, according to the ancient law, as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. And these shall appoint in their first year twelve examiners, to continue until each has completed seventy-five years, to whom three shall afterwards be added yearly ; and let these divide all the magistracies into twelve parts, and prove the holders of them by every sort of test to which a freeman may be subjected ; and let them live while they hold office in the precinct of Helios and Apollo, in which they were chosen, and let each one form a judgment of some things individually, and of others in company with his colleagues ; and let him place a writing in the agora about each magistracy, and what the magistrate ought to suffer or pay, according to the decision of the examiners. And if a magistrate does not admit that he has been justly judged, let him bring the examiners before the select judges, and if he be acquitted by their decision, let him, if he will, accuse the examiners themselves ; if, however, he be convicted, and have been condemned to death by the examiners, let him die (and of course he can only die once) : — but any other penalties which admit of being doubled let him suffer twice over. LAWS BOOK XII

The so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all admiration. He knew that the men of his own time believed and had no doubt that there were Gods, which was a reasonable belief in those days, because most men were the sons of Gods, and according to tradition he was one himself. He appears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man, but to the Gods only, and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided by him. For he made the two parties take an oath respecting the points in dispute, and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now that a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence of the Gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and the opinion of most men, and of the men, is that in return for small sacrifice and a few flattering words they will be their accomplices in purloining large sums and save them from many terrible punishments, the way of Rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of JUSTICE ; for as the needs of men about the Gods are changed, the laws should also be changed ; — in the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do away with the oaths of the parties on either side — he who obtains leave to bring an action should write, down the charges, but should not add an oath ; and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the magistrates in writing, and not swear ; for it is a dreadful thing to know, when many lawsuits are going on in a state that almost half the people who meet one another quite unconcernedly at the public meals and in other companies and relations of private life are perjured. Let the law, then, be as follows : — A judge who is about to give judgment shall take an oath, and he who is choosing magistrates for the state shall either vote on oath or with a voting tablet which he brings from a temple ; so too the judge of dances and of all music, and the superintendents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, and any matters in which, as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be gained by a false oath ; but all cases in which a denial confirmed by an oath clearly results in a great advantage to the taker of the oath, shall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit, and the presiding judges shall not permit either of them. to use an oath for the sake of persuading, nor to call down curses on himself and his race, nor to use unseemly supplications or womanish laments. But they shall ever be teaching and learning what is just in auspicious words ; and he who does otherwise shall be supposed to speak beside the point, and the judges shall again bring him back to the question at issue. On the other hand, strangers in their dealings with strangers shall as at present have power to give and receive oaths, for they will not often grow old in the city or leave a fry of young ones like themselves to be the sons and heirs of the land. LAWS BOOK XII

Let such be the character of the person who goes abroad, and let him go abroad under these conditions. In the next place, the stranger who comes from abroad should be received in a friendly spirit. Now there are four kinds of strangers, of whom we must make some mention — the first is he who comes and stays throughout the summer ; this class are like birds of passage, taking wing in pursuit of commerce, and flying over the sea to other cities, while the season lasts ; he shall be received in market-places and harbours and public buildings, near the city but outside, by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these matters ; and they shall take care that a stranger, whoever he be, duly receives JUSTICE ; but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation. They shall hold the intercourse with him which is necessary, and this shall be as little as possible. The second kind is just a spectator who comes to see with his eyes and hear with his ears the festivals of the Muses ; such ought to have entertainment provided them at the temples by hospitable persons, and the priests and ministers of the temples should see and attend to them. But they should not remain more than a reasonable time ; let them see and hear that for the sake of which they came, and then go away, neither having suffered nor done any harm. The priests shall be their judges, if any of them receive or do any wrong up to the sum of fifty drachmae, but if any greater charge be brought, in such cases the suit shall come before the wardens of the agora. The third kind of stranger is he who comes on some public business from another land, and is to be received with public honours. He is to be received only by the generals and commanders of horse and foot, and the host by whom he is entertained, in conjunction with the Prytanes, shall have the sole charge of what concerns him. There is a fourth dass of persons answering to our spectators, who come from another land to look at ours. In the first place, such visits will be rare, and the visitor should be at least fifty years of age ; he may possibly be wanting to see something that is rich and rare in other states, or himself to show something in like manner to another city. Let such an one, then, go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, being one of them himself : let him go, for example, to the house of the superintendent of education, confident that he is a fitting guest of such a host, or let him go to the house of some of those who have gained the prize of virtue and hold discourse with them, both learning from them, and also teaching them ; and when he has seen and heard all, he shall depart, as a friend taking leave of friends, and be honoured by them with gifts and suitable tributes of respect. These are the customs, according to which our city should receive all strangers of either sex who come from other countries, and should send forth her own citizens, showing respect to Zeus, the God of hospitality, not forbidding strangers at meals and sacrifices, as is the manner which prevails among the children of the Nile, nor driving them away by savage proclamations. LAWS BOOK XII

Now that the whole city has been divided into parts of which the nature and number have been described, and laws have been given about all the most important contracts as far as this was possible, the next thing will be to have JUSTICE done. The first of the courts shall consist of elected judges, who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and the defendant in common : these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. And in the second court there shall be judges of the villages and tribes corresponding to the twelvefold division of the land, and before these the litigants shall go to contend for greater damages, if the suit be not decided before the first judges ; the defendant, if he be defeated the second time, shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in the indictment ; and if he find fault with his judges and would try a third time, let him carry the suit before the select judges, and if he be again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much again. And the plaintiff, if when defeated before the first judges he persist in going on to the second, shall if he wins receive in addition to the damages a fifth part more, and if defeated he shall pay a like sum ; but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision, and will insist on proceeding to a third court, then if he win he shall receive from the defendant the amount of the damages and, as I said before, half as much again, and the plaintiff, if he lose, shall pay half of the damages claimed, Now the assignment by lot of judges to courts and the completion of the number of them, and the appointment of servants to the different magistrates, and the times at which the several causes should be heard, and the votings and delays, and all the things that necessarily concern suits, and the order of causes, and the time in which answers have to be put in and parties are to appear — of these and other things akin to these we have indeed already spoken, but there is no harm in repeating what is right twice or thrice : — All lesser and easier matters which the elder legislator has omitted may be supplied by the younger one. Private courts will be sufficiently regulated in this way, and the public and state courts, and those which the magistrates must use in the administration of their several offices, exist in many other states. Many very respectable institutions of this sort have been framed by good men, and from them the guardians of the law may by reflection derive what is necessary, for the order of our new state, considering and correcting them, and bringing them to the test of experience, until every detail appears to be satisfactorily determined ; and then putting the final seal upon them, and making them irreversible, they shall use them for ever afterwards. As to what relates to the silence of judges and the abstinence from words of evil omen and the reverse, and the different notions of the just and good and honourable which exist in our : own as compared with other states, they have been partly mentioned already, and another part of them will be mentioned hereafter as we draw near the end. To all these matters he who would be an equal judge, shall justly look, and he shall possess writings about them that he may learn them. For of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner ; otherwise there would be no meaning the divine and admirable law possessing a name akin to mind (nous, nomos). And of all other words, such as the praises and censures of individuals which occur in poetry and also in prose, whether written down or uttered in daily conversation, whether men dispute about them in the spirit of contention or weakly assent to them, as is often the case — of all these the one sure test is the writings of the legislator, which the righteous judge ought to have in his mind as the antidote of all other words, and thus make himself and the city stand upright, procuring for the good the continuance and increase of JUSTICE, and for the bad, on the other hand, a conversion from ignorance and intemperance, and in general from all unrighteousness, as far as their evil minds can be healed, but to those whose web of life is in reality finished, giving death, which is the only remedy for souls in their condition, as I may say truly again and again. And such judges and chiefs of judges will be worthy of receiving praise from the whole city. LAWS BOOK XII

Ath. Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray — the reason is that their legislators have such different aims ; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of JUSTICE, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom ; and some legislate with a view to two things at once — they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states ; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things look. LAWS BOOK XII

Ath. And is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue, and has won the palm of excellence, that these very qualities of which we are now speaking — courage, temperance, wisdom, JUSTICE ? LAWS BOOK XII

Ath. Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of our divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle is which is the same in all the four — the same, as we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in JUSTICE and in prudence, and which, being one, we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this, my friends, we will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be regarded as one, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one ? Certainly, if we take counsel among ourselves, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place amongst us ; but if you have made up your mind that we should let the matter alone, we will. LAWS BOOK XII

Athenian : It is necessary, then, it seems, that I should first portray in better terms, according to our previous statement, the generation of gods and of living creatures, which has been ill portrayed by those before us ; I must resume the statement which I have attempted (980d) in speaking against the impious, declaring that there are gods who have a care for all things, small and greater, and who are well-nigh inexorable in what relates to the JUSTICE of things : that is, if you remember, Cleinias ; for you did take memoranda besides, and indeed what then was spoken was very true. And the most important part of it was that every soul was senior to each body : do you remember ? Or in any case, surely, this must be so ? For that which is better and more ancient and more godlike is credibly so (980e) in comparison with the young, the junior, and the less emancipated ; and altogether, a thing governing is senior to a thing governed, and the driver every way senior to the driven. So much, then, let us conclude — that soul is senior to body ; and if this is the case, (981a) what came first in that which first was born will more credibly seem almost to have been original. So let us take it that the beginning of the beginning is more august in state, and that we are most correctly entering upon wisdom in the greatest matters relating to the generation of the gods. EPINOMIS BOOK XII

All this we have stated in accordance with JUSTICE, which wreaks vengeance on the impious : but now, as regards the matter under examination, it is not possible for us to disbelieve that we must deem the good man (989a) to be wise ; and let us see if we may perhaps be able, either by education or by art, to perceive this wisdom which we have all this while been seeking ; for if we fall behind the just in failing to know it, our condition will be that of ignorant persons. Such, then, seems our case to me, and I must say so : for I have sought this wisdom high and low, and so far as it has been revealed to me I will try to render it plain to you. EPINOMIS BOOK XII

It has been plain, I believe, all along that I took a keen interest in the operations that have been carried out, and that I was most anxious to see them finally completed. In this I was mainly prompted (4.320b) by my jealous regard for what is noble ; for I esteem it just that those who are truly virtuous, and who act accordingly, should achieve the reputation they deserve. Now for the present (God willing) affairs are going well ; but it is in the future that the chief struggle lies. For while it might be thought that excellence in courage and speed and strength might belong to various other men, everyone would agree that surpassing excellence in truth, JUSTICE, generosity and the outward exhibition of all these virtues (4.320c) naturally belongs to those who profess to hold them in honor. Now the point of this remark is plain ; but none the less it is right that we should remind ourselves that it behoves certain persons (who these are of course you know) to surpass the rest of mankind as if they were less than children. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to show plainly that we are the sort of men we claim to be, and that all the more because (God willing) it will be an easy task. For whereas all other men find it necessary to wander far afield (4.320d) if they mean to get themselves known, you are in such a position now that people all the world over — bold though it be to say so — have their eyes fixed on one place only, and in that place upon you above all men. Seeing, then, that you have the eyes of all upon you, prepare yourself to play the part of that ancient worthy Lycurgus and of Cyrus and of all those others who have been famed hitherto for their excellence of character and of statesmanship ; and that all the more because there are (4.320e) many, including nearly all the people here, who keep saying that, now that Dionysius is overthrown, there is every prospect that things will go to ruin owing to the jealous rivalry of yourself, and Heracleides and Theodotes and the other notables. I pray, then, that no one, if possible, may suffer from this complaint ; but in case anyone should, after all, do so, you must play the part of a physician ; and so things will turn out best for you all. LETTERS LETTER IV

Some God, as it seems plain to me, is preparing for you good fortune in a gracious and bountiful way, if only you accept it with grace. For you dwell near together as neighbors in close association (6.322d) so that you can help one another in the things of greatest importance. For Hermeias will find in his multitude of horses or of other military equipment, or even in the gaining of gold itself, no greater source of power for all purposes than in the gaining of steadfast friends possessed of a sound character ; while Erastus and Coriscus, in addition to this fair Science of Ideas, need also — as I, old though I am, assert — the science which is a safeguard in dealing with the wicked and unjust, and a kind of self-defensive power. (6.322e) For they lack experience owing to the fact that they have spent a large part of their lives in company with us who are men of moderation and free from vice ; and for this reason, as I have said, they need these additional qualities, so that they may not be compelled to neglect the true Science, and to pay more attention than is right to that which is human and necessitated. Now Hermeias, on the other hand, seems to me — (6.323a) so far as I can judge without having met him as yet — to possess this practical ability both by nature and also through the skill bred of experience. What, then, do I suggest ? To you, Hermeias, I, who have made trial of Erastus and Coriscus more fully than you, affirm and proclaim and testify that you will not easily discover more trustworthy characters than these your neighbors ; and I counsel you to hold fast to these men by every righteous means, and regard this as a duty of no secondary importance. To Coriscus and Erastus the counsel I give is this — that they in turn should hold fast to Hermeias, (6.323b) and endeavor by thus holding to one another to become united in the bonds of friendship. But in case any one of you should be thought to be breaking up this union in any way — for what is human is not altogether durable — send a letter here to me and my friends stating the grounds of complaint ; for I believe that — unless the disruption should happen to be serious — the arguments sent you from here by us, based on JUSTICE and reverence, will serve better than any incantation to weld you and bind you together once again into your former state of friendship (6.323c) and fellowship. If, then, all of us — both we and you — practice this philosophy, as each is able, to the utmost of our power, the prophecy I have now made will come true ; but if we fail to do this, I keep silence as to the consequence ; for the prophecy I am making is one of good omen, and I declare that we shall, God willing, do all these things well. All you three must read this letter, all together if possible, or if not by twos ; and as often as you possibly can read it in common, and use it as a form of covenant and a binding law, (6.323d) as is right ; and with an earnestness that is not out of tune combined with the playfulness that is sister to earnestness, swear by the God that is Ruler of all that is and that shall be, and swear by the Lord and Father of the Ruler and Cause, Whom, if we are real philosophers, we shall all know truly so far as men well-fortuned can. LETTERS LETTER VI

As I observed these incidents and the men engaged in public affairs, the laws too and the customs, the more closely I examined them and the farther I advanced in life, the more difficult it seemed to me to handle public affairs aright. For it was not possible to be active in politics without friends and trustworthy supporters ; and to find these ready to my hand was not an easy matter, since public affairs at Athens were not carried on in accordance with the manners and practices of our fathers ; nor was there any ready method by which I could make new friends. The laws too, written and unwritten, were being altered for the worse, and the evil was growing with startling rapidity. The result was that, though at first I had been full of a strong impulse towards political life, as I looked at the course of affairs and saw them being swept in all directions by contending currents, my head finally began to swim ; and, though I did not stop looking to see if there was any likelihood of improvement in these symptoms and in the general course of public life, I postponed action till a suitable opportunity should arise. Finally, it became clear to me, with regard to all existing cornmunities, that they were one and all misgoverned. For their laws have got into a state that is almost incurable, except by some extraordinary reform with good luck to support it. And I was forced to say, when praising true philosophy that it is by this that men are enabled to see what JUSTICE in public and private life really is. Therefore, I said, there will be no cessation of evils for the sons of men, till either those who are pursuing a right and true philosophy receive sovereign power in the States, or those in power in the States by some dispensation of providence become true philosophers. LETTERS LETTER VII

With these thoughts in my mind I came to Italy and Sicily on my first visit. My first impressions on arrival were those of strong disapproval — disapproval of the kind of life which was there called the life of happiness, stuffed full as it was with the banquets of the Italian Greeks and Syracusans, who ate to repletion twice every day, and were never without a partner for the night ; and disapproval of the habits which this manner of life produces. For with these habits formed early in life, no man under heaven could possibly attain to wisdom — human nature is not capable of such an extraordinary combination. Temperance also is out of the question for such a man ; and the same applies to virtue generally. No city could remain in a state of tranquillity under any laws whatsoever, when men think it right to squander all their property in extravagant, and consider it a duty to be idle in everything else except eating and drinking and the laborious prosecution of debauchery. It follows necessarily that the constitutions of such cities must be constantly changing, tyrannies, oligarchies and democracies succeeding one another, while those who hold the power cannot so much as endure the name of any form of government which maintains JUSTICE and equality of rights. LETTERS LETTER VII

With these views and thus nerved to the task, I sailed from home, in the spirit which some imagined, but principally through a feeling of shame with regard to myself, lest I might some day appear to myself wholly and solely a mere man of words, one who would never of his own will lay his hand to any act. Also there was reason to think that I should be betraying first and foremost my friendship and comradeship with Dion, who in very truth was in a position of considerable danger. If therefore anything should happen to him, or if he were banished by Dionysios and his other enemies and coming to us as exile addressed this question to me : “Plato, I have come to you as a fugitive, not for want of hoplites, nor because I had no cavalry for defence against my enemies, but for want of words and power of persuasion, which I knew to be a special gift of yours, enabling you to lead young men into the path of goodness and JUSTICE, and to establish in every case relations of friendship and comradeship among them. It is for the want of this assistance on your part that I have left Syracuse and am here now. And the disgrace attaching to your treatment of me is a small matter. But philosophy — whose praises you are always singing, while you say she is held in dishonour by the rest of mankind — must we not say that philosophy along with me has now been betrayed, so far as your action was concerned ? Had I been living at Megara, you would certainly have come to give me your aid towards the objects for which I asked it ; or you would have thought yourself the most contemptible of mankind. But as it is, do you think that you will escape the reputation of cowardice by making excuses about the distance of the journey, the length of the sea voyage, and the amount of labour involved ? Far from it.” To reproaches of this kind what creditable reply could I have made ? Surely none. LETTERS LETTER VII

I took my departure, therefore, acting, so far as a man can act, in obedience to reason and JUSTICE, and for these reasons leaving my own occupations, which were certainly not discreditable ones, to put myself under a tyranny which did not seem likely to harmonise with my teaching or with myself. By my departure I secured my own freedom from the displeasure of Zeus Xenios, and made myself clear of any charge on the part of philosophy, which would have been exposed to detraction, if any disgrace had come upon me for faint-heartedness and cowardice. LETTERS LETTER VII

All this has been said with a view to counselling the friends and family of Dion. And in addition to this I give for the third time to you the same advice and counsel which I have given twice before to others — not to enslave Sicily or any other State to despots — this my counsel but — to put it under the rule of laws — for the other course is better neither for the enslavers nor for the enslaved, for themselves, their children’s children and descendants ; the attempt is in every way fraught with disaster. It is only small and mean natures that are bent upon seizing such gains for themselves, natures that know nothing of goodness and JUSTICE, divine as well as human, in this life and in the next. LETTERS LETTER VII

In one word, the man who has no natural kinship with this matter cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or memory ; for it cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it. Therefore, if men are not by nature kinship allied to JUSTICE and all other things that are honourable, though they may be good at learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds — or if they have the kinship but are slow learners and have no memory — none of all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice. For both must be learnt together ; and together also must be learnt, by complete and long continued study, as I said at the beginning, the true and the false about all that has real being. After much effort, as names, definitions, sights, and other data of sense, are brought into contact and friction one with another, in the course of scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and answer without ill will, with a sudden flash there shines forth understanding about every problem, and an intelligence whose efforts reach the furthest limits of human powers. Therefore every man of worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing them to writing. In one word, then, it may be known from this that, if one sees written treatises composed by anyone, either the laws of a lawgiver, or in any other form whatever, these are not for that man the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses. But if these things were worked at by him as things of real worth, and committed to writing, then surely, not gods, but men “have themselves bereft him of his wits.” LETTERS LETTER VII

The policy which would best serve to secure your real “well-doing” is that which I shall now endeavor as best I can to describe to you. And I hope that my advice will not only be salutary to you (though to you in special), but also (8.352c) to all the Syracusans, in the second place, and, in the third, to your enemies and your foes, unless any of them be a doer of impious deeds ; for such deeds are irremediable and none could ever wash out their stain. Mark, then, what I now say. Now that the tyranny is broken down over the whole of Sicily all your fighting rages round this one subject of dispute, the one party desiring to recover the headship, and the other to put the finishing touch to the expulsion of the tyrants. Now the majority of men always believe that the right advice about these matters (8.352d) is the advising of such action as will do the greatest possible harm to one’s enemies and the greatest possible good to one’s friends ; whereas it is by no means easy to do much harm to others without also suffering in turn much harm oneself. And without going far afield one may see such consequences clearly in the recent events in Sicily itself, where the one faction is trying to inflict injury and the other to ward off the injurers ; and the tale thereof, if ever you told it to others, (8.352e) would inevitably prove a most impressive lesson. Of such policies, one may say, there is no lack ; but as for a policy which would prove beneficial to all alike, foes as well as friends, or at least as little detrimental as possible to either, such a policy is neither easy to discern, nor, when discerned, easy to carry out ; and to advise such a policy or attempt to describe it is much like saying a prayer. Be it so, then, that this is nothing but a prayer (and in truth every man ought always (8.353a) to begin his speaking and his thinking with the gods) ; yet may it attain fulfilment in indicating some such counsel as this : — Now and almost ever since the war began both you and your enemies have been ruled continuously by that one family which your fathers set on the throne in the hour of their greatest distress, when Greek Sicily was in the utmost danger of being entirely overrun by the Carthaginians and barbarized. On that occasion they chose Dionysius because of his youth and warlike prowess to take charge of (8.353b) the military operations for which he was suited, with Hipparinus, who was older, as his fellow-counsellor, appointing them dictators for the safeguarding of Sicily, with the title, as men say, of “tyrants.” But whether one prefers to suppose that the cause which ultimately brought about their salvation was divine Fortune and the Deity, or the virtue of the rulers, or possibly the combination of both assisted by the citizens of that age — as to this let everyone form his own notion ; in any case this was the way in which salvation for the men of that generation came about. Seeing, then, that they proved themselves men of such a quality, (8.353c) it is surely right that they should be repaid with gratitude by all those whom they saved. But if in after times the tyrant’s house has wrongly abused the bounty of the city, the penalty for this it has suffered in part, and in part it will have to pay. What, then, is the penalty rightly to be exacted from them under existing circumstances ? If you were able to get quit of them easily, without serious dangers and trouble, or if they were able to regain the empire without difficulty, then, in either case, it would not have been possible for me so much as to offer the advice which I am now about to utter ; but as it is, both of you ought to bear in mind (8.353d) and remember how many times each party has hopefully imagined that it lacked but a little of achieving complete success almost every time ; and, what is more, that it is precisely this little deficiency which is always turning out to be the cause of great and numberless evils. And of these evils no limit is ever reached, but what seems to be the end of the old is always being linked on to the beginning of a new brood ; and because of this endless chain of evil (8.353e) the whole tribe of tyrants and democrats alike will be in danger of destruction. But should any of these consequences — likely as they are though lamentable — come to pass, hardly a trace of the Greek tongue will remain in all Sicily, since it will have been transformed into a province or dependency of Phoenicians or Opicians. Against this all the Greeks must with all zeal provide a remedy. If, therefore, any man knows of a remedy that is truer and better than that which I am now about to propose, (8.354a) and puts it openly before us, he shall have the best right to the title “Friend of Greece.” The remedy, however, which commends itself to me I shall now endeavor to explain, using the utmost freedom of speech and a tone of impartial JUSTICE. For indeed I am speaking somewhat like an arbitrator, and addressing to the two parties, the former despot and his subjects, as though each were a single person, the counsel I gave of old. And now also my word of advice to every despot would be that he should shun the despot’s title and his task, and change his despotism for kingship. (8.354b) That this is possible has been actually proved by that wise and good man Lycurgus ; for when he saw that the family of his kinsmen in Argos and in Messene had in both cases destroyed both themselves and their city by advancing from kingship to despotic power, he was alarmed about his own city as well as his own family, and as a remedy he introduced the authority of the Elders and of the Ephors to serve as a bond of safety for the kingly power ; and because of this they have already been kept safe (8.354c) and glorious all these generations since Law became with them supreme king over men instead of men being despots over the laws. And now also I urgently admonish you all to do the same. Those of you who are rushing after despotic power I exhort to change their course and to flee betimes from what is counted as “bliss” by men of insatiable cravings and empty heads, and to try to transform themselves into the semblance of a king, and to become subject to kingly laws, owing their possession of the highest honors to the voluntary goodwill of the citizens and to the laws. And (8.354d) I should counsel those who follow after the ways of freedom, and shun as a really evil thing the yoke of bondage, to beware lest by their insatiable craving for an immoderate freedom they should ever fall sick of their forefathers’ disease, which the men of that time suffered because of their excessive anarchy, through indulging an unmeasured love of freedom. For the Siceliots of the age before Dionysius and Hipparinus began to rule were living blissfully, as they supposed, being in luxury and ruling also over their rulers ; and they even stoned to death the ten generals (8.354e) who preceded Dionysius, without any legal trial, to show that they were no slaves of any rightful master, nor of any law, but were in all ways altogether free. Hence it was that the rule of the despots befell them. For as regards both slavery and freedom, when either is in excess it is wholly evil, but when in moderation wholly good ; and moderate slavery consists in being the slave of God, immoderate, in being the slave of men ; (8.355a) and men of sound sense have Law for their God, but men without sense Pleasure. Since these things are naturally ordained thus, I exhort Dion’s friends to declare what I am advising to all the Syracusans, as being the joint advice both of Dion and myself ; and I will be the interpreter of what he would have said to you now, were he alive and able to speak. “Pray then,” someone might say, “what message does the advice of Dion declare to us concerning the present situation ?” It is this : “Above all else, O ye Syracusans, accept such laws (8.355b) as do not appear to you likely to turn your minds covetously to money-making and wealth ; but rather — since there are three objects, the soul, the body, and money besides, — accept such laws as cause the virtue of the soul to be held first in honor, that of the body second, subordinate to that of the soul, and the honor paid to money to come third and last, in subjection to both the body and the soul. The ordinance which effects this (8.355c) will be truly laid down by you as law, since it really makes those who obey it blessed ; whereas the phrase which terms the rich “blessed” is not only a miserable one in itself, being the senseless phrase of women and children, but also renders those who believe it equally miserable. That this exhortation of mine is true you will learn by actual experience if you make trial of what I am now saying concerning laws ; for in all matters experience is held to be the truest test. And when you have accepted laws of this kind, inasmuch as (8.355d) Sicily is beset with dangers, and you are neither complete victors nor utterly vanquished, it will be, no doubt, both just and profitable for you all to pursue a middle course — not only those of you who flee from the harshness of the tyranny, but also those who crave to win back that tyranny — the men whose ancestors in those days performed the mightiest deed in saving the Greeks from the barbarians, with the result that it is possible for us now to talk about constitutions ; whereas, if they had then been ruined, no place would have been left at all for either talk or hope. So, then, let the one party of you gain freedom by the aid of kingly rule, (8.355e) and the other gain a form of kingly rule that is not irresponsible, with the laws exercising despotic sway over the kings themselves as well as the rest of the citizens, in case they do anything illegal. On these conditions set up kings for all of you, by the help of the gods and with honest and sound intent, — my own son first in return for twofold favors, namely that conferred by me and that conferred by my father ; for he delivered the city from barbarians in his own day, while I, in the present day, have twice delivered it from tyrants, (8.356a) whereof you yourselves are witnesses. And as your second king create the man who possesses the same name as my father and is son to Dionysius, in return for his present assistance and for his pious disposition ; for he, though he is sprung from a tyrant’s loins, is in act of delivering the city of his own free will, gaining thereby for himself and for his race everlasting honor in place of a transitory and unrighteous tyranny. And, thirdly, you ought to invite to become king of Syracuse — as willing king of a willing city — him who is now (8.356b) commander of your enemies’ army, Dionysius, son of Dionysius, if so be that he is willing of his own accord to transform himself into a king, being moved thereto by fear of fortune’s changes, and by pity for his country and the untended state of her temples and her tombs, lest because of his ambition he utterly ruin all and become a cause of rejoicing to the barbarians. And these three, — whether you grant them the power of the Laconian kings or curtail that power by a common agreement, — you should establish as kings in some such manner as the following, (8.356c) which indeed has been described to you before, yet listen to it now again. If you find that the family of Dionysius and Hipparinus is willing to make an end of the evils now occurring in order to secure the salvation of Sicily provided that they receive honors both in the present and for the future for themselves and for their family, then on these terms, as was said before, convoke envoys empowered to negotiate a pact, such men as they may choose, whether they come from Sicily or from abroad or both, and in such numbers as may be mutually agreed. (8.356d) And these men, on their arrival, should first lay down laws and a constitution which is so framed as to permit the kings to be put in control of the temples and of all else that fitly belongs to those who once were benefactors. And as controllers of war and peace they should appoint Law-wardens, thirty-five in number, in conjunction with the People and the Council. And there should be various courts of law for various suits, but in matters involving death or exile the Thirty-five should form the court ; and in addition to these there should be judges selected (8.356e) from the magistrates of each preceding year, one from each magistracy — the one, that is, who is approved as the most good and just ; and these should decide for the ensuing year all cases which involve the death, imprisonment or transportation of citizens ; and it should not be permissible for a king to be a judge of such suits, but he, like a priest, (8.357a) should remain clean from bloodshed and imprisonment and exile. This is what I planned for you when I was alive, and it is still my plan now. With your aid, had not Furies in the guise of guests prevented me, I should then have overcome our foes, and established the State in the way I planned ; and after this, had my intentions been realized, I should have resettled the rest of Sicily by depriving the barbarians of the land they now hold — excepting those who fought in defence of the common liberty against the tyranny — (8.357b) and restoring the former occupiers of the Greek regions to their ancient and ancestral homes. And now likewise I counsel you all with one accord to adopt and execute these same plans, and to summon all to this task, and to count him who refuses as a common enemy. Nor is such a course impossible ; for when plans actually exist in two souls, and when they are readily perceived upon reflection to be the best, he who pronounces such plans impossible is hardly a man of understanding. And by the “two souls” (8.357c) I mean the soul of Hipparinus the son of Dionysius and that of my own son ; for should these agree together, I believe that all the rest of the Syracusans who have a care for their city will consent. Well then, when you have paid due honor, with prayer, to all the gods and all the other powers to whom, along with the gods, it is due, cease not from urging and exhorting both friends and opponents by gentle means and every means, until, like a heaven-sent dream presented to waking eyes, (8.357d) the plan which I have pictured in words be wrought by you into plain deeds and brought to a happy consummation.” LETTERS LETTER VIII

“Hope,” he says, “cherishes the soul of him who lives in JUSTICE and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey — hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.” THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Well said, Cephalus, I replied ; but as concerning JUSTICE, what is it ? — to speak the truth and to pay your debts — no more than this ? And even to this are there not exceptions ? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him ? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you, truly say, about JUSTICE ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was JUSTICE, he did not mean to include that case ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of JUSTICE ; for he really meant to say that JUSTICE is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And what is that which JUSTICE gives, and to whom ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then JUSTICE is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Then in time of peace JUSTICE will be of no use ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

You think that JUSTICE may be of use in peace as well as in war ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And what similar use or power of acquisition has JUSTICE in time of peace ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

In contracts, Socrates, JUSTICE is of use. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

That is to say, JUSTICE is useful when money is useless ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then JUSTICE is useful to the individual and to the State ; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that JUSTICE is useful ; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And so of all other things — JUSTICE is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Then JUSTICE is not good for much. But let us consider this further point : Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that JUSTICE is an art of theft ; to be practised, however, THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And that human virtue is JUSTICE ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And can the just by JUSTICE make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Then if a man says that JUSTICE consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies — to say this is not wise ; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that JUSTICE is “doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.” THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Yes, I said ; but if this definition of JUSTICE also breaks down, what other can be offered ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

He roared out to the whole company : What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all ? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another ? I say that if you want really to know what JUSTICE is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honor to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer ; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that JUSTICE is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me ; I must have clearness and accuracy. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don’t be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were “knocking under to one another,” and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for JUSTICE, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth ? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

But what if I give you an answer about JUSTICE other and better, he said, than any of these ? What do you deserve to have done to you ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Listen, then, he said ; I proclaim that JUSTICE is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me ? But of course you won’t. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests ; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the JUSTICE which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all States there is the same principle of JUSTICE, which is the interest of the government ; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one prinprinciple of JUSTICE, which is the interest of the stronger. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Now I understand you, I said ; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark that in defining JUSTICE you have yourself used the word “interest,” which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words “of the stronger” are added. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Great or small, never mind about that : we must first inquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that JUSTICE is interest of some sort, but you go on to say “of the stronger” ; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects — and that is what you call JUSTICE ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Then JUSTICE, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger, but the reverse ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider : Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is JUSTICE ? Has not that been admitted ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Then you must also have acknowledged JUSTICE not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, JUSTICE is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometime command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that JUSTICE is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest ; whence follows that JUSTICE is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest — this was what the weaker had to do ; and this was affirmed by him to be JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by JUSTICE what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken ? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake ? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking ; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies ; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies ; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest ; and the subject is required to execute his commands ; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, JUSTICE is the interest of the stronger. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

When we had got to this point in the argument, and everyone saw that the definition of JUSTICE had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said, Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master ; and you further imagine that the rulers of States, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no ; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that JUSTICE and the just are in reality another’s good ; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant ; and inJUSTICE the opposite ; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just : he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts : wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State : when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income ; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office ; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just ; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of inJUSTICE on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent ; and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of inJUSTICE in which the criminal is the happiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do inJUSTICE are the most miserable — that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale ; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public ; for which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished and incur great disgrace — they who do such wrong in particular cases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of inJUSTICE. For mankind censure inJUSTICE, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, inJUSTICE, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than JUSTICE ; and, as I said at first, JUSTICE is the interest of the stronger, whereas inJUSTICE is a man’s own profit and interest. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

You appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us, Thrasymachus — whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself ; we are a large party ; and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe inJUSTICE to be more gainful than JUSTICE, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit inJUSTICE either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of inJUSTICE, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong ; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring JUSTICE to inJUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And for this reason, I said, money and honor have no attraction for them ; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honor. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonorable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help — not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to anyone who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present ; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects ; and everyone who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that JUSTICE is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed at present ; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly ? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect inJUSTICE is more gainful than perfect JUSTICE ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

I suppose that you would call JUSTICE virtue and inJUSTICE vice ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

What a charming notion ! So likely too, seeing that I affirm inJUSTICE to be profitable and JUSTICE not. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And would you call JUSTICE vice ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied ; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class inJUSTICE with wisdom and virtue, and JUSTICE with the opposite. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance ; it was a hot summer’s day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents ; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that JUSTICE was virtue and wisdom, and inJUSTICE vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point : THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that inJUSTICE is stronger and more powerful than JUSTICE, but now JUSTICE, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than inJUSTICE, if inJUSTICE is ignorance ; this can no longer be questioned by anyone. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way : You would not deny that a State may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other States, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

I know, I said, that such was your position ; but what I would further consider is, whether this power which is possessed by the superior State can exist or be exercised without JUSTICE or only with JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

If you are right in your view, and JUSTICE is wisdom, then only with JUSTICE ; but if I am right, then without JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And this is because inJUSTICE creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and JUSTICE imparts harmony and friendship ; is not that true, Thrasymachus ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Feast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument ; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company. Well, then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my repast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action ; nay, more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time vigorously together, is not strictly true, for, if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another ; but it is evident that there must have been some remnant of JUSTICE in them, which enabled them to combine ; if there had not been they would have injured one another as well as their victims ; they were but half-villains in their enterprises ; for had they been whole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given ; but still I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

And we have admitted that JUSTICE is the excellence of the soul, and inJUSTICE the defect of the soul ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, inJUSTICE can never be more profitable than JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle toward me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained ; but that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of JUSTICE. I left that inquiry and turned away to consider whether JUSTICE is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly ; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what JUSTICE is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy. THE REPUBLIC BOOK I

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place JUSTICE ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Then the many are of another mind ; they think that JUSTICE is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured JUSTICE and praised inJUSTICE. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been ; but to my mind the nature of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE has not yet been made clear. Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of JUSTICE according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise JUSTICE do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just — if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears ; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of JUSTICE to inJUSTICE maintained by anyone in a satisfactory way. I want to hear JUSTICE praised in respect of itself ; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this ; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising JUSTICE and censuring inJUSTICE. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

They say that to do inJUSTICE is, by nature, good ; to suffer inJUSTICE, evil ; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered inJUSTICE and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither ; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants ; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of JUSTICE ; it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do inJUSTICE and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer inJUSTICE without the power of retaliation ; and JUSTICE, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do inJUSTICE. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist ; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Now that those who practise JUSTICE do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this kind : having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them ; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of JUSTICE by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the King of Lydia ; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he, stooping and looking in, saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human and having nothing on but a gold ring ; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the King ; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outward and reappeared ; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result — when he turned the collet inward he became invisible, when outward he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court ; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the Queen, and with her help conspired against the King and slew him and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other ; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in JUSTICE. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with anyone at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust ; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that JUSTICE is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever anyone thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that inJUSTICE is far more profitable to the individual than JUSTICE, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine anyone obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another’s, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another’s faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer inJUSTICE. Enough of this. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them ; there is no other way ; and how is the isolation to be effected ? I answer : Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just ; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft ; like the skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to be great in his inJUSTICE (he who is found out is nobody) : for the highest reach of inJUSTICE is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect inJUSTICE ; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for JUSTICE. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself ; he must be one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where force is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honored and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of JUSTICE or for the sake of honor and rewards ; therefore, let him be clothed in JUSTICE only, and have no other covering ; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst ; then he will have been put to the proof ; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death ; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of JUSTICE and the other of inJUSTICE, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Well, then, according to the proverb, “Let brother help brother” — if he fails in any part, do you assist him ; although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the power of helping JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more : There is another side to Glaucon’s argument about the praise and censure of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, which is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just ; but why ? not for the sake of JUSTICE, but for the sake of character and reputation ; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of JUSTICE. More, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the others ; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious ; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says that the gods make the oaks of the just — THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Maintains JUSTICE ; to whom the black earth brings forth THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to the just ; they take them down into the world below, where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands ; their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further ; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is the style in which they praise JUSTICE. But about the wicked there is another strain ; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a sieve ; also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just who are reputed to be unjust ; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, which is not confined to the poets, but is found in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that JUSTICE and virtue are honorable, but grievous and toilsome ; and that the pleasures of vice and inJUSTICE are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty ; and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honor them both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods : they say that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich men’s doors and persuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a man’s own or his ancestor’s sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts ; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost ; with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod : THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

“Can I by JUSTICE or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my days ?” THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

For what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just, profit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of JUSTICE, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of my house ; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear someone exclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult ; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to concealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and assemblies ; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods ? or, suppose them to have no care of human things — why in either case should we mind about concealment ? And even if there are gods, and they do care about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the poets ; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by “sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.” Let us be consistent, then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak truly, why, then, we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of inJUSTICE ; for if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall lose the gains of inJUSTICE ; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. “But there is a world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.” Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare ; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose JUSTICE rather than the worst inJUSTICE ? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honor JUSTICE ; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears JUSTICE praised ? And even if there should be someone who is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that JUSTICE is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free will ; unless, peradventure, there be someone whom the divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of inJUSTICE, or who has attained knowledge of the truth — but no other man. He only blames inJUSTICE, who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of JUSTICE — beginning with the ancient heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men of our own time — no one has ever blamed inJUSTICE or praised JUSTICE except with a view to the glories, honors, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye ; or shown that of all the things of a man’s soul which he has within him, JUSTICE is the greatest good, and inJUSTICE the greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upward, we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but everyone would have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harboring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these about JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you, because I want to hear from you the opposite side ; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority which JUSTICE has over inJUSTICE, but what effect they have on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations ; for unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the false, we shall say that you do not praise JUSTICE, but the appearance of it ; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep inJUSTICE dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that JUSTICE is another’s good and the interest of the stronger, and that inJUSTICE is a man’s own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that JUSTICE is one of that highest class of goods which are desired, indeed, for their results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes — like sight or hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional good — I would ask you in your praise of JUSTICE to regard one point only : I mean the essential good and evil which JUSTICE and inJUSTICE work in the possessors of them. Let others praise JUSTICE and censure inJUSTICE, magnifying the rewards and honors of the one and abusing the other ; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to us that JUSTICE is better than inJUSTICE, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of inJUSTICE, and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced — this I infer from your general character, for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two ; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the task ; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which JUSTICE has over inJUSTICE. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while breath and speech remain to me ; I am afraid that there would be an impiety in being present when JUSTICE is evil spoken of and not lifting up a hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I can. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the inquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus ; suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by someone to read small letters from a distance ; and it occurred to someone else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger — if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser — this would have been thought a rare piece of good-fortune. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

I will tell you, I replied ; JUSTICE, which is the subject of our inquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Then in the larger the quantity of JUSTICE is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we inquire into the nature of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the JUSTICE and inJUSTICE of the State in process of creation also. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Where, then, is JUSTICE, and where is inJUSTICE, and in what part of the State did they spring up ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Yes, I said, now I understand : the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created ; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how JUSTICE and inJUSTICE originate. In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to see a State at fever-heat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas and tables and other furniture ; also dainties and perfumes and incense and courtesans and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety. We must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses and clothes and shoes ; the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Then we have found the desired natures ; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated ? Is not this an inquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater inquiry which is our final end — How do JUSTICE and inJUSTICE grow up in States ? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length. THE REPUBLIC BOOK II

Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men ; poets and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable ; and that inJUSTICE is profitable when undetected, but that JUSTICE is a man’s own loss and another’s gain — these things we shall forbid them to utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite. THE REPUBLIC BOOK III

That such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we cannot determine until we have discovered what JUSTICE is, and how naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just or not. THE REPUBLIC BOOK III

But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of JUSTICE and medicine are always being opened ; and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them. THE REPUBLIC BOOK III

Would you say “most,” I replied, when you consider that there is a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is actually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness ; he imagines that he is a master in dishonesty ; able to take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of the way of JUSTICE : and all for what ? — in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK III

If we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find the answer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians may very likely be the happiest of men ; but that our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole ; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find JUSTICE, and in the ill-ordered State inJUSTICE : and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two is the happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole ; and by and by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we were painting a statue, and someone came up to us and said : Why do you not put the most beautiful colors on the most beautiful parts of the body — the eyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black — to him we might fairly answer : Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes ; consider rather whether, by giving this and the other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And so I say to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians ; for we too can clothe our husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid them till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also might be allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the wine-cup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only as much as they like ; in this way we might make every class happy — and then, as you imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea into our heads ; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the character of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much consequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not, are confined to cobblers ; but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seeming and not real guardians, then see how they turn the State upside down ; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving order and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and not the destroyers of the State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are doing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness individually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a noble order, and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

But where, amid all this, is JUSTICE ? Son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us see where in it we can discover JUSTICE and where inJUSTICE, and in what they differ from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Nonsense, said Glaucon : did you not promise to search yourself, saying that for you not to help JUSTICE in her need would be an impiety ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words “of a citizen,” you will not be far wrong — hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking, not for courage, but JUSTICE ; and for the purpose of our inquiry we have said enough. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State — first, temperance, and then JUSTICE, which is the end of our search. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Now, can we find JUSTICE without troubling ourselves about temperance ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that JUSTICE should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of ; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favor of considering temperance first. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

And so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been discovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a State virtuous must be JUSTICE, if we only knew what that was. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that JUSTICE does not steal away, and pass out of sight and escape us ; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country : watch therefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let me know. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

I grow impatient at the length of your exordium. Well, then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not : You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted ; now JUSTICE is this principle or a part of it. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Then to do one’s own business in a certain way may be assumed to be JUSTICE. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted ; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative ; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, JUSTICE would be the fourth, or remaining one. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

And the virtue which enters into this competition is JUSTICE ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Then on this view also JUSTICE will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man’s own, and belongs to him ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Certainly. This, then, is inJUSTICE ; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is JUSTICE, and will make the city just. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

We will not, I said, be over-positive as yet ; but if, on trial, this conception of JUSTICE be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be no longer any room for doubt ; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh inquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine JUSTICE on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State JUSTICE would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual — if they agree, we shall be satisfied ; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which JUSTICE will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

The just man then, if we regard the idea of JUSTICE only, will be like the just State ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be JUSTICE ; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain ; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

We cannot but remember that the JUSTICE of the State consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

And is JUSTICE dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Are you satisfied, then, that the quality which makes such men and such States is JUSTICE, or do you hope to discover some other ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Then our dream has been realized ; and the suspicion which we entertained at the beginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of JUSTICE, has now been verified ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

And the division of labor which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another’s, was a shadow of JUSTICE, and for that reason it was of use ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

But in reality JUSTICE was such as we were describing, being concerned, however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man : for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others — he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself ; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals — when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business ; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Very good ; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the nature of JUSTICE in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

And if the nature of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

And just actions cause JUSTICE, and unjust actions cause inJUSTICE ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

And is not the creation of JUSTICE the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of inJUSTICE the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Still our old question of the comparative advantage of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE has not been answered : Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power ; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire JUSTICE and virtue, or to escape from inJUSTICE and vice ; assuming them both to be such as we have described ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV

Then let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse ; the encouragement which you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew what I was talking about. To declare the truth about matters of high interest which a man honors and loves, among wise men who love him, need occasion no fear or faltering in his mind ; but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a hesitating inquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery thing ; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about beauty, or goodness, or JUSTICE, in the matter of laws. And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends ; and therefore you do well to encourage me. THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after JUSTICE and inJUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

True, he replied ; but what of that ? I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute JUSTICE ; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree of JUSTICE than is to be found in other men ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

We were inquiring into the nature of absolute JUSTICE and into the character of the perfectly just, and into inJUSTICE and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact. THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither ; who see the many just, and not absolute JUSTICE, and the like — such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK V

And are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter’s eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, JUSTICE in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them — are not such persons, I ask, simply blind ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory, and is quick to learn — noble, gracious, the friend of truth, JUSTICE, courage, temperance, who are his kindred ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

Then, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant : perchance some noble and welleducated person, detained by exile in her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to her ; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns and neglects ; and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts, which they justly despise, and come to her ; or peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages’s bridle ; for everything in the life of Theages conspired to divert him from philosophy ; but ill-health kept him away from politics. My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude ; and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of JUSTICE at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such a one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts — he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall ; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will be, think you, be an unskilful artificer of JUSTICE, temperance, and every civil virtue ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upward and downward : I mean that they will first look at absolute JUSTICE and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy ; and will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man ; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts ; and distinguished the several natures of JUSTICE, temperance, courage, and wisdom ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this — higher than JUSTICE and the other virtues ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal ; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of JUSTICE and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner ; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of JUSTICE, and is endeavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute JUSTICE ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VII

I acknowledge, he said, the JUSTICE of your rebuke. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we are speaking ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VII

All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us ; and if only those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training are sound in body and mind, JUSTICE herself will have nothing to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the constitution and of the State ; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VII

In this way : you know that there are certain principles about JUSTICE and honor, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up, obeying and honoring them. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VII

Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not ?) that what has been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although difficult, not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed ; that is to say, when the true philosopher-kings are born in a State, one or more of them, despising the honors of this present world which they deem mean and worthless, esteeming above all things right and the honor that springs from right, and regarding JUSTICE as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VII

Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity ; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure JUSTICE or pure inJUSTICE. The inquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue inJUSTICE, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer JUSTICE. THE REPUBLIC BOOK VIII

Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of JUSTICE ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX

Yes, that was said. Now, then, having determined the power and quality of JUSTICE and inJUSTICE, let us have a little conversation with him. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX

To him the supporter of JUSTICE makes answer that he should ever so speak and act as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete mastery over the entire human creature. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX

Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of JUSTICE will say. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX

And so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honor, or advantage, the approver of JUSTICE is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX

What shall he profit, if his inJUSTICE be undetected and unpunished ? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized ; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of JUSTICE and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength, and health, in proportion as the soul is more honorable than the body. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IX

Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will anyone be profited if under the influence of honor or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect JUSTICE and virtue ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK X

Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many other proofs ; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity ; and then her beauty will be revealed, and JUSTICE and inJUSTICE and all the things which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have grown over them of sea-weed and shells and stones, so that he is more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look. Where, then ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK X

And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument ; we have not introduced the rewards and glories of JUSTICE, which, as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod ; but JUSTICE in her own nature has been shown to be the best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades. THE REPUBLIC BOOK X

And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which JUSTICE and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death. THE REPUBLIC BOOK X

The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just : for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure JUSTICE might be weighed against pure inJUSTICE. Do you remember ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK X

Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of JUSTICE that the estimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us ; since she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to her own. THE REPUBLIC BOOK X

These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things which JUSTICE of herself provides. THE REPUBLIC BOOK X

Well, I said, I will tell you a tale ; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this, too, is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterward, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pyre, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth ; they were near together, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after they had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand ; and in like manner the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand ; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to them, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them ; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival ; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously inquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too long to tell ; but the sum was this : He said that for every wrong which they had done to anyone they suffered tenfold ; or once in a hundred years — such being reckoned to be the length of man’s life, and the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behavior, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and JUSTICE and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers, there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, “Where is Ardiaeus the Great ?” (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er : he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was : “He comes not hither, and will never come.” And this, said he, was one of the dreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants ; and there were also, besides the tyrants, private individuals who had been great criminals : they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or someone who had not been sufficiently punished tried to ascend ; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and heard the sound, seized and carried them off ; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell. And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice ; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great. THE REPUBLIC BOOK X

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken ; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness, and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after JUSTICE and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing. THE REPUBLIC BOOK X