dikaiosyene = justice
JUSTICE, popular definitions of, Crat. 413 ; =to speak the truth and pay one’s debts, Rep. 1. 331 foil.; = the interest of the stronger, ib. 338; 2. 367 (cp. Gorg. 489; Laws 4. 714 B); =honour among thieves, Rep. 1. 352; =the excellence of the soul, ib. 353; = the opinion of the best, Laws 9. 864; =power of knowledge, Hipp. Min. 375 ; = doing one’s own work, 1 Alcib. 127 (cp. Rep. 4. 443):—a part of virtue, Meno 73 E, 79 (cp. Rep. 1. 350); the art which gives good and evil to friends and enemies, Rep. 1. 332 foil., 336; is a thief, ib. 334; the proper virtue of man, ib. 335; ‘ sublime simplicity,’ ib. 348; does not aim at excess, ib. 349; identical with wisdom and virtue, ib. 351 ; a principle of harmony, ibid. (cp. 9. 591 D); in the highest class of goods, ib. 2. 357, 367 D (cp. Euthyd. 279 ; Laws I. 631 C); the union of temperance, wisdom, and courage, Rep. 4. 433 ; Laws 1. 631 C ; a division of labour, Rep. 4. 433 foil. (cp. 1. 332,349,350); ‘an honourable maiden,’ Laws 12. 943 E :—given by Zeus to mankind, Protag. 322 C, 329 C; love the cause of, Symp. 196 ; nature and origin of (Glaucon), Rep. 2. 358, 359! conventional, ib. 359 A ; Theaet. 172 A, 177 C ; Laws 10. 889 E; praised for its consequences only (Adeimantus), Rep. 2. 362 E, 366; a matter of appearance, ib. 365 :—essential to states, Protag. 322 D (cp. Phaedo 82 B); supposed to exist to some degree in every man, Protag. 323 B ; acquired by habit, Phaedo 82 B ; happiness dependent upon, Gorg. 470; useful alike in war and peace, Rep. 1. 333 ; can do no harm, ib. 335 ; more precious than gold, ib. 336 E (cp. Laws n. 913 B); toilsome, Rep, 1. 364 (cp. Pro-tag. 340 C ; Laws 4. 718 E); follows after God, Laws 4. 716 A; worthy of honour, ib. 5. 730 D ; the administration of, ought to be shared in by ail the citizens, ib. 6. 768; especially necessary towards slaves and inferiors, ib. 777 E ; the salvation of men, ib. 10. 906 B; the civilizer of humanity, ib. n. 937 E ; found to some extent in every constitution, ib. is. 945 D (cp. Rep. 1. 338 E):—compared to health, Rep. 4. 444:—the poets on, ib. 2. 363, 364, 365 E :—in perfection, ib. 361 : — justice and equity, Laws 6. 757 ;—justice and expediency, 1 Alcib. 113, 116;— justice and holiness, Protag. 330, 331; Euthyph. 12 ;—justice and politics, Gorg. 464;—justice and retribution, Laws 5. 728;—justice and virtue, Rep. 1. 348 :—justice more profitable than injustice, ib. 4. 445 ; 9. 589 foil.; superior to injustice, ib. 9. 589; final triumph of, ib. 580; 10. 612, 613:—in the state, ib. 2. 369; 4. 431, 433; the same in the. individual and the state, ib. 4.435 foil., 441 foil.: —absolute justice, ib. 5. 479 E ; 6. 501 B; 7. 517 E:—natural justice, Gorg. 483, 484, 488, 492; Laws 10. 890 A (cp. ib. 3. 690 B):—’ the justice of the Gods,’ Laws 10.904. JUSTICE. (The happiness which is conferred by justice is one of the main theses of the Gorgias. The young Sophist, Polus, and Collides, the man of the world, agree in thinking that the unjust is happy so long as he is able to escape punishment. But Socrates maintains a higher view, which he sets forth under a paradoxical form. The wicked man is unhappy.because he is wicked, and still more unhappy when he is not punished for his evil deeds. On the other hand the just and innocent are happy even on earth and amidst the greatest sufferings ; and in the world to come all the advantages are on their side. The argument is confirmed in Plato’s fashion by a myth.
Once upon a time the judgment of souls took place upon the day of death while both the judges and the judged were alive. The result was unsatisfactory: the veil of the body hid the soul from the glance of the judge, who was himself hindered by a like impediment. In order to remedy this evil Zeus made his sons judges in the world below, and the souls were tried after death. There was no more escape for the wicked: the judges beheld his soul stained and corrupted by lust and wickedness and pronounced thefitting penalty.— The argument of the Gorgias is in a manner resumed and completed in the Republic. In the first Book several definitions of justice are attempted, all of which fall before the dialectic of Socrates. Glaucon and Adeimantus then intervene:—mankind regard justice as a necessity, not as a good in itself, or at best as only to be practised because of the temporal benefits which flow from it: can Socrates prove that it belongs to a higher class of goods ; Socrates in reply proposes to construct an ideal state in which justice will be more easily recognized than in the individual. JUSTICE is thus discovered to be the essential virtue of the state (a thesis afterwards enlarged upon by Aristotle (Pol. i. 2. 16 ; iii. 13, § 3)), the bond of the social organization, and, like temperance in the Laws (3. 696, 697; 4. 709 E), rather the accompaniment or condition of the virtues than a virtue in itself. Expressed in an outward or political form it becomes the great principle which has been already enunciated (Rep. I. 332), ‘ that every man shall do his own work’; on this Plato bases the necessity of the division into classes which underlies the whole fabric of the ideal state (Rep. 4433 foil.; Tim. 17 C). Thus we are led to acknowledge the happiness of the just ; for he alone reflects in himself this vital principle of the state (Rep. 4. 445)-The final proof is supplied by a comparison of the perfect state with actual forms of government. These, like the individuals who correspond to them, become more and more miserable as they recede further from the ideal, and the climax is reached (Rep. 9. 587) when the tyrant is shown by the aid of arithmetic to have ‘729 times less pleasure than the king’ (i.e. the perfectly just ruler). Lastly, the happiness of the just is proved to, extend also into the next world, where men appear before the judgment-seat of heaven and receive the due reward of their deeds in this life. —In the Laws, no less than in the Republic, justice is assigned a high place among the virtues. Every constitution, however imperfect, must share in justice “to some degree ; for no association, even of the bad, can be formed unless regard is had to justice (cp. Lysis 214). It is the virtue which makes men civilized, and fits them to dwell together in the state. But injustice is the disease of cities and governments, corresponding to sickness in the bodily frame. Again, the just man shows his justice especially in his dealings with slaves and inferiors, whom he endeavours to train in virtue (cp. Arist. Pol. i. 13 § 14). He alone enjoys true happiness; for to him the good and the pleasant are one and the same. lie has God always as his friend and guide, whereas the unjust passes through life in wild confusion and soon comes to the end of his seeming prosperity.)
Pol. JUSTICE, Socrates, far excels the two others. GORGIAS
Ath. JUSTICE is said by them to be the interest of the stronger. LAWS BOOK IV
Ath. “Friends,” we say to them, — “God, as the old tradition declares, holding in his hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, travels according to his nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of his end. JUSTICE always accompanies him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To justice, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows in her company with all humility and order ; but he who is lifted up with pride, or elated by wealth or rank, or beauty, who is young and foolish, and has a soul hot with insolence, and thinks that he has no need of any guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted of God ; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think ? LAWS BOOK IV
Let me first understand you, I replied. JUSTICE, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this ? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK I
Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our inquiry, ages ago, there was JUSTICE tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her ; nothing could be more ridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands — that was the way with us — we looked not at what we were seeking, but at what was far off in the distance ; and therefore, I suppose, we missed her. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV
I mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of JUSTICE, and have failed to recognize her. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV
Further, we affirmed that JUSTICE was doing one’s own business, and not being a busybody ; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us. THE REPUBLIC BOOK IV
JUSTICE and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after ? THE REPUBLIC BOOK VI