Matter

As in Man before the organization or shaping by the All-Soul, so everywhere else there is MATTER, always the same: there is a certain tendency to think of MATTER as being ‘material’, e.g. in man as flesh or clay, in the world at large as some sort of powdery beginning or residue of things: this misconception must be carefully guarded out. ‘MATTER’, says Jules Simon, ‘is rather a demand of thought than a reality of existence’: this is perhaps to state the case rashly, but it is certainly nearer to the true conception than is the notion the word conveys to the uninstructed mind.

MATTER is the last, lowest, and least emanation of the creative power of the All-Soul, or rather it is a little lower than that even: it is, to speak roughly, the point at which the creative or generative power comes to a halt; it is the Ultimate Possible, it is almost Non-Being; it would be Non-Being except that Absolute Non-Being is non-existent, impossible in a world emanating from the bounty of Being: often no doubt it is called Non-Being but this is not in strict definition but as a convenient expression of its utter, all-but-infinite remoteness from the Authentic-Existence to which, in the long line of descent, it owes its origin.

We are to think of it — as is indicated in the tract on Evil (Enneads I,8,) – as invisible, imperceptible to any sense, unknowable by any reach of the mind except by its negation of all that the mind can however feebly grasp, as utterly outside the realm of form except in so far as feebly it stretches towards some determination in the universal pining of all things towards the Goodness and Wisdom from which however remotely all have sprung.

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Under such an interweaving, then, the Soul would not be subjected to the body’s affections and experiences: it would be present rather as Ideal-Form in MATTER. Enneads I,1,

Let us then suppose Soul to be in body as Ideal-Form in MATTER. Now if – the first possibility – the Soul is an essence, a self-existent, it can be present only as separable form and will therefore all the more decidedly be the Using-Principle (and therefore unaffected). Enneads I,1,

And, further, these Civic Virtues – measured and ordered themselves and acting as a principle of measure to the Soul which is as MATTER to their forming – are like to the measure reigning in the over-world, and they carry a trace of that Highest Good in the Supreme; for, while utter measurelessness is brute MATTER and wholly outside of Likeness, any participation in Ideal-Form produces some corresponding degree of Likeness to the formless Being There. And participation goes by nearness: the Soul nearer than the body, therefore closer akin, participates more fully and shows a godlike presence, almost cheating us into the delusion that in the Soul we see God entire. Enneads I,2,

Is Dialectic, then, the same as Philosophy? It is the precious part of Philosophy. We must not think of it as the mere tool of the metaphysician: Dialectic does not consist of bare theories and rules: it deals with verities; Existences are, as it were, MATTER to it, or at least it proceeds methodically towards Existences, and possesses itself, at the one step, of the notions and of the realities. Enneads I,3,

Our reasoning faculties employ the data of Dialectic almost as their proper possession for they are mainly concerned about MATTER (whose place and worth Dialectic establishes). Enneads I,3,

All shapelessness whose kind admits of pattern and form, as long as it remains outside of Reason and Idea, is ugly by that very isolation from the Divine-Thought. And this is the Absolute Ugly: an ugly thing is something that has not been entirely mastered by pattern, that is by Reason, the MATTER not yielding at all points and in all respects to Ideal-Form. Enneads I,6,

But what accordance is there between the material and that which antedates all MATTER? On what principle does the architect, when he finds the house standing before him correspondent with his inner ideal of a house, pronounce it beautiful? Is it not that the house before him, the stones apart, is the inner idea stamped upon the mass of exterior matter, the indivisible exhibited in diversity? So with the perceptive faculty: discerning in certain objects the Ideal-Form which has bound and controlled shapeless matter, opposed in nature to Idea, seeing further stamped upon the common shapes some shape excellent above the common, it gathers into unity what still remains fragmentary, catches it up and carries it within, no longer a thing of parts, and presents it to the Ideal-Principle as something concordant and congenial, a natural friend: the joy here is like that of a good man who discerns in a youth the early signs of a virtue consonant with the achieved perfection within his own soul. Enneads I,6,

The beauty of colour is also the outcome of a unification: it derives from shape, from the conquest of the darkness inherent in MATTER by the pouring-in of light, the unembodied, which is a Rational-Principle and an Ideal-Form. Enneads I,6,

And harmonies unheard in sound create the harmonies we hear, and wake the soul to the consciousness of beauty, showing it the one essence in another kind: for the measures of our sensible music are not arbitrary but are determined by the Principle whose labour is to dominate MATTER and bring pattern into being. Enneads I,6,

Thus far of the beauties of the realm of sense, images and shadow-pictures, fugitives that have entered into MATTER – to adorn, and to ravish, where they are seen. Enneads I,6,

What must we think but that all this shame is something that has gathered about the Soul, some foreign bane outraging it, soiling it, so that, encumbered with all manner of turpitude, it has no longer a clean activity or a clean sensation, but commands only a life smouldering dully under the crust of evil; that, sunk in manifold death, it no longer sees what a Soul should see, may no longer rest in its own being, dragged ever as it is towards the outer, the lower, the dark? An unclean thing, I dare to say; flickering hither and thither at the call of objects of sense, deeply infected with the taint of body, occupied always in MATTER, and absorbing MATTER into itself; in its commerce with the Ignoble it has trafficked away for an alien nature its own essential Idea. Enneads I,6,

So, we may justly say, a Soul becomes ugly – by something foisted upon it, by sinking itself into the alien, by a fall, a descent into body, into MATTER. The dishonour of the Soul is in its ceasing to be clean and apart. Gold is degraded when it is mixed with earthy particles; if these be worked out, the gold is left and is beautiful, isolated from all that is foreign, gold with gold alone. And so the Soul; let it be but cleared of the desires that come by its too intimate converse with the body, emancipated from all the passions, purged of all that embodiment has thrust upon it, withdrawn, a solitary, to itself again – in that moment the ugliness that came only from the alien is stripped away. Enneads I,6,

The bodily Kind, in that it partakes of MATTER is an evil thing. What form is in bodies is an untrue-form: they are without life: by their own natural disorderly movement they make away with each other; they are hindrances to the soul in its proper Act; in their ceaseless flux they are always slipping away from Being. Enneads I,8,

But what is the root of this evil state? how can it be brought under the causing principle indicated? Firstly, such a Soul is not apart from MATTER, is not purely itself. That is to say, it is touched with Unmeasure, it is shut out from the Forming-Idea that orders and brings to measure, and this because it is merged into a body made of MATTER. Enneads I,8,

Then if the Reasoning-Faculty too has taken hurt, the Soul’s seeing is baulked by the passions and by the darkening that MATTER brings to it, by its decline into MATTER, by its very attention no longer to Essence but to Process – whose principle or source is, again, MATTER, the Kind so evil as to saturate with its own pravity even that which is not in it but merely looks towards it. Enneads I,8,

The Soul wrought to perfection, addressed towards the Intellectual-Principle, is steadfastly pure: it has turned away from MATTER; all that is undetermined, that is outside of measure, that is evil, it neither sees nor draws near; it endures in its purity, only, and wholly, determined by the Intellectual-Principle. Enneads I,8,

The Soul that breaks away from this source of its reality to the non-perfect and non-primal is, as it were, a secondary, an image, to the loyal Soul. By its falling-away – and to the extent of the fall – it is stripped of Determination, becomes wholly indeterminate, sees darkness. Looking to what repels vision, as we look when we are said to see darkness, it has taken MATTER into itself. Enneads I,8,

But, it will be objected, if this seeing and frequenting of the darkness is due to the lack of good, the Soul’s evil has its source in that very lack; the darkness will be merely a secondary cause – and at once the Principle of Evil is removed from MATTER, is made anterior to MATTER. Enneads I,8,

No: Evil is not in any and every lack; it is in absolute lack. What falls in some degree short of the Good is not Evil; considered in its own kind it might even be perfect, but where there is utter dearth, there we have Essential Evil, void of all share in Good; this is the case with MATTER. Enneads I,8,

MATTER has not even existence whereby to have some part in Good: Being is attributed to it by an accident of words: the truth would be that it has Non-Being. Enneads I,8,

In fine we are not to think of Evil as some particular bad thing – injustice, for example, or any other ugly trait – but as a principle distinct from any of the particular forms in which, by the addition of certain elements, it becomes manifest. Thus there may be wickedness in the Soul; the forms this general wickedness is to take will be determined by the environing MATTER, by the faculties of the Soul that operate and by the nature of their operation, whether seeing, acting, or merely admitting impression. Enneads I,8,

But supposing things external to the Soul are to be counted Evil – sickness, poverty and so forth – how can they be referred to the principle we have described? Well, sickness is excess or defect in the body, which as a material organism rebels against order and measure; ugliness is but matter not mastered by Ideal-Form; poverty consists in our need and lack of goods made necessary to us by our association with MATTER whose very nature is to be one long want. Enneads I,8,

In a word since MATTER belongs only to the sensible world, vice in men is not the Absolute Evil; not all men are vicious; some overcome vice, some, the better sort, are never attacked by it; and those who master it win by means of that in them which is not material. Enneads I,8,

Still we may reasonably ask how can vice in man be a contrary to The Good in the Supernal: for vice is the contrary to virtue and virtue is not The Good but merely the good thing by which MATTER is brought to order. Enneads I,8,

In the case of fire and water we would admit contrariety if it were not for their common element, the MATTER, about which are gathered the warmth and dryness of one and the dampness and cold of the other: if there were only present what constitutes their distinct kinds, the common ground being absent, there would be, here also, essence contrary to essence. Enneads I,8,

But why does the existence of the Principle of Good necessarily comport the existence of a Principle of Evil? Is it because the All necessarily comports the existence of MATTER? Yes: for necessarily this All is made up of contraries: it could not exist if MATTER did not. The Nature of this Kosmos is, therefore, a blend; it is blended from the Intellectual-Principle and Necessity: what comes into it from God is good; evil is from the Ancient Kind which, we read, is the underlying MATTER not yet brought to order by the Ideal-Form. Enneads I,8,

The escape, we read, is not a matter of place, but of acquiring virtue, of disengaging the self from the body; this is the escape from MATTER. Plato explains somewhere how a man frees himself and how he remains bound; and the phrase “to live among the gods” means to live among the Intelligible-Existents, for these are the Immortals. Enneads I,8,

As necessarily as there is Something after the First, so necessarily there is a Last: this Last is MATTER, the thing which has no residue of good in it: here is the necessity of Evil. Enneads I,8,

But there will still be some to deny that it is through this MATTER that we ourselves become evil. Enneads I,8,

They will say that neither ignorance nor wicked desires arise in MATTER. Even if they admit that the unhappy condition within us is due to the pravity inherent in body, they will urge that still the blame lies not in the MATTER itself but with the Form present in it – such Form as heat, cold, bitterness, saltness and all other conditions perceptible to sense, or again such states as being full or void – not in the concrete signification but in the presence or absence of just such forms. In a word, they will argue, all particularity in desires and even in perverted judgements upon things, can be referred to such causes, so that Evil lies in this Form much more than in the mere MATTER. Enneads I,8,

Yet, even with all this, they can be compelled to admit that MATTER is the Evil. Enneads I,8,

For, the quality (form) that has entered into MATTER does not act as an entity apart from the MATTER, any more than axe-shape will cut apart from iron. Further, Forms lodged in MATTER are not the same as they would be if they remained within themselves; they are Reason-Principles Materialized, they are corrupted in the MATTER, they have absorbed its nature: essential fire does not burn, nor do any of the essential entities effect, of themselves alone, the operation which, once they have entered into MATTER, is traced to their action. Enneads I,8,

MATTER becomes mistress of what is manifested through it: it corrupts and destroys the incomer, it substitutes its own opposite character and kind, not in the sense of opposing, for example, concrete cold to concrete warmth, but by setting its own formlessness against the Form of heat, shapelessness to shape, excess and defect to the duly ordered. Thus, in sum, what enters into MATTER ceases to belong to itself, comes to belong to MATTER, just as, in the nourishment of living beings, what is taken in does not remain as it came, but is turned into, say, dog’s blood and all that goes to make a dog, becomes, in fact, any of the humours of any recipient. Enneads I,8,

No, if body is the cause of Evil, then there is no escape; the cause of Evil is MATTER. Enneads I,8,

Still, it will be urged, the incoming Idea should have been able to conquer the MATTER. Enneads I,8,

The difficulty is that MATTER’s master cannot remain pure itself except by avoidance of MATTER. Enneads I,8,

We see partial wrong; from what is before us we divine that which is lacking to the entire form (or Kind) thus indicated; we see that the completed Kind would be the Indeterminate; by this process we are able to identify and affirm Evil. In the same way when we observe what we feel to be an ugly appearance in MATTER – left there because the Reason-Principle has not become so completely the master as to cover over the unseemliness – we recognise Ugliness by the falling-short from Ideal-Form. Enneads I,8,

But how can we identify what has never had any touch of Form? We utterly eliminate every kind of Form; and the object in which there is none whatever we call MATTER: if we are to see MATTER we must so completely abolish Form that we take shapelessness into our very selves. Enneads I,8,

But if MATTER is devoid of quality how can it be evil? It is described as being devoid of quality in the sense only that it does not essentially possess any of the qualities which it admits and which enter into it as into a substratum. No one says that it has no nature; and if it has any nature at all, why may not that nature be evil though not in the sense of quality? Quality qualifies something not itself: it is therefore an accidental; it resides in some other object. MATTER does not exist in some other object but is the substratum in which the accidental resides. MATTER, then, is said to be devoid of Quality in that it does not in itself possess this thing which is by nature an accidental. If, moreover, Quality itself be devoid of Quality, how can MATTER, which is the unqualified, be said to have it? Thus, it is quite correct to say at once that MATTER is without Quality and that it is evil: it is Evil not in the sense of having Quality but, precisely, in not having it; give it Quality and in its very Evil it would almost be a Form, whereas in Truth it is a Kind contrary to Form. Enneads I,8,

This objection may be answered by applying the principle to the case of Evil in the Soul; the Evil, the Vice, will be a Negation and not anything having a separate existence; we come to the doctrine which denies MATTER or, admitting it, denies its Evil; we need not seek elsewhere; we may at once place Evil in the Soul, recognising it as the mere absence of Good. But if the negation is the negation of something that ought to become present, if it is a denial of the Good by the Soul, then the Soul produces vice within itself by the operation of its own Nature, and is devoid of good and, therefore, Soul though it be, devoid of life: the Soul, if it has no life, is soulless; the Soul is no Soul. Enneads I,8,

We teach that Virtue is not the Absolute GoodGood and Beauty, because we know that These are earlier than Virtue and transcend it, and that it is good and beautiful by some participation in them. Now as, going upward from virtue, we come to the Beautiful and to the Good, so, going downward from Vice, we reach Essential Evil: from Vice as the starting-point we come to vision of Evil, as far as such vision is possible, and we become evil to the extent of our participation in it. We are become dwellers in the Place of Unlikeness, where, fallen from all our resemblance to the Divine, we lie in gloom and mud: for if the Soul abandons itself unreservedly to the extreme of viciousness, it is no longer a vicious Soul merely, for mere vice is still human, still carries some trace of good: it has taken to itself another nature, the Evil, and as far as Soul can die it is dead. And the death of Soul is twofold: while still sunk in body to lie down in MATTER and drench itself with it; when it has left the body, to lie in the other world until, somehow, it stirs again and lifts its sight from the mud: and this is our “going down to Hades and slumbering there.” Enneads I,8,

For weakness in the body is not like that in the Soul: the word weakness, which covers the incapacity for work and the lack of resistance in the body, is applied to the Soul merely by analogy – unless, indeed, in the one case as in the other, the cause of the weakness is MATTER. Enneads I,8,

Now this weakness must be seated either in Souls utterly disengaged or in Souls bound to MATTER or in both. Enneads I,8,

It cannot exist in those apart from MATTER, for all these are pure and, as we read, winged and perfect and unimpeded in their task: there remains only that the weakness be in the fallen Souls, neither cleansed nor clean; and in them the weakness will be, not in any privation but in some hostile presence, like that of phlegm or bile in the organs of the body. Enneads I,8,

MATTER exists; Soul exists; and they occupy, so to speak, one place. There is not one place for MATTER and another for Soul-MATTER, for instance, kept to earth, Soul in the air: the soul’s “separate place” is simply its not being in MATTER; that is, its not being united with it; that is that there be no compound unit consisting of Soul and MATTER; that is that Soul be not moulded in MATTER as in a matrix; this is the Soul’s apartness. Enneads I,8,

But the faculties of the Soul are many, and it has its beginning, its intermediate phases, its final fringe. MATTER appears, importunes, raises disorders, seeks to force its way within; but all the ground is holy, nothing there without part in Soul. MATTER therefore submits, and takes light: but the source of its illumination it cannot attain to, for the Soul cannot lift up this foreign thing close by, since the evil of it makes it invisible. On the contrary the illumination, the light streaming from the Soul, is dulled, is weakened, as it mixes with MATTER which offers Birth to the Soul, providing the means by which it enters into generation, impossible to it if no recipient were at hand. Enneads I,8,

This is the fall of the Soul, this entry into MATTER: thence its weakness: not all the faculties of its being retain free play, for MATTER hinders their manifestation; it encroaches upon the Soul’s territory and, as it were, crushes the Soul back; and it turns to evil all that it has stolen, until the Soul finds strength to advance again. Enneads I,8,

Thus the cause, at once, of the weakness of Soul and of all its evil is MATTER. Enneads I,8,

The evil of MATTER precedes the weakness, the vice; it is Primal Evil. Even though the Soul itself submits to MATTER and engenders to it; if it becomes evil within itself by its commerce with MATTER, the cause is still the presence of MATTER: the Soul would never have approached MATTER but that the presence of MATTER is the occasion of its earth-life. Enneads I,8,

If the existence of MATTER be denied, the necessity of this Principle must be demonstrated from the treatises “On MATTER” where the question is copiously treated. Enneads I,8,

But the case is different when one holds that body is, of itself, perishable and that Soul is the principle of permanence: this view obliges us to the proof that the character of body is not in itself fatal either to the coherence or to the lasting stability which are imperative: it must be shown that the two elements of the union envisaged are not inevitably hostile, but that on the contrary (in the heavens) even MATTER must conduce to the scheme of the standing result. Enneads: II I

We have to ask, that is, how MATTER, this entity of ceaseless flux constituting the physical mass of the universe, could serve towards the immortality of the Kosmos. Enneads: II I

Any such quality, modified at best from its supreme form, deteriorates again within itself: things of any kind that approach from above, altered by merely leaving their source change further still by their blending with bodies, with MATTER, with each other. Enneads II,3,

All that thus proceeds from the supernal combines into a unity and every existing entity takes something from this blended infusion so that the result is the thing itself plus some quality. The effluence does not make the horse but adds something to it; for horse comes by horse, and man by man: the sun plays its part no doubt in the shaping, but the man has his origin in the Human-Principle. Outer things have their effect, sometimes to hurt and sometimes to help; like a father, they often contribute to good but sometimes also to harm; but they do not wrench the human being from the foundations of its nature; though sometimes MATTER is the dominant, and the human principle takes the second place so that there is a failure to achieve perfection; the Ideal has been attenuated. Enneads II,3,

All, then, is antecedent and resultant, each sequent becoming in turn an antecedent once it has taken its place among things. And perhaps this is a cause of progressive deterioration: men, for instance, are not as they were of old; by dint of interval and of the inevitable law, the Reason-Principles have ceded something to the characteristics of the MATTER. Enneads II,3,

Well, perhaps even the less good has its contributory value in the All. Perhaps there is no need that everything be good. Contraries may co-operate; and without opposites there could be no ordered Universe: all living beings of the partial realm include contraries. The better elements are compelled into existence and moulded to their function by the Reason-Principle directly; the less good are potentially present in the Reason-Principles, actually present in the phenomena themselves; the Soul’s power had reached its limit, and failed to bring the Reason-Principles into complete actuality since, amid the clash of these antecedent Principles, MATTER had already from its own stock produced the less good. Enneads II,3,

Yet, with all this, MATTER is continuously overruled towards the better; so that out of the total of things – modified by Soul on the one hand and by MATTER on the other hand, and on neither hand as sound as in the Reason-Principles – there is, in the end, a Unity. Enneads II,3,

But these Reason-Principles, contained in the Soul, are they Thoughts? And if so, by what process does the Soul create in accordance with these Thoughts? It is upon MATTER that this act of the Reason is exercised; and what acts physically is not an intellectual operation or a vision, but a power modifying matter, not conscious of it but merely acting upon it: the Reason-Principle, in other words, acts much like a force producing a figure or pattern upon water – that of a circle, suppose, where the formation of the ring is conditioned by something distinct from that force itself. Enneads II,3,

If this is so, the prior puissance of the Soul (that which conveys the Reason-Principles) must act by manipulating the other Soul, that which is united with MATTER and has the generative function. Enneads II,3,

In sum, then, the Intellectual-Principle gives from itself to the Soul of the All which follows immediately upon it: this again gives forth from itself to its next, illuminated and imprinted by it; and that secondary Soul at once begins to create, as under order, unhindered in some of its creations, striving in others against the repugnance of MATTER. Enneads II,3,

It has a creative power, derived; it is stored with Reason-Principles not the very originals: therefore it creates, but not in full accordance with the Principles from which it has been endowed: something enters from itself; and, plainly, this is inferior. The issue then is something living, yes; but imperfect, hindering its own life, something very poor and reluctant and crude, formed in a MATTER that is the fallen sediment of the Higher Order, bitter and embittering. This is the Soul’s contribution to the All. Enneads II,3,

Rightly, therefore, is this Kosmos described as an image continuously being imaged, the First and the Second Principles immobile, the Third, too, immobile essentially, but, accidentally and in MATTER, having motion. Enneads II,3,

Fourth tractate – MATTER in its two kinds. Enneads II,4,

By common agreement of all that have arrived at the conception of such a Kind, what is known as MATTER is understood to be a certain base, a recipient of Form-Ideas. Thus far all go the same way. But departure begins with the attempt to establish what this basic Kind is in itself, and how it is a recipient and of what. Enneads II,4,

To a certain school, body-forms exclusively are the Real Beings; existence is limited to bodies; there is one only MATTER, the stuff underlying the primal-constituents of the Universe: existence is nothing but this MATTER: everything is some modification of this; the elements of the Universe are simply this MATTER in a certain condition. Enneads II,4,

The school has even the audacity to foist MATTER upon the divine beings so that, finally, God himself becomes a mode of MATTER – and this though they make it corporeal, describing it as a body void of quality, but a magnitude. Enneads II,4,

Another school makes it incorporeal: among these, not all hold the theory of one only MATTER; some of them while they maintain the one MATTER, in which the first school believes, the foundation of bodily forms, admit another, a prior, existing in the divine-sphere, the base of the Ideas there and of the unembodied Beings. Enneads II,4,

Now if MATTER must characteristically be undetermined, void of shape, while in that sphere of the Highest there can be nothing that lacks determination, nothing shapeless, there can be no MATTER there. Further, if all that order is simplex, there can be no need of MATTER, whose function is to join with some other element to form a compound: it will be found of necessity in things of derived existence and shifting nature – the signs which lead us to the notion of MATTER – but it is unnecessary to the primal. Enneads II,4,

And again, where could it have come from? whence did it take its being? If it is derived, it has a source: if it is eternal, then the Primal-Principles are more numerous than we thought, the Firsts are a meeting-ground. Lastly, if that MATTER has been entered by Idea, the union constitutes a body; and, so, there is Body in the Supreme. Enneads II,4,

Further, a compound in the Intellectual order is not to be confounded with a compound in the realm of MATTER; the Divine Reasons are compounds and their Act is to produce a compound, namely that (lower) Nature which works towards Idea. And there is not only a difference of function; there is a still more notable difference of source. Then, too, the MATTER of the realm of process ceaselessly changes its form: in the eternal, MATTER is immutably one and the same, so that the two are diametrically opposites. The MATTER of this realm is all things in turn, a new entity in every separate case, so that nothing is permanent and one thing ceaselessly pushes another out of being: MATTER has no identity here. In the Intellectual it is all things at once: and therefore has nothing to change into: it already and ever contains all. This means that not even in its own Sphere is the MATTER there at any moment shapeless: no doubt that is true of the MATTER here as well; but shape is held by a very different right in the two orders of MATTER. Enneads II,4,

As to whether MATTER is eternal or a thing of process, this will be clear when we are sure of its precise nature. Enneads II,4,

There is, therefore, a MATTER accepting the shape, a permanent substratum. Enneads II,4,

Further, admitting that there is an Intelligible Realm beyond, of which this world is an image, then, since this world-compound is based on MATTER, there must be MATTER there also. Enneads II,4,

And how can you predicate an ordered system without thinking of form, and how think of form apart from the notion of something in which the form is lodged? No doubt that Realm is, in the strict fact, utterly without parts, but in some sense there is part there too. And in so far as these parts are really separate from each other, any such division and difference can be no other than a condition of MATTER, of a something divided and differentiated: in so far as that realm, though without parts, yet consists of a variety of entities, these diverse entities, residing in a unity of which they are variations, reside in a MATTER; for this unity, since it is also a diversity, must be conceived of as varied and multiform; it must have been shapeless before it took the form in which variation occurs. For if we abstract from the Intellectual-Principle the variety and the particular shapes, the Reason-Principles and the Thoughts, what precedes these was something shapeless and undetermined, nothing of what is actually present there. Enneads II,4,

It may be objected that the Intellectual-Principle possesses its content in an eternal conjunction so that the two make a perfect unity, and that thus there is no MATTER there. Enneads II,4,

But that argument would equally cancel the MATTER present in the bodily forms of this realm: body without shape has never existed, always body achieved and yet always the two constituents. We discover these two – MATTER and Idea – by sheer force of our reasoning which distinguishes continually in pursuit of the simplex, the irreducible, working on, until it can go no further, towards the ultimate in the subject of enquiry. And the ultimate of every partial-thing is its MATTER, which, therefore, must be all darkness since light is a Reason-Principle. The Mind, too, as also a Reason-Principle, sees only in each particular object the Reason-Principle lodging there; anything lying below that it declares to lie below the light, to be therefore a thing of darkness, just as the eye, a thing of light, seeks light and colours which are modes of light, and dismisses all that is below the colours and hidden by them, as belonging to the order of the darkness, which is the order of MATTER. Enneads II,4,

The dark element in the Intelligible, however, differs from that in the sense-world: so therefore does the MATTER – as much as the forming-Idea presiding in each of the two realms. The Divine MATTER, though it is the object of determination has, of its own nature, a life defined and intellectual; the MATTER of this sphere while it does accept determination is not living or intellective, but a dead thing decorated: any shape it takes is an image, exactly as the Base is an image. There on the contrary the shape is a real-existent as is the Base. Those that ascribe Real Being to MATTER must be admitted to be right as long as they keep to the MATTER of the Intelligible Realm: for the Base there is Being, or even, taken as an entirety with the higher that accompanies it, is illuminated Being. Enneads II,4,

Both are engendered, in the sense that they have had a beginning, but unengendered in that this beginning is not in Time: they have a derived being but by an eternal derivation: they are not, like the Kosmos, always in process but, in the character of the Supernal, have their Being permanently. For that differentiation within the Intelligible which produces MATTER has always existed and it is this cleavage which produces the MATTER there: it is the first movement; and movement and differentiation are convertible terms since the two things arose as one: this motion, this cleavage, away from the first is indetermination (= MATTER), needing The First to its determination which it achieves by its Return, remaining, until then, an Alienism, still lacking good; unlit by the Supernal. It is from the Divine that all light comes, and, until this be absorbed, no light in any recipient of light can be authentic; any light from elsewhere is of another order than the true. Enneads II,4,

The same fact is clearly established by decay, a process implying a compound object; where there is decay there is a distinction between MATTER and Form. Enneads II,4,

The basic-constituents of things must be either their Form-Idea or that Primal MATTER (of the Intelligible) or a compound of the Form and MATTER. Enneads II,4,

Form-Idea, pure and simple, they cannot be: for without MATTER how could things stand in their mass and magnitude? Neither can they be that Primal MATTER, for they are not indestructible. Enneads II,4,

They must, therefore, consist of MATTER and Form-Idea – Form for quality and shape, MATTER for the base, indeterminate as being other than Idea. Enneads II,4,

Empedokles in identifying his “elements” with MATTER is refuted by their decay. Enneads II,4,

Anaxagoras, in identifying his “primal-combination” with MATTER – to which he allots no mere aptness to any and every nature or quality but the effective possession of all – withdraws in this way the very Intellectual-Principle he had introduced; for this Mind is not to him the bestower of shape, of Forming Idea; and it is co-aeval with MATTER, not its prior. But this simultaneous existence is impossible: for if the combination derives Being by participation, Being is the prior; if both are Authentic Existents, then an additional Principle, a third, is imperative (a ground of unification). And if this Creator, Mind, must pre-exist, why need MATTER contain the Forming-Ideas parcel-wise for the Mind, with unending labour, to assort and allot? Surely the undetermined could be brought to quality and pattern in the one comprehensive act? As for the notion that all is in all, this clearly is impossible. Enneads II,4,

If this “infinite” means “of endless extension” there is no infinite among beings; there is neither an infinity-in-itself (Infinity Abstract) nor an infinity as an attribute to some body; for in the first case every part of that infinity would be infinite and in the second an object in which the infinity was present as an attribute could not be infinite apart from that attribute, could not be simplex, could not therefore be MATTER. Enneads II,4,

What, then, is this Kind, this MATTER, described as one stuff, continuous and without quality? Clearly since it is without quality it is incorporeal; bodiliness would be quality. Enneads II,4,

Clay, for example, is matter to the potter but is not MATTER pure and simple. Nothing of this sort is our object: we are seeking the stuff which underlies all alike. We must therefore refuse to it all that we find in things of sense – not merely such attributes as colour, heat or cold, but weight or weightlessness, thickness or thinness, shape and therefore magnitude; though notice that to be present within magnitude and shape is very different from possessing these qualities. Enneads II,4,

The MATTER must be of later origin than the forming-power, and therefore must be at its disposition throughout, ready to become anything, ready therefore to any bulk; besides, if it possessed magnitude, it would necessarily possess shape also: it would be doubly inductile. Enneads II,4,

The imaging of Quantity upon MATTER by an outside power is not more surprising than the imaging of Quality; Quality is no doubt a Reason-Principle, but Quantity also – being measure, number – is equally so. Enneads II,4,

In a word, every unembodied Kind must be classed as without quantity, and MATTER is unembodied. Enneads II,4,

This Magnitude-Absolute, then, enters and beats the MATTER out into Magnitude? Not at all: the MATTER was not previously shrunken small: there was no littleness or bigness: the Idea gives Magnitude exactly as it gives every quality not previously present. Enneads II,4,

But how can I form the conception of the sizelessness of MATTER? How do you form the concept of any absence of quality? What is the Act of the Intellect, what is the mental approach, in such a case? The secret is Indetermination. Enneads II,4,

All knowledge comes by Reason and the Intellectual Act; in this case Reason conveys information in any account it gives, but the act which aims at being intellectual is, here, not intellection but rather its failure: therefore the representation of MATTER must be spurious, unreal, something sprung of the Alien, of the unreal, and bound up with the alien reason. Enneads II,4,

This is Plato’s meaning where he says that MATTER is apprehended by a sort of spurious reasoning. Enneads II,4,

There is vision, then, in this approach of the Mind towards MATTER? Some vision, yes; of shapelessness, of colourlessness, of the unlit, and therefore of the sizeless. More than this would mean that the Soul is already bestowing Form. Enneads II,4,

But is not such a void precisely what the Soul experiences when it has no intellection whatever? No: in that case it affirms nothing, or rather has no experience: but in knowing MATTER, it has an experience, what may be described as the impact of the shapeless; for in its very consciousness of objects that have taken shape and size it knows them as compounds (i.e., as possessing with these forms a formless base) for they appear as things that have accepted colour and other quality. Enneads II,4,

And just as even MATTER itself is not stably shapeless but, in things, is always shaped, the Soul also is eager to throw over it the thing-form; for the Soul recoils from the indefinite, dreads, almost, to be outside of reality, does not endure to linger about Non-Being. Enneads II,4,

“A certain mass then; and if mass, then Magnitude? Obviously if your Base has no Magnitude it offers no footing to any entrant. And suppose it sizeless; then, what end does it serve? It never helped Idea or quality; now it ceases to account for differentiation or for magnitude, though the last, wheresoever it resides, seems to find its way into embodied entities by way of MATTER.” Enneads II,4,

“Or, taking a larger view, observe that actions, productive operations, periods of time, movements, none of these have any such substratum and yet are real things; in the same way the most elementary body has no need of MATTER; things may be, all, what they are, each after its own kind, in their great variety, deriving the coherence of their being from the blending of the various Ideal-Forms. This MATTER with its sizelessness seems, then, to be a name without a content.” Enneads II,4,

Now, to begin with: extension is not an imperative condition of being a recipient; it is necessary only where it happens to be a property inherent to the recipient’s peculiar mode of being. The Soul, for example, contains all things but holds them all in an unextended unity; if magnitude were one of its attributes it would contain things in extension. MATTER does actually contain in spatial extension what it takes in; but this is because itself is a potential recipient of spatial extension: animals and plants, in the same way, as they increase in size, take quality in parallel development with quantity, and they lose in the one as the other lessens. Enneads II,4,

No doubt in the case of things as we know them there is a certain mass lying ready beforehand to the shaping power: but that is no reason for expecting bulk in MATTER strictly so called; for in such cases MATTER is not the absolute; it is that of some definite object; the Absolute MATTER must take its magnitude, as every other property, from outside itself. Enneads II,4,

A thing then need not have magnitude in order to receive form: it may receive mass with everything else that comes to it at the moment of becoming what it is to be: a phantasm of mass is enough, a primary aptness for extension, a magnitude of no content – whence the identification that has been made of MATTER with The Void. Enneads II,4,

But I prefer to use the word phantasm as hinting the indefiniteness into which the Soul spills itself when it seeks to communicate with MATTER, finding no possibility of delimiting it, neither encompassing it nor able to penetrate to any fixed point of it, either of which achievements would be an act of delimitation. Enneads II,4,

In other words, we have something which is to be described not as small or great but as the great-and-small: for it is at once a mass and a thing without magnitude, in the sense that it is the MATTER on which Mass is based and that, as it changes from great to small and small to great, it traverses magnitude. Its very undeterminateness is a mass in the same sense that of being a recipient of Magnitude – though of course only in the visible object. Enneads II,4,

In the order of things without Mass, all that is Ideal-Principle possesses delimitation, each entity for itself, so that the conception of Mass has no place in them: MATTER, not delimited, having in its own nature no stability, swept into any or every form by turns, ready to go here, there and everywhere, becomes a thing of multiplicity: driven into all shapes, becoming all things, it has that much of the character of mass. Enneads II,4,

But these Ideas enter, not into Magnitude itself but into some subject that has been brought to Magnitude. For to suppose them entering into Magnitude and not into MATTER – is to represent them as being either without Magnitude and without Real-Existence (and therefore undistinguishable from the MATTER) or not Ideal-Forms (apt to body) but Reason-Principles (utterly removed) whose sphere could only be Soul; at this, there would be no such thing as body (i.e., instead of Ideal-Forms shaping MATTER and so producing body, there would be merely Reason-Principles dwelling remote in Soul.) Enneads II,4,

The multiplicity here must be based upon some unity which, since it has been brought to Magnitude, must be, itself, distinct from Magnitude. MATTER is the base of Identity to all that is composite: once each of the constituents comes bringing its own MATTER with it, there is no need of any other base. No doubt there must be a container, as it were a place, to receive what is to enter, but MATTER and even body precede place and space; the primal necessity, in order to the existence of body, is MATTER. Enneads II,4,

Bodies are compound, actions not. Further, MATTER does in some sense underlie action; it supplies the substratum to the doer: it is permanently within him though it does not enter as a constituent into the act where, indeed, it would be a hindrance. Doubtless, one act does not change into another – as would be the case if there were a specific MATTER of actions – but the doer directs himself from one act to another so that he is the MATTER, himself, to his varying actions. Enneads II,4,

MATTER, in sum, is necessary to quality and to quantity, and, therefore, to body. Enneads II,4,

If we reject it, we must by the same reasoning reject qualities and mass: for quality, or mass, or any such entity, taken by itself apart, might be said not to exist. But these do exist, though in an obscure existence: there is much less ground for rejecting MATTER, however it lurk, discerned by none of the senses. Enneads II,4,

It eludes the eye, for it is utterly outside of colour: it is not heard, for it is no sound: it is no flavour or savour for nostrils or palate: can it, perhaps, be known to touch? No: for neither is it corporeal; and touch deals with body, which is known by being solid, fragile, soft, hard, moist, dry – all properties utterly lacking in MATTER. Enneads II,4,

It is grasped only by a mental process, though that not an act of the intellective mind but a reasoning that finds no subject; and so it stands revealed as the spurious thing it has been called. No bodiliness belongs to it; bodiliness is itself a phase of Reason-Principle and so is something different from MATTER, as MATTER, therefore, from it: bodiliness already operative and so to speak made concrete would be body manifest and not MATTER unelaborated. Enneads II,4,

The elements are sizeless, and how conceive an attribute where there is neither base nor bulk? Again, if the quality possesses determination, it is not MATTER the undetermined; and anything without determination is not a quality but is the substratum – the very MATTER we are seeking. Enneads II,4,

It may be suggested that perhaps this absence of quality means simply that, of its own nature, it has no participation in any of the set and familiar properties, but takes quality by this very non-participation, holding thus an absolutely individual character, marked off from everything else, being as it were the negation of those others. Deprivation, we will be told, comports quality: a blind man has the quality of his lack of sight. If then – it will be urged – MATTER exhibits such a negation, surely it has a quality, all the more so, assuming any deprivation to be a quality, in that here the deprivation is all comprehensive. Enneads II,4,

Is it suggested that its mere Alienism is a quality in MATTER? If this Alienism is difference-absolute (the abstract entity) it possesses no Quality: absolute Quality cannot be itself a qualified thing. Enneads II,4,

If the Alienism is to be understood as meaning only that MATTER is differentiated, then it is different not by itself (since it is certainly not an absolute) but by this Difference, just as all identical objects are so by virtue of Identicalness (the Absolute principle of Identity). Enneads II,4,

An absence is neither a Quality nor a qualified entity; it is the negation of a Quality or of something else, as noiselessness is the negation of noise and so on. A lack is negative; Quality demands something positive. The distinctive character of MATTER is unshape, the lack of qualification and of form; surely then it is absurd to pretend that it has Quality in not being qualified; that is like saying that sizelessness constitutes a certain size. Enneads II,4,

The distinctive character of MATTER, then, is simply its manner of being – not something definite inserted in it but, rather a relation towards other things, the relation of being distinct from them. Enneads II,4,

Other things possess something besides this relation of Alienism: their form makes each an entity. MATTER may with propriety be described as merely alien; perhaps, even, we might describe it as “The Aliens,” for the singular suggests a certain definiteness while the plural would indicate the absence of any determination. Enneads II,4,

But is Absence this privation itself, or something in which this Privation is lodged? Anyone maintaining that MATTER and Privation are one and the same in substratum but stand separable in reason cannot be excused from assigning to each the precise principle which distinguishes it in reason from the other: that which defines MATTER must be kept quite apart from that defining the Privation and vice versa. Enneads II,4,

There are three possibilities: MATTER is not in Privation and Privation is not in MATTER; or each is in each; or each is in itself alone. Enneads II,4,

Now if they should stand quite apart, neither calling for the other, they are two distinct things: MATTER is something other than Privation even though Privation always goes with it: into the principle of the one, the other cannot enter even potentially. Enneads II,4,

If they stand to each other as fire to heat – heat in fire, but fire not included in the concept of heat – if MATTER is Privation in the way in which fire is heat, then the Privation is a form under which MATTER appears but there remains a base distinct from the Privation and this base must be the MATTER. Here, too, they are not one thing. Enneads II,4,

Or we might say that the one concept defines the relation of substratum to what is not substratum, while that of Privation, in bringing out the indeterminateness of MATTER, applies to the MATTER in itself: but this still makes Privation and MATTER two in reason though one in substratum. Enneads II,4,

Now if MATTER possesses an identity – though only the identity of being indeterminate, unfixed and without quality – how can we bring it so under two principles? Enneads II,4,

Now MATTER is a thing that is brought under order – like all that shares its nature by participation or by possessing the same principle – therefore, necessarily, MATTER is The Undelimited and not merely the recipient of a nonessential quality of Indefiniteness entering as an attribute. Enneads II,4,

Secondly, what must a thing be to take Indefiniteness as an attribute? Obviously it must, beforehand, be either Definiteness or a defined thing. But MATTER is neither. Enneads II,4,

Then again Indefiniteness entering as an attribute into the definite must cease to be indefinite: but Indefiniteness has not entered as an attribute into MATTER: that is, MATTER is essentially Indefiniteness. Enneads II,4,

The MATTER even of the Intellectual Realm is the Indefinite, (the undelimited); it must be a thing generated by the undefined nature, the illimitable nature, of the Eternal Being, The One illimitableness, however, not possessing native existence There but engendered by The One. Enneads II,4,

But how can MATTER be common to both spheres, be here and be There? Because even Indefiniteness has two phases. Enneads II,4,

So that MATTER here (as only an image of Indefiniteness) would be less indefinite? On the contrary, more indefinite as an Image-thing remote from true being. Indefiniteness is the greater in the less ordered object; the less deep in good, the deeper in evil. The Indeterminate in the Intellectual Realm, where there is truer being, might almost be called merely an Image of Indefiniteness: in this lower Sphere where there is less Being, where there is a refusal of the Authentic, and an adoption of the Image-Kind, Indefiniteness is more authentically indefinite. Enneads II,4,

But this argument seems to make no difference between the indefinite object and Indefiniteness-essential. Is there none? In any object in which Reason and MATTER co-exist we distinguish between Indeterminateness and the Indeterminate subject: but where MATTER stands alone we make them identical, or, better, we would say right out that in that case essential Indeterminateness is not present; for it is a Reason-Principle and could not lodge in the indeterminate object without at once annulling the indeterminateness. Enneads II,4,

MATTER, then, must be described as Indefinite of itself, by its natural opposition to Reason-Principle. Reason is Reason and nothing else; just so MATTER, opposed by its indeterminateness to Reason, is Indeterminateness and nothing else. Enneads II,4,

Then MATTER is simply Alienism (the Principle of Difference)? No: it is merely that part of Alienism which stands in contradiction with the Authentic Existents which are Reason-Principles. So understood, this non-existent has a certain measure of existence; for it is identical with Privation, which also is a thing standing in opposition to the things that exist in Reason. Enneads II,4,

But on this reasoning must not MATTER owe its evil to having in some degree participated in good? No: its evil is in its first lack: it was not a possessor (of some specific character). Enneads II,4,

For in MATTER we have no mere absence of means or of strength; it is utter destitution – of sense, of virtue, of beauty, of pattern, of Ideal principle, of quality. This is surely ugliness, utter disgracefulness, unredeemed evil. Enneads II,4,

The MATTER in the Intellectual Realm is an Existent, for there is nothing previous to it except the Beyond-Existence; but what precedes the MATTER of this sphere is Existence; by its alienism in regard to the beauty and good of Existence, MATTER is therefore a non-existent. Enneads II,4,

Then the question rises whether MATTER – potentially what it becomes by receiving shape – is actually something else or whether it has no actuality at all. In general terms: When a potentiality has taken a definite form, does it retain its being? Is the potentiality, itself, in actualization? The alternative is that, when we speak of the “Actual Statue” and of the “Potential Statue,” the Actuality is not predicated of the same subject as the “Potentiality.” If we have really two different subjects, then the potential does not really become the actual: all that happens is that an actual entity takes the place of a potential. Enneads: II V.

The actualized entity is not the MATTER (the Potentiality, merely) but a combination, including the Form-Idea upon the MATTER. Enneads: II V.

Now: if there is no MATTER there to harbour potentiality: if nothing there has any future apart from its actual mode: if nothing there generates, whether by changes or in the permanence of its identity; if nothing goes outside of itself to give being to what is other than itself; then, potentiality has no place there: the Beings there possess actuality as belonging to eternity, not to time. Enneads: II V.

Those, however, who assert MATTER in the Intellectual Realm will be asked whether the existence of that MATTER does not imply the potential there too; for even if MATTER there exists in another mode than here, every Being there will have its MATTER, its form and the union of the two (and therefore the potential, separable from the actual). What answer is to be made? Simply, that even the MATTER there is Idea, just as the Soul, an Idea, is MATTER to another (a higher) Being. Enneads: II V.

But relatively to that higher, the Soul is a potentiality? No: for the Idea (to which it is MATTER) is integral to the Soul and does not look to a future; the distinction between the Soul and its Idea is purely mental: the Idea and the MATTER it includes are conceived as a conjunction but are essentially one Kind: remember that Aristotle makes his Fifth Body immaterial. Enneads: II V.

This applies equally to the Soul, not to that in MATTER but to that in the Intellectual Sphere; and even that in MATTER, the Soul of Growth, is an actualization in its difference; it possesses actually (and not, like material things, merely in image) the Being that belongs to it. Enneads: II V.

But what we think of as MATTER, what we assert to be the potentiality of all things, cannot be said to be actually any one being among beings: if it were of itself any definite being, it could not be potentially all. Enneads: II V.

How, therefore, can it be actually anything? The answer is that while MATTER can not be any of the things which are founded upon it, it may quite well be something else, admitting that all existences are not rooted in MATTER. Enneads: II V.

How can we talk of it? How can it be the MATTER of real things? It is talked of, and it serves, precisely, as a Potentiality. Enneads: II V.

As Potentiality then, it is not any definite thing but the potentiality of everything: being nothing in itself – beyond what being MATTER amounts to – it is not in actualization. For if it were actually something, that actualized something would not be MATTER, or at least not MATTER out and out, but merely MATTER in the limited sense in which bronze is the matter of the statue. Enneads: II V.

Motion, for example, is different from Being, but plays about it, springing from it and living within it: MATTER is, so to speak, the outcast of Being, it is utterly removed, irredeemably what it was from the beginning: in origin it was Non-Being and so it remains. Enneads: II V.

So that MATTER, as the Actualization of Non-Being, is all the more decidedly Non-Being, is Authentic Non-Existence. Enneads: II V.

If MATTER is to be kept as the unchanging substratum, we must keep it as MATTER: that means – does it not? – that we must define it as a Potentiality and nothing more – or refute these considerations. Enneads: II V.

Rejecting its warmth, its glow, its lightness – all which certainly do seem to be qualities – and its resistance, there is left only its extension by three dimensions: in other words, its MATTER is its Reality. Enneads: II VI.

But that cannot be held: surely the form is much more likely than the MATTER to be the Reality. Enneads: II VI.

And the outcome of this Reason-Principle entering into the underlying MATTER, what is that? Certainly not what is seen and burns, for that is the something in which these qualities inhere. Enneads: II VI.

But let it be understood how we came to say that body passing through and through another body must produce disintegration, while we make qualities pervade their substances without producing disintegration: the bodilessness of qualities is the reason. MATTER, too, is bodiless: it may, then, be supposed that as MATTER pervades everything so the bodiless qualities associated with it – as long as they are few – have the power of penetration without disintegration. Anything solid would be stopped either in virtue of the fact that a solid has the precise quality which forbids it to penetrate or in that the mere coexistence of too many qualities in MATTER (constitutes density and so) produces the same inhibition. Enneads: II VII.

This would mean that the qualities of two substances do not bring about the mixing by merely being qualities but by being apt to mixture; nor does MATTER refuse to enter into a mixing as MATTER but as being associated with a quality repugnant to mixture; and this all the more since it has no magnitude of its own but only does not reject magnitude. Enneads: II VII.

We have thus covered our main ground, but since corporeity has been mentioned, we must consider its nature: is it the conjunction of all the qualities or is it an Idea, or Reason-Principle, whose presence in MATTER constitutes a body? Now if body is the compound, the thing made up of all the required qualities plus MATTER, then corporeity is nothing more than their conjunction. Enneads: II VII.

And if it is a Reason-Principle, one whose incoming constitutes the body, then clearly this Principle contains embraced within itself all the qualities. If this Reason-Principle is to be no mere principle of definition exhibiting the nature of a thing but a veritable Reason constituting the thing, then it cannot itself contain MATTER but must encircle MATTER, and by being present to MATTER elaborate the body: thus the body will be MATTER associated with an indwelling Reason-Principle which will be in itself immaterial, pure Idea, even though irremoveably attached to the body. It is not to be confounded with that other Principle in man – treated elsewhere – which dwells in the Intellectual World by right of being itself an Intellectual Principle. Enneads: II VII.

If we are told that there is always MATTER as a possible term, we ask why then should not MATTER itself come to nothingness. If we are told it may, then we ask why it should ever have been generated. If the answer comes that it had its necessary place as the ultimate of the series, we return that the necessity still holds. Enneads: II VIII.

With MATTER left aside as wholly isolated, the Divine Beings are not everywhere but in some bounded place, walled off, so to speak; if that is not possible, MATTER itself must receive the Divine light (and so cannot be annihilated). Enneads: II VIII.

If He made it later than this world – abstracting the formal-idea of this world and leaving the MATTER out – the Souls that have come to know that intermediate sphere would have experienced enough to keep them from entering this. If the meaning is simply that Souls exhibit the Ideal-Form of the Universe, what is there distinctive in the teaching? Enneads: II VIII.

Yet in the same breath, that very Soul which was the occasion of descent to the others is declared not to have descended. “It knew no decline,” but merely illuminated the darkness in such a way that an image of it was formed upon the MATTER. Then, they shape an image of that image somewhere below – through the medium of MATTER or of Materiality or whatever else of many names they choose to give it in their frequent change of terms, invented to darken their doctrine – and so they bring into being what they call the Creator or Demiurge, then this lower is severed from his Mother (Sophia) and becomes the author of the Kosmos down to the latest of the succession of images constituting it. Enneads: II VIII.

Further, how explain that under this illumination the MATTER of the Kosmos produces images of the order of Soul instead of mere bodily-nature? An image of Soul could not demand darkness or MATTER, but wherever formed it would exhibit the character of the producing element and remain in close union with it. Enneads: II VIII.

Next, is this image a real-being, or, as they say, an Intellection? If it is a reality, in what way does it differ from its original? By being a distinct form of the Soul? But then, since the original is the reasoning Soul, this secondary form must be the vegetative and generative Soul; and then, what becomes of the theory that it is produced for glory’s sake, what becomes of the creation in arrogance and self-assertion? The theory puts an end also to creation by representation and, still more decidedly, to any thinking in the act; and what need is left for a creator creating by way of MATTER and Image? If it is an Intellection, then we ask first “What justifies the name?” and next, “How does anything come into being unless the Soul give this Intellection creative power and how, after all, can creative power reside in a created thing?” Are we to be told that it is a question of a first Image followed by a second? But this is quite arbitrary. Enneads: II VIII.

Another difficulty: These people come upon earth not as Soul-Images but as veritable Souls; yet, by great stress and strain, one or two of them are able to stir beyond the limits of the world, and when they do attain Reminiscence barely carry with them some slight recollection of the Sphere they once knew: on the other hand, this Image, a new-comer into being, is able, they tell us – as also is its Mother – to form at least some dim representation of the celestial world. It is an Image, stamped in MATTER, yet it not merely has the conception of the Supreme and adopts from that world the plan of this, but knows what elements serve the purpose. How, for instance, did it come to make fire before anything else? What made it judge fire a better first than some other object? Again, if it created the fire of the Universe by thinking of fire, why did it not make the Universe at a stroke by thinking of the Universe? It must have conceived the product complete from the first; the constituent elements would be embraced in that general conception. Enneads: II VIII.

In fine, the theory amounts to making the world one of the Primals, and with it the MATTER from which it emerges. Enneads: II VIII.

The Intellectual Principle, then, in its unperturbed serenity has brought the universe into being, by communicating from its own store to MATTER: and this gift is the Reason-Form flowing from it. For the Emanation of the Intellectual Principle is Reason, an emanation unfailing as long as the Intellectual Principle continues to have place among beings. Enneads III,2,

The Intellectual Sphere (the Divine) alone is Reason, and there can never be another Sphere that is Reason and nothing else; so that, given some other system, it cannot be as noble as that first; it cannot be Reason: yet since such a system cannot be merely MATTER, which is the utterly unordered, it must be a mixed thing. Its two extremes are MATTER and the Divine Reason; its governing principle is Soul, presiding over the conjunction of the two, and to be thought of not as labouring in the task but as administering serenely by little more than an act of presence. Enneads III,2,

The conflict and destruction that reign among living beings are inevitable, since things here are derived, brought into existence because the Divine Reason which contains all of them in the upper Heavens – how could they come here unless they were There? – must outflow over the whole extent of MATTER. Enneads III,2,

Thus, supposing we were enquiring for the finest type of the human being as known here, we would certainly not demand that he prove identical with Man as in the Divine Intellect; we would think it enough in the Creator to have so brought this thing of flesh and nerve and bone under Reason as to give grace to these corporeal elements and to have made it possible for Reason to have contact with MATTER. Enneads III,2,

Suppose this Universe were the direct creation of the Reason-Principle applying itself, quite unchanged, to MATTER, retaining, that is, the hostility to partition which it derives from its Prior, the Intellectual Principle – then, this its product, so produced, would be of supreme and unparalleled excellence. But the Reason-Principle could not be a thing of entire identity or even of closely compact diversity; and the mode in which it is here manifested is no matter of censure since its function is to be all things, each single thing in some distinctive way. Enneads III,2,

But has it not, besides itself entering MATTER, brought other beings down? Has it not for example brought Souls into MATTER and, in adapting them to its creation, twisted them against their own nature and been the ruin of many of them? And can this be right? The answer is that the Souls are, in a fair sense, members of this Reason-Principle and that it has not adapted them to the creation by perverting them, but has set them in the place here to which their quality entitles them. Enneads III,2,

This new difficulty is not met by the former answer; that all stands as well as the nature of things allows; that the blame for their condition falls on MATTER dragging them down; that, given the plan as we know it, evil cannot be eliminated and should not be; that the MATTER making its presence felt is still not supreme but remains an element taken in from outside to contribute to a definite total, or rather to be itself brought to order by Reason. Enneads III,2,

For (in the case of an evil life) whether it is that the constitution of the man is such as to drive him down the troubled paths or whether (the fault is mental or spiritual in that) the desires have gained control, we are compelled to attribute the guilt to the substratum (something inferior to the highest principle in Man). We would be naturally inclined to say that this substratum (the responsible source of evil) must be MATTER and not, as our argument implies, the Reason-Principle; it would appear that not the Reason-Principle but MATTER were the dominant, crude MATTER at the extreme and then MATTER as shaped in the realized man: but we must remember that to this free Principle in man (which is a phase of the All Soul) the Substratum (the direct inferior to be moulded) is (not MATTER but) the Reason-Principle itself with whatever that produces and moulds to its own form, so that neither crude MATTER nor MATTER organized in our human total is sovereign within us. Enneads III,3,

And any Reason-Principle may be said to include within itself the Reason-Principle of MATTER which therefore it is able to elaborate to its own purposes, either finding it consonant with itself or bestowing upon it the quality which makes it so. The Reason-Principle of an ox does not occur except in connection with the MATTER appropriate to the ox-Kind. It must be by such a process that the transmigration, of which we read takes place; the Soul must lose its nature, the Reason-Principle be transformed; thus there comes the ox-soul which once was Man. Enneads III,3,

But, if all this be true, how can evil fall within the scope of seership? The predictions of the seers are based on observation of the Universal Circuit: how can this indicate the evil with the good? Clearly the reason is that all contraries coalesce. Take, for example, Shape and MATTER: the living being (of the lower order) is a coalescence of these two; so that to be aware of the Shape and the Reason-Principle is to be aware of the MATTER on which the Shape has been imposed. Enneads III,3,

The Heavenly Aphrodite, daughter of Kronos who is no other than the Intellectual Principle – must be the Soul at its divinest: unmingled as the immediate emanation of the unmingled; remaining ever Above, as neither desirous nor capable of descending to this sphere, never having developed the downward tendency, a divine Hypostasis essentially aloof, so unreservedly an Authentic Being as to have no part with MATTER – and therefore mythically “the unmothered” justly called not Celestial Spirit but God, as knowing no admixture, gathered cleanly within itself. Enneads III,5,

But, first what prevents every one of the Celestials from being an Eros, a Love? And why are they not untouched by MATTER like the Gods? On the first question: Every Celestial born in the striving of the Soul towards the good and beautiful is an Eros; and all the Souls within the Kosmos do engender this Celestial; but other Spirit-Beings, equally born from the Soul of the All, but by other faculties of that Soul, have other functions: they are for the direct service of the All, and administer particular things to the purpose of the Universe entire. The Soul of the All must be adequate to all that is and therefore must bring into being spirit powers serviceable not merely in one function but to its entire charge. Enneads III,5,

But what participation can the Celestials have in MATTER, and in what MATTER? Certainly none in bodily MATTER; that would make them simply living things of the order of sense. And if, even, they are to invest themselves in bodies of air or of fire, the nature must have already been altered before they could have any contact with the corporeal. The Pure does not mix, unmediated, with body – though many think that the Celestial-Kind, of its very essence, comports a body aerial or of fire. Enneads III,5,

But why should one order of Celestial descend to body and another not? The difference implies the existence of some cause or medium working upon such as thus descend. What would constitute such a medium? We are forced to assume that there is a MATTER of the Intellectual Order, and that Beings partaking of it are thereby enabled to enter into the lower MATTER, the corporeal. Enneads III,5,

It is said then to spring from Poverty and Possession in the sense that Lack and Aspiration and the Memory of the Ideal Principles, all present together in the Soul, produce that Act towards The Good which is Love. Its Mother is Poverty, since striving is for the needy; and this Poverty is MATTER, for MATTER is the wholly poor: the very ambition towards the good is a sign of existing indetermination; there is a lack of shape and of Reason in that which must aspire towards the Good, and the greater degree of effort implies the lower depth of materiality. A thing aspiring towards the Good is an Ideal-principle only when the striving (with attainment) will leave it still unchanged in Kind: when it must take in something other than itself, its aspiration is the presentment of MATTER to the incoming power. Enneads III,5,

Thus Love is at once, in some degree a thing of MATTER and at the same time a Celestial, sprung of the Soul; for Love lacks its Good but, from its very birth, strives towards It. Enneads III,5,

It is universally true that the characteristic Act of immaterial entities is performed without any change in them – otherwise they would at last be worn away – theirs is the Act of the unmoving; where act means suffering change, there is MATTER: an immaterial Being would have no ground of permanence if its very Act changed it. Enneads III,6,

Now MATTER is the one field of the desiring faculty, as of the principles of nutrition growth and engendering, which are root and spring to desire and to every other affection known to this Ideal-form. No Ideal-form can be the victim of disturbance or be in any way affected: it remains in tranquillity; only the MATTER associated with it can be affected by any state or experience induced by the movement which its mere presence suffices to set up. Thus the vegetal Principle induces vegetal life but it does not, itself, pass through the processes of vegetation; it gives growth but it does not grow; in no movement which it originates is it moved with the motion it induces; it is in perfect repose, or, at least, its movement, really its act, is utterly different from what it causes elsewhere. Enneads III,6,

But MATTER also is an incorporeal, though after a mode of its own; we must examine, therefore, how this stands, whether it is passive, as is commonly held, a thing that can be twisted to every shape and Kind, or whether it too must be considered impassive and in what sense and fashion so. But in engaging this question and defining the nature of matter we must correct certain prevailing errors about the nature of the Authentic Existent, about Essence, about Being. Enneads III,6,

But body, a non-existence? MATTER, on which all this universe rises, a non-existence? Mountain and rock, the wide solid earth, all that resists, all that can be struck and driven, surely all proclaims the real existence of the corporeal? And how, it will be asked, can we, on the contrary, attribute Being, and the only Authentic Being, to entities like Soul and Intellect, things having no weight or pressure, yielding to no force, offering no resistance, things not even visible? Yet even the corporeal realm witnesses for us; the resting earth has certainly a scantier share in Being than belongs to what has more motion and less solidity – and less than belongs to its own most upward element, for fire begins, already, to flit up and away outside of the body-kind. Enneads III,6,

We are thus brought back to the nature of that underlying matter and the things believed to be based upon it; investigation will show us that MATTER has no reality and is not capable of being affected. Enneads III,6,

MATTER must be bodiless – for body is a later production, a compound made by MATTER in conjunction with some other entity. Thus it is included among incorporeal things in the sense that body is something that is neither Real-Being nor MATTER. Enneads III,6,

MATTER is no Soul; it is not Intellect, is not Life, is no Ideal-Principle, no Reason-Principle; it is no limit or bound, for it is mere indetermination; it is not a power, for what does it produce? It lives on the farther side of all these categories and so has no tide to the name of Being. It will be more plausibly called a non-being, and this in the sense not of movement (away from Being) or station (in Not-Being) but of veritable Not-Being, so that it is no more than the image and phantasm of Mass, a bare aspiration towards substantial existence; it is stationary but not in the sense of having position, it is in itself invisible, eluding all effort to observe it, present where no one can look, unseen for all our gazing, ceaselessly presenting contraries in the things based upon it; it is large and small, more and less, deficient and excessive; a phantasm unabiding and yet unable to withdraw – not even strong enough to withdraw, so utterly has it failed to accept strength from the Intellectual Principle, so absolute its lack of all Being. Enneads III,6,

Its every utterance, therefore, is a lie; it pretends to be great and it is little, to be more and it is less; and the Existence with which it masks itself is no Existence, but a passing trick making trickery of all that seems to be present in it, phantasms within a phantasm; it is like a mirror showing things as in itself when they are really elsewhere, filled in appearance but actually empty, containing nothing, pretending everything. Into it and out of it move mimicries of the Authentic Existents, images playing upon an image devoid of Form, visible against it by its very formlessness; they seem to modify it but in reality effect nothing, for they are ghostly and feeble, have no thrust and meet none in MATTER either; they pass through it leaving no cleavage, as through water; or they might be compared to shapes projected so as to make some appearance upon what we can know only as the Void. Enneads III,6,

Further: if visible objects were of the rank of the originals from which they have entered into MATTER we might believe MATTER to be really affected by them, for we might credit them with some share of the power inherent in their Senders: but the objects of our experiences are of very different virtue than the realities they represent, and we deduce that the seeming modification of matter by visible things is unreal since the visible thing itself is unreal, having at no point any similarity with its source and cause. Feeble, in itself, a false thing and projected upon a falsity, like an image in dream or against water or on a mirror, it can but leave MATTER unaffected; and even this is saying too little, for water and mirror do give back a faithful image of what presents itself before them. Enneads III,6,

A further evidence is in our speaking of a fire being burned out, when it has passed over into another element; we do not say that the MATTER has been burned out: in other words, modification affects what is subject to dissolution; the acceptance of modification is the path towards dissolution; susceptibility to modification and susceptibility to dissolution go necessarily together. But MATTER can never be dissolved. What into? By what process? Still: MATTER harbours heat, cold, qualities beyond all count; by these it is differentiated; it holds them as if they were of its very substance and they blend within it – since no quality is found isolated to itself – MATTER lies there as the meeting ground of all these qualities with their changes as they act and react in the blend: how, then, can it fail to be modified in keeping? The only escape would be to declare MATTER utterly and for ever apart from the qualities it exhibits; but the very notion of Substance implies that any and every thing present in it has some action upon it. Enneads III,6,

The intermediary mass on which these surface changes appear is certainly not transmuted by them; but might there not be a modification of the underlying MATTER? No: it is impossible to think of MATTER being modified by, for instance, colour – for, of course we must not talk of modification when there is no more than a presence, or at most a presenting of shape. Enneads III,6,

Mirrors and transparent objects, even more, offer a close parallel; they are quite unaffected by what is seen in or through them: material things are reflections, and the MATTER on which they appear is further from being affected than is a mirror. Heat and cold are present in MATTER, but the MATTER itself suffers no change of temperature: growing hot and growing cold have to do only with quality; a quality enters and brings the impassible Substance under a new state – though, by the way, research into nature may show that cold is nothing positive but an absence, a mere negation. The qualities come together into MATTER, but in most cases they can have no action upon each other; certainly there can be none between those of unlike scope: what effect, for example, could fragrance have on sweetness or the colour-quality on the quality of form, any quality on another of some unrelated order? The illustration of the mirror may well indicate to us that a given substratum may contain something quite distinct from itself – even something standing to it as a direct contrary – and yet remain entirely unaffected by what is thus present to it or merged into it. Enneads III,6,

A thing can be hurt only by something related to it, and similarly things are not changed or modified by any chance presence: modification comes by contrary acting upon contrary; things merely different leave each other as they were. Such modification by a direct contrary can obviously not occur in an order of things to which there is no contrary: MATTER, therefore (the mere absence of Reality) cannot be modified: any modification that takes place can occur only in some compound of MATTER and reality, or, speaking generally, in some agglomeration of actual things. The MATTER itself – isolated, quite apart from all else, utterly simplex – must remain immune, untouched in the midst of all the interacting agencies; just as when people fight within their four walls, the house and the air in it remain without part in the turmoil. Enneads III,6,

We may take it, then, that while all the qualities and entities that appear upon MATTER group to produce each the effect belonging to its nature, yet MATTER itself remains immune, even more definitely immune than any of those qualities entering into it which, not being contraries, are not affected by each other. Enneads III,6,

Further: If MATTER were susceptible of modification, it must acquire something by the incoming of the new state; it will either adopt that state, or, at least, it will be in some way different from what it was. Now upon this first incoming quality suppose a second to supervene; the recipient is no longer MATTER but a modification of MATTER: this second quality, perhaps, departs, but it has acted and therefore leaves something of itself after it; the substratum is still further altered. This process proceeding, the substratum ends by becoming something quite different from MATTER; it becomes a thing settled in many modes and many shapes; at once it is debarred from being the all-recipient; it will have closed the entry against many incomers. In other words, the MATTER is no longer there: MATTER is destructible. Enneads III,6,

No: if there is to be a MATTER at all, it must be always identically as it has been from the beginning: to speak of MATTER as changing is to speak of it as not being MATTER. Enneads III,6,

Therefore there are only two possibilities: the first, that MATTER itself changes and so ceases to be itself, the second that it never ceases to be itself and therefore never changes. Enneads III,6,

We may be answered that it does not change in its character as MATTER: but no one could tell us in what other character it changes; and we have the admission that the MATTER in itself is not subject to change. Enneads III,6,

Just as the Ideal Principles stand immutably in their essence – which consists precisely in their permanence – so, since the essence of MATTER consists in its being MATTER (the substratum to all material things) it must be permanent in this character; because it is MATTER, it is immutable. In the Intellectual realm we have the immutable Idea; here we have MATTER, itself similarly immutable. Enneads III,6,

I think, in fact, that Plato had this in mind where he justly speaks of the Images of Real Existents “entering and passing out”: these particular words are not used idly: he wishes us to grasp the precise nature of the relation between MATTER and the Ideas. Enneads III,6,

The difficulty on this point is not really that which presented itself to most of our predecessors – how the Ideas enter into MATTER – it is rather the mode of their presence in it. Enneads III,6,

It is in fact strange at sight that MATTER should remain itself intact, unaffected by Ideal-forms present within it, especially seeing that these are affected by each other. It is surprising, too, that the entrant Forms should regularly expel preceding shapes and qualities, and that the modification (which cannot touch MATTER) should affect what is a compound (of Idea with MATTER) and this, again, not a haphazard but precisely where there is need of the incoming or outgoing of some certain Ideal-form, the compound being deficient through the absence of a particular principle whose presence will complete it. Enneads III,6,

But the reason is that the fundamental nature of MATTER can take no increase by anything entering it, and no decrease by any withdrawal: what from the beginning it was, it remains. It is not like those things whose lack is merely that of arrangement and order which can be supplied without change of substance as when we dress or decorate something bare or ugly. Enneads III,6,

But where the bringing to order must cut through to the very nature, the base original must be transmuted: it can leave ugliness for beauty only by a change of substance. MATTER, then, thus brought to order must lose its own nature in the supreme degree unless its baseness is an accidental: if it is base in the sense of being Baseness the Absolute, it could never participate in order, and, if evil in the sense of being Evil the Absolute, it could never participate in good. Enneads III,6,

We conclude that MATTER’s participation in Idea is not by way of modification within itself: the process is very different; it is a bare seeming. Perhaps we have here the solution of the difficulty as to how MATTER, essentially evil, can be reaching towards The Good: there would be no such participation as would destroy its essential nature. Given this mode of pseudo-participation – in which MATTER would, as we say, retain its nature, unchanged, always being what it has essentially been – there is no longer any reason to wonder as to how while essentially evil, it yet participates in Idea: for, by this mode, it does not abandon its own character: participation is the law, but it participates only just so far as its essence allows. Under a mode of participation which allows it to remain on its own footing, its essential nature stands none the less, whatsoever the Idea, within that limit, may communicate to it: it is by no means the less evil for remaining immutably in its own order. If it had authentic participation in The Good and were veritably changed, it would not be essentially evil. Enneads III,6,

In a word, when we call MATTER evil we are right only if we mean that it is not amenable to modification by The Good; but that means simply that it is subject to no modification whatever. Enneads III,6,

This is Plato’s conception: to him participation does not, in the case of MATTER, comport any such presence of an Ideal-form in a Substance to be shaped by it as would produce one compound thing made up of the two elements changing at the same moment, merging into one another, modified each by the other. Enneads III,6,

In his haste to his purpose he raises many difficult questions, but he is determined to disown that view; he labours to indicate in what mode MATTER can receive the Ideal-forms without being, itself, modified. The direct way is debarred since it is not easy to point to things actually present in a base and yet leaving that base unaffected: he therefore devises a metaphor for participation without modification, one which supports, also, his thesis that all appearing to the senses is void of substantial existence and that the region of mere seeming is vast. Enneads III,6,

Holding, as he does, that it is the patterns displayed upon MATTER that cause all experience in living bodies while the MATTER itself remains unaffected, he chooses this way of stating its immutability, leaving us to make out for ourselves that those very patterns impressed upon it do not comport any experience, any modification, in itself. Enneads III,6,

In the case, no doubt, of the living bodies that take one pattern or shape after having borne another, it might be said that there was a change, the variation of shape being made verbally equivalent to a real change: but since MATTER is essentially without shape or magnitude, the appearing of shape upon it can by no freedom of phrase be described as a change within it. On this point one must have “a rule for thick and thin” one may safely say that the underlying Kind contains nothing whatever in the mode commonly supposed. Enneads III,6,

But if we reject even the idea of its really containing at least the patterns upon it, how is it, in any sense, a recipient? The answer is that in the metaphor cited we have some reasonably adequate indication of the impassibility of MATTER coupled with the presence upon it of what may be described as images of things not present. Enneads III,6,

Plato speaks of MATTER as becoming dry, wet, inflamed, but we must remember the words that follow: “and taking the shape of air and of water”: this blunts the expressions “becoming wet, becoming inflamed”; once we have MATTER thus admitting these shapes, we learn that it has not itself become a shaped thing but that the shapes remain distinct as they entered. We see, further, that the expression “becoming inflamed” is not to be taken strictly: it is rather a case of becoming fire. Becoming fire is very different from becoming inflamed, which implies an outside agency and, therefore, susceptibility to modification. MATTER, being itself a portion of fire, cannot be said to catch fire. To suggest that the fire not merely permeates the matter, but actually sets it on fire is like saying that a statue permeates its bronze. Enneads III,6,

Further, if what enters must be an Ideal-Principle how could it set MATTER aflame? But what if it is a pattern or condition? No: the object set aflame is so in virtue of the combination of MATTER and condition. Enneads III,6,

But how can this follow on the conjunction when no unity has been produced by the two? Even if such a unity had been produced, it would be a unity of things not mutually sharing experiences but acting upon each other. And the question would then arise whether each was effective upon the other or whether the sole action was not that of one (the form) preventing the other (the MATTER) from slipping away? But when any material thing is severed, must not the MATTER be divided with it? Surely the bodily modification and other experience that have accompanied the sundering, must have occurred, identically, within the MATTER? This reasoning would force the destructibility of MATTER upon us: “the body is dissolved; then the MATTER is dissolved.” We would have to allow MATTER to be a thing of quantity, a magnitude. But since it is not a magnitude it could not have the experiences that belong to magnitude and, on the larger scale, since it is not body it cannot know the experiences of body. Enneads III,6,

In fact those that declare MATTER subject to modification may as well declare it body right out. Enneads III,6,

Further, they must explain in what sense they hold that MATTER tends to slip away from its form (the Idea). Can we conceive it stealing out from stones and rocks or whatever else envelops it? And of course they cannot pretend that MATTER in some cases rebels and sometimes not. For if once it makes away of its own will, why should it not always escape? If it is fixed despite itself, it must be enveloped by some Ideal-Form for good and all. This, however, leaves still the question why a given portion of MATTER does not remain constant to any one given form: the reason lies mainly in the fact that the Ideas are constantly passing into it. Enneads III,6,

MATTER (we read) is “the receptacle and nurse of all generation.” Enneads III,6,

Now if MATTER is such a receptacle and nurse, all generation is distinct from it; and since all the changeable lies in the realm of generation, MATTER, existing before all generation, must exist before all change. Enneads III,6,

Here the mirror itself is seen, for it is itself an Ideal-Form of a Kind (has some degree of Real Being); but bare MATTER, which is no Idea, is not a visible thing; if it were, it would have been visible in its own character before anything else appeared upon it. The condition of MATTER may be illustrated by that of air penetrated by light and remaining, even so, unseen because it is invisible whatever happens. Enneads III,6,

The reflections in the mirror are not taken to be real, all the less since the appliance on which they appear is seen and remains while the images disappear, but MATTER is not seen either with the images or without them. But suppose the reflections on the mirror remaining and the mirror itself not seen, we would never doubt the solid reality of all that appears. Enneads III,6,

If, then, there is, really, something in a mirror, we may suppose objects of sense to be in MATTER in precisely that way: if in the mirror there is nothing, if there is only a seeming of something, then we may judge that in MATTER there is the same delusion and that the seeming is to be traced to the Substantial-Existence of the Real-Beings, that Substantial-Existence in which the Authentic has the real participation while only an unreal participation can belong to the unauthentic since their condition must differ from that which they would know if the parts were reversed, if the Authentic Existents were not and they were. Enneads III,6,

But would this mean that if there were no MATTER nothing would exist? Precisely as in the absence of a mirror, or something of similar power, there would be no reflection. Enneads III,6,

This alien base exists and the myth represents it as a pauper to exhibit its nature, to show that MATTER is destitute of The Good. The claimant does not ask for all the Giver’s store, but it welcomes whatever it can get; in other words, what appears in MATTER is not Reality. Enneads III,6,

The name, too (Poverty), conveys that MATTER’s need is never met. The union with Poros, Possession, is designed to show that MATTER does not attain to Reality, to Plenitude, but to some bare sufficiency – in point of fact to imaging skill. Enneads III,6,

If MATTER were participant and received Reality to the extent which we are apt to imagine, it would be penetrated by a Reality thus sucked into its constitution. But we know that the Entrant is not thus absorbed: MATTER remains as it was, taking nothing to itself: it is the check to the forthwelling of Authentic Existence; it is a ground that repels; it is a mere receptacle to the Realities as they take their common path and here meet and mingle. It resembles those reflecting vessels, filled with water, which are often set against the sun to produce fire: the heat rays – prevented, by their contrary within, from being absorbed – are flung out as one mass. Enneads III,6,

It is in this sense and way that MATTER becomes the cause of the generated realm; the combinations within it hold together only after some such reflective mode. Enneads III,6,

Now the objects attracting the sun-rays to themselves – illuminated by a fire of the sense-order – are necessarily of the sense-order; there is perceptibility because there has been a union of things at once external to each other and continuous, contiguous, in direct contact, two extremes in one line. But the Reason-Principle operating upon MATTER is external to it only in a very different mode and sense: exteriority in this case is amply supplied by contrariety of essence and can dispense with any opposite ends (any question of lineal position); or, rather, the difference is one that actually debars any local extremity; sheer incongruity of essence, the utter failure in relationship, inhibits admixture (between MATTER and any form of Being). Enneads III,6,

The reason, then, of the immutability of MATTER is that the entrant principle neither possesses it nor is possessed by it. Consider, as an example, the mode in which an opinion or representation is present in the mind; there is no admixture; the notion that came goes in its time, still integrally itself alone, taking nothing with it, leaving nothing after it, because it has not been blended with the mind; there is no “outside” in the sense of contact broken, and the distinction between base and entrant is patent not to the senses but to the reason. Enneads III,6,

In that example, no doubt, the mental representation – though it seems to have a wide and unchecked control – is an image, while the Soul (Mind) is in its nature not an image (but a Reality): none the less the Soul or Mind certainly stands to the concept as MATTER, or in some analogous relation. The representation, however, does not cover the Mind over; on the contrary it is often expelled by some activity there; however urgently it presses in, it never effects such an obliteration as to be taken for the Soul; it is confronted there by indwelling powers, by Reason-Principles, which repel all such attack. Enneads III,6,

MATTER – feebler far than the Soul for any exercise of power, and possessing no phase of the Authentic Existents, not even in possession of its own falsity – lacks the very means of manifesting itself, utter void as it is; it becomes the means by which other things appear, but it cannot announce its own presence. Penetrating thought may arrive at it, discriminating it from Authentic Existence; then, it is discerned as something abandoned by all that really is, by even the dimmest semblants of being, as a thing dragged towards every shape and property and appearing to follow – yet in fact not even following. Enneads III,6,

An Ideal-Principle approaches and leads MATTER towards some desired dimension, investing this non-existent underlie with a magnitude from itself which never becomes incorporate – for MATTER, if it really incorporated magnitude, would be a mass. Enneads III,6,

Eliminate this Ideal-Form and the substratum ceases to be a thing of magnitude, or to appear so: the mass produced by the Idea was, let us suppose, a man or a horse; the horse-magnitude came upon the MATTER when a horse was produced upon it; when the horse ceases to exist upon the MATTER, the magnitude of the horse departs also. If we are told that the horse implies a certain determined bulk and that this bulk is a permanent thing, we answer that what is permanent in this case is not the magnitude of the horse but the magnitude of mass in general. That same Magnitude might be fire or earth; on their disappearance their particular magnitudes would disappear with them. MATTER, then, can never take to itself either pattern or magnitude; if it did, it would no longer be able to turn from being fire, let us say, into being something else; it would become and be fire once for all. Enneads III,6,

In a word, though MATTER is far extended – so vastly as to appear co-extensive with all this sense-known Universe – yet if the Heavens and their content came to an end, all magnitude would simultaneously pass from MATTER with, beyond a doubt, all its other properties; it would be abandoned to its own Kind, retaining nothing of all that which, in its own peculiar mode, it had hitherto exhibited. Enneads III,6,

That a thing essentially devoid of magnitude should come to a certain size is no more astonishing than that a thing essentially devoid of heat should become warm: MATTER’s essential existence is quite separate from its existing in bulk, since, of course, magnitude is an immaterial principle as pattern is. Besides, if we are not to reduce MATTER to nothing, it must be all things by way of participation, and Magnitude is one of those all things. Enneads III,6,

In bodies, necessarily compounds, Magnitude though not a determined Magnitude must be present as one of the constituents; it is implied in the very notion of body; but MATTER – not a Body – excludes even undetermined Magnitude. Enneads III,6,

Magnitude is not, like MATTER, a receptacle; it is an Ideal-Principle: it is a thing standing apart to itself, not some definite Mass. The fact is that the self-gathered content of the Intellectual Principle or of the All-Soul, desires expansion (and thereby engenders secondaries): in its images – aspiring and moving towards it and eagerly imitating its act – is vested a similar power of reproducing their states in their own derivatives. The Magnitude latent in the expansive tendency of the Image-making phase (of Intellect or All-Soul) runs forth into the Absolute Magnitude of the Universe; this in turn enlists into the process the spurious magnitude of MATTER: the content of the Supreme, thus, in virtue of its own prior extension enables MATTER – which never possesses a content – to exhibit the appearance of Magnitude. It must be understood that spurious Magnitude consists in the fact that a thing (MATTER) not possessing actual Magnitude strains towards it and has the extension of that straining. All that is Real Being gives forth a reflection of itself upon all else; every Reality, therefore, has Magnitude which by this process is communicated to the Universe. Enneads III,6,

The Magnitude inherent in each Ideal-Principle – that of a horse or of anything else – combines with Magnitude the Absolute with the result that, irradiated by that Absolute, MATTER entire takes Magnitude and every particle of it becomes a mass; in this way, by virtue at once of the totality of Idea with its inherent magnitude and of each several specific Idea, all things appear under mass; MATTER takes on what we conceive as extension; it is compelled to assume a relation to the All and, gathered under this Idea and under Mass, to be all things – in the degree in which the operating power can lead the really nothing to become all. Enneads III,6,

By the conditions of Manifestation, colour rises from non-colour (= from the colourless prototype of colour in the Ideal Realm). Quality, known by the one name with its parallel in the sphere of Primals, rises, similarly, from non-quality: in precisely the same mode, the Magnitude appearing upon MATTER rises from non-Magnitude or from that Primal which is known to us by the same name; so that material things become visible through standing midway between bare underlie and Pure Idea. All is perceptible by virtue of this origin in the Intellectual Sphere but all is falsity since the base in which the manifestation takes place is a non-existent. Enneads III,6,

Particular entities thus attain their Magnitude through being drawn out by the power of the Existents which mirror themselves and make space for themselves in them. And no violence is required to draw them into all the diversity of Shapes and Kinds because the phenomenal All exists by MATTER (by MATTER’s essential all-receptivity) and because each several Idea, moreover, draws MATTER its own way by the power stored within itself, the power it holds from the Intellectual Realm. MATTER is manifested in this sphere as Mass by the fact that it mirrors the Absolute Magnitude; Magnitude here is the reflection in the mirror. The Ideas meet all of necessity in MATTER (the Ultimate of the emanatory progress): and MATTER, both as one total thing and in its entire scope, must submit itself, since it is the Material of the entire Here, not of any one determined thing: what is, in its own character, no determined thing may become determined by an outside force – though, in becoming thus determined, it does not become the definite thing in question, for thus it would lose its own characteristic indetermination. Enneads III,6,

No: this Principle comes from the source of Magnitude (= is primal “Magnitude”) and therefore MATTER can have no extension, in which to harbour the Magnitude of the Principle, but can take in only its reflected appearance. Enneads III,6,

MATTER, then, wears Magnitude as a dress thrown about it by its association with that Absolute Magnitude to whose movement it must answer; but it does not, for that, change its Kind; if the Idea which has clothed it were to withdraw, it would once again be what it permanently is, what it is by its own strength, or it would have precisely the Magnitude lent to it by any other form that happens to be present in it. Enneads III,6,

The (Universal) Soul – containing the Ideal Principles of Real-Beings, and itself an Ideal Principle – includes all in concentration within itself, just as the Ideal Principle of each particular entity is complete and self-contained: it, therefore, sees these principles of sensible things because they are turned, as it were, towards it and advancing to it: but it cannot harbour them in their plurality, for it cannot depart from its Kind; it sees them, therefore, stripped of Mass. MATTER, on the contrary, destitute of resisting power since it has no Act of its own and is a mere shadow, can but accept all that an active power may choose to send. In what is thus sent, from the Reason-Principle in the Intellectual Realm, there is already contained a degree of the partial object that is to be formed: in the image-making impulse within the Reason-Principle there is already a step (towards the lower manifestation) or we may put it that the downward movement from the Reason-Principle is a first form of the partial: utter absence of partition would mean no movement but (sterile) repose. MATTER cannot be the home of all things in concentration as the Soul is: if it were so, it would belong to the Intellective Sphere. It must be all-recipient but not in that partless mode. It is to be the Place of all things, and it must therefore extend universally, offer itself to all things, serve to all interval: thus it will be a thing unconfined to any moment (of space or time) but laid out in submission to all that is to be. Enneads III,6,

But would we not expect that some one particularized form should occupy MATTER (at once) and so exclude such others as are not able to enter into combination? No: for there is no first Idea except the Ideal Principle of the Universe – and, by this Idea, MATTER is (the seat of) all things at once and of the particular thing in its parts – for the MATTER of a living being is disparted according to the specific parts of the organism: if there were no such partition nothing would exist but the Reason-Principle. Enneads III,6,

The Ideal Principles entering into MATTER as to a Mother (to be “born into the Universe”) affect it neither for better nor for worse. Enneads III,6,

Their action is not upon MATTER but upon each other; these powers conflict with their opponent principles, not with their substrata – which it would be foolish to confuse with the entrant forms – Heat (the Principle) annuls Cold, and Blackness annuls Whiteness; or, the opponents blend to form an intermediate quality. Only that is affected which enters into combinations: being affected is losing something of self-identity. Enneads III,6,

In beings of soul and body, the affection occurs in the body, modified according to the qualities and powers presiding at the act of change: in all such dissolution of constituent parts, in the new combinations, in all variation from the original structure, the affection is bodily, the Soul or Mind having no more than an accompanying knowledge of the more drastic changes, or perhaps not even that. (Body is modified: Mind knows) but the MATTER concerned remains unaffected; heat enters, cold leaves it, and it is unchanged because neither Principle is associated with it as friend or enemy. Enneads III,6,

So the appellation “Recipient and Nurse” is the better description: MATTER is the mother only in the sense indicated; it has no begetting power. But probably the term Mother is used by those who think of a Mother as MATTER to the offspring, as a container only, giving nothing to them, the entire bodily frame of the child being formed out of food. But if this Mother does give anything to the offspring it does so not in its quality as MATTER but as being an Ideal-Form; for only the Idea is generative; the contrary Kind is sterile. Enneads III,6,

This, I think, is why the doctors of old, teaching through symbols and mystic representations, exhibit the ancient Hermes with the generative organ always in active posture; this is to convey that the generator of things of sense is the Intellectual Reason Principle: the sterility of MATTER, eternally unmoved, is indicated by the eunuchs surrounding it in its representation as the All-Mother. Enneads III,6,

This too exalting title is conferred upon it in order to indicate that it is the source of things in the sense of being their underlie: it is an approximate name chosen for a general conception; there is no intention of suggesting a complete parallel with motherhood to those not satisfied with a surface impression but needing a precisely true presentment; by a remote symbolism, the nearest they could find, they indicate that MATTER is sterile, not female to full effect, female in receptivity only, not in pregnancy: this they accomplish by exhibiting MATTER as approached by what is neither female nor effectively male, but castrated of that impregnating power which belongs only to the unchangeably masculine. Enneads III,6,

There is, obviously, no question here of hands or feet, of any implement borrowed or inherent: Nature needs simply the MATTER which it is to work upon and bring under Form; its productivity cannot depend upon mechanical operation. What driving or hoisting goes to produce all that variety of colour and pattern? The wax-workers, whose methods have been cited as parallel to the creative act of Nature, are unable to make colours; all they can do to impose upon their handicraft colours taken from elsewhere. None the less there is a parallel which demands attention: in the case of workers in such arts there must be something locked within themselves, an efficacy not going out from them and yet guiding their hands in all their creation; and this observation should have indicated a similar phenomenon in Nature; it should be clear that this indwelling efficacy, which makes without hands, must exist in Nature, no less than in the craftsman – but, there, as a thing completely inbound. Nature need possess no outgoing force as against that remaining within; the only moved thing is MATTER; there can be no moved phase in this Nature-Principle; any such moved phase could not be the primal mover; this Nature-Principle is no such moved entity; it is the unmoved Principle operating in the Kosmos. Enneads III,8,

But, if Nature entire is in question here, it is identical with the Reason-Principle; and any part of it that is unmoved is the Reason-Principle. The Nature-Principle must be an Ideal-Form, not a compound of Form and MATTER; there is no need for it to possess MATTER, hot and cold: the MATTER that underlies it, on which it exercises its creative act, brings all that with it, or, natively without quality, becomes hot and cold, and all the rest, when brought under Reason: MATTER, to become fire, demands the approach not of fire but of a Reason-Principle. Enneads III,8,

This is no slight evidence that in the animal and vegetable realms the Reason-Principles are the makers and that Nature is a Reason-Principle producing a second Reason-Principle, its offspring, which, in turn, while itself, still, remaining intact, communicates something to the underlie, MATTER. Enneads III,8,

This implies the distinction of MATTER and Form in it – as there must be in all actual seeing – the MATTER in this case being the Intelligibles which the Intellectual-Principle contains and sees. All actual seeing implies duality; before the seeing takes place there is the pure unity (of the power of seeing). That unity (of principle) acquires duality (in the act of seeing), and the duality is (always to be traced back to) a unity. Enneads III,8,

(B) The Soul itself must exist as Seeing – with the Intellectual-Principle as the object of its vision – it is undetermined before it sees but is naturally apt to see: in other words, Soul is MATTER to (its determinant) the Intellectual-Principle. Enneads III,8,

(E) In the case of everything which has developed from possibility to actuality the actual is that which remains self-identical for its entire duration – and this it is which makes perfection possible even in things of the corporeal order, as for instance in fire but the actual of this kind cannot be everlasting since (by the fact of their having once existed only in potentiality) MATTER has its place in them. In anything, on the contrary, not composite (= never touched by MATTER or potentiality) and possessing actuality, that actual existence is eternal… There is, however, the case, also in which a thing, itself existing in actuality, stands as potentiality to some other form of Being. Enneads III,8,

Even supposing Real-Beings (such as soul) to be produced by some other principle, they are certainly not made from MATTER; or, if they were, the creating principle must infuse into them, from within itself, something of the nature of Real-Being; but, at this, it would itself suffer change, as it created more or less. And, after all, why should it thus produce at any given moment rather than remain for ever stationary? Moreover the produced total, variable from more to less, could not be an eternal: yet the soul, it stands agreed, is eternal. Enneads IV,3,

What then can be thought to have happened when soul, utterly clean from body, first comes into commerce with the bodily nature? It is reasonable, necessary even, to begin with the Soul of the All. Notice that if we are to explain and to be clear, we are obliged to use such words as “entry” and “ensoulment,” though never was this All unensouled, never did body subsist with soul away, never was there MATTER unelaborate; we separate, the better to understand; there is nothing illegitimate in the verbal and mental sundering of things which must in fact be co-existent. Enneads IV,3,

It is not present as Form is in MATTER; for the Form as in MATTER is inseparable and, further, is something superimposed upon an already existent thing; soul, on the contrary, is that which engenders the Form residing within the MATTER and therefore is not the Form. If the reference is not to the Form actually present, but to Form as a thing existing apart from all formed objects, it is hard to see how such an entity has found its way into body, and at any rate this makes the soul separable. Enneads IV,3,

Thus the Intellectual-Principle possesses: the Soul of the All eternally receives from it; this is the soul’s life; its consciousness is its intellection of what is thus eternally present to it; what proceeds from it into MATTER and is manifested there is Nature, with which – or even a little before it – the series of real being comes to an end, for all in this order are the ultimates of the intellectual order and the beginnings of the imitative. Enneads IV,4,

There is also the decided difference that Nature operates toward soul, and receives from it: soul, near to Nature but superior, operates towards Nature but without receiving in turn; and there is the still higher phase (the purely Intellectual) with no action whatever upon body or upon MATTER. Enneads IV,4,

We cannot, then, refer all that exists to Reason-Principles inherent in the seed of things (Spermatic Reasons); the universe is to be traced further back, to the more primal forces, to the principles by which that seed itself takes shape. Such spermatic principles cannot be the containers of things which arise independently of them, such as what enters from MATTER (the reasonless) into membership of the All, or what is due to the mere interaction of existences. Enneads IV,4,

For, in sum: Firstly, intentions are not to be considered as the operative causes; necessities inherent in the nature of things account for all that comes from the other realm; it is a matter of the inevitable relation of parts, and, besides, all is the sequence to the living existence of a unity. Secondly, there is the large contribution made by the individual. Thirdly, each several communication, good in itself, takes another quality in the resultant combination. Fourthly, the life in the kosmos does not look to the individual but to the whole. Finally, there is MATTER, the underlie, which being given one thing receives it as something else, and is unable to make the best of what it takes. Enneads IV,4,

The light, then, raying from bodies is an outgoing activity of a luminous body; the light within luminous bodies – understand; such as are primarily luminous – is the essential being embraced under the idea of that body. When such a body is brought into association with MATTER, its activity produces colour: when there is no such association, it does not give colour – it gives merely an incipient on which colour might be formed – for it belongs to another being (primal light) with which it retains its link, unable to desert from it, or from its (inner) activity. Enneads IV,5,

The sovereign principle, the authentic man, will be as Form to this MATTER or as agent to this instrument, and thus, whatever that relation be, the soul is the man. Enneads IV,7,

Body – not merely because it is a composite, but even were it simplex – could not exist unless there were soul in the universe, for body owes its being to the entrance of a Reason-Principle into MATTER, and only from soul can a Reason-Principle come. Enneads IV,7,

Perhaps we will be asked to consider body as a simple entity (disregarding the question of any constituent elements): they will tell us, then, that no doubt, as purely material, it cannot have a self-springing life – since matter is without quality – but that life is introduced by the fact that the MATTER is brought to order under Forming-Idea. But if by this Forming-Idea they mean an essential, a real being, then it is not the conjoint of body and idea that constitutes soul: it must be one of the two items and that one, being (by hypothesis) outside of the MATTER, cannot be body: to make it body would simply force us to repeat our former analysis. Enneads IV,7,

If on the contrary they do not mean by this Forming-Idea a real being, but some condition or modification of the MATTER, they must tell us how and whence this modification, with resultant life, can have found the way into the MATTER: for very certainly MATTER does not mould itself to pattern or bring itself to life. Enneads IV,7,

It becomes clear that since neither MATTER nor body in any mode has this power, life must be brought upon the stage by some directing principle external and transcendent to all that is corporeal. Enneads IV,7,

In fact, body itself could not exist in any form if soul-power did not: body passes; dissolution is in its very nature; all would disappear in a twinkling if all were body. It is no help to erect some one mode of body into soul; made of the same MATTER as the rest, this soul body would fall under the same fate: of course it could never really exist: the universe of things would halt at the material, failing something to bring MATTER to shape. Enneads IV,7,

Nay more: MATTER itself could not exist: the totality of things in this sphere is dissolved if it be made to depend upon the coherence of a body which, though elevated to the nominal rank of “soul,” remains air, fleeting breath (the Stoic pneuma, rarefied matter, “spirit” in the lower sense), whose very unity is not drawn from itself. Enneads IV,7,

If it is nothing, only the pneuma exists, the “certain state” being no more than a word; this leads imperatively to the assertion that MATTER alone exists, Soul and God mere words, the lowest alone is. Enneads IV,7,

If on the contrary this “configuration” is really existent – something distinct from the underlie or MATTER, something residing in MATTER but itself immaterial as not constructed out of MATTER, then it must be a Reason-Principle, incorporeal, a separate Nature. Enneads IV,7,

If sensation is apprehension by means of the soul’s employment of the body, intellection cannot be a similar use of the body or it would be identical with sensation. If then intellection is apprehension apart from body, much more must there be a distinction between the body and the intellective principle: sensation for objects of sense, intellection for the intellectual object. And even if this be rejected, it must still be admitted that there do exist intellections of intellectual objects and perceptions of objects not possessing magnitude: how, we may then ask, can a thing of magnitude know a thing that has no magnitude, or how can the partless be known by means of what has parts? We will be told “By some partless part.” But, at this, the intellective will not be body: for contact does not need a whole; one point suffices. If then it be conceded – and it cannot be denied – that the primal intellections deal with objects completely incorporeal, the principle of intellection itself must know by virtue of being, or becoming, free from body. Even if they hold that all intellection deals with the ideal forms in MATTER, still it always takes place by abstraction from the bodies (in which these forms appear) and the separating agent is the Intellectual-Principle. For assuredly the process by which we abstract circle, triangle, line or point, is not carried through by the aid of flesh or MATTER of any kind; in all such acts the soul or mind must separate itself from the material: at once we see that it cannot be itself material. Similarly it will be agreed that, as beauty and justice are things without magnitude, so must be the intellective act that grasps them. Enneads IV,7,

Further: if the powers in question were bodies, then necessarily the stronger powers would be large masses and those less efficient small masses: but if there are large masses with small while not a few of the smaller masses manifest great powers, then the efficiency must be vested in something other than magnitude; efficacy, thus, belongs to non-magnitude. Again; MATTER, they tell us, remains unchanged as long as it is body, but produces variety upon accepting qualities; is not this proof enough that the entrants (with whose arrival the changes happen) are Reason-Principles and not of the bodily order? They must not remind us that when pneuma and blood are no longer present, animals die: these are necessary no doubt to life, but so are many other things of which none could possibly be soul: and neither pneuma nor blood is present throughout the entire being; but soul is. Enneads IV,7,

It is thought that in the Conjoint of body and soul the soul holds the rank of Form to the MATTER which here is the ensouled body – not, then, Form to every example of body or to body as merely such, but to a natural organic body having the potentiality of life. Enneads IV,7,

(16) What intelligent mind can doubt the immortality of such a value, one in which there is a life self-springing and therefore not to be destroyed? This is at any rate a life not imported from without, not present in the mode of the heat in fire – for if heat is characteristic of the fire proper, it certainly is adventitious to the MATTER underlying the fire; or fire, too, would be everlasting – it is not in any such mode that the soul has life: this is no case of a MATTER underlying and a life brought into that MATTER and making it into soul (as heat comes into matter and makes it fire). Enneads IV,7,

Even supposing life could be described as a condition imposed upon MATTER, still the source from which this condition entered the MATTER must necessarily be admitted to be immortal simply by being unable to take into itself the opposite of the life which it conveys. Enneads IV,7,

There is, besides, no principle that can prevent anything from partaking, to the extent of its own individual receptivity in the Nature of Good. If therefore MATTER has always existed, that existence is enough to ensure its participation in the being which, according to each receptivity, communicates the supreme good universally: if on the contrary, MATTER has come into being as a necessary sequence of the causes preceding it, that origin would similarly prevent it standing apart from the scheme as though it were out of reach of the principle to whose grace it owes its existence. Enneads IV,8,

How life was purveyed to the universe of things and to the separate beings in it may be thus conceived: That great soul must stand pictured before another soul, one not mean, a soul that has become worthy to look, emancipate from the lure, from all that binds its fellows in bewitchment, holding itself in quietude. Let not merely the enveloping body be at peace, body’s turmoil stilled, but all that lies around, earth at peace, and sea at peace, and air and the very heavens. Into that heaven, all at rest, let the great soul be conceived to roll inward at every point, penetrating, permeating, from all sides pouring in its light. As the rays of the sun throwing their brilliance upon a lowering cloud make it gleam all gold, so the soul entering the material expanse of the heavens has given life, has given immortality: what was abject it has lifted up; and the heavenly system, moved now in endless motion by the soul that leads it in wisdom, has become a living and a blessed thing; the soul domiciled within, it takes worth where, before the soul, it was stark body – clay and water – or, rather, the blankness of MATTER, the absence of Being, and, as an author says, “the execration of the Gods.” Enneads: V I

In two ways, then, the Intellectual-Principle enhances the divine quality of the soul, as father and as immanent presence; nothing separates them but the fact that they are not one and the same, that there is succession, that over against a recipient there stands the ideal-form received; but this recipient, MATTER to the Supreme Intelligence, is also noble as being at once informed by divine intellect and uncompounded. Enneads: V I

Thus by what we call the Number and the Dyad of that higher realm, we mean Reason Principles and the Intellectual-Principle: but while the Dyad is, as regards that sphere, undetermined – representing, as it were, the underly (or MATTER) of The One – the later Number (or Quantity) – that which rises from the Dyad (Intellectual-Principle) and The One – is not MATTER to the later existents but is their forming-Idea, for all of them take shape, so to speak, from the ideas rising within this. The determination of the Dyad is brought about partly from its object – The One – and partly from itself, as is the case with all vision in the act of sight: intellection (the Act of the Dyad) is vision occupied upon The One. Enneads: V I

A being of this quality, like the Intellectual-Principle, must be felt to be worthy of the all-pure: it could not derive from any other than from the firsfirst prinprinciple of all; as it comes into existence, all other beings must be simultaneously engendered – all the beauty of the Ideas, all the Gods of the Intellectual realm. And it still remains pregnant with this offspring; for it has, so to speak, drawn all within itself again, holding them lest they fall away towards MATTER to be “brought up in the House of Rhea” (in the realm of flux). This is the meaning hidden in the Mysteries, and in the Myths of the gods: Kronos, as the wisest, exists before Zeus; he must absorb his offspring that, full within himself, he may be also an Intellectual-Principle manifest in some product of his plenty; afterwards, the myth proceeds, Kronos engenders Zeus, who already exists as the (necessary and eternal) outcome of the plenty there; in other words the offspring of the Divine Intellect, perfect within itself, is Soul (the life-principle carrying forward the Ideas in the Divine Mind). Enneads: V I

In Empedocles, similarly, we have a dividing principle, “Strife,” set against “Friendship” – which is The One and is to him bodiless, while the elements represent MATTER. Enneads: V I

If on the contrary each is a principle, then the effective powers become a matter of chance; under what compulsion are they to hold together and act with one mind towards that work of unity, the harmony of the entire heavenly system? Again what can make it necessary that the material bodies of the heavenly system be equal in number to the Intellectual moving principles, and how can these incorporeal Beings be numerically many when there is no MATTER to serve as the basis of difference? For these reasons the ancient philosophers that ranged themselves most closely to the school of Pythagoras and of his later followers and to that of Pherekudes, have insisted upon this Nature, some developing the subject in their writings while others treated of it merely in unwritten discourses, some no doubt ignoring it entirely. Enneads: V I

But the nature of this contained potentiality would have to be explained: it cannot be that of MATTER, a receptivity, for thus the Source becomes passive – the very negation of production. Enneads V,3,

Difference everywhere is a good, and so there must be differing archetypes, though only to evil could be attribute any power in MATTER to thwart nature by overmastering the perfect Reason-Principles, hidden but given, all. Enneads V,7,

But let us leave the arts and consider those works produced by Nature and admitted to be naturally beautiful which the creations of art are charged with imitating, all reasoning life and unreasoning things alike, but especially the consummate among them, where the moulder and maker has subdued the material and given the form he desired. Now what is the beauty here? It has nothing to do with the blood or the menstrual process: either there is also a colour and form apart from all this, or there is nothing unless sheer ugliness or a bare recipient, as it were the mere MATTER of beauty. Enneads V,8,

Whence shone forth the beauty of Helen, battle-sought; or of all those women like in loveliness to Aphrodite; or of Aphrodite herself; or of any human being that has been perfect in beauty; or of any of these gods manifest to sight, or unseen but carrying what would be beauty if we saw? In all these is it not the Idea, something of that realm but communicated to the produced from within the producer just as in works of art, we held, it is communicated from the arts to their creations? Now we can surely not believe that, while the made thing and the Idea thus impressed upon MATTER are beautiful, yet the Idea not so alloyed but resting still with the creator – the Idea primal, immaterial, firmly a unity – is not Beauty. Enneads V,8,

Thus there is in the Nature-Principle itself an Ideal archetype of the beauty that is found in material forms and, of that archetype again, the still more beautiful archetype in Soul, source of that in Nature. In the proficient soul this is brighter and of more advanced loveliness: adorning the soul and bringing to it a light from that greater light which is beauty primally, its immediate presence sets the soul reflecting upon the quality of this prior, the archetype which has no such entries, and is present nowhere but remains in itself alone, and thus is not even to be called a Reason-Principle but is the creative source of the very first Reason-Principle which is the Beauty to which Soul serves as MATTER. Enneads V,8,

From the beginning to end all is gripped by the Forms of the Intellectual Realm: MATTER itself is held by the Ideas of the elements and to these Ideas are added other Ideas and others again, so that it is hard to work down to crude MATTER beneath all that sheathing of Idea. Indeed since MATTER itself is in its degree, an Idea – the lowest – all this universe is Idea and there is nothing that is not Idea as the archetype was. And all is made silently, since nothing had part in the making but Being and Idea further reason why creation went without toil. The Exemplar was the Idea of an All, and so an All must come into being. Enneads V,8,

Bring this vision actually before your sight, so that there shall be in your mind the gleaming representation of a sphere, a picture holding sprung, themselves, of that universe and repose or some at rest, some in motion. Keep this sphere before you, and from it imagine another, a sphere stripped of magnitude and of spatial differences; cast out your inborn sense of MATTER, taking care not merely to attenuate it: call on God, maker of the sphere whose image you now hold, and pray Him to enter. And may He come bringing His own Universe with all the Gods that dwell in it – He who is the one God and all the gods, where each is all, blending into a unity, distinct in powers but all one god in virtue of that one divine power of many facets. Enneads V,8,

The pattern giving beauty to the corporeal rests upon it as Idea to its MATTER and the substrate may change and from being pleasant become distasteful, a sign, in all reason, that the beauty comes by participation. Enneads V,8,

All that we see, and describe as having existence, we know to be compound; hand-wrought or compacted by nature, nothing is simplex. Now the hand-wrought, with its metal or stone or wood, is not realized out of these materials until the appropriate craft has produced statue, house or bed, by imparting the particular idea from its own content. Similarly with natural forms of being; those including several constituents, compound bodies as we call them, may be analysed into the materials and the Idea imposed upon the total; the human being, for example, into soul and body; and the human body into the four elements. Finding everything to be a compound of MATTER and shaping principle – since the MATTER of the elements is of itself shapeless – you will enquire whence this forming idea comes; and you will ask whether in the soul we recognise a simplex or whether this also has constituents, something representing MATTER and something else – the Intellectual-Principle in it – representing Idea, the one corresponding to the shape actually on the statue, the other to the artist giving the shape. Enneads V,8,

But, soul reached, why need we look higher; why not make this The First? A main reason is that the Intellectual-Principle is at once something other and something more powerful than Soul and that the more powerful is in the nature of things the prior. For it is certainly not true, as people imagine, that the soul, brought to perfection, produces Intellect. How could that potentiality come to actuality unless there be, first, an effective principle to induce the actualization which, left to chance, might never occur? The Firsts must be supposed to exist in actuality, looking to nothing else, self-complete. Anything incomplete must be sequent upon these, and take its completion from the principles engendering it which, like fathers, labour in the improvement of an offspring born imperfect: the produced is a MATTER to the producing principle and is worked over by it into a shapely perfection. Enneads V,8,

We take it, then, that the Intellectual-Principle is the authentic existences and contains them all – not as in a place but as possessing itself and being one thing with this its content. All are one there and yet are distinct: similarly the mind holds many branches and items of knowledge simultaneously, yet none of them merged into any other, each acting its own part at call quite independently, every conception coming out from the inner total and working singly. It is after this way, though in a closer unity, that the Intellectual-Principle is all Being in one total – and yet not in one, since each of these beings is a distinct power which, however, the total Intellectual-Principle includes as the species in a genus, as the parts in a whole. This relation may be illustrated by the powers in seed; all lies undistinguished in the unit, the formative ideas gathered as in one kernel; yet in that unit there is eye-principle, and there is hand-principle, each of which is revealed as a separate power by its distinct material product. Thus each of the powers in the seed is a Reason-Principle one and complete yet including all the parts over which it presides: there will be something bodily, the liquid, for example, carrying mere MATTER; but the principle itself is Idea and nothing else, idea identical with the generative idea belonging to the lower soul, image of a higher. This power is sometimes designated as Nature in the seed-life; its origin is in the divine; and, outgoing from its priors as light from fire, it converts and shapes the matter of things, not by push and pull and the lever work of which we hear so much, but by bestowal of the Ideas. Enneads V,8,

Given the Reason-Principle (the outgoing divine Idea) of a certain living thing and the MATTER to harbour this seed-principle, the living thing must come into being: in the same way once there exists – an intellective Nature, all powerful, and with nothing to check it – since nothing intervenes between it and that which is of a nature to receive it – inevitably the higher imprints form and the lower accepts, it. The recipient holds the Idea in division, here man, there sun, while in the giver all remains in unity. Enneads V,8,

This suggests the question whether the Intellectual Kosmos contains the forms only of the things of sense or of other existents as well. But first we will consider how it stands with artistic creations: there is no question of an ideal archetype of evil: the evil of this world is begotten of need, privation, deficiency, and is a condition peculiar to MATTER distressed and to what has come into likeness with MATTER. Enneads V,8,

The crafts, such as building and carpentry which give us MATTER in wrought forms, may be said, in that they draw on pattern, to take their principles from that realm and from the thinking There: but in that they bring these down into contact with the sense-order, they are not wholly in the Intellectual: they are founded in man. So agriculture, dealing with material growths: so medicine watching over physical health; so the art which aims at corporeal strength and well-being: power and well-being mean something else There, the fearlessness and self-sufficing quality of all that lives. Enneads V,8,

It must be observed that the Ideas will be of universals; not of Socrates but of Man: though as to man we may enquire whether the individual may not also have place There. Under the heading of individuality there is to be considered the repetition of the same feature from man to man, the simian type, for example, and the aquiline: the aquiline and the simian must be taken to be differences in the Idea of Man as there are different types of the animal: but MATTER also has its effect in bringing about the degree of aquilinity. Similarly with difference of complexion, determined partly by the Reason-Principle, partly by MATTER and by diversity of place. Enneads V,8,

But on the question as to whether the repulsive and the products of putridity have also their Idea – whether there is an Idea of filth and mud – it is to be observed that all that the Intellectual-Principle derived from The First is of the noblest; in those Ideas the base is not included: these repulsive things point not to the Intellectual-Principle but to the Soul which, drawing upon the Intellectual-Principle, takes from MATTER certain other things, and among them these. Enneads V,8,

This conclusion must not however prevent our seeking in the actual substance of the Sensible world an element held in common by MATTER, by Form and by their Composite, all of which are designated as substances, though it is not maintained that they are Substance in an equal degree; Form is usually held to be Substance in a higher degree than MATTER, and rightly so, in spite of those who would have MATTER to be the more truly real. Enneads: VI I

But perhaps we should rather speak of some single category, embracing Intellectual Substance, MATTER, Form, and the Composite of MATTER and Form. One might refer to the family of the Heraclids as a unity in the sense, not of a common element in all its members, but of a common origin: similarly, Intellectual Substance would be Substance in the first degree, the others being substances by derivation and in a lower degree. Enneads: VI I

We have however to enquire in what sense the abstract numbers are substances. Can it be that they are also in a manner quantitative? Into whatever category they fall, the other numbers (those inherent in objects) can have nothing in common with them but the name. 5>Speech, time, motion – in what sense are these quantities? Let us begin with speech. It is subject to measurement, but only in so far as it is sound; it is not a quantity in its essential nature, which nature is that it be significant, as noun and verb are significant. The air is its MATTER, as it is MATTER to verb and noun, the components of speech. Enneads: VI I

Furthermore, if “in time,” “in place” are to be ranged under a category other than that applying to time and place, why not a separate category for “in a vessel”? Why not distinct categories for “in MATTER,” “in a subject,” “a part in a whole,” “a whole in its parts,” “a genus in its species,” “a species in a genus”? We are certainly on the way to a goodly number of categories. Enneads: VI I

To the first genus are assigned Substrates, including MATTER, to which is given a priority over the others; so that what is ranked as the firsfirst principle comes under the same head with things which must be posterior to it since it is their principle. Enneads: VI I

First, then: the prior is made homogeneous with the subsequent. Now this is impossible: in this relation the subsequent owes its existence to the prior, whereas among things belonging to one same genus each must have, essentially, the equality implied by the genus; for the very meaning of genus is to be predicated of the species in respect of their essential character. And that MATTER is the basic source of all the rest of things, this school, we may suppose, would hardly deny. Enneads: VI I

If MATTER is taken to be the only Existent, and all other things as modifications of MATTER, it is not legitimate to set up a single genus to embrace both the Existent and the other things; consistency requires that Being (Substance) be distinguished from its modifications and that these modifications be duly classified. Enneads: VI I

But the error in this theory is fundamental. To set MATTER the potential above everything, instead of recognising the primacy of actuality, is in the highest degree perverse. If the potential holds the primacy among the Existents, its actualization becomes impossible; it certainly cannot bring itself into actuality: either the actual exists previously, and so the potential is not the first-principle, or, if the two are to be regarded as existing simultaneously, the first-principles must be attributed to hazard. Besides, if they are simultaneous, why is not actuality given the primacy? Why is the potential more truly real than the actual? Supposing however that the actual does come later than the potential, how must the theory proceed? Obviously MATTER does not produce Form: the unqualified does not produce Quality, nor does actuality take its origin in the potential; for that would mean that the actual was inherent in the potential, which at once becomes a dual thing. Enneads: VI I

Furthermore, God becomes a secondary to MATTER, inasmuch as even he is regarded as a body composed of MATTER and Form – though how he acquires the Form is not revealed. If however he be admitted to exist apart from MATTER in virtue of his character as a principle and a rational law (logos), God will be bodiless, the Creative Power bodiless. If we are told that he is without MATTER but is composite in essence by the fact of being a body, this amounts to introducing another MATTER, the MATTER of God. Enneads: VI I

Again, how can MATTER be a first-principle, seeing that it is body? Body must necessarily be a plurality, since all bodies are composite of MATTER and Quality. If however body in this case is to be understood in some different way, then MATTER is identified with body only by an equivocation. Enneads: VI I

And whence is this resistance supposed to come? Whence the three dimensions? What is the source of their existence? MATTER is not comprised in the concept of the three-dimensional, nor the three-dimensional in the concept of MATTER; if MATTER partakes thus of extension, it can no longer be a simplex. Enneads: VI I

Again, whence does MATTER derive its unifying power? It is assuredly not the Absolute Unity, but has only that of participation in Unity. Enneads: VI I

On other grounds also, it is indefensible not to have reserved the high place for the true first-principle of things but to have set up in its stead the formless, passive and lifeless, the irrational, dark and indeterminate, and to have made this the source of Being. In this theory God is introduced merely for the sake of appearance: deriving existence from MATTER he is a composite, a derivative, or, worse, a mere state of MATTER. Enneads: VI I

Another consideration is that, if MATTER is a substrate, there must be something outside it, which, acting on it and distinct from it, makes it the substrate of what is poured into it. But if God is lodged in MATTER and by being involved in MATTER is himself no more than a substrate, he will no longer make MATTER a substrate nor be himself a substrate in conjunction with MATTER. For of what will they be substrates, when that which could make them substrates is eliminated? This so-called substrate turns out to have swallowed up all that is; but a substrate must be relative, and relative not to its content but to something which acts upon it as upon a datum. Enneads: VI I

Again, the substrate comports a relation to that which is not substrate; hence, to something external to it: there must, then, be something apart from the substrate. If nothing distinct and external is considered necessary, but the substrate itself can become everything and adopt every character, like the versatile dancer in the pantomime, it ceases to be a substrate: it is, essentially, everything. The mime is not a substrate of the characters he puts on; these are in fact the realisation of his own personality: similarly, if the MATTER with which this theory presents us comports in its own being all the realities, it is no longer the substrate of all: on the contrary, the other things can have no reality whatever, if they are no more than states of MATTER in the sense that the poses of the mime are states through which he passes. Enneads: VI I

Then, those other things not existing, MATTER will not be a substrate, nor will it have a place among the Existents; it will be MATTER bare, and for that reason not even MATTER, since MATTER is a relative. The relative is relative to something else: it must, further, be homogeneous with that something else: double is relative to half, but not Substance to double. Enneads: VI I

How then can an Existent be relative to a Non-existent, except accidentally? But the True-Existent, or MATTER, is related (to what emerges from it) as Existent to Non-Existent. For if potentiality is that which holds the promise of existence and that promise does not constitute Reality, the potentiality cannot be a Reality. In sum, these very teachers who deprecate the production of Realities from Nonrealities, themselves produce Non-reality from Reality; for to them the universe as such is not a Reality. Enneads: VI I

But is it not a paradox that, while MATTER, the Substrate, is to them an existence, bodies should not have more claim to existence, the universe yet more, and not merely a claim grounded on the reality of one of its parts? It is no less paradoxical that the living form should owe existence not to its soul but to its MATTER only, the soul being but an affection of MATTER and posterior to it. From what source then did MATTER receive ensoulment? Whence, in short, is soul’s entity derived? How does it occur that MATTER sometimes turns into bodies, while another part of it turns into Soul? Even supposing that Form might come to it from elsewhere, that accession of Quality to MATTER would account not for Soul, but simply for organized body soulless. If, on the contrary, there is something which both moulds MATTER and produces Soul, then prior to the produced there must be Soul the producer. Enneads: VI I

This philosophy began by identifying the Real with body; then, viewing with apprehension the transmutations of bodies, decided that Reality was that which is permanent beneath the superficial changes – which is much as if one regarded space as having more title to Reality than the bodies within it, on the principle that space does not perish with them. They found a permanent in space, but it was a fault to take mere permanence as in itself a sufficient definition of the Real; the right method would have been to consider what properties must characterize Reality, by the presence of which properties it has also that of unfailing permanence. Thus if a shadow had permanence, accompanying an object through every change, that would not make it more real than the object itself. The sensible universe, as including the Substrate and a multitude of attributes, will thus have more claim to be Reality entire than has any one of its component entities (such as MATTER): and if the sensible were in very truth the whole of Reality, MATTER, the mere base and not the total, could not be that whole. Enneads: VI I

Most surprising of all is that, while they make sense-perception their guarantee of everything, they hold that the Real cannot be grasped by sensation; – for they have no right to assign to MATTER even so much as resistance, since resistance is a quality. If however they profess to grasp Reality by Intellect, is it not a strange Intellect which ranks MATTER above itself, giving Reality to MATTER and not to itself? And as their “Intellect” has, thus, no Real-Existence, how can it be trustworthy when it speaks of things higher than itself, things to which it has no affinity whatever? But an adequate treatment of this entity (MATTER) and of substrates will be found elsewhere. Enneads: VI I

Qualities must be for this school distinct from Substrates. This in fact they acknowledge by counting them as the second category. If then they form a distinct category, they must be simplex; that is to say they are not composite; that is to say that as qualities, pure and simple, they are devoid of MATTER: hence they are bodiless and active, since MATTER is their substrate – a relation of passivity. Enneads: VI I

Again, if they identify Qualities with qualifications of MATTER, then in the first place even their Seminal Principles (Logoi) will be material and will not have to reside in MATTER to produce a composite, but prior to the composite thus produced they will themselves be composed of MATTER and Form: in other words, they will not be Forms or Principles. Further, if they maintain that the Seminal Principles are nothing but MATTER in a certain state, they evidently identify Qualities with States, and should accordingly classify them in their fourth genus. If this is a state of some peculiar kind, what precisely is its differentia? Clearly the state by its association with MATTER receives an accession of Reality: yet if that means that when divorced from MATTER it is not a Reality, how can State be treated as a single genus or species? Certainly one genus cannot embrace the Existent and the Non-existent. Enneads: VI I

And what is this state implanted in MATTER? It is either real, or unreal: if real, absolutely bodiless: if unreal, it is introduced to no purpose; MATTER is all there is; Quality therefore is nothing. The same is true of State, for that is even more unreal; the alleged Fourth Category more so. Enneads: VI I

MATTER then is the sole Reality. But how do we come to know this? Certainly not from MATTER itself. How, then? From Intellect? But Intellect is merely a state of MATTER, and even the “state” is an empty qualification. We are left after all with MATTER alone competent to make these assertions, to fathom these problems. And if its assertions were intelligent, we must wonder how it thinks and performs the functions of Soul without possessing either Intellect or Soul. If, then, it were to make foolish assertions, affirming itself to be what it is not and cannot be, to what should we ascribe this folly? Doubtless to MATTER, if it was in truth MATTER that spoke. But MATTER does not speak; anyone who says that it does proclaims the predominance of MATTER in himself; he may have a soul, but he is utterly devoid of Intellect, and lives in ignorance of himself and of the faculty alone capable of uttering the truth in these things. Enneads: VI I

With regard to States: It may seem strange that States should be set up as a third class – or whatever class it is – since all States are referable to MATTER. We shall be told that there is a difference among States, and that a State as in MATTER has definite characteristics distinguishing it from all other States and further that, whereas Qualities are States of MATTER, States properly so-called belong to Qualities. But if Qualities are nothing but States of MATTER, States (in the strict sense of the term) are ultimately reducible to MATTER, and under MATTER they must be classed. Enneads: VI I

We cannot indeed escape positing these three, Being, Motion, Stability, once it is the fact that the Intellect discerns them as separates; and if it thinks of them at all, it posits them by that very thinking; if they are thought, they exist. Things whose existence is bound up with MATTER have no being in the Intellect: these three principles are however free of MATTER; and in that which goes free of MATTER to be thought is to be. Enneads VI,2,

Life, too, burst upon Being, or rather was inseparably bound up with it; and thus it was that all living things of necessity came to be. Body too was there, since MATTER and Quality were present. Enneads VI,2,

It is certainly no numerical unity, no individual thing; for whatever you find in that sphere is a species, since it is divorced from MATTER. This may be the import of the difficult words of Plato, that Substance is broken up into an infinity of parts. So long as the division proceeds from genus to species, infinity is not reached; a limit is set by the species generated: the lowest species, however – that which is not divided into further species – may be more accurately regarded as infinite. And this is the meaning of the words: “to relegate them once and for all to infinity and there abandon them.” As for particulars, they are, considered in themselves, infinite, but come under number by being embraced by the (total) unity. Enneads VI,2,

If Soul acts as a genus or a species, the various (particular) souls must act as species. Their activities (Acts) will be twofold: the activity upward is Intellect; that which looks downward constitutes the other powers imposed by the particular Reason-Principle (the Reason-Principle of the being ensouled); the lowest activity of Soul is in its contact with MATTER to which it brings Form. Enneads VI,2,

Alternatively, Becoming may be divided into MATTER and the Form imposed upon MATTER. These may be regarded each as a separate genus, or else both may be brought under a single category and receive alike the name of Substance. Enneads VI,3,

But what, we may ask, have MATTER and Form in common? In what sense can MATTER be conceived as a genus, and what will be its species? What is the differentia of MATTER? In which genus, MATTER or Form, are we to rank the composite of both? It may be this very composite which constitutes the Substance manifested in bodies, neither of the components by itself answering to the conception of Body: how, then, can we rank them in one and the same genus as the composite? How can the elements of a thing be brought within the same genus as the thing itself? Yet if we begin with bodies, our first-principles will be compounds. Enneads VI,3,

Why not resort to analogy? Admitted that the classification of the Sensible cannot proceed along the identical lines marked out for the Intellectual: is there any reason why we should not for Intellectual-Being substitute MATTER, and for Intellectual Motion substitute Sensible Form, which is in a sense the life and consummation of MATTER? The inertia of MATTER would correspond with Stability, while the Identity and Difference of the Intellectual would find their counterparts in the similarity and diversity which obtain in the Sensible realm. Enneads VI,3,

But, in the first place, MATTER does not possess or acquire Form as its life or its Act; Form enters it from without, and remains foreign to its nature. Secondly, Form in the Intellectual is an Act and a motion; in the Sensible Motion is different from Form and accidental to it: Form in relation to MATTER approximates rather to Stability than to Motion; for by determining MATTER’s indetermination it confers upon it a sort of repose. Enneads VI,3,

As for Stability, how can it belong to MATTER, which is distorted into every variety of mass, receiving its forms from without, and even with the aid of these forms incapable of offspring. Enneads VI,3,

How then do we go to work? Let us begin by distinguishing MATTER, Form, the Mixture of both, and the Attributes of the Mixture. The Attributes may be subdivided into those which are mere predicates, and those serving also as accidents. The accidents may be either inclusive or included; they may, further, be classified as activities, experiences, consequents. Enneads VI,3,

MATTER will be found common to all substances, not however as a genus, since it has no differentiae – unless indeed differentiae be ascribed to it on the ground of its taking such various forms as fire and air. Enneads VI,3,

It may be held that MATTER is sufficiently constituted a genus by the fact that the things in which it appears hold it in common, or in that it presents itself as a whole of parts. In this sense MATTER will indeed be a genus, though not in the accepted sense of the term. MATTER, we may remark, is also a single element, if the element as such is able to constitute a genus. Enneads VI,3,

Further, if to a Form be added the qualification “bound up with, involved in MATTER,” MATTER separates that Form from other Forms: it does not however embrace the whole of Substantial Form (as, to be the genus of Form, it must). Enneads VI,3,

We may, also, restrict Substance to the Composite. MATTER and Form then cease to be substances. If they are Substance equally with the Composite, it remains to enquire what there is common to all three. Enneads VI,3,

Thus we have five genera, counting the first three entities as one. If the first three are not massed into a unity, the series will be MATTER, Form, Composite, Relation, Quantity, Quality, Motion. The last three may, again, be included in Relation, which is capable of bearing this wider extension. Enneads VI,3,

What, then, we have to ask, is the constant element in the first three entities? What is it that identifies them with their inherent Substance? Is it the capacity to serve as a base? But MATTER, we maintain, serves as the base and seat of Form: Form, thus, will be excluded from the category of Substance. Again, the Composite is the base and seat of attributes: hence, Form combined with MATTER will be the basic ground of Composites, or at any rate of all posteriors of the Composite – Quantity, Quality, Motion, and the rest. Enneads VI,3,

Equally the Substantial Form is never a predicate, since it never acts as a modification of anything. Form is not an attribute of MATTER hence, is not predicable of MATTER it is simply a constituent of the Couplement. On the other hand, the Form of a man is not different from the man himself (and so does not “modify” the Couplement). Enneads VI,3,

MATTER, similarly, is part of a whole, and belongs to something else only as to a whole and not as to a separate thing of which it is predicated. White, on the contrary, essentially belongs to something distinct from itself. Enneads VI,3,

It may be claimed as a common element in MATTER, Form and the Couplement that they are all substrates. But the mode in which MATTER is the substrate of Form is different from that in which Form and the Couplement are substrates of their modifications. Enneads VI,3,

And is it strictly true to say that MATTER is the substrate of Form? Form is rather the completion which MATTER’s nature as pure potentiality demands. Enneads VI,3,

Moreover, Form cannot be said to reside in MATTER (as in a substrate). When one thing combines with another to form a unity, the one does not reside in the other; both alike are substrates of a third: thus, Man (the Form) and a man (the Composite) are substrates of their experiences, and are prior to their activities and consequents. Enneads VI,3,

It follows that the fact of “not being present in a subject (or substrate) is not universally true of Substance, unless presence in a subject be stipulated as not including the case of the part present in the whole or of one thing combining with another to form a distinct unity; a thing will not be present as in a subject in that with which it co-operates in the information of a composite substance. Form, therefore, is not present in MATTER as in a subject, nor is Man so present in Socrates, since Man is part of Socrates. Enneads VI,3,

The truth is, however, that the “Substance” of our enquiry may be apprehended in directly opposite ways: it may be determined by one of the properties we have been discussing, by more than one, by all at once, according as they answer to the notions of MATTER, Form and the Couplement. Enneads VI,3,

Do we infer that fire and water are not Substance? They certainly are not Substance because they are visible. Why, then? Because they possess MATTER? No. Or Form? No. Nor because they involve a Couplement of MATTER and Form. Then why are they Substance? By existing. But does not Quantity exist, and Quality? This anomaly is to be explained by an equivocation in the term “existence.” Enneads VI,3,

But MATTER, it may be contended, is the source of existence to the Sensible things implanted in it. From what source, then, we retort, does MATTER itself derive existence and being? That MATTER is not a Primary we have established elsewhere. If it be urged that other things can have no subsistence without being implanted in MATTER, we admit the claim for Sensible things. But though MATTER be prior to these, it is not thereby precluded from being posterior to many things-posterior, in fact, to all the beings of the Intellectual sphere. Its existence is but a pale reflection, and less complete than that of the things implanted in it. These are Reason-Principles and more directly derived from Being: MATTER has of itself no Reason-Principle whatever; it is but a shadow of a Principle, a vain attempt to achieve a Principle. Enneads VI,3,

But, our critic may pursue, MATTER gives existence to the things implanted in it, just as Socrates gives existence to the whiteness implanted in himself? We reply that the higher being gives existence to the lower, the lower to the higher never. Enneads VI,3,

But once concede that Form is higher in the scale of Being than MATTER, and MATTER can no longer be regarded as a common ground of both, nor Substance as a genus embracing MATTER, Form and the Couplement. True, these will have many common properties, to which we have already referred, but their being (or existence) will nonetheless be different. When a higher being comes into contact with a lower, the lower, though first in the natural order, is yet posterior in the scale of Reality: consequently, if Being does not belong in equal degrees to MATTER, to Form and to the Couplement, Substance can no longer be common to all three in the sense of being their genus: to their posteriors it will bear a still different relation, serving them as a common base by being bound up with all alike. Substance, thus, resembles life, dim here, clearer there, or portraits of which one is an outline, another more minutely worked. By measuring Being by its dim manifestation and neglecting a fuller revelation elsewhere, we may come to regard this dim existence as a common ground. Enneads VI,3,

We conclude that the term “Being” must have different connotations as applied to MATTER, to Form and to both conjointly, in spite of the single source pouring into the different streams. Enneads VI,3,

Perhaps we cannot even maintain that MATTER and Form are derived from a single source; they are clearly in some sense different. Enneads VI,3,

Our plan must be to apprehend what is constant in stone, earth, water and the entities which they compose – the vegetal and animal forms, considered purely as sensibles – and to confine this constant within a single genus. Neither MATTER nor Form will thus be overlooked, for Sensible Substance comports them; fire and earth and the two intermediaries consist of MATTER and Form, while composite things are actually many substances in one. They all, moreover, have that common property which distinguishes them from other things: serving as subjects to these others, they are never themselves present in a subject nor predicated of any other thing. Similarly, all the characteristics which we have ascribed to Substance find a place in this classification. Enneads VI,3,

What then can this “part” be? MATTER may be suggested. But are we actually to maintain that the particular sensible substance consists of a conglomeration of qualities and MATTER, while Sensible Substance as a whole is merely the sum of these coagulations in the uniform MATTER, each one separately forming a quale or a quantum or else a thing of many qualities? Is it true to say that everything whose absence leaves subsistence incomplete is a part of the particular substance, while all that is accidental to the substance already existent takes independent rank and is not submerged in the mixture which constitutes this so-called substance? I decline to allow that whatever combines in this way with anything else is Substance if it helps to produce a single mass having quantity and quality, whereas taken by itself and divorced from this complementary function it is a quality: not everything which composes the amalgam is Substance, but only the amalgam as a whole. Enneads VI,3,

We may be told that Man (the universal) is Form alone, Socrates Form in MATTER. But on this very ground Socrates will be less fully Man than the universal; for the Reason-Principle will be less effectual in MATTER. If, on the contrary, Man is not determined by Form alone, but presupposes MATTER, what deficiency has Man in comparison with the material manifestation of Man, or the Reason-Principle in isolation as compared with its embodiment in a unit of MATTER? Besides, the more general is by nature prior; hence, the Form-Idea is prior to the individual: but what is prior by nature is prior unconditionally. How then can the Form take a lower rank? The individual, it is true, is prior in the sense of being more readily accessible to our cognisance; this fact, however, entails no objective difference. Enneads VI,3,

We have spoken of Quality as combining with other entities, MATTER and Quantity, to form the complete Sensible Substance; this Substance, so called, may be supposed to constitute the manifold world of Sense, which is not so much an essence as a quale. Thus, for the essence of fire we must look to the Reason-Principle; what produces the visible aspect is, properly speaking, a quale. Enneads VI,3,

It may even be doubted whether the arts, as Reason-Principles, can fairly be among Sensible qualities; Reason-Principles, it is true, may reside in MATTER, but “matter” for them means Soul. On the other hand, their being found in company with MATTER commits them in some degree to the lower sphere. Take the case of lyrical music: it is performed upon strings; melody, which may be termed a part of the art, is sensuous sound – though, perhaps, we should speak here not of parts but of manifestations (Acts): yet, called manifestations, they are nonetheless sensuous. The beauty inherent in body is similarly bodiless; but we have assigned it to the order of things bound up with body and subordinate to it. Enneads VI,3,

Now, when the potentiality of Motion consists in an ability to walk, it may be imagined as thrusting a man forward and causing him to be continually adopting a different position; when it lies in the capacity to heat, it heats; when the potentiality takes hold of MATTER and builds up the organism, we have growth; and when another potentiality demolishes the structure, the result is decay, that which has the potentiality of demolition experiencing the decay. Where the birth-giving principle is active, we find birth; where it is impotent and the power to destroy prevails, destruction takes place – not the destruction of what already exists, but that which intervenes upon the road to existence. Enneads VI,3,

Now, in beings whose unity does not reproduce the entire nature of that principle, any presence is presence of an emanant power: even this, however, does not mean that the principle is less than integrally present; it is not sundered from the power which it has uttered; all is offered, but the recipient is able to take only so much. But in Beings in which the plenitude of these powers is manifested, there clearly the Authentic itself is present, though still as remaining distinct; it is distinct in that, becoming the informing principle of some definite thing, it would abdicate from its standing as the total and from its uttermost self-abiding and would belong, in some mode of accident, to another thing as well. Still it is not the property of what may seek to join with it; it chooses where it will and enters as the participant’s power may allow, but it does not become a chattel; it remains the quested and so in another sense never passes over. There is nothing disquieting in omnipresence after this mode where there is no appropriation: in the same accidental way, we may reasonably put it, soul concurs with body, but it is soul self-holding, not inbound with MATTER, free even of the body which it has illuminated through and through. Enneads VI,4,

For my part I am satisfied that anyone considering the mode in which MATTER participates in the Ideas will be ready enough to accept this tenet of omnipresence in identity, no longer rejecting it as incredible or even difficult. This because it seems reasonable and imperative to dismiss any notion of the Ideas lying apart with MATTER illumined from them as from somewhere above – a meaningless conception, for what have distance and separation to do here? This participation cannot be thought of as elusive or very perplexing; on the contrary, it is obvious, accessible in many examples. Enneads VI,5,

Note, however, that when we sometimes speak of the Ideas illuminating MATTER this is not to suggest the mode in which material light pours down on a material object; we use the phrase in the sense only that, the material being image while the Ideas are archetypes, the two orders are distinguished somewhat in the manner of illuminant and illuminated. But it is time to be more exact. Enneads VI,5,

We do not mean that the Idea, locally separate, shows itself in MATTER like a reflection in water; the MATTER touches the Idea at every point, though not in a physical contact, and, by dint of neighbourhood – nothing to keep them apart – is able to absorb thence all that lies within its capacity, the Idea itself not penetrating, not approaching, the MATTER, but remaining self-locked. Enneads VI,5,

We take it, then, that the Idea, say of Fire – for we had best deal with MATTER as underlying the elements – is not in the MATTER. The Ideal Fire, then, remaining apart, produces the form of fire throughout the entire enfired mass. Now let us suppose – and the same method will apply to all the so-called elements – that this Fire in its first material manifestation is a multiple mass. That single Fire is seen producing an image of itself in all the sensible fires; yet it is not spatially separate; it does not, then, produce that image in the manner of our visible light; for in that case all this sensible fire, supposing that it were a whole of parts (as the analogy would necessitate), must have generated spatial positions out of itself, since the Idea or Form remains in a non-spatial world; for a principle thus pluralized must first have departed from its own character in order to be present in that many and participate many times in the one same Form. Enneads VI,5,

The Idea, impartible, gives nothing of itself to the MATTER; its unbreaking unity, however, does not prevent it shaping that multiple by its own unity and being present to the entirety of the multiple, bringing it to pattern not by acting part upon part but by presence entire to the object entire. It would be absurd to introduce a multitude of Ideas of Fire, each several fire being shaped by a particular idea; the Ideas of fire would be infinite. Besides, how would these resultant fires be distinct, when fire is a continuous unity? and if we apply yet another fire to certain matter and produce a greater fire, then the same Idea must be allowed to have functioned in the same way in the new matter as in the old; obviously there is no other Idea. Enneads VI,5,

Now the higher power is present integrally but, in the weakness of the recipient material, is not discerned as every point; it is present as an identity everywhere not in the mode of the material triangle – identical though, in many representations, numerically multiple, but in the mode of the immaterial, ideal triangle which is the source of the material figures. If we are asked why the omnipresence of the immaterial triangle does not entail that of the material figure, we answer that not all MATTER enters into the participation necessary; MATTER accepts various forms and not all MATTER is apt for all form; the First MATTER, for example, does not lend itself to all but is for the First Kinds first and for the others in due order, though these, too, are omnipresent. Enneads VI,5,

Consider the life in any living thing; it does not reach only to some fixed point, unable to permeate the entire being; it is omnipresent. If on this again we are asked How, we appeal to the character of this power, not subject to quantity but such that though you divide it mentally for ever you still have the same power, infinite to the core; in it there is no MATTER to make it grow less and less according to the measured mass. Enneads VI,5,

Yet the universe has at once extension and beauty? Yes; because it has not been allowed to slip away into the limitless but is held fast by unity; and it has beauty in virtue of Beauty not of Magnitude; it needed Beauty to parry that magnitude; in the degree of its extension it was void of beauty and to that degree ugly. Thus extension serves as MATTER to Beauty since what calls for its ordering is a multiplicity. The greater the expansion, the greater the disorder and ugliness. Enneads VI,6,

Is it, then, suspended at some one point, or rocking to and fro? No; any such poising, with or without side motion, could be known only by place (which MATTER precedes). Enneads VI,6,

And there is movement in its lack of consciousness; it has passed out of Intellectual-Principle, slid away. That it cannot break free but is under compulsion from without to keep to its circling with no possibility of advance, in this would be its rest. Thus it is not true to speak of MATTER as being solely in flux. Enneads VI,6,

But what of the decad? Where lies the need of decad to a thing which, by totalling to that power, is decad already? The need may be like that of Form to MATTER; ten and decad may exist by its virtue; and, once more, the decad must previously exist of its own existence, decad unattached. Enneads VI,6,

But where does this thing lie? Is it existent only in the defining thought, so to speak? No; it is also a thing, though a thing of the Intellectual. All that belongs to that order is at once an Intellectual and in some degree the concrete thing. There is a position, as well as a manner of being, for all configurations, for surface, for solid. And certainly the configurations are not of our devising; for example, the configurations of the universe are obviously antecedent to ourselves; so it must be with all the configurations of the things of nature; before the bodily reproductions all must exist There, without configuration, primal configurations. For these primals are not shapes in something; self-belonging, they are perfect without extension; only the extended needs the external. In the sphere of Real-Being the configuration is always a unity; it becomes discrete either in the Living-Form or immediately before: I say “becomes discrete” not in the sense that it takes magnitude There but that it is broken apart for the purpose of the Living-Form and is allotted to the bodies within that Form – for instance, to Fire There, the Intellectual Pyramid. And because the Ideal-Form is There, the fire of this sphere seeks to produce that configuration against the check of MATTER: and so of all the rest as we read in the account of the realm of sense. Enneads VI,6,

Only in conjunction with their causes are things good; even in this sphere a thing is good in virtue of being complete; form means that the thing is complete, the MATTER duly controlled; this control means that nothing has been left crude; but something is so left if anything belonging to the shape be missing-eye, or other part. Thus to state cause is to state the thing complete. Why eyes or eyebrows? For completion: if you say “For preservation,” you affirm an indwelling safeguard of the essence, something contributory to the being: the essence, then, preceded the safeguard and the cause was inbound with the essence; distinct, this cause is in its nature a part of the essence. Enneads VI,7,

We ask first whether man as here is a Reason-Principle different to that soul which produces him as here and gives him life and thought; or is he that very soul or, again, the (yet lower) soul using the human body? Now if man is a reasonable living being and by “living being” is meant a conjoint of soul and body, the Reason-Principle of man is not identical with soul. But if the conjoint of soul and body is the reason-principle of man, how can man be an eternal reality, seeing that it is only when soul and body have come together that the Reason-Principle so constituted appears? The Reason-Principle will be the foreteller of the man to be, not the Man Absolute with which we are dealing but more like his definition, and not at that indicating his nature since what is indicated is not the Idea that is to enter MATTER but only that of the known thing, the conjoint. We have not yet found the Man we are seeking, the equivalent of the Reason-Principle. Enneads VI,7,

This does not define the principle of either. If we are to state with entire accuracy the Reason-Principles of the Forms in MATTER and associated with MATTER, we cannot pass over the generative Reason-Principle, in this case that of Man, especially since we hold that a complete definition must cover the essential manner of being. Enneads VI,7,

The soul of that order, the soul that has entered into MATTER of that order, is man by having, apart from body, a certain disposition; within body it shapes all to its own fashion, producing another form of Man, man reduced to what body admits, just as an artist may make a reduced image of that again. Enneads VI,7,

The power of the All-Soul, as Reason-Principle of the universe, may be considered as laying down a pattern before the effective separate powers go forth from it: this plan would be something like a tentative illumining of MATTER; the elaborating soul would give minute articulation to these representations of itself; every separate effective soul would become that towards which it tended, assuming that particular form as the choral dancer adapts himself to the action set down for him. Enneads VI,7,

But, having fire (warmth) and water, it will certainly have vegetation; how does vegetation exist There? Earth, too? either these are alive or they are There as dead things and then not everything There has life. How in sum can the things of this realm be also There? Vegetal life we can well admit, for the plant is a Reason-Principle established in life. If in the plant the Reason-Principle, entering MATTER and constituting the plant, is a certain form of life, a definite soul, then, since every Reason-Principle is a unity, then either this of plant-life is the primal or before it there is a primal plant, source of its being: that first plant would be a unity; those here, being multiple, must derive from a unity. This being so, that primal must have much the truer life and be the veritable plant, the plants here deriving from it in the secondary and tertiary degree and living by a vestige of its life. Enneads VI,7,

Fire, similarly, with other such things, must be a Reason-Principle established in MATTER: fire certainly does not originate in the friction to which it may be traced; the friction merely brings out a fire already existent in the scheme and contained in the materials rubbed together. MATTER does not in its own character possess this fire-power: the true cause is something informing the MATTER, that is to say, a Reason-Principle, obviously therefore a soul having the power of bringing fire into being; that is, a life and a Reason-Principle in one. Enneads VI,7,

On the nature of the Intellectual-Principle we get light from its manifestations; they show that it demands such diversity as is compatible with its being a monad. Take what principle you will, that of plant or animal: if this principle were a pure unity and not a specifically varied thing, it could not so serve as principle; its product would be MATTER, the principle not having taken all those forms necessary if MATTER is to be permeated and utterly transformed. A face is not one mass; there are nose and eyes; and the nose is not a unity but has the differences which make it a nose; as bare unity it would be mere mass. Enneads VI,7,

MATTER would have Forming-Idea for its good, since, were it conscious, it would welcome that; body would look to soul, without which it could not be or endure; soul must look to virtue; still higher stands Intellectual-Principle; above that again is the principle we call the Primal. Each of these progressive priors must have act upon those minors to which they are, respectively, the good: some will confer order and place, others life, others wisdom and the good life: Intellectual-Principle will draw upon the Authentic Good which we hold to be coterminous with it, both as being an Activity put forth from it and as even now taking light from it. This good we will define later. Enneads VI,7,

But what is that whose entry supplies every such need? Some Idea, we maintain. There is a Form to which MATTER aspires: to soul, moral excellence is this Form. Enneads VI,7,

A thing is potentially that to which its nature looks; this, obviously, it lacks; what it lacks, of its better, is its good. MATTER is of all that most in need; its next is the lowest Form; Form at lowest is just one grade higher than MATTER. If a thing is a good to itself, much more must its perfection, its Form, its better, be a good to it; this better, good in its own nature, must be good also to the quester whose good it procures. Enneads VI,7,

Now to see what all this reasoning has established: Universally, what approaches as a good is a Form; MATTER itself contains this good which is Form: are we to conclude that, if MATTER had will, it would desire to be Form unalloyed? No: that would be desiring its own destruction, for the good seeks to subject everything to itself. But perhaps MATTER would not wish to remain at its own level but would prefer to attain Being and, this acquired, to lay aside its evil. Enneads VI,7,

If we are asked how the evil thing can have tendency towards the good, we answer that we have not attributed tendency to MATTER; our argument needed the hypothesis of sensation in MATTER – in so far as possible consistently with retention of its character – and we asserted that the entry of Form, that dream of the Good, must raise it to a nobler order. If then MATTER is Evil, there is no more to be said; if it is something else – a wrong thing, let us say – then in the hypothesis that its essence acquire sensation would not the appropriate upon the next or higher plane be its good, as in the other cases? But not what is evil in MATTER would be the quester of good but that element in it (lowest Form) which in it is associated with evil. Enneads VI,7,

But if MATTER by very essence is evil how could it choose the good? This question implies that if Evil were self-conscious it would admire itself: but how can the unadmirable be admired; and did we not discover that the good must be apt to the nature? There that question may rest. But if universally the good is Form and the higher the ascent the more there is of Form-Soul more truly Form than body is and phases of soul progressively of higher Form and Intellectual-Principle standing as Form to soul collectively – then the Good advances by the opposite of MATTER and, therefore, by a cleansing and casting away to the utmost possible at each stage: and the greatest good must be there where all that is of MATTER has disappeared. The Principle of Good rejecting MATTER entirely – or rather never having come near it at any point or in any way – must hold itself aloft with that Formless in which Primal Form takes its origin. But we will return to this. Enneads VI,7,

But since Thence come the beauty and light in all, it is Thence that Intellectual-Principle took the brilliance of the Intellectual Energy which flashed Nature into being; Thence soul took power towards life, in virtue of that fuller life streaming into it. Intellectual-Principle was raised thus to that Supreme and remains with it, happy in that presence. Soul too, that soul which as possessing knowledge and vision was capable, clung to what it saw; and as its vision so its rapture; it saw and was stricken; but having in itself something of that principle it felt its kinship and was moved to longing like those stirred by the image of the beloved to desire of the veritable presence. Lovers here mould themselves to the beloved; they seek to increase their attraction of person and their likeness of mind; they are unwilling to fall short in moral quality or in other graces lest they be distasteful to those possessing such merit – and only among such can true love be. In the same way the soul loves the Supreme Good, from its very beginnings stirred by it to love. The soul which has never strayed from this love waits for no reminding from the beauty of our world: holding that love – perhaps unawares – it is ever in quest, and, in its longing to be borne Thither, passes over what is lovely here and with one glance at the beauty of the universe dismisses all; for it sees that all is put together of flesh and MATTER, befouled by its housing, made fragmentary by corporal extension, not the Authentic Beauty which could never venture into the mud of body to be soiled, annulled. Enneads VI,7,

Shape is an impress from the unshaped; it is the unshaped that produces shape, not shape the unshaped; and MATTER is needed for the producing; MATTER, in the nature of things, is the furthest away, since of itself it has not even the lowest degree of shape. Thus lovableness does not belong to MATTER but to that which draws upon Form: the Form upon MATTER comes by way of soul; soul is more nearly Form and therefore more lovable; Intellectual-Principle, nearer still, is even more to be loved: by these steps we are led to know that the FirsFirst Principle, principle of Beauty, must be formless. Enneads VI,7,

If the mind reels before something thus alien to all we know, we must take our stand on the things of this realm and strive thence to see. But, in the looking, beware of throwing outward; this Principle does not lie away somewhere leaving the rest void; to those of power to reach, it is present; to the inapt, absent. In our daily affairs we cannot hold an object in mind if we have given ourselves elsewhere, occupied upon some other matter; that very thing must be before us to be truly the object of observation. So here also; preoccupied by the impress of something else, we are withheld under that pressure from becoming aware of The Unity; a mind gripped and fastened by some definite thing cannot take the print of the very contrary. As MATTER, it is agreed, must be void of quality in order to accept the types of the universe, so and much more must the soul be kept formless if there is to be no infixed impediment to prevent it being brimmed and lit by the Primal Principle. Enneads VI,8,