Reason-Principle

We see partial wrong; from what is before us we divine that which is lacking to the entire form (or Kind) thus indicated; we see that the completed Kind would be the Indeterminate; by this process we are able to identify and affirm Evil. In the same way when we observe what we feel to be an ugly appearance in Matter – left there because the REASON-PRINCIPLE has not become so completely the master as to cover over the unseemliness – we recognise Ugliness by the falling-short from Ideal-Form. Enneads I,8,

The gist of the whole matter lies in the consideration that Soul governs this All by the plan contained in the REASON-PRINCIPLE and plays in the All exactly the part of the particular principle which in every living-thing forms the members of the organism and adjusts them to the unity of which they are portions; the entire force of the Soul is represented in the All, but, in the parts, Soul is present only in proportion to the degree of essential reality held by each of such partial objects. Surrounding every separate entity there are other entities, whose approach will sometimes be hostile and sometimes helpful to the purpose of its nature; but to the All taken in its length and breadth each and every separate existent is an adjusted part, holding its own characteristic and yet contributing by its own native tendency to the entire life-history of the Universe. Enneads II,3,

All living things, then – all in the heavens and all elsewhere – fall under the general REASON-PRINCIPLE of the All – they have been made parts with a view to the whole: not one of these parts, however exalted, has power to effect any alteration of these REASON-PRINCIPLEs or of things shaped by them and to them; some modification one part may work upon another, whether for better or for worse; but there is no power that can wrest anything outside of its distinct nature. Enneads II,3,

No doubt the REASON-PRINCIPLE (conveyed by the Soul) covers all the action and experience of this realm: nothing happens, even here, by any form of haphazard; all follows a necessary order. Enneads II,3,

Is everything, then, to be attributed to the act of the REASON-PRINCIPLEs? To their existence, no doubt, but not to their effective action; they exist and they know; or better, the Soul, which contains the engendering REASON-PRINCIPLE, knows the results of all it has brought to pass. For whensoever similar factors meet and act in relation to each other, similar consequences must inevitably ensue: the Soul adopting or foreplanning the given conditions accomplishes the due outcome and links all into a total. Enneads II,3,

Well, perhaps even the less good has its contributory value in the All. Perhaps there is no need that everything be good. Contraries may co-operate; and without opposites there could be no ordered Universe: all living beings of the partial realm include contraries. The better elements are compelled into existence and moulded to their function by the REASON-PRINCIPLE directly; the less good are potentially present in the REASON-PRINCIPLEs, actually present in the phenomena themselves; the Soul’s power had reached its limit, and failed to bring the REASON-PRINCIPLEs into complete actuality since, amid the clash of these antecedent Principles, Matter had already from its own stock produced the less good. Enneads II,3,

But these REASON-PRINCIPLEs, contained in the Soul, are they Thoughts? And if so, by what process does the Soul create in accordance with these Thoughts? It is upon Matter that this act of the Reason is exercised; and what acts physically is not an intellectual operation or a vision, but a power modifying matter, not conscious of it but merely acting upon it: the REASON-PRINCIPLE, in other words, acts much like a force producing a figure or pattern upon water – that of a circle, suppose, where the formation of the ring is conditioned by something distinct from that force itself. Enneads II,3,

But that argument would equally cancel the Matter present in the bodily forms of this realm: body without shape has never existed, always body achieved and yet always the two constituents. We discover these two – Matter and Idea – by sheer force of our reasoning which distinguishes continually in pursuit of the simplex, the irreducible, working on, until it can go no further, towards the ultimate in the subject of enquiry. And the ultimate of every partial-thing is its Matter, which, therefore, must be all darkness since light is a REASON-PRINCIPLE. The Mind, too, as also a REASON-PRINCIPLE, sees only in each particular object the REASON-PRINCIPLE lodging there; anything lying below that it declares to lie below the light, to be therefore a thing of darkness, just as the eye, a thing of light, seeks light and colours which are modes of light, and dismisses all that is below the colours and hidden by them, as belonging to the order of the darkness, which is the order of Matter. Enneads II,4,

No: all that ever appears upon it is brought in by the Idea: the Idea alone possesses: to it belongs the magnitude and all else that goes with the REASON-PRINCIPLE or follows upon it. Quantity is given with the Ideal-Form in all the particular species – man, bird, and particular kind of bird. Enneads II,4,

The imaging of Quantity upon Matter by an outside power is not more surprising than the imaging of Quality; Quality is no doubt a REASON-PRINCIPLE, but Quantity also – being measure, number – is equally so. Enneads II,4,

Besides quantitativeness itself (the Absolute-Principle) does not possess quantity, which belongs only to things participating in it, a consideration which shows that Quantitativeness is an Idea-Principle. A white object becomes white by the presence of whiteness; what makes an organism white or of any other variety of colour is not itself a specific colour but, so to speak, a specific REASON-PRINCIPLE: in the same way what gives an organism a certain bulk is not itself a thing of magnitude but is Magnitude itself, the abstract Absolute, or the REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads II,4,

It is grasped only by a mental process, though that not an act of the intellective mind but a reasoning that finds no subject; and so it stands revealed as the spurious thing it has been called. No bodiliness belongs to it; bodiliness is itself a phase of REASON-PRINCIPLE and so is something different from Matter, as Matter, therefore, from it: bodiliness already operative and so to speak made concrete would be body manifest and not Matter unelaborated. Enneads II,4,

Now all that is Number and REASON-PRINCIPLE is outside of boundlessness: these bestow bound and settlement and order in general upon all else: neither anything that has been brought under order nor any Order-Absolute is needed to bring them under order. The thing that has to be brought under order (e.g., Matter) is other than the Ordering Principle which is Limit and Definiteness and REASON-PRINCIPLE. Therefore, necessarily, the thing to be brought under order and to definiteness must be in itself a thing lacking delimitation. Enneads II,4,

For, first, any attribute to any subject must be a REASON-PRINCIPLE; and Indefiniteness is not a REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads II,4,

But this argument seems to make no difference between the indefinite object and Indefiniteness-essential. Is there none? In any object in which Reason and Matter co-exist we distinguish between Indeterminateness and the Indeterminate subject: but where Matter stands alone we make them identical, or, better, we would say right out that in that case essential Indeterminateness is not present; for it is a REASON-PRINCIPLE and could not lodge in the indeterminate object without at once annulling the indeterminateness. Enneads II,4,

Matter, then, must be described as Indefinite of itself, by its natural opposition to REASON-PRINCIPLE. Reason is Reason and nothing else; just so Matter, opposed by its indeterminateness to Reason, is Indeterminateness and nothing else. Enneads II,4,

But is not the Form of Quality? No, the Form is not a Quality: it is a REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads: II VI.

And the outcome of this REASON-PRINCIPLE entering into the underlying Matter, what is that? Certainly not what is seen and burns, for that is the something in which these qualities inhere. Enneads: II VI.

We might define the burning as an Act springing from the REASON-PRINCIPLE: then the warming and lighting and other effects of fire will be its Acts and we still have found no foothold for its quality. Enneads: II VI.

We have thus covered our main ground, but since corporeity has been mentioned, we must consider its nature: is it the conjunction of all the qualities or is it an Idea, or REASON-PRINCIPLE, whose presence in Matter constitutes a body? Now if body is the compound, the thing made up of all the required qualities plus Matter, then corporeity is nothing more than their conjunction. Enneads: II VII.

And if it is a REASON-PRINCIPLE, one whose incoming constitutes the body, then clearly this Principle contains embraced within itself all the qualities. If this REASON-PRINCIPLE is to be no mere principle of definition exhibiting the nature of a thing but a veritable Reason constituting the thing, then it cannot itself contain Matter but must encircle Matter, and by being present to Matter elaborate the body: thus the body will be Matter associated with an indwelling REASON-PRINCIPLE which will be in itself immaterial, pure Idea, even though irremoveably attached to the body. It is not to be confounded with that other Principle in man – treated elsewhere – which dwells in the Intellectual World by right of being itself an Intellectual Principle. Enneads: II VII.

They will scarcely urge upon us the doubling of the Principle in Act by a Principle in Potentiality. It is absurd to seek such a plurality by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality in the case of immaterial beings whose existence is in Act – even in lower forms no such division can be made and we cannot conceive a duality in the Intellectual-Principle, one phase in some vague calm, another all astir. Under what form can we think of repose in the Intellectual Principle as contrasted with its movement or utterance? What would the quiescence of the one phase be as against the energy of the others? No: the Intellectual-Principle is continuously itself, unchangeably constituted in stable Act. With movement – towards it or within it – we are in the realm of the Soul’s operation: such act is a REASON-PRINCIPLE emanating from it and entering into Soul, thus made an Intellectual Soul, but in no sense creating an intermediate Principle to stand between the two. Enneads: II VIII.

To increase the Primals by making the Supreme Mind engender the REASON-PRINCIPLE, and this again engender in the Soul a distinct power to act as mediator between Soul and the Supreme Mind, this is to deny intellection to the Soul, which would no longer derive its Reason from the Intellectual-Principle but from an intermediate: the Soul then would possess not the REASON-PRINCIPLE but an image of it: the Soul could not know the Intellectual-Principle; it could have no intellection. Enneads: II VIII.

Once more, we have no right to ask that all men shall be good, or to rush into censure because such universal virtue is not possible: this would be repeating the error of confusing our sphere with the Supreme and treating evil as a nearly negligible failure in wisdom – as good lessened and dwindling continuously, a continuous fading out; it would be like calling the Nature-Principle evil because it is not Sense-Perception and the thing of sense evil for not being a REASON-PRINCIPLE. If evil is no more than that, we will be obliged to admit evil in the Supreme also, for there, too, Soul is less exalted than the Intellectual-Principle, and That too has its Superior. Enneads: II VIII.

But when our Soul holds to its REASON-PRINCIPLE, to the guide, pure and detached and native to itself, only then can we speak of personal operation, of voluntary act. Things so done may truly be described as our doing, for they have no other source; they are the issue of the unmingled Soul, a Principle that is a First, a leader, a sovereign not subject to the errors of ignorance, not to be overthrown by the tyranny of the desires which, where they can break in, drive and drag, so as to allow of no act of ours, but mere answer to stimulus. Enneads: III I

The REASON-PRINCIPLE within a seed contains all the parts and qualities concentrated in identity; there is no distinction, no jarring, no internal hindering; then there comes a pushing out into bulk, part rises in distinction with part, and at once the members of the organism stand in each other’s way and begin to wear each other down. Enneads III,2,

Yet: Amid all that they effect and accept, the divine Realm imposes the one harmonious act; each utters its own voice, but all is brought into accord, into an ordered system, for the universal purpose, by the ruling REASON-PRINCIPLE. This Universe is not Intelligence and Reason, like the Supernal, but participant in Intelligence and Reason: it stands in need of the harmonizing because it is the meeting ground of Necessity and divine Reason-Necessity pulling towards the lower, towards the unreason which is its own characteristic, while yet the Intellectual Principle remains sovereign over it. Enneads III,2,

But: if the evil in men is involuntary, if their own will has not made them what they are, how can we either blame wrong-doers or even reproach their victims with suffering through their own fault? If there is a Necessity, bringing about human wickedness either by force of the celestial movement or by a rigorous sequence set up by the First Cause, is not the evil a thin rooted in Nature? And if thus the REASON-PRINCIPLE of the universe is the creator of evil, surely all is injustice? No: Men are no doubt involuntary sinners in the sense that they do not actually desire to sin; but this does not alter the fact that wrongdoers, of their own choice, are, themselves, the agents; it is because they themselves act that the sin is in their own; if they were not agents they could not sin. Enneads III,2,

Are we, then, to conclude that particular things are determined by Necessities rooted in Nature and by the sequence of causes, and that everything is as good as anything can be? No: the REASON-PRINCIPLE is the sovereign, making all: it wills things as they are and, in its reasonable act, it produces even what we know as evil: it cannot desire all to be good: an artist would not make an animal all eyes; and in the same way, the REASON-PRINCIPLE would not make all divine; it makes Gods but also celestial spirits, the intermediate order, then men, then the animals; all is graded succession, and this in no spirit of grudging but in the expression of a Reason teeming with intellectual variety. Enneads III,2,

Suppose this Universe were the direct creation of the REASON-PRINCIPLE applying itself, quite unchanged, to Matter, retaining, that is, the hostility to partition which it derives from its Prior, the Intellectual Principle – then, this its product, so produced, would be of supreme and unparalleled excellence. But the REASON-PRINCIPLE could not be a thing of entire identity or even of closely compact diversity; and the mode in which it is here manifested is no matter of censure since its function is to be all things, each single thing in some distinctive way. Enneads III,2,

But has it not, besides itself entering Matter, brought other beings down? Has it not for example brought Souls into Matter and, in adapting them to its creation, twisted them against their own nature and been the ruin of many of them? And can this be right? The answer is that the Souls are, in a fair sense, members of this REASON-PRINCIPLE and that it has not adapted them to the creation by perverting them, but has set them in the place here to which their quality entitles them. Enneads III,2,

The ordinance of the Kosmos, then, is in keeping with the Intellectual Principle. True, no reasoning went to its creation, but it so stands that the keenest reasoning must wonder – since no reasoning could be able to make it otherwise – at the spectacle before it, a product which, even in the Kinds of the partial and particular Sphere, displays the Divine Intelligence to a degree in which no arranging by reason could express it. Every one of the ceaselessly recurrent types of being manifests a creating REASON-PRINCIPLE above all censure. No fault is to be found unless on the assumption that everything ought to come into being with all the perfection of those that have never known such a coming, the Eternals. In that case, things of the Intellectual realm and things of the realm of sense must remain one unbroken identity for ever. Enneads III,2,

In this demand for more good than exists, there is implied a failure to recognize that the form allotted to each entity is sufficient in itself; it is like complaining because one kind of animal lacks horns. We ought to understand both that the REASON-PRINCIPLE must extend to every possible existent and, at the same time, that every greater must include lesser things, that to every whole belong its parts, and that all cannot be equality unless all part is to be absent. Enneads III,2,

These considerations oblige us to state the Logos (the REASON-PRINCIPLE of the Universe) once again, and more clearly, and to justify its nature. Enneads III,2,

This REASON-PRINCIPLE, then – let us dare the definition in the hope of conveying the truth – this Logos is not the Intellectual Principle unmingled, not the Absolute Divine Intellect; nor does it descend from the pure Soul alone; it is a dependent of that Soul while, in a sense, it is a radiation from both those divine Hypostases; the Intellectual Principle and the Soul – the Soul as conditioned by the Intellectual Principle engender this Logos which is a Life holding restfully a certain measure of Reason. Enneads III,2,

But this REASON-PRINCIPLE which emanates from the complete unity, divine Mind, and the complete unity Life (= Soul) – is neither a uniate complete Life nor a uniate complete divine Mind, nor does it give itself whole and all-including to its subject. (By an imperfect communication) it sets up a conflict of part against part: it produces imperfect things and so engenders and maintains war and attack, and thus its unity can be that only of a sum-total not of a thing undivided. At war with itself in the parts which it now exhibits, it has the unity, or harmony, of a drama torn with struggle. The drama, of course, brings the conflicting elements to one final harmony, weaving the entire story of the clashing characters into one thing; while in the Logos the conflict of the divergent elements rises within the one element, the REASON-PRINCIPLE: the comparison therefore is rather with a harmony emerging directly from the conflicting elements themselves, and the question becomes what introduces clashing elements among these REASON-PRINCIPLEs. Enneads III,2,

Now in the case of music, tones high and low are the product of REASON-PRINCIPLEs which, by the fact that they are Principles of harmony, meet in the unit of Harmony, the absolute Harmony, a more comprehensive Principle, greater than they and including them as its parts. Similarly in the Universe at large we find contraries – white and black, hot and cold, winged and wingless, footed and footless, reasoning and unreasoning – but all these elements are members of one living body, their sum-total; the Universe is a self-accordant entity, its members everywhere clashing but the total being the manifestation of a REASON-PRINCIPLE. That one REASON-PRINCIPLE, then, must be the unification of conflicting REASON-PRINCIPLEs whose very opposition is the support of its coherence and, almost, of its Being. Enneads III,2,

And indeed, if it were not multiple, it could not be a Universal Principle, it could not even be at all a REASON-PRINCIPLE; in the fact of its being a REASON-PRINCIPLE is contained the fact of interior difference. Now the maximum of difference is contrariety; admitting that this differentiation exists and creates, it will create difference in the greatest and not in the least degree; in other words, the REASON-PRINCIPLE, bringing about differentiation to the uttermost degree, will of necessity create contrarieties: it will be complete only by producing itself not in merely diverse things but in contrary things. Enneads III,2,

The nature of the REASON-PRINCIPLE is adequately expressed in its Act and, therefore, the wider its extension the nearer will its productions approach to full contrariety: hence the world of sense is less a unity than is its REASON-PRINCIPLE; it contains a wider multiplicity and contrariety: its partial members will, therefore, be urged by a closer intention towards fullness of life, a warmer desire for unification. Enneads III,2,

But, surely, this excuses them? No; excuse lies with the REASON-PRINCIPLE – and the REASON-PRINCIPLE does not excuse them. Enneads III,2,

But these actors, Souls, hold a peculiar dignity: they act in a vaster place than any stage: the Author has made them masters of all this world; they have a wide choice of place; they themselves determine the honour or discredit in which they are agents since their place and part are in keeping with their quality: they therefore fit into the REASON-PRINCIPLE of the Universe, each adjusted, most legitimately, to the appropriate environment, as every string of the lyre is set in the precisely right position, determined by the Principle directing musical utterance, for the due production of the tones within its capacity. All is just and good in the Universe in which every actor is set in his own quite appropriate place, though it be to utter in the Darkness and in Tartarus the dreadful sounds whose utterance there is well. Enneads III,2,

Similarly the REASON-PRINCIPLE entire is One, but it is broken into unequal parts: hence the difference of place found in the Universe, better spots and worse; and hence the inequality of Souls, finding their appropriate surroundings amid this local inequality. The diverse places of this sphere, the Souls of unequal grade and unlike conduct, are wen exemplified by the distinction of parts in the Syrinx or any other instrument: there is local difference, but from every position every string gives forth its own tone, the sound appropriate, at once, to its particular place and to the entire plan. Enneads III,2,

Souls vary in worth; and the difference is due, among other causes, to an almost initial inequality; it is in reason that, standing to the REASON-PRINCIPLE, as parts, they should be unequal by the fact of becoming separate. Enneads III,2,

But does not this make it absurd to introduce Souls as responsible causes, some acting for good and some for evil? If we thus exonerate the REASON-PRINCIPLE from any part in wickedness do we not also cancel its credit for the good? Why not simply take the doings of these actors for representative parts of the REASON-PRINCIPLE as the doings of stage-actors are representative parts of the stage-drama? Why not admit that the REASON-PRINCIPLE itself includes evil action as much as good action, and inspires the precise conduct of all its representatives? Would not this be all the more Plausible in that the universal drama is the completer creation and that the REASON-PRINCIPLE is the source of all that exists? But this raises the question: “What motive could lead the Logos to produce evil?” Enneads III,2,

The explanation, also, would take away all power in the Universe from Souls, even those nearest to the divine; they would all be mere parts of a REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads III,2,

What is our answer? All events and things, good and evil alike, are included under the Universal REASON-PRINCIPLE of which they are parts – strictly “included” for this Universal Idea does not engender them but encompasses them. Enneads III,3,

Then the REASON-PRINCIPLE has measured things out with the set purpose of inequality? Certainly not: the inequality is inevitable by the nature of things: the REASON-PRINCIPLE of this Universe follows upon a phase of the Soul; the Soul itself follows upon an Intellectual Principle, and this Intellectual Principle is not one among the things of the Universe but is all things; in all things, there is implied variety of things; where there is variety and not identity there must be primals, secondaries, tertiaries and every grade downward. Forms of life, then, there must be that are not pure Soul but the dwindling of Souls enfeebled stage by stage of the process. There is, of course, a Soul in the REASON-PRINCIPLE constituting a living being, but it is another Soul (a lesser phase), not that (the Supreme Soul) from which the REASON-PRINCIPLE itself derives; and this combined vehicle of life weakens as it proceeds towards matter, and what it engenders is still more deficient. Consider how far the engendered stands from its origin and yet, what a marvel! Enneads III,3,

This does not, however, stand outside of Providence or of the Reason of the All; the Over-World cannot be dependent upon the World of Sense. The higher shines down upon the lower, and this illumination is Providence in its highest aspect: The REASON-PRINCIPLE has two phases, one which creates the things of process and another which links them with the higher beings: these higher beings constitute the over-providence on which depends that lower providence which is the secondary REASON-PRINCIPLE inseparably united with its primal: the two – the Major and Minor Providence – acting together produce the universal woof, the one all-comprehensive Providence. Enneads III,3,

For (in the case of an evil life) whether it is that the constitution of the man is such as to drive him down the troubled paths or whether (the fault is mental or spiritual in that) the desires have gained control, we are compelled to attribute the guilt to the substratum (something inferior to the highest principle in Man). We would be naturally inclined to say that this substratum (the responsible source of evil) must be Matter and not, as our argument implies, the REASON-PRINCIPLE; it would appear that not the REASON-PRINCIPLE but Matter were the dominant, crude Matter at the extreme and then Matter as shaped in the realized man: but we must remember that to this free Principle in man (which is a phase of the All Soul) the Substratum (the direct inferior to be moulded) is (not Matter but) the REASON-PRINCIPLE itself with whatever that produces and moulds to its own form, so that neither crude Matter nor Matter organized in our human total is sovereign within us. Enneads III,3,

The quality now manifested may be probably referred to the conduct of a former life; we may suppose that previous actions have made the REASON-PRINCIPLE now governing within us inferior in radiance to that which ruled before; the Soul which later will shine out again is for the present at a feebler power. Enneads III,3,

And any REASON-PRINCIPLE may be said to include within itself the REASON-PRINCIPLE of Matter which therefore it is able to elaborate to its own purposes, either finding it consonant with itself or bestowing upon it the quality which makes it so. The REASON-PRINCIPLE of an ox does not occur except in connection with the Matter appropriate to the ox-Kind. It must be by such a process that the transmigration, of which we read takes place; the Soul must lose its nature, the REASON-PRINCIPLE be transformed; thus there comes the ox-soul which once was Man. Enneads III,3,

But all sums to a unity, a comprehensive Providence. From the inferior grade downwards is Fate: the upper is Providence alone: for in the Intellectual Kosmos all is REASON-PRINCIPLE or its Priors-Divine Mind and unmingled Soul-and immediately upon these follows Providence which rises from Divine Mind, is the content of the Unmingled Soul, and, through this Soul, is communicated to the Sphere of living things. Enneads III,3,

This REASON-PRINCIPLE comes as a thing of unequal parts, and therefore its creations are unequal, as, for example, the several members of one Living Being. But after this allotment of rank and function, all act consonant with the will of the gods keeps the sequence and is included under the providential government, for the REASON-PRINCIPLE of providence is god-serving. Enneads III,3,

All such right-doing, then, is linked to Providence; but it is not therefore performed by it: men or other agents, living or lifeless, are causes of certain things happening, and any good that may result is taken up again by Providence. In the total, then, the right rules and what has happened amiss is transformed and corrected. Thus, to take an example from a single body, the Providence of a living organism implies its health; let it be gashed or otherwise wounded, and that REASON-PRINCIPLE which governs it sets to work to draw it together, knit it anew, heal it, and put the affected part to rights. Enneads III,3,

The act of the libertine is not done by Providence or in accordance with Providence; neither is the action of the good done by Providence – it is done by the man – but it is done in accordance with Providence, for it is an act consonant with the REASON-PRINCIPLE. Thus a patient following his treatment is himself an agent and yet is acting in accordance with the doctor’s method inspired by the art concerned with the causes of health and sickness: what one does against the laws of health is one’s act, but an act conflicting with the Providence of medicine. Enneads III,3,

But, if all this be true, how can evil fall within the scope of seership? The predictions of the seers are based on observation of the Universal Circuit: how can this indicate the evil with the good? Clearly the reason is that all contraries coalesce. Take, for example, Shape and Matter: the living being (of the lower order) is a coalescence of these two; so that to be aware of the Shape and the REASON-PRINCIPLE is to be aware of the Matter on which the Shape has been imposed. Enneads III,3,

The living-being of the compound order is not present (as pure and simple Idea) like the living being of the Intellectual order: in the compound entity, we are aware, at once, of the REASON-PRINCIPLE and of the inferior element brought under form. Now the Universe is such a compound living thing: to observe, therefore, its content is to be aware not less of its lower elements than of the Providence which operates within it. Enneads III,3,

This Providence reaches to all that comes into being; its scope therefore includes living things with their actions and states, the total of their history at once overruled by the REASON-PRINCIPLE and yet subject in some degree to Necessity. Enneads III,3,

This, then, is a union of Reason with something that is not Reason but a mere indeterminate striving in a being not yet illuminated: the offspring Love, therefore, is not perfect, not self-sufficient, but unfinished, bearing the signs of its parentage, the undirected striving and the self-sufficient Reason. This offspring is a REASON-PRINCIPLE but not purely so; for it includes within itself an aspiration ill-defined, unreasoned, unlimited – it can never be sated as long as it contains within itself that element of the Indeterminate. Love, then, clings to the Soul, from which it sprung as from the principle of its Being, but it is lessened by including an element of the REASON-PRINCIPLE which did not remain self-concentrated but blended with the indeterminate, not, it is true, by immediate contact but through its emanation. Love, therefore, is like a goad; it is without resource in itself; even winning its end, it is poor again. Enneads III,5,

But what are we to understand by this Zeus with the garden into which, we are told, Poros or Wealth entered? And what is the garden? We have seen that the Aphrodite of the Myth is the Soul and that Poros, Wealth, is the REASON-PRINCIPLE of the Universe: we have still to explain Zeus and his garden. Enneads III,5,

This Poros, Possession, then, is the REASON-PRINCIPLE of all that exists in the Intellectual Realm and in the supreme Intellect; but being more diffused, kneaded out as it were, it must touch Soul, be in Soul, (as the next lower principle). Enneads III,5,

For, all that lies gathered in the Intellect is native to it: nothing enters from without; but “Poros intoxicated” is some Power deriving satisfaction outside itself: what, then, can we understand by this member of the Supreme filled with Nectar but a REASON-PRINCIPLE falling from a loftier essence to a lower? This means that the REASON-PRINCIPLE upon “the birth of Aphrodite” left the Intellectual for the Soul, breaking into the garden of Zeus. Enneads III,5,

A garden is a place of beauty and a glory of wealth: all the loveliness that Zeus maintains takes its splendour from the REASON-PRINCIPLE within him; for all this beauty is the radiation of the Divine Intellect upon the Divine Soul, which it has penetrated. What could the Garden of Zeus indicate but the images of his Being and the splendours of his glory? And what could these divine splendours and beauties be but the Ideas streaming from him? These REASON-PRINCIPLEs – this Poros who is the lavishness, the abundance of Beauty – are at one and are made manifest; this is the Nectar-drunkenness. For the Nectar of the gods can be no other than what the god-nature essentially demands; and this is the Reason pouring down from the divine Mind. Enneads III,5,

The Intellectual Principle possesses Itself to satiety, but there is no “drunken” abandonment in this possession which brings nothing alien to it. But the REASON-PRINCIPLE – as its offspring, a later hypostasis – is already a separate Being and established in another Realm, and so is said to lie in the garden of this Zeus who is divine Mind; and this lying in the garden takes place at the moment when, in our way of speaking, Aphrodite enters the realm of Being. Enneads III,5,

If the Soul were material and had magnitude, it would be difficult, indeed quite impossible, to make it appear to be immune, unchangeable, when any of such emotions lodge in it. And even considering it as an Authentic Being, devoid of magnitude and necessarily indestructible, we must be very careful how we attribute any such experiences to it or we will find ourselves unconsciously making it subject to dissolution. If its essence is a Number or as we hold a REASON-PRINCIPLE, under neither head could it be susceptible of feeling. We can think, only, that it entertains unreasoned reasons and experiences unexperienced, all transmuted from the material frames, foreign and recognized only by parallel, so that it possesses in a kind of non-possession and knows affection without being affected. How this can be demands enquiry. Enneads III,6,

But how explain the alternation of timidity and daring in the initiative faculty? Timidity would come by the failure to look towards the REASON-PRINCIPLE or by looking towards some inferior phase of it or by some defect in the organs of action – some lack or flaw in the bodily equipment – or by outside prevention of the natural act or by the mere absence of adequate stimulus: boldness would arise from the reverse conditions: neither implies any change, or even any experience, in the Soul. Enneads III,6,

Matter is no Soul; it is not Intellect, is not Life, is no Ideal-Principle, no REASON-PRINCIPLE; it is no limit or bound, for it is mere indetermination; it is not a power, for what does it produce? It lives on the farther side of all these categories and so has no tide to the name of Being. It will be more plausibly called a non-being, and this in the sense not of movement (away from Being) or station (in Not-Being) but of veritable Not-Being, so that it is no more than the image and phantasm of Mass, a bare aspiration towards substantial existence; it is stationary but not in the sense of having position, it is in itself invisible, eluding all effort to observe it, present where no one can look, unseen for all our gazing, ceaselessly presenting contraries in the things based upon it; it is large and small, more and less, deficient and excessive; a phantasm unabiding and yet unable to withdraw – not even strong enough to withdraw, so utterly has it failed to accept strength from the Intellectual Principle, so absolute its lack of all Being. Enneads III,6,

Now the objects attracting the sun-rays to themselves – illuminated by a fire of the sense-order – are necessarily of the sense-order; there is perceptibility because there has been a union of things at once external to each other and continuous, contiguous, in direct contact, two extremes in one line. But the REASON-PRINCIPLE operating upon Matter is external to it only in a very different mode and sense: exteriority in this case is amply supplied by contrariety of essence and can dispense with any opposite ends (any question of lineal position); or, rather, the difference is one that actually debars any local extremity; sheer incongruity of essence, the utter failure in relationship, inhibits admixture (between Matter and any form of Being). Enneads III,6,

The (Universal) Soul – containing the Ideal Principles of Real-Beings, and itself an Ideal Principle – includes all in concentration within itself, just as the Ideal Principle of each particular entity is complete and self-contained: it, therefore, sees these principles of sensible things because they are turned, as it were, towards it and advancing to it: but it cannot harbour them in their plurality, for it cannot depart from its Kind; it sees them, therefore, stripped of Mass. Matter, on the contrary, destitute of resisting power since it has no Act of its own and is a mere shadow, can but accept all that an active power may choose to send. In what is thus sent, from the REASON-PRINCIPLE in the Intellectual Realm, there is already contained a degree of the partial object that is to be formed: in the image-making impulse within the REASON-PRINCIPLE there is already a step (towards the lower manifestation) or we may put it that the downward movement from the REASON-PRINCIPLE is a first form of the partial: utter absence of partition would mean no movement but (sterile) repose. Matter cannot be the home of all things in concentration as the Soul is: if it were so, it would belong to the Intellective Sphere. It must be all-recipient but not in that partless mode. It is to be the Place of all things, and it must therefore extend universally, offer itself to all things, serve to all interval: thus it will be a thing unconfined to any moment (of space or time) but laid out in submission to all that is to be. Enneads III,6,

But would we not expect that some one particularized form should occupy Matter (at once) and so exclude such others as are not able to enter into combination? No: for there is no first Idea except the Ideal Principle of the Universe – and, by this Idea, Matter is (the seat of) all things at once and of the particular thing in its parts – for the Matter of a living being is disparted according to the specific parts of the organism: if there were no such partition nothing would exist but the REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads III,6,

We may be answered that the REASON-PRINCIPLE is, no doubt, unmoved, but that the Nature-Principle, another being, operates by motion. Enneads III,8,

But, if Nature entire is in question here, it is identical with the REASON-PRINCIPLE; and any part of it that is unmoved is the REASON-PRINCIPLE. The Nature-Principle must be an Ideal-Form, not a compound of Form and Matter; there is no need for it to possess Matter, hot and cold: the Matter that underlies it, on which it exercises its creative act, brings all that with it, or, natively without quality, becomes hot and cold, and all the rest, when brought under Reason: Matter, to become fire, demands the approach not of fire but of a REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads III,8,

This is no slight evidence that in the animal and vegetable realms the REASON-PRINCIPLEs are the makers and that Nature is a REASON-PRINCIPLE producing a second REASON-PRINCIPLE, its offspring, which, in turn, while itself, still, remaining intact, communicates something to the underlie, Matter. Enneads III,8,

The REASON-PRINCIPLE presiding over visible Shape is the very ultimate of its order, a dead thing unable to produce further: that which produces in the created realm is the living REASON-PRINCIPLE – brother no doubt, to that which gives mere shape, but having life-giving power. Enneads III,8,

But if this REASON-PRINCIPLE (Nature) is in act – and produces by the process indicated – how can it have any part in Contemplation? To begin with, since in all its production it is stationary and intact, a REASON-PRINCIPLE self-indwelling, it is in its own nature a Contemplative act. All doing must be guided by an Idea, and will therefore be distinct from that Idea: the REASON-PRINCIPLE then, as accompanying and guiding the work, will be distinct from the work; not being action but REASON-PRINCIPLE it is, necessarily, Contemplation. Taking the REASON-PRINCIPLE, the Logos, in all its phases, the lowest and last springs from a mental act (in the higher Logos) and is itself a contemplation, though only in the sense of being contemplated, but above it stands the total Logos with its two distinguishable phases, first, that identified not as Nature but as All-Soul and, next, that operating in Nature and being itself the Nature-Principle. Enneads III,8,

And does this REASON-PRINCIPLE, Nature, spring from a contemplation? Wholly and solely? From self-contemplation, then? Or what are we to think? It derives from a Contemplation and some contemplating Being; how are we to suppose it to have Contemplation itself? The Contemplation springing from the reasoning faculty – that, I mean, of planning its own content, it does not possess. Enneads III,8,

But why not, since it is a phase of Life, a REASON-PRINCIPLE and a creative Power? Because to plan for a thing is to lack it: Nature does not lack; it creates because it possesses. Its creative act is simply its possession of it own characteristic Essence; now its Essence, since it is a REASON-PRINCIPLE, is to be at once an act of contemplation and an object of contemplation. In other words, the, Nature-Principle produces by virtue of being an act of contemplation, an object of contemplation and a REASON-PRINCIPLE; on this triple character depends its creative efficacy. Enneads III,8,

Further: suppose they succeed; they desired a certain thing to come about, not in order to be unaware of it but to know it, to see it present before the mind: their success is the laying up of a vision. We act for the sake of some good; this means not for something to remain outside ourselves, not in order that we possess nothing but that we may hold the good of the action. And hold it, where? Where but in the mind? Thus once more, action is brought back to contemplation: for (mind or) Soul is a REASON-PRINCIPLE and anything that one lays up in the Soul can be no other than a REASON-PRINCIPLE, a silent thing, the more certainly such a principle as the impression made is the deeper. Enneads III,8,

The Soul, once domiciled within that Idea and brought to likeness with it, becomes productive, active; what it always held by its primary nature it now grasps with knowledge and applies in deed, so becoming, as it were, a new thing and, informed as it now is by the purely intellectual, it sees (in its outgoing act) as a stranger looking upon a strange world. It was, no doubt, essentially a REASON-PRINCIPLE, even an Intellectual Principle; but its function is to see a (lower) realm which these do not see. Enneads III,8,

The Sage, then, is the man made over into a REASON-PRINCIPLE: to others he shows his act but in himself he is Vision: such a man is already set, not merely in regard to exterior things but also within himself, towards what is one and at rest: all his faculty and life are inward-bent. Enneads III,8,

But, if in the total the organization in which they have their being is compact of variety – as it must be since every REASON-PRINCIPLE is a unity of multiplicity and variety, and may be thought of as a psychic animated organism having many shapes at its command – if this is so and all constitutes a system in which being is not cut adrift from being, if there is nothing chance – borne among beings as there is none even in bodily organisms, then it follows that Number must enter into the scheme; for, once again, Being must be stable; the members of the Intellectual must possess identity, each numerically one; this is the condition of individuality. Where, as in bodily masses, the Idea is not essentially native, and the individuality is therefore in flux, existence under ideal form can rise only out of imitation of the Authentic Existences; these last, on the contrary, not rising out of any such conjunction (as the duality of Idea and dead Matter) have their being in that which is numerically one, that which was from the beginning, and neither becomes what it has not been nor can cease to be what it is. Enneads IV,3,

While the Soul (as an eternal, a Divine Being) is at rest – in rest firmly based on Repose, the Absolute – yet, as we may put it, that huge illumination of the Supreme pouring outwards comes at last to the extreme bourne of its light and dwindles to darkness; this darkness, now lying there beneath, the soul sees and by seeing brings to shape; for in the law of things this ultimate depth, neighbouring with soul, may not go void of whatsoever degree of that REASON-PRINCIPLE it can absorb, the dimmed reason of reality at its faintest. Enneads IV,3,

The kosmos is like a net which takes all its life, as far as ever it stretches, from being wet in the water, and has no act of its own; the sea rolls away and the net with it, precisely to the full of its scope, for no mesh of it can strain beyond its set place: the soul is of so far-reaching a nature – a thing unbounded – as to embrace the entire body of the All in the one extension; so far as the universe extends, there soul is; and if the universe had no existence, the extent of soul would be the same; it is eternally what it is. The universe spreads as broad as the presence of soul; the bound of its expansion is the point at which, in its downward egression from the Supreme, it still has soul to bind it in one: it is a shadow as broad as the REASON-PRINCIPLE proceeding from soul; and that REASON-PRINCIPLE is of scope to generate a kosmic bulk as vast as lay in the purposes of the Idea (the Divine forming power) which it conveys. Enneads IV,3,

We are not to think that the Soul acts upon the object by conformity to any external judgement; there is no pause for willing or planning: any such procedure would not be an act of sheer nature, but one of applied art: but art is of later origin than soul; it is an imitator, producing dim and feeble copies – toys, things of no great worth – and it is dependent upon all sorts of mechanism by which alone its images can be produced. The soul, on the contrary, is sovereign over material things by might of Real-Being; their quality is determined by its lead, and those elementary things cannot stand against its will. On the later level, things are hindered one by the other, and thus often fall short of the characteristic shape at which their unextended REASON-PRINCIPLE must be aiming; in that other world (under the soul but above the material) the entire shape (as well as the idea) comes from soul, and all that is produced takes and keeps its appointed place in a unity, so that the engendered thing, without labour as without clash, becomes all that it should be. In that world the soul has elaborated its creation, the images of the gods, dwellings for men, each existing to some peculiar purpose. Enneads IV,3,

It belongs to the nature of the All to make its entire content reproduce, most felicitously, the REASON-PRINCIPLEs in which it participates; every particular thing is the image within matter of a REASON-PRINCIPLE which itself images a pre-material REASON-PRINCIPLE: thus every particular entity is linked to that Divine Being in whose likeness it is made, the divine principle which the soul contemplated and contained in the act of each creation. Such mediation and representation there must have been since it was equally impossible for the created to be without share in the Supreme, and for the Supreme to descend into the created. Enneads IV,3,

For the container of the total of things must be a self-sufficing entity and remain so: in its periods it is wrought out to purpose under its REASON-PRINCIPLEs which are perdurably valid; by these periods it reverts unfailingly, in the measured stages of defined life-duration, to its established character; it is leading the things of this realm to be of one voice and plan with the Supreme. And thus the kosmic content is carried forward to its purpose, everything in its co-ordinate place, under one only REASON-PRINCIPLE operating alike in the descent and return of souls and to every purpose of the system. Enneads IV,3,

We may not think of some things being fitted into a system with others abandoned to the capricious; if things must happen by cause, by natural sequences, under one REASON-PRINCIPLE and a single set scheme, we must admit that the minor equally with the major is fitted into that order and pattern. Enneads IV,3,

Now, the faculty presiding over sensation and impulse is vested in the sensitive and representative soul; it draws upon the REASON-PRINCIPLE immediately above itself; downward, it is in contact with an inferior of its own: on this analogy the uppermost member of the living being was taken by the ancients to be obviously its seat; they lodged it in the brain, or not exactly in the brain but in that sensitive part which is the medium through which the REASON-PRINCIPLE impinges upon the brain. They saw that something must be definitely allocated to body – at the point most receptive of the act of reason – while something, utterly isolated from body must be in contact with that superior thing which is a form of soul (and not merely of the vegetative or other quasi-corporeal forms but) of that soul apt to the appropriation of the perceptions originating in the REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads IV,3,

But what of the memory of mental acts: do these also fall under the imaging faculty? If every mental act is accompanied by an image we may well believe that this image, fixed and like a picture of the thought, would explain how we remember the object of knowledge once entertained. But if there is no such necessary image, another solution must be sought. Perhaps memory would be the reception, into the image-taking faculty, of the REASON-PRINCIPLE which accompanies the mental conception: this mental conception – an indivisible thing, and one that never rises to the exterior of the consciousness – lies unknown below; the REASON-PRINCIPLE the revealer, the bridge between the concept and the image-taking faculty exhibits the concept as in a mirror; the apprehension by the image-taking faculty would thus constitute the enduring presence of the concept, would be our memory of it. Enneads IV,3,

What place, then, is there for reasoning, for calculation, what place for memory, where wisdom and knowledge are eternal, unfailingly present, effective, dominant, administering in an identical process? The fact that the product contains diversity and difference does not warrant the notion that the producer must be subject to corresponding variations. On the contrary, the more varied the product, the more certain the unchanging identity of the producer: even in the single animal the events produced by Nature are many and not simultaneous; there are the periods, the developments at fixed epochs – horns, beard, maturing breasts, the acme of life, procreation – but the principles which initially determined the nature of the being are not thereby annulled; there is process of growth, but no diversity in the initial principle. The identity underlying all the multiplicity is confirmed by the fact that the principle constituting the parent is exhibited unchanged, undiminished, in the offspring. We have reason, then, for thinking that one and the same wisdom envelops both, and that this is the unalterable wisdom of the kosmos taken as a whole; it is manifold, diverse and yet simplex, presiding over the most comprehensive of living beings, and in no wise altered within itself by this multiplicity, but stably one REASON-PRINCIPLE, the concentrated totality of things: if it were not thus all things, it would be a wisdom of the later and partial, not the wisdom of the Supreme. Enneads IV,4,

But what is the difference between the Wisdom thus conducting the universe and the principle known as Nature? This Wisdom is a first (within the All-Soul) while Nature is a last: for Nature is an image of that Wisdom, and, as a last in the soul, possesses only the last of the REASON-PRINCIPLE: we may imagine a thick waxen seal, in which the imprint has penetrated to the very uttermost film so as to show on both sides, sharp cut on the upper surface, faint on the under. Nature, thus, does not know, it merely produces: what it holds it passes, automatically, to its next; and this transmission to the corporeal and material constitutes its making power: it acts as a thing warmed, communicating to what lies in next contact to it the principle of which it is the vehicle so as to make that also warm in some less degree. Enneads IV,4,

But if in the soul thing follows thing, if there is earlier and later in its productions, if it engenders or creates in time, then it must be looking towards the future; and if towards the future, then towards the past as well? No: prior and past are in the things its produces; in itself nothing is past; all, as we have said, is one simultaneous grouping of REASON-PRINCIPLEs. In the engendered, dissimilarity is not compatible with unity, though in the REASON-PRINCIPLEs supporting the engendered such unity of dissimilars does occur – hand and foot are in unity in the REASON-PRINCIPLE (of man), but apart in the realm of sense. Of course, even in that ideal realm there is apartness, but in a characteristic mode, just as in a mode, there is priority. Enneads IV,4,

The Circuit does not go by chance but under the REASON-PRINCIPLE of the living whole; therefore there must be a harmony between cause and caused; there must be some order ranging things to each other’s purpose, or in due relation to each other: every several configuration within the Circuit must be accompanied by a change in the position and condition of things subordinate to it, which thus by their varied rhythmic movement make up one total dance-play. Enneads IV,4,

Now the movement is guided by a REASON-PRINCIPLE; the relations of the living whole are altered in consequence; here in our own realm all that happens reacts in sympathy to the events of that higher sphere: it becomes, therefore, advisable to ask whether we are to think of this realm as following upon the higher by agreement, or to attribute to the configurations the powers underlying the events, and whether such powers would be vested in the configurations simply or in the relations of the particular items. Enneads IV,4,

No: the REASON-PRINCIPLE of the universe would be better envisaged as a wisdom uttering order and law to a state, in full knowledge of what the citizens will do and why, and in perfect adaptation of law to custom; thus the code is made to thread its way in and out through all their conditions and actions with the honour or infamy earned by their conduct; and all coalesces by a kind of automatism. Enneads IV,4,

The Soul is the REASON-PRINCIPLE of the universe, ultimate among the Intellectual Beings – its own essential Nature is one of the Beings of the Intellectual Realm – but it is the primal REASON-PRINCIPLE of the entire realm of sense. Enneads IV,6,

Body – not merely because it is a composite, but even were it simplex – could not exist unless there were soul in the universe, for body owes its being to the entrance of a REASON-PRINCIPLE into Matter, and only from soul can a REASON-PRINCIPLE come. Enneads IV,7,

If on the contrary this “configuration” is really existent – something distinct from the underlie or Matter, something residing in Matter but itself immaterial as not constructed out of Matter, then it must be a REASON-PRINCIPLE, incorporeal, a separate Nature. Enneads IV,7,

The Dyad is a secondary; deriving from unity, it finds in unity the determinant needed by its native indetermination: once there is any determination, there is Number, in the sense, of course, of the real (the archetypal) Number. And the soul is such a number or quantity. For the Primals are not masses or magnitudes; all of that gross order is later, real only to the sense-thought; even in seed the effective reality is not the moist substance but the unseen – that is to say Number (as the determinant of individual being) and the REASON-PRINCIPLE (of the product to be). Enneads: V I

Yet any offspring of the Intellectual-Principle must be a REASON-PRINCIPLE; the thought of the Divine Mind must be a substantial existence: such then is that (Soul) which circles about the Divine Mind, its light, its image inseparably attached to it: on the upper level united with it, filled from it, enjoying it, participant in its nature, intellective with it, but on the lower level in contact with the realm beneath itself, or, rather, generating in turn an offspring which must lie beneath; of this lower we will treat later; so far we deal still with the Divine. Enneads: V I

Our way is to teach our soul how the Intellectual-Principle exercises self-vision; the phase thus to be taught is that which already touches the intellective order, that which we call the understanding or intelligent soul, indicating by the very name that it is already of itself in some degree an Intellectual-Principle or that it holds its peculiar power through and from that Principle. This phase must be brought to understand by what means it has knowledge of the thing it sees and warrant for what it affirms: if it became what it affirms, it would by that fact possess self-knowing. All its vision and affirmation being in the Supreme or deriving from it – There where itself also is – it will possess self-knowledge by its right as a REASON-PRINCIPLE, claiming its kin and bringing all into accord with the divine imprint upon it. Enneads V,3,

Now comes the question what sort of thing does the Intellectual-Principle see in seeing the Intellectual Realm and what in seeing itself? We are not to look for an Intellectual realm reminding us of the colour or shape to be seen on material objects: the intellectual antedates all such things; and even in our sphere the production is very different from the REASON-PRINCIPLE in the seeds from which it is produced. The seed principles are invisible and the beings of the Intellectual still more characteristically so; the Intellectuals are of one same nature with the Intellectual Realm which contains them, just as the REASON-PRINCIPLE in the seed is identical with the soul, or life-principle, containing it. Enneads V,3,

May we think, perhaps, that the First contained the universe as an indistinct total whose items are elaborated to distinct existence within the Second by the REASON-PRINCIPLE there? That Second is certainly an Activity; the Transcendent would contain only the potentiality of the universe to come. Enneads V,3,

Still, how can a REASON-PRINCIPLE (the Intellectual), characteristically a manifold, a total, derive from what is obviously no REASON-PRINCIPLE? But how, failing such origin in the simplex, could we escape (what cannot be accepted) the derivation of a REASON-PRINCIPLE from a REASON-PRINCIPLE? And how does the secondarily good (the imaged Good) derive from The Good, the Absolute? What does it hold from the Absolute Good to entitle it to the name? Similarity to the prior is not enough, it does not help towards goodness; we demand similarity only to an actually existent Good: the goodness must depend upon derivation from a Prior of such a nature that the similarity is desirable because that Prior is good, just as the similarity would be undesirable if the Prior were not good. Enneads V,3,

But if (in virtue of this periodic return) each archetype may be reproduced by numerous existents, what need is there that there be distinct REASON-PRINCIPLEs and archetypes for each existent in any one period? Might not one (archetypal) man suffice for all, and similarly a limited number of souls produce a limitless number of men? No: one REASON-PRINCIPLE cannot account for distinct and differing individuals: one human being does not suffice as the exemplar for many distinct each from the other not merely in material constituents but by innumerable variations of ideal type: this is no question of various pictures or images reproducing an original Socrates; the beings produced differ so greatly as to demand distinct REASON-PRINCIPLEs. The entire soul-period conveys with it all the requisite REASON-PRINCIPLEs, and so too the same existents appear once more under their action. Enneads V,7,

But individuals are brought into being by the union of the REASON-PRINCIPLEs of the parents, male and female: this seems to do away with a definite REASON-PRINCIPLE for each of the offspring: one of the parents – the male let us say – is the source; and the offspring is determined not by REASON-PRINCIPLEs differing from child to child but by one only, the father’s or that of the father’s father. Enneads V,7,

No: a distinct REASON-PRINCIPLE may be the determinant for the child since the parent contains all: they would become effective at different times. Enneads V,7,

In the case of twin birth among human beings how can we make out the REASON-PRINCIPLEs to be different; and still more when we turn to the animals and especially those with litters? Where the young are precisely alike, there is one REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads V,7,

The consideration of Quantity brings the same result: If production is undetermined in regard to Quantity, each thing has its distinct REASON-PRINCIPLE: if there is a measured system the Quantity has been determined by the unrolling and unfolding of the REASON-PRINCIPLEs of all the existences. Enneads V,7,

Art, then, creating in the image of its own nature and content, and working by the Idea or REASON-PRINCIPLE of the beautiful object it is to produce, must itself be beautiful in a far higher and purer degree since it is the seat and source of that beauty, indwelling in the art, which must naturally be more complete than any comeliness of the external. In the degree in which the beauty is diffused by entering into matter, it is so much the weaker than that concentrated in unity; everything that reaches outwards is the less for it, strength less strong, heat less hot, every power less potent, and so beauty less beautiful. Enneads V,8,

Thus there is in the Nature-Principle itself an Ideal archetype of the beauty that is found in material forms and, of that archetype again, the still more beautiful archetype in Soul, source of that in Nature. In the proficient soul this is brighter and of more advanced loveliness: adorning the soul and bringing to it a light from that greater light which is beauty primally, its immediate presence sets the soul reflecting upon the quality of this prior, the archetype which has no such entries, and is present nowhere but remains in itself alone, and thus is not even to be called a REASON-PRINCIPLE but is the creative source of the very first REASON-PRINCIPLE which is the Beauty to which Soul serves as Matter. Enneads V,8,

Now, if we could think of this as the primal wisdom, we need look no further, since, at that, we have discovered a principle which is neither a derivative nor a “stranger in something strange to it.” But if we are told that, while this REASON-PRINCIPLE is in Nature, yet Nature itself is its source, we ask how Nature came to possess it; and, if Nature derived it from some other source, we ask what that other source may be; if, on the contrary, the principle is self-sprung, we need look no further: but if we are referred to the Intellectual-Principle we must make clear whether the Intellectual-Principle engendered the wisdom: if we learn that it did, we ask whence: if from itself, then inevitably, it is itself Wisdom. Enneads V,8,

We take it, then, that the Intellectual-Principle is the authentic existences and contains them all – not as in a place but as possessing itself and being one thing with this its content. All are one there and yet are distinct: similarly the mind holds many branches and items of knowledge simultaneously, yet none of them merged into any other, each acting its own part at call quite independently, every conception coming out from the inner total and working singly. It is after this way, though in a closer unity, that the Intellectual-Principle is all Being in one total – and yet not in one, since each of these beings is a distinct power which, however, the total Intellectual-Principle includes as the species in a genus, as the parts in a whole. This relation may be illustrated by the powers in seed; all lies undistinguished in the unit, the formative ideas gathered as in one kernel; yet in that unit there is eye-principle, and there is hand-principle, each of which is revealed as a separate power by its distinct material product. Thus each of the powers in the seed is a REASON-PRINCIPLE one and complete yet including all the parts over which it presides: there will be something bodily, the liquid, for example, carrying mere Matter; but the principle itself is Idea and nothing else, idea identical with the generative idea belonging to the lower soul, image of a higher. This power is sometimes designated as Nature in the seed-life; its origin is in the divine; and, outgoing from its priors as light from fire, it converts and shapes the matter of things, not by push and pull and the lever work of which we hear so much, but by bestowal of the Ideas. Enneads V,8,

Given the REASON-PRINCIPLE (the outgoing divine Idea) of a certain living thing and the Matter to harbour this seed-principle, the living thing must come into being: in the same way once there exists – an intellective Nature, all powerful, and with nothing to check it – since nothing intervenes between it and that which is of a nature to receive it – inevitably the higher imprints form and the lower accepts, it. The recipient holds the Idea in division, here man, there sun, while in the giver all remains in unity. Enneads V,8,

Now as to the arts and crafts and their productions: The imitative arts – painting, sculpture, dancing, pantomimic gesturing – are, largely, earth-based; on an earthly base; they follow models found in sense, since they copy forms and movements and reproduce seen symmetries; they cannot therefore be referred to that higher sphere except indirectly, through the REASON-PRINCIPLE in humanity. Enneads V,8,

It must be observed that the Ideas will be of universals; not of Socrates but of Man: though as to man we may enquire whether the individual may not also have place There. Under the heading of individuality there is to be considered the repetition of the same feature from man to man, the simian type, for example, and the aquiline: the aquiline and the simian must be taken to be differences in the Idea of Man as there are different types of the animal: but Matter also has its effect in bringing about the degree of aquilinity. Similarly with difference of complexion, determined partly by the REASON-PRINCIPLE, partly by Matter and by diversity of place. Enneads V,8,

It follows that in the cases specified above – agent, knowledge and the rest – the relation must be considered as in actual operation, and the Act and the REASON-PRINCIPLE in the Act must be assumed to be real: in all other cases there will be simply participation in an Ideal-Form, in a REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads: VI I

Measurement is an Act of the measurer upon the measured object: it too is therefore a kind of REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads: VI I

Now if the condition of being related is regarded as a Form having a generic unity, Relation must be allowed to be a single genus owing its reality to a REASON-PRINCIPLE involved in all instances. If however the REASON-PRINCIPLEs (governing the correlatives) stand opposed and have the differences to which we have referred, there may perhaps not be a single genus, but this will not prevent all relatives being expressed in terms of a certain likeness and falling under a single category. Enneads: VI I

Qualities in the true sense – those, that is, which determine qualia – being in accordance with our definition powers, will in virtue of this common ground be a kind of REASON-PRINCIPLE; they will also be in a sense Forms, that is, excellences and imperfections whether of soul or of body. Enneads: VI I

Again, not all qualities can be regarded as REASON-PRINCIPLEs: chronic disease cannot be a REASON-PRINCIPLE. Perhaps, however, we must speak in such cases of privations, restricting the term “Quantities” to Ideal-Forms and powers. Thus we shall have, not a single genus, but reference only to the unity of a category. Knowledge will be regarded as a Form and a power, ignorance as a privation and powerlessness. Enneads: VI I

But if Quality is determined by formation and characteristic and REASON-PRINCIPLE, how explain the various cases of powerlessness and deformity? Doubtless we must think of Principles imperfectly present, as in the case of deformity. And disease – how does that imply a REASON-PRINCIPLE? Here, no doubt, we must think of a principle disturbed, the Principle of health. Enneads: VI I

But it is not necessary that all qualities involve a REASON-PRINCIPLE; it suffices that over and above the various kinds of disposition there exist a common element distinct from Substance, and it is what comes after the substance that constitutes Quality in an object. Enneads: VI I

And what part is played by the individual form? If it constitutes the individual’s specific character, it is not a quality; if, however, it is what makes an object beautiful or ugly after the specific form has been determined, then it involves a REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads: VI I

Suppose however Passion to be a different motion from Action: how then does its modification of the patient object change that patient’s character without the agent being affected by the patient? For obviously an agent cannot be passive to the operation it performs upon another. Can it be that the fact of motion existing elsewhere creates the Passion, which was not Passion in the agent? If the whiteness of the swan, produced by its REASON-PRINCIPLE, is given at its birth, are we to affirm Passion of the swan on its passing into being? If, on the contrary, the swan grows white after birth, and if there is a cause of that growth and the corresponding result, are we to say that the growth is a Passion? Or must we confine Passion to purely qualitative change? One thing confers beauty and another takes it: is that which takes beauty to be regarded as patient? If then the source of beauty – tin, suppose – should deteriorate or actually disappear, while the recipient – copper – improves, are we to think of the copper as passive and the tin active? Take the learner: how can he be regarded as passive, seeing that the Act of the agent passes into him (and becomes his Act)? How can the Act, necessarily a simple entity, be both Act and Passion? No doubt the Act is not in itself a Passion; nonetheless, the learner coming to possess it will be a patient by the fact of his appropriation of an experience from outside: he will not, of course, be a patient in the sense of having himself performed no Act; learning – like seeing – is not analogous to being struck, since it involves the acts of apprehension and recognition. Enneads: VI I

We then ask whether the plurality here consists of the REASON-PRINCIPLEs of the things of process. Or is this unity not something different from the mere sum of these Principles? Certainly Soul itself is one REASON-PRINCIPLE, the chief of the REASON-PRINCIPLEs, and these are its Act as it functions in accordance with its essential being; this essential being, on the other hand, is the potentiality of the REASON-PRINCIPLEs. This is the mode in which this unity is a plurality, its plurality being revealed by the effect it has upon the external. Enneads VI,2,

One, in the sense of being one REASON-PRINCIPLE? No; it is the substrate of Soul that is one, though one in such a way as to be also two or more – as many as are the Primaries which constitute Soul. Either, then, it is life as well as Substance, or else it possesses life. Enneads VI,2,

Now Motion, thus manifested in conjunction with Being, does not alter Being’s nature – unless to complete its essential character – and it does retain for ever its own peculiar nature: at once, then, we are forced to introduce Stability. To reject Stability would be more unreasonable than to reject Motion; for Stability is associated in our thought and conception with Being even more than with Motion; unalterable condition, unchanging mode, single REASON-PRINCIPLE – these are characteristics of the higher sphere. Enneads VI,2,

How then does the universal Intellect produce the particulars while, in virtue of its REASON-PRINCIPLE, remaining a unity? In other words, how do the various grades of Being, as we call them, arise from the four primaries? Here is this great, this infinite Intellect, not given to idle utterance but to sheer intellection, all-embracing, integral, no part, no individual: how, we ask, can it possibly be the source of all this plurality? Number at all events it possesses in the objects of its contemplation: it is thus one and many, and the many are powers, wonderful powers, not weak but, being pure, supremely great and, so to speak, full to overflowing powers in very truth, knowing no limit, so that they are infinite, infinity, Magnitude-Absolute. Enneads VI,2,

But though Intellect possesses them all by way of thought, this is not discursive thought: nothing it lacks that is capable of serving as REASON-PRINCIPLE, while it may itself be regarded as one great and perfect REASON-PRINCIPLE, holding all the Principles as one and proceeding from its own Primaries, or rather having eternally proceeded, so that “proceeding” is never true of it. It is a universal rule that whatever reasoning discovers to exist in Nature is to be found in Intellect apart from all ratiocination: we conclude that Being has so created Intellect that its reasoning is after a mode similar to that of the Principles which produce living beings; for the REASON-PRINCIPLEs, prior to reasoning though they are, act invariably in the manner which the most careful reasoning would adopt in order to attain the best results. Enneads VI,2,

If Soul acts as a genus or a species, the various (particular) souls must act as species. Their activities (Acts) will be twofold: the activity upward is Intellect; that which looks downward constitutes the other powers imposed by the particular REASON-PRINCIPLE (the REASON-PRINCIPLE of the being ensouled); the lowest activity of Soul is in its contact with Matter to which it brings Form. Enneads VI,2,

We may, again, regard Form as the creator of Substance and make the REASON-PRINCIPLE of Substance dependent upon Form: yet we do not come thereby to an understanding of the nature of Substance. Enneads VI,3,

But Matter, it may be contended, is the source of existence to the Sensible things implanted in it. From what source, then, we retort, does Matter itself derive existence and being? That Matter is not a Primary we have established elsewhere. If it be urged that other things can have no subsistence without being implanted in Matter, we admit the claim for Sensible things. But though Matter be prior to these, it is not thereby precluded from being posterior to many things-posterior, in fact, to all the beings of the Intellectual sphere. Its existence is but a pale reflection, and less complete than that of the things implanted in it. These are REASON-PRINCIPLEs and more directly derived from Being: Matter has of itself no REASON-PRINCIPLE whatever; it is but a shadow of a Principle, a vain attempt to achieve a Principle. Enneads VI,3,

We may be told that Man (the universal) is Form alone, Socrates Form in Matter. But on this very ground Socrates will be less fully Man than the universal; for the REASON-PRINCIPLE will be less effectual in Matter. If, on the contrary, Man is not determined by Form alone, but presupposes Matter, what deficiency has Man in comparison with the material manifestation of Man, or the REASON-PRINCIPLE in isolation as compared with its embodiment in a unit of Matter? Besides, the more general is by nature prior; hence, the Form-Idea is prior to the individual: but what is prior by nature is prior unconditionally. How then can the Form take a lower rank? The individual, it is true, is prior in the sense of being more readily accessible to our cognisance; this fact, however, entails no objective difference. Enneads VI,3,

Moreover, such a difference, if established, would be incompatible with a single REASON-PRINCIPLE of Substance; First and Second Substance could not have the same Principle, nor be brought under a single genus. Enneads VI,3,

In sum, just as there is a REASON-PRINCIPLE of Beauty, so there must be a REASON-PRINCIPLE of greatness, participation in which makes a thing great, as the Principle of beauty makes it beautiful. Enneads VI,3,

We have spoken of Quality as combining with other entities, Matter and Quantity, to form the complete Sensible Substance; this Substance, so called, may be supposed to constitute the manifold world of Sense, which is not so much an essence as a quale. Thus, for the essence of fire we must look to the REASON-PRINCIPLE; what produces the visible aspect is, properly speaking, a quale. Enneads VI,3,

Man’s essence will lie in his REASON-PRINCIPLE; that which is perfected in the corporeal nature is a mere image of the REASON-PRINCIPLE a quale rather than an essence. Enneads VI,3,

Consider: the visible Socrates is a man, yet we give the name of Socrates to that likeness of him in a portrait, which consists of mere colours, mere pigments: similarly, it is a REASON-PRINCIPLE which constitutes Socrates, but we apply the name Socrates to the Socrates we see: in truth, however, the colours and shapes which make up the visible Socrates are but reproductions of those in the REASON-PRINCIPLE, while this REASON-PRINCIPLE itself bears a corresponding relation to the truest REASON-PRINCIPLE of Man. But we need not elaborate this point. Enneads VI,3,

But the beauty in the germ, in the particular REASON-PRINCIPLE – is this the same as the manifested beauty, or do they coincide only in name? Are we to assign this beauty – and the same question applies to deformity in the soul – to the Intellectual order, or to the Sensible? That beauty is different in the two spheres is by now clear. If it be embraced in Sensible Quality, then virtue must also be classed among the qualities of the lower. But merely some virtues will take rank as Sensible, others as Intellectual qualities. Enneads VI,3,

But we refrain from assigning Soul to Sensible Substance, on the ground that we have already referred to Quality (which is Sensible) those affections of Soul which are related to body. On the contrary, Soul, conceived apart from affection and REASON-PRINCIPLE, we have restored to its origin, leaving in the lower realm no substance which is in any sense Intellectual. Enneads VI,3,

But would not this indicate that the Authentic is diverse, multiple? That diversity is simplex still; that multiple is one; for it is a REASON-PRINCIPLE, which is to say a unity in variety: all Being is one; the differing being is still included in Being; the differentiation is within Being, obviously not within non-Being. Being is bound up with the unity which is never apart from it; wheresoever Being appears, there appears its unity; and the unity of Being is self-standing, for presence in the sensible does not abrogate independence: things of sense are present to the Intellectual – where this occurs – otherwise than as the Intellectual is present within itself; so, too, body’s presence to soul differs from that of knowledge to soul; one item of knowledge is present in a different way than another; a body’s presence to body is, again, another form of relation. Enneads VI,4,

Now if this principle is to be a true unity – where the unity is of the essence – it must in some way be able to manifest itself as including the contrary nature, that of potential multiplicity, while by the fact that this multiplicity belongs to it not as from without but as from and by itself, it remains authentically one, possessing boundlessness and multiplicity within that unity; its nature must be such that it can appear as a whole at every point; this, as encircled by a single self-embracing REASON-PRINCIPLE, which holds fast about that unity, never breaking with itself but over all the universe remaining what it must be. Enneads VI,5,

We ask first whether man as here is a REASON-PRINCIPLE different to that soul which produces him as here and gives him life and thought; or is he that very soul or, again, the (yet lower) soul using the human body? Now if man is a reasonable living being and by “living being” is meant a conjoint of soul and body, the REASON-PRINCIPLE of man is not identical with soul. But if the conjoint of soul and body is the reason-principle of man, how can man be an eternal reality, seeing that it is only when soul and body have come together that the REASON-PRINCIPLE so constituted appears? The REASON-PRINCIPLE will be the foreteller of the man to be, not the Man Absolute with which we are dealing but more like his definition, and not at that indicating his nature since what is indicated is not the Idea that is to enter Matter but only that of the known thing, the conjoint. We have not yet found the Man we are seeking, the equivalent of the REASON-PRINCIPLE. Enneads VI,7,

But – it may be said – the REASON-PRINCIPLE of such beings must be some conjoint, one element in another. Enneads VI,7,

This does not define the principle of either. If we are to state with entire accuracy the REASON-PRINCIPLEs of the Forms in Matter and associated with Matter, we cannot pass over the generative REASON-PRINCIPLE, in this case that of Man, especially since we hold that a complete definition must cover the essential manner of being. Enneads VI,7,

What, then, is this essential of Man? What is the indwelling, inseparable something which constitutes Man as here? Is the REASON-PRINCIPLE itself a reasoning living being or merely a maker of that reasoning life-form? and what is it apart from that act of making? The living being corresponds to a reasoning life in the REASON-PRINCIPLE; man therefore is a reasoning life: but there is no life without soul; either, then, the soul supplies the reasoning life – and man therefore is not an essence but simply an activity of the soul – or the soul is the man. Enneads VI,7,

Man, thus, must be some REASON-PRINCIPLE other than soul. But why should he not be some conjoint – a soul in a certain REASON-PRINCIPLE – the REASON-PRINCIPLE being, as it were, a definite activity which however could not exist without that which acts? This is the case with the REASON-PRINCIPLEs in seed which are neither soulless nor entirely soul. For these productive principles cannot be devoid of soul and there is nothing surprising in such essences being REASON-PRINCIPLEs. Enneads VI,7,

The Man of the realm of birth has sense-perception: the higher soul enters to bestow a brighter life, or rather does not so much enter as simply impart itself; for soul does not leave the Intellectual but, maintaining that contact, holds the lower life as pendant from it, blending with it by the natural link of REASON-PRINCIPLE to REASON-PRINCIPLE: and man, the dimmer, brightens under that illumination. Enneads VI,7,

But how can that higher soul have sense-perception? It is the perception of what falls under perception There, sensation in the mode of that realm: it is the source of the soul’s perception of the sense-realm in its correspondence with the Intellectual. Man as sense-percipient becomes aware of that correspondence and accommodates the sense-realm to the lowest extremity of its counterpart There, proceeding from the fire Intellectual to the fire here which becomes perceptible by its analogy with that of the higher sphere. If material things existed There, the soul would perceive them; Man in the Intellectual, Man as Intellectual soul, would be aware of the terrestrial. This is how the secondary Man, copy of Man in the Intellectual, contains the REASON-PRINCIPLEs in copy; and Man in the Intellectual-Principle contained the Man that existed before any man. The diviner shines out upon the secondary and the secondary upon the tertiary; and even the latest possesses them all – not in the sense of actually living by them all but as standing in under-parallel to them. Some of us act by this lowest; in another rank there is a double activity, a trace of the higher being included; in yet another there is a blending of the third grade with the others: each is that Man by which he acts while each too contains all the grades, though in some sense not so. On the separation of the third life and third Man from the body, then if the second also departs – of course not losing hold on the Above – the two, as we are told, will occupy the same place. No doubt it seems strange that a soul which has been the REASON-PRINCIPLE of a man should come to occupy the body of an animal: but the soul has always been all, and will at different times be this and that. Enneads VI,7,

When a soul which in the human state has been thus attached chooses animal nature and descends to that, it is giving forth the REASON-PRINCIPLE – necessarily in it – of that particular animal: this lower it contained and the activity has been to the lower. Enneads VI,7,

The power of the All-Soul, as REASON-PRINCIPLE of the universe, may be considered as laying down a pattern before the effective separate powers go forth from it: this plan would be something like a tentative illumining of Matter; the elaborating soul would give minute articulation to these representations of itself; every separate effective soul would become that towards which it tended, assuming that particular form as the choral dancer adapts himself to the action set down for him. Enneads VI,7,

But why are they not at man’s level of reason: why also the difference from man to man? We must reflect that, since the many forms of lives are movements – and so with the Intellections – they cannot be identical: there must be different lives, distinct intellections, degrees of lightsomeness and clarity: there must be firsts, seconds, thirds, determined by nearness to the Firsts. This is how some of the Intellections are gods, others of a secondary order having what is here known as reason, while others again belong to the so-called unreasoning: but what we know here as unreasoning was There a REASON-PRINCIPLE; the unintelligent was an Intellect; the Thinker of Horse was Intellect and the Thought, Horse, was an Intellect. Enneads VI,7,

If all were one identity, the total could not contain this variety of forms; there would be nothing but a self-sufficing unity. Like every compound it must consist of things progressively differing in form and safeguarded in that form. This is in the very nature of shape and REASON-PRINCIPLE; a shape, that of man let us suppose, must include a certain number of differences of part but all dominated by a unity; there will be the noble and the inferior, eye and finger, but all within a unity; the part will be inferior in comparison with the total but best in its place. The REASON-PRINCIPLE, too, is at once the living form and something else, something distinct from the being of that form. It is so with virtue also; it contains at once the universal and the particular; and the total is good because the universal is not differentiated. Enneads VI,7,

The very heavens, patently multiple, cannot be thought to disdain any form of life since this universe holds everything. Now how do these things come to be here? Does the higher realm contain all of the lower? All that has been shaped by REASON-PRINCIPLE and conforms to Idea. Enneads VI,7,

But, having fire (warmth) and water, it will certainly have vegetation; how does vegetation exist There? Earth, too? either these are alive or they are There as dead things and then not everything There has life. How in sum can the things of this realm be also There? Vegetal life we can well admit, for the plant is a REASON-PRINCIPLE established in life. If in the plant the REASON-PRINCIPLE, entering Matter and constituting the plant, is a certain form of life, a definite soul, then, since every REASON-PRINCIPLE is a unity, then either this of plant-life is the primal or before it there is a primal plant, source of its being: that first plant would be a unity; those here, being multiple, must derive from a unity. This being so, that primal must have much the truer life and be the veritable plant, the plants here deriving from it in the secondary and tertiary degree and living by a vestige of its life. Enneads VI,7,

But earth; how is there earth There: what is the being of earth and how are we to represent to ourselves the living earth of that realm? First, what is it, what the mode of its being? Earth, here and There alike, must possess shape and a REASON-PRINCIPLE. Now in the case of the vegetal, the REASON-PRINCIPLE of the plant here was found to be living in that higher realm: is there such a REASON-PRINCIPLE in our earth? Take the most earthy of things found shaped in earth and they exhibit, even they, the indwelling earth-principle. The growing and shaping of stones, the internal moulding of mountains as they rise, reveal the working of an ensouled REASON-PRINCIPLE fashioning them from within and bringing them to that shape: this, we must take it, is the creative earth-principle corresponding to what we call the specific principle of a tree; what we know as earth is like the wood of the tree; to cut out a stone is like lopping a twig from a tree, except of course that there is no hurt done, the stone remaining a member of the earth as the twig, uncut, of the tree. Enneads VI,7,

Realizing thus that the creative force inherent in our earth is life within a REASON-PRINCIPLE, we are easily convinced that the earth There is much more primally alive, that it is a reasoned Earth-Livingness, the earth of Real-Being, earth primally, the source of ours. Enneads VI,7,

Fire, similarly, with other such things, must be a REASON-PRINCIPLE established in Matter: fire certainly does not originate in the friction to which it may be traced; the friction merely brings out a fire already existent in the scheme and contained in the materials rubbed together. Matter does not in its own character possess this fire-power: the true cause is something informing the Matter, that is to say, a REASON-PRINCIPLE, obviously therefore a soul having the power of bringing fire into being; that is, a life and a REASON-PRINCIPLE in one. Enneads VI,7,

There is infinity in Intellectual-Principle since, of its very nature, it is a multiple unity, not with the unity of a house but with that of a REASON-PRINCIPLE, multiple in itself: in the one Intellectual design it includes within itself, as it were in outline, all the outlines, all the patterns. All is within it, all the powers and intellections; the division is not determined by a boundary but goes ever inward; this content is held as the living universe holds the natural forms of the living creatures in it from the greatest to the least, down even to the minutest powers where there is a halt at the individual form. The discrimination is not of items huddled within a sort of unity; this is what is known as the Universal Sympathy, not of course the sympathy known here which is a copy and prevails amongst things in separation; that authentic Sympathy consists in all being a unity and never discriminate. Enneads VI,7,

Thus Intellectual-Principle is a vestige of the Supreme; but since the vestige is a Form going out into extension, into plurality, that Prior, as the source of Form, must be itself without shape and Form: if the Prior were a Form, the Intellectual-Principle itself could be only a REASON-PRINCIPLE. It was necessary that The First be utterly without multiplicity, for otherwise it must be again referred to a prior. Enneads VI,7,

Are we to determine the good by the respective values of things? This is to make Idea and REASON-PRINCIPLE the test: all very well; but arrived at these, what explanation have we to give as to why Idea and REASON-PRINCIPLE themselves are good? In the lower, we recognise goodness – in its less perfect form – by comparison with what is poorer still; we are without a standard There where no evil exists, the Bests holding the field alone. Reason demands to know what constitutes goodness; those principles are good in their own nature and we are left in perplexity because cause and fact are identical: and even though we should state a cause, the doubt still remains until our reason claims its rights There. But we need not abandon the search; another path may lead to the light. Enneads VI,7,

Now if there is thus an Intellectual-Principle before all things, their founding principle, this cannot be a thing lying subject to chance – multiple, no doubt, but a concordance, ordered so to speak into oneness. Such a multiple – the co-ordination of all particulars and consisting of all the REASON-PRINCIPLEs of the universe gathered into the closest union – this cannot be a thing of chance, a thing “happening so to be.” It must be of a very different nature, of the very contrary nature, separated from the other by all the difference between reason and reasonless chance. And if the Source is precedent even to this, it must be continuous with this reasoned secondary so that the two be correspondent; the secondary must participate in the prior, be an expression of its will, be a power of it: that higher therefore (as above the ordering of reason) is without part or interval (implied by reasoned arrangement), is a one – all REASON-PRINCIPLE, one number, a One greater than its product, more powerful, having no higher or better. Thus the Supreme can derive neither its being nor the quality of its being. God Himself, therefore, is what He is, self-related, self-tending; otherwise He becomes outward-tending, other-seeking – who cannot but be wholly self-poised. Enneads VI,8,

Seeking Him, seek nothing of Him outside; within is to be sought what follows upon Him; Himself do not attempt. He is, Himself, that outer, He the encompassment and measure of all things; or rather He is within, at the innermost depth; the outer, circling round Him, so to speak, and wholly dependent upon Him, is REASON-PRINCIPLE and Intellectual-Principle-or becomes Intellectual-Principle by contact with Him and in the degree of that contact and dependence; for from Him it takes the being which makes it Intellectual-Principle. Enneads VI,8,

Soul must be sounded to the depths, understood as an emanation from Intellectual-Principle and as holding its value by a REASON-PRINCIPLE thence infused. Next this Intellect must be apprehended, an Intellect other than the reasoning faculty known as the rational principle; with reasoning we are already in the region of separation and movement: our sciences are REASON-PRINCIPLEs lodged in soul or mind, having manifestly acquired their character by the presence in the soul of Intellectual-Principle, source of all knowing. Enneads VI,8,