Relation

In considering RELATION we must enquire whether it possesses the community of a genus, or whether it may on other grounds be treated as a unity. Enneads: VI I

Above all, has RELATION – for example, that of right and left, double and half – any actuality? Has it, perhaps, actuality in some cases only, as for instance in what is termed “posterior” but not in what is termed “prior”? Or is its actuality in no case conceivable? What meaning, then, are we to attach to double and half and all other cases of less and more; to habit and disposition, reclining, sitting, standing; to father, son, master, slave; to like, unlike, equal, unequal; to active and passive, measure and measured; or again to knowledge and sensation, as related respectively to the knowable and the sensible? Knowledge, indeed, may be supposed to entail in relation to the known object some actual entity corresponding to that object’s Ideal Form, and similarly with sensation as related to the sense-object. The active will perform some constant function in relation to the passive, as will the measure in relation to the measured. Enneads: VI I

Right and left, before and behind, would seem to belong less to the category of RELATION than to that of Situation. Right means “situated at one point,” left means “situated at another.” But the right and left are in our conception, nothing of them in the things themselves. Enneads: VI I

Now if we do not mean anything by RELATION but are victims of words, none of the relations mentioned can exist: RELATION will be a notion void of content. Enneads: VI I

Suppose however that we do possess ourselves of objective truth when in comparing two points of time we pronounce one prior, or posterior, to the other, that priority does entail something distinct from the objects to which it refers; admit an objective truth behind the relation of left and right: does this apply also to magnitudes, and is the relation exhibiting excess and deficiency also something distinct from the quantities involved? Now one thing is double of another quite apart from our speech or thought; one thing possesses and another is possessed before we notice the fact; equals do not await our comparison but – and this applies to Quality as well as Quantity – rest upon an identity existing between the objects compared: in all the conditions in which we assert RELATION the mutual relation exists over and above the objects; we perceive it as already existent; our knowledge is directed upon a thing, there to be known – a clear testimony to the reality of RELATION. Enneads: VI I

In these circumstances we can no longer put the question of its existence. We have simply to distinguish: sometimes the relation subsists while the objects remain unaltered and even apart; sometimes it depends upon their combination; sometimes, while they remain unchanged, the relation utterly ceases, or, as happens with right and near, becomes different. These are the facts which chiefly account for the notion that RELATION has no reality in such circumstances. Enneads: VI I

Our task, thus, is to give full value to this elusive character of RELATION, and, then to enquire what there is that is constant in all these particular cases and whether this constant is generic or accidental; and having found this constant, we must discover what sort of actuality it possesses. Enneads: VI I

It need hardly be said that we are not to affirm RELATION where one thing is simply an attribute of another, as a habit is an attribute of a soul or of a body; it is not RELATION when a soul belongs to this individual or dwells in that body. RELATION enters only when the actuality of the relationships is derived from no other source than RELATION itself; the actuality must be, not that which is characteristic of the substances in question, but that which is specifically called relative. Thus double with its correlative, half gives actuality neither to two yards’ length or the number two, nor to one yard’s length or the number one; what happens is that, when these quantities are viewed in their relation, they are found to be not merely two and one respectively, but to produce the assertion and to exhibit the fact of standing one to the other in the condition of double and half. Out of the objects in a certain conjunction this condition of being double and half has issued as something distinct from either; double and half have emerged as correlatives, and their being is precisely this of mutual dependence; the double exists by its superiority over the half, and the half by its inferiority; there is no priority to distinguish double from half; they arise simultaneously. Enneads: VI I

Further, if RELATION always takes the same form, the term is univocal (and specific differentiation is impossible); if not, that is if it differs from case to case, the term is equivocal, and the same reality will not necessarily be implied by the mere use of the term RELATION. Enneads: VI I

Are we thus, then, to divide RELATION, and thereby reject the notion of an identical common element in the different kinds of RELATION, making it a universal rule that the relation takes a different character in either correlative? We must in this case recognise that in our distinction between productive and non-productive relations we are overlooking the equivocation involved in making the terms cover both action and passion, as though these two were one, and ignoring the fact that production takes a different form in the two correlatives. Take the case of equality, producing equals: nothing is equal without equality, nothing identical without identity. Greatness and smallness both entail a presence – the presence of greatness and smallness respectively. When we come to greater and smaller, the participants in these relations are greater and smaller only when greatness and smallness are actually observed in them. Enneads: VI I

Now if the condition of being related is regarded as a Form having a generic unity, RELATION must be allowed to be a single genus owing its reality to a Reason-Principle involved in all instances. If however the Reason-Principles (governing the correlatives) stand opposed and have the differences to which we have referred, there may perhaps not be a single genus, but this will not prevent all relatives being expressed in terms of a certain likeness and falling under a single category. Enneads: VI I

Further, if “boxer” is in the category of Quality, why not “agent” as well? And with agent goes “active.” Thus “active” need not go into the category of RELATION; nor again need “passive,” if “patient” is a quale. Moreover, agent” is perhaps better assigned to the category of Quality for the reason that the term implies power, and power is Quality. But if power as such were determined by Substance (and not by Quality), the agent, though ceasing to be a quale, would not necessarily become a relative. Besides, “active” is not like “greater”: the greater, to be the greater, demands a less, whereas “active” stands complete by the mere possession of its specific character. Enneads: VI I

We may be told that neither Act nor Motion requires a genus for itself, but that both revert to RELATION, Act belonging to the potentially active, Motion to the potentially motive. Our reply is that RELATION produces relatives as such, and not the mere reference to an external standard; given the existence of a thing, whether attributive or relative, it holds its essential character prior to any relationship: so then must Act and Motion, and even such an attribute as habit; they are not prevented from being prior to any relationship they may occupy, or from being conceivable in themselves. Otherwise, everything will be relative; for anything you think of – even Soul – bears some relationship to something else. Enneads: VI I

But, to return to activity proper and the action, is there any reason why these should be referred to RELATION? They must in every instance be either Motion or Act. Enneads: VI I

If however activity is referred to RELATION and the action made a distinct genus, why is not Motion referred to RELATION and the movement made a distinct genus? Why not bisect the unity, Motion, and so make Action and Passion two species of the one thing, ceasing to consider Action and Passion as two genera? Enneads: VI I

Thus, what is Action in one relation may be Passion in another. One same motion will be Action from the point of view of A, Passion from that of B; for the two are so disposed that they might well be consigned to the category of RELATION – at any rate in the cases where the Action entails a corresponding Passion: neither correlative is found in isolation; each involves both Action and Passion, though A acts as mover and B is moved: each then involves two categories. Enneads: VI I

Reclining is surely nothing but “lying up,” and tallies with “lying down” and “lying midway.” But if the reclining belongs thus to the category of RELATION, why not the recliner also? For as “on the right” belongs to the RELATIONs, so does “the thing on the right”; and similarly with “the thing on the left.” Enneads: VI I

The above considerations – to which others, doubtless, might be added – suffice to show that these five are primary genera. But that they are the only primary genera, that there are no others, how can we be confident of this? Why do we not add unity to them? Quantity? Quality? RELATION, and all else included by our various forerunners? As for unity: If the term is to mean a unity in which nothing else is present, neither Soul nor Intellect nor anything else, this can be predicated of nothing, and therefore cannot be a genus. If it denotes the unity present in Being, in which case we predicate Being of unity, this unity is not primal. Enneads VI,2,

As for RELATION, manifestly an offshoot, how can it be included among primaries? RELATION is of thing ranged against thing; it is not self-pivoted, but looks outward. Enneads VI,2,

The “mere predicates” fall under the category of RELATION: such are cause and element. The accidents included in the composite substances ire found to be either Quality or Quantity; those which are inclusive are of the nature of Space and Time. Activities and experiences comprise Motions; consequents Space and Time, which are consequents respectively of the Composites and of Motion. Enneads VI,3,

The first three entities (Matter, Form, Composite) go, as we have discovered, to make a single common genus, the Sensible counterpart of Substance. Then follow in order RELATION, Quantity, Quality, Time-during-which, Place-in-which, Motion; though, with Time and Space already included (under RELATION), Time-during-which and Place-in-which become superfluous. Enneads VI,3,

Thus we have five genera, counting the first three entities as one. If the first three are not massed into a unity, the series will be Matter, Form, Composite, RELATION, Quantity, Quality, Motion. The last three may, again, be included in RELATION, which is capable of bearing this wider extension. Enneads VI,3,

Now we have often maintained that number and magnitude are to be regarded as the only true quantities, and that Space and Time have no right to be conceived as quantitative: Time as the measure of Motion should be assigned to RELATION, while Space, being that which circumscribes Body, is also a relative and falls under the same category; though continuous, it is, like Motion, not included in Quantity. Enneads VI,3,

To judge from these instances, there is contrariety in Quantity. Place we may neglect as not strictly coming under the category of Quantity; if it were admitted, “above” could only be a contrary if there were something in the universe which was “below”: as referring to the partial, the terms “above” and “below” are used in a purely relative sense, and must go with “right” and “left” into the category of RELATION. Enneads VI,3,

But consider the sweet as beneficial, the bitter as injurious: then bitter and sweet are distinguished, not by Quality, but by RELATION. We might also be disposed to identify the sweet with the thick, and the Pungent with the thin: “thick” however hardly reveals the essence but merely the cause of sweetness – an argument which applies equally to pungency. Enneads VI,3,

Furthermore, it cannot lay claim to the category of RELATION on the mere ground that it has an attributive and not a self-centred existence: on this ground, Quality too would find itself in that same category; for Quality is an attribute and contained in an external: and the same is true of Quantity. Enneads VI,3,

If we are agreed that Quality and Quantity, though attributive, are real entities, and on the basis of this reality distinguishable as Quality and Quantity respectively: then, on the same principle, since Motion, though an attribute has a reality prior to its attribution, it is incumbent upon us to discover the intrinsic nature of this reality. We must never be content to regard as a relative something which exists prior to its attribution, but only that which is engendered by RELATION and has no existence apart from the relation to which it owes its name: the double, strictly so called, takes birth and actuality in juxtaposition with a yard’s length, and by this very process of being juxtaposed with a correlative acquires the name and exhibits the fact of being double. Enneads VI,3,

With regard to the relative, we have maintained that RELATION belongs to one object as compared with another, that the two objects coexist simultaneously, and that RELATION is found wherever a substance is in such a condition as to produce it; not that the substance is a relative, except in so far as it constitutes part of a whole – a hand, for example, or head or cause or principle or element. Enneads VI,3,