Now Motion, thus manifested in conjunction with Being, does not alter Being’s nature – unless to complete its essential character – and it does retain for ever its own peculiar nature: at once, then, we are forced to introduce STABILITY. To reject STABILITY would be more unreasonable than to reject Motion; for STABILITY is associated in our thought and conception with Being even more than with Motion; unalterable condition, unchanging mode, single Reason-Principle – these are characteristics of the higher sphere. Enneads VI,2,
STABILITY, then, may also be taken as a single genus. Obviously distinct from Motion and perhaps even its contrary, that it is also distinct from Being may be shown by many considerations. We may especially observe that if STABILITY were identical with Being, so also would Motion be, with equal right. Why identity in the case of STABILITY and not in that of Motion, when Motion is virtually the very life and Act both of Substance and of Absolute Being? However, on the very same principle on which we separated Motion from Being with the understanding that it is the same and not the same – that they are two and yet one – we also separate STABILITY from Being, holding it, yet, inseparable; it is only a logical separation entailing the inclusion among the Existents of this other genus. To identify STABILITY with Being, with no difference between them, and to identify Being with Motion, would be to identify STABILITY with Motion through the mediation of Being, and so to make Motion and STABILITY one and the same thing. Enneads VI,2,
We cannot indeed escape positing these three, Being, Motion, STABILITY, once it is the fact that the Intellect discerns them as separates; and if it thinks of them at all, it posits them by that very thinking; if they are thought, they exist. Things whose existence is bound up with Matter have no being in the Intellect: these three principles are however free of Matter; and in that which goes free of Matter to be thought is to be. Enneads VI,2,
Being, the most firmly set of all things, that in virtue of which all other things receive STABILITY, possesses this STABILITY not as from without but as springing within, as inherent. STABILITY is the goal of intellection, a STABILITY which had no beginning, and the state from which intellection was impelled was STABILITY, though STABILITY gave it no impulsion; for Motion neither starts from Motion nor ends in Motion. Again, the Form-Idea has STABILITY, since it is the goal of Intellect: intellection is the Form’s Motion. Enneads VI,2,
Thus all the Existents are one, at once Motion and STABILITY; Motion and STABILITY are genera all-pervading, and every subsequent is a particular being, a particular stability and a particular motion. Enneads VI,2,
We have caught the radiance of Being, and beheld it in its three manifestations: Being, revealed by the Being within ourselves; the Motion of Being, revealed by the motion within ourselves; and its STABILITY revealed by ours. We accommodate our being, motion, stability to those (of the Archetypal), unable however to draw any distinction but finding ourselves in the presence of entities inseparable and, as it were, interfused. We have, however, in a sense, set them a little apart, holding them down and viewing them in isolation; and thus we have observed Being, STABILITY, Motion – these three, of which each is a unity to itself; in so doing, have we not regarded them as being different from each other? By this posing of three entities, each a unity, we have, surely, found Being to contain Difference. Enneads VI,2,
They will, moreover, be primary genera, because nothing can be predicated of them as denoting their essential nature. Nothing, of course we mean, but Being; but this Being is not their genus, since they cannot be identified with any particular being as such. Similarly, Being will not stand as genus to Motion or STABILITY, for these also are not its species. Beings (or Existents) comprise not merely what are to be regarded as species of the genus Being, but also participants in Being. On the other hand, Being does not participate in the other four principles as its genera: they are not prior to Being; they do not even attain to its level. Enneads VI,2,
Quantity is not among the primaries, because these are permanently associated with Being. Motion is bound up with Actual Being (Being-in-Act), since it is its life; with Motion, STABILITY too gained its foothold in Reality; with these are associated Difference and Identity, so that they also are seen in conjunction with Being. But number (the basis of Quantity) is a posterior. It is posterior not only with regard to these genera but also within itself; in number the posterior is divided from the prior; this is a sequence in which the posteriors are latent in the priors (and do not appear simultaneously). Number therefore cannot be included among the primary genera; whether it constitutes a genus at all remains to be examined. Enneads VI,2,
We may take it as clear that it is the nature of Quantity to indicate a certain quantum, and to measure the quantum of the particular; Quantity is moreover, in a sense, itself a quantum. But if the quantum is the common element in number and magnitude, either we have number as a primary with magnitude derived from it, or else number must consist of a blending of Motion and STABILITY, while magnitude will be a form of Motion or will originate in Motion, Motion going forth to infinity and STABILITY creating the unit by checking that advance. Enneads VI,2,
But the problem of the origin of number and magnitude, or rather of how they subsist and are conceived, must be held over. It may, thus, be found that number is among the primary genera, while magnitude is posterior and composite; or that number belongs to the genus STABILITY, while magnitude must be consigned to Motion. But we propose to discuss all this at a later stage. Enneads VI,2,
How then do the four genera complete Substance without qualifying it or even particularizing it? It has been observed that Being is primary, and it is clear that none of the four – Motion, STABILITY, Difference, Identity – is distinct from it. That this Motion does not produce Quality is doubtless also clear, but a word or two will make it clearer still. Enneads VI,2,
The truth is not that Being first is and then takes Motion, first is and then acquires STABILITY: neither STABILITY nor Motion is a mere modification of Being. Similarly, Identity and Difference are not later additions: Being did not grow into plurality; its very unity was a plurality; but plurality implies Difference, and unity-in-plurality involves Identity. Enneads VI,2,
Knowledge again, is Motion originating in the self; it is the observation of Being – an Act, not a State: hence it too falls under Motion, or perhaps more suitably under STABILITY, or even under both; if under both, knowledge must be thought of as a complex, and if a complex, is posterior. Enneads VI,2,
But if all come into existence simultaneously, what else is produced but that amalgam of all Existents which we have just considered (Intellect)? How can other things exist over and above this all-including amalgam? And if all the constituents of this amalgam are genera, how do they produce species? How does Motion produce species of Motion? Similarly with STABILITY and the other genera. Enneads VI,2,
Why not resort to analogy? Admitted that the classification of the Sensible cannot proceed along the identical lines marked out for the Intellectual: is there any reason why we should not for Intellectual-Being substitute Matter, and for Intellectual Motion substitute Sensible Form, which is in a sense the life and consummation of Matter? The inertia of Matter would correspond with STABILITY, while the Identity and Difference of the Intellectual would find their counterparts in the similarity and diversity which obtain in the Sensible realm. Enneads VI,3,
But, in the first place, Matter does not possess or acquire Form as its life or its Act; Form enters it from without, and remains foreign to its nature. Secondly, Form in the Intellectual is an Act and a motion; in the Sensible Motion is different from Form and accidental to it: Form in relation to Matter approximates rather to STABILITY than to Motion; for by determining Matter’s indetermination it confers upon it a sort of repose. Enneads VI,3,
As for STABILITY, how can it belong to Matter, which is distorted into every variety of mass, receiving its forms from without, and even with the aid of these forms incapable of offspring. Enneads VI,3,
What view are we to take of that which is opposed to Motion, whether it be STABILITY or Rest? Are we to consider it as a distinct genus, or to refer it to one of the genera already established? We should, no doubt, be well advised to assign STABILITY to the Intellectual, and to look in the lower sphere for Rest alone. Enneads VI,3,
First, then, we have to discover the precise nature of this Rest. If it presents itself as identical with STABILITY, we have no right to expect to find it in the sphere where nothing is stable and the apparently stable has merely a less strenuous motion. Enneads VI,3,
Suppose the contrary: we decide that Rest is different from STABILITY inasmuch as STABILITY belongs to the utterly immobile, Rest to the stationary which, though of a nature to move, does not move. Now, if Rest means coming to rest, it must be regarded as a motion which has not yet ceased but still continues; but if we suppose it to be incompatible with Motion, we have first to ask whether there is in the Sensible world anything without motion. Enneads VI,3,
But, it may be asked, why not regard Motion as the negation of STABILITY? We reply that Motion does not appear alone; it is accompanied by a force which actualizes its object, forcing it on, as it were, giving it a thousand forms and destroying them all: Rest, on the contrary, comports nothing but the object itself, and signifies merely that the object has no motion. Enneads VI,3,
Why, then, did we not in discussing the Intellectual realm assert that STABILITY was the negation of Motion? Because it is not indeed possible to consider STABILITY as an annulling of Motion, for when Motion ceases STABILITY does not exist, but requires for its own existence the simultaneous existence of Motion; and what is of a nature to move is not stationary because STABILITY of that realm is motionless, but because STABILITY has taken hold of it; in so far as it has Motion, it will never cease to move: thus, it is stationary under the influence of STABILITY, and moves under the influence of Motion. In the lower realm, too, a thing moves in virtue of Motion, but its Rest is caused by a deficiency; it has been deprived of its due motion. Enneads VI,3,
What we have to observe is the essential character of this Sensible counterpart of STABILITY. Enneads VI,3,
Consider sickness and health. The convalescent moves in the sense that he passes from sickness to health. What species of rest are we to oppose to this convalescence? If we oppose the condition from which he departs, that condition is sickness, not STABILITY; if that into which he passes, it is health, again not the same as STABILITY. Enneads VI,3,
It may be declared that health or sickness is indeed some form of STABILITY: we are to suppose, then, that STABILITY is the genus of which health and sickness are species; which is absurd. Enneads VI,3,
STABILITY may, again, be regarded as an attribute of health: according to this view, health will not be health before possessing STABILITY. Enneads VI,3,