His Way is indicated in many sumptuous passages of the Enneads – it is coldly charted for him in the tractate on Dialectic, Enneads I,3,. The TERM is more richly described in the famous sixth tract of the same First Ennead: the main need, the cry, of man’s nature is to become actually, as he is always potentially, Divine: all his faculties, images each of its next highest, culminate in the Intellectual-Principle or Intellective-Principle, the Intuitional or True-knowing Faculty; and his duty, or rather his happiness, his blessedness, his deepest inner voice, is to labour his entire being into identification with this, the Divine in him: through this inner Divine, in an ecstasy away from all the lower and, first, from all that links him to Matter, he may even in this life attain to the ‘possession’ of the God-head in an ineffable act of identification, becoming Uniate, one with God, actually God, and foretasting the blessedness of the final Return after which he is for all the space of eternity to be with the Godhead, to be Divine, or to be God.
We come, so, to the question whether Purification is the whole of this human quality, virtue, or merely the forerunner upon which virtue follows? Does virtue imply the achieved state of purification or does the mere process suffice to it, Virtue being something of less perfection than the accomplished pureness which is almost the TERM? To have been purified is to have cleansed away everything alien: but Goodness is something more. Enneads I,2,
What art is there, what method, what discipline to bring us there where we must go? The TERM at which we must arrive we may take as agreed: we have established elsewhere, by many considerations, that our journey is to the Good, to the Primal-Principle; and, indeed, the very reasoning which discovered the TERM was itself something like an initiation. Enneads I,3,
But what order of beings will attain the TERM? Surely, as we read, those that have already seen all or most things, those who at their first birth have entered into the life-germ from which is to spring a metaphysician, a musician or a born lover, the metaphysician taking to the path by instinct, the musician and the nature peculiarly susceptible to love needing outside guidance. Enneads I,3,
The first degree is the conversion from the lower life; the second – held by those that have already made their way to the sphere of the Intelligibles, have set as it were a footprint there but must still advance within the realm – lasts until they reach the extreme hold of the place, the TERM attained when the topmost peak of the Intellectual realm is won. Enneads I,3,
And if, even, we set Happiness in some ultimate TERM pursued by inborn tendency, then on this head, too, we must allow it to animals from the moment of their attaining this Ultimate: the nature in them comes to a halt, having fulfilled its vital course from a beginning to an end. Enneads I,4,
It may be a distasteful notion, this bringing-down of happiness so low as to the animal world – making it over, as then we must, even to the vilest of them and not withholding it even from the plants, living they too and having a life unfolding to a TERM. Enneads I,4,
No: if Pleasure be the TERM, if here be the good of life, it is impossible to deny the good of life to any order of living things; if the TERM be inner-peace, equally impossible; impossible, too, if the good of life be to live in accordance with the purpose of nature. Enneads I,4,
Now if happiness did indeed require freedom from pain, sickness, misfortune, disaster, it would be utterly denied to anyone confronted by such trials: but if it lies in the fruition of the Authentic Good, why turn away from this TERM and look to means, imagining that to be happy a man must need a variety of things none of which enter into happiness? If, in fact, felicity were made up by heaping together all that is at once desirable and necessary we must bid for these also. But if the TERM must be one and not many; if in other words our quest is of a TERM and not of TERMs; that only can be elected which is ultimate and noblest, that which calls to the tenderest longings of the soul. Enneads I,4,
Such things can never make part of our final object: our TERM must be such that though these pleasanter conditions be absent and their contraries present, it shall remain, still, intact. Enneads I,4,
Then why are these conditions sought and their contraries repelled by the man established in happiness? Here is our answer: These more pleasant conditions cannot, it is true, add any particle towards the Sage’s felicity: but they do serve towards the integrity of his being, while the presence of the contraries tends against his Being or complicates the TERM: it is not that the Sage can be so easily deprived of the TERM achieved but simply that he that holds the highest good desires to have that alone, not something else at the same time, something which, though it cannot banish the Good by its incoming, does yet take place by its side. Enneads I,4,
In any case if the man that has attained felicity meets some turn of fortune that he would not have chosen, there is not the slightest lessening of his happiness for that. If there were, his felicity would be veering or falling from day to day; the death of a child would bring him down, or the loss of some trivial possession. No: a thousand mischances and disappointments may befall him and leave him still in the tranquil possession of the TERM. Enneads I,4,
He can care for no other TERM than That: all else he will attend to only as he might change his residence, not in expectation of any increase to his settled felicity, but simply in a reasonable attention to the differing conditions surrounding him as he lives here or there. Enneads I,4,
The Good is that on which all else depends, towards which all Existences aspire as to their source and their need, while Itself is without need, sufficient to Itself, aspiring to no other, the measure and TERM of all, giving out from itself the Intellectual-Principle and Existence and Soul and Life and all Intellective-Act. Enneads I,8,
This school, in fact, is convicted by its neglect of all mention of virtue: any discussion of such matters is missing utterly: we are not told what virtue is or under what different kinds it appears; there is no word of all the numerous and noble reflections upon it that have come down to us from the ancients; we do not learn what constitutes it or how it is acquired, how the Soul is tended, how it is cleaned. For to say “Look to God” is not helpful without some instruction as to what this looking imports: it might very well be said that one can “look” and still sacrifice no pleasure, still be the slave of impulse, repeating the word God but held in the grip of every passion and making no effort to master any. Virtue, advancing towards the TERM and, linked with thought, occupying a Soul makes God manifest: God on the lips, without a good conduct of life, is a word. Enneads: II VIII.
If they treat God as they do the Intellectual-Principle – as later, engendered and deriving intellection from without – soul and intellect and God may prove to have no existence: this would follow if a potentiality could not come to existence, or does not become actual, unless the corresponding actuality exists. And what could lead it onward if there were no separate being in previous actuality? Even on the absurd supposition that the potentially existent brings itself to actuality, it must be looking to some TERM, and that must be no potentiality but actual. Enneads IV,7,
No doubt the eternally self-identical may have potentiality and be self-led to self-realization, but even in this case the being considered as actualized is of higher order than the being considered as merely capable of actualization and moving towards a desired TERM. Enneads IV,7,
Since there is a Source, all the created must spring from it and in accordance with it; and we are rightly told not to go seeking the causes impelling a Source to produce, especially when this is the perfectly sufficient Source and identical with the TERM: a Source which is Source and TERM must be the All-Unity, complete in itself. Enneads V,8,
Thus for Being, as for the others, unity turns out to be, in some sense, Principle and TERM, not however in the same sense as for things of the physical order – a discrepancy leading us to infer that even in unity there are degrees of priority. Enneads VI,2,
Why not halt, then – it will be asked – at Intellectual-Principle and make that The Good? Soul and life are traces of Intellectual-Principle; that principle is the TERM of Soul which on judgement sets itself towards Intellectual-Principle, pronouncing right preferable to wrong and virtue in every form to vice, and thus ranking by its choosing. Enneads VI,7,
It is in view, probably, of this difficulty that Plato, in the Philebus, makes pleasure an element in the TERM; the good is not defined as a simplex or set in Intellectual-Principle alone; while he rightly refrains from identifying the good with the pleasant, yet he does not allow Intellectual-Principle, foreign to pleasure, to be The Good, since he sees no attractive power in it. He may also have had in mind that the good, to answer to its name, must be a thing of delight and that an object of pursuit must at least hold some pleasure for those that acquire and possess it, so that where there is no joy the good too is absent, further that pleasure, implying pursuit, cannot pertain to the First and that therefore good cannot. Enneads VI,7,
The Intellectual-Principle is the less for seeing things as distinct even in its act of grasping in unity the multiple content of its Intellectual realm; in its knowing of the particular it possesses itself of one Intellectual shape; but, even thus, in this dealing with variety as unity, it leaves us still with the question how we are to envisage that which stands beyond this all-lovely, beyond this principle at once multiple and above multiplicity, the Supreme for which the soul hungers though unable to tell why such a being should stir its longing-reason, however, urging that This at last is the Authentic TERM because the Nature best and most to be loved may be found there only where there is no least touch of Form. Bring something under Form and present it so before the mind; immediately we ask what Beyond imposed that shape; reason answers that while there exists the giver having shape to give – a giver that is shape, idea, an entirely measured thing – yet this is not alone, is not adequate in itself, is not beautiful in its own right but is a mingled thing. Shape and idea and measure will always be beautiful, but the Authentic Beauty and the Beyond-Beauty cannot be under measure and therefore cannot have admitted shape or be Idea: the primal existent, The First, must be without Form; the beauty in it must be, simply, the Nature of the Intellectual Good. Enneads VI,7,
The objection would imply that where there is most good there is least freedom. If this is absurd, still more absurd to deny freedom to The Good on the ground that it is good and self-concentred, not needing to lean upon anything else but actually being the TERM to which all tends, itself moving to none. Enneads VI,8,
The Supreme is the TERM of all; it is like the principle and ground of some vast tree of rational life; itself unchanging, it gives reasoned being to the growth into which it enters. Enneads VI,8,
Thus the Supreme as containing no otherness is ever present with us; we with it when we put otherness away. It is not that the Supreme reaches out to us seeking our communion: we reach towards the Supreme; it is we that become present. We are always before it: but we do not always look: thus a choir, singing set in due order about the conductor, may turn away from that centre to which all should attend: let it but face aright and it sings with beauty, present effectively. We are ever before the Supreme – cut off is utter dissolution; we can no longer be – but we do not always attend: when we look, our TERM is attained; this is rest; this is the end of singing ill; effectively before Him, we lift a choral song full of God. Enneads VI,8,
Even those that have never found entry must admit the existence of that invisible; they will know their source and Principle since by principle they see principle and are linked with it, by like they have contact with like and so they grasp all of the divine that lies within the scope of mind. Until the seeing comes they are still craving something, that which only the vision can give; this TERM, attained only by those that have overpassed all, is the All-Transcending. Enneads VI,8,
There is thus a converse in virtue of which the essential man outgrows Being, becomes identical with the Transcendent of Being. The self thus lifted, we are in the likeness of the Supreme: if from that heightened self we pass still higher – image to archetype – we have won the TERM of all our journeying. Fallen back again, we awaken the virtue within until we know ourselves all order once more; once more we are lightened of the burden and move by virtue towards Intellectual-Principle and through the Wisdom in That to the Supreme. Enneads VI,8,