But if this is the true account of the UNITY OF SOUL, we must be able to meet the problems that ensue: firstly, the difficulty of one thing being present at the same moment in all things; and, secondly, the difficulty of soul in body as against soul not embodied. Enneads IV,3,4
Anyone who rejects this view, and holds that either atoms or some entities void of part coming together produce soul, is refuted by the very UNITY OF SOUL and by the prevailing sympathy as much as by the very coherence of the constituents. Bodily materials, in nature repugnant to unification and to sensation, could never produce unity or self-sensitiveness, and soul is self-sensitive. And, again, constituents void of part could never produce body or bulk. Enneads IV,7,3
Now to begin with, the UNITY OF SOUL, mine and another’s, is not enough to make the two totals of soul and body identical. An identical thing in different recipients will have different experiences; the identity Man, in me as I move and you at rest, moves in me and is stationary in you: there is nothing stranger, nothing impossible, in any other form of identity between you and me; nor would it entail the transference of my emotion to any outside point: when in any one body a hand is in pain, the distress is felt not in the other but in the hand as represented in the centralizing unity. Enneads IV,9,2
We are not asserting the UNITY OF SOUL in the sense of a complete negation of multiplicity – only of the Supreme can that be affirmed – we are thinking of soul as simultaneously one and many, participant in the nature divided in body, but at the same time a unity by virtue of belonging to that Order which suffers no division. Enneads IV,9,2