Soc. And wisdom and mind cannot exist WITHOUT SOUL ? PHILEBUS
Ath. Just the opposite, as I said, of the opinion which once prevailed among men, that the sun and stars are WITHOUT SOUL. Even in those days men wondered about them, and that which is now ascertained was then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of them — that if they had been things WITHOUT SOUL, and had no mind, they could never have moved with numerical exactness so wonderful ; and even at that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the orderer of the universe. But these same persons again mistaking the nature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and not older than the body, once more overturned the world, or rather, I should say, themselves ; for the bodies which they saw moving in heaven all appeared to be full of stones, and earth, and many other lifeless substances, and to these they assigned the causes of all things. Such studies gave rise to much atheism and perplexity, and the poets took occasion to be abusive — comparing the philosophers to she-dogs uttering vain howlings, and talking other nonsense of the same sort. But now, as I said, the case is reversed. LAWS BOOK XII
So now I trust we may make one true statement about all these things : it cannot be that earth and heaven and all the (983c) stars and all the masses they comprise, WITHOUT SOUL attached to each or resident in each, should pass along as they do, so exactly to every year and month and day, and that all the things that happen should happen for the good of us all.And according as man is a meaner creature, he should show himself, not a babbler, but a speaker of clear sense. If, then, anyone shall speak of onrushes or natural forces or the like as in a sort the causes of bodies, he will say nothing clear : but we must firmly recall what we have said, and see whether (983d) our statement is reasonable or is utterly at fault — namely, in the first place, that existence is of two kinds, the one<one soul, and the other body, and that many things are in either, though all are different from each other and those of the one kind from those of the other, and that there is no other third thing common to any of them ; but soul differs from body. Intelligent, of course, we shall hold it to be, and the other unintelligent ; the one governs, the other is governed ; and the one is cause of all things, while the other is incapable of causing any of its experiences : so that to assert that the heavenly bodies (983e) have come into existence through anything else, and are not the offspring, as we have said, of soul and body, is great folly and unreason. However, if our statements on all such existences are to prevail, and the whole order of them is to be convincingly shown to be divine by their origin, we must certainly class them as one or the other of two things : either we must in all correctness glorify them as actual gods, (984a) or suppose them to be images produced as likenesses of the gods, creations of the gods themselves. For they are the work of no mindless or inconsiderable beings but, as we have said, we must class them as one or other of these things ; and, if classed as the latter, we must honor them far above all images : for never will fairer or more generally-known images be found among all mankind, none established in more various places, more pre-eminent in purity, majesty, and (984b) life altogether, than in the way in which their existence is altogether fashioned. EPINOMIS BOOK XII