gr. péras (tó): fim, termo, conclusão, limite. Ser que é metafisicamente acabado, perfeito, v. seu negativo: ápeiron.
This addressing of being-there in its limitedness is a λóγος as ὁρισμóς. For the Greeks, a limiting speaking means an addressing of genuine being-there. That having limits, limitedness, constitutes the genuine there-character, we see in Metaphysics Δ, Chapter 17: πέρας is the ἔσχατον, “the outermost aspect of what is there at the moment, outside of which, at first, nothing more of the matter encountered is to be found; and within which the whole of the beings encountered are to be seen.” This character of the πέρας is then determined, without qualification, as εἶδος. The having-of-limits is the genuine “look of a being that has any kind of range.” Πέρας is, however, not only εἶδος but also τέλος. Τέλος means “end” in the sense of “completedness,” not “aim” or even “purpose.” That is to say that completedness is a πέρας such that “movement and action go toward it”—κίνησις and πρᾶξις, the being-occupied with something where a movement or action finds its end (no idea of a purpose!) There are, indeed, beings that have both of these limit-characters. The character of πέρας also has something to do with the οὗ ἕνεκα, the “for-the-sake-of-which.” The genuine, ultimate character of being in the εἶδος and τέλος is the character of the πέρας. For recognizing, limit is the having-of-limits only because it is the having-of-limits of the matter, the πρᾶγμα determined in its limits. [Heidegger, GA18:38]
PÉRAS (terme, limite, extrémité) [grec]
subs. nt.
Les acceptions du mot sont multiples (Aristote, Phys. III 3, 202b-8, 208a). Il désigne d’abord le point final par opposition à arkhê (origine, point de départ), puis par extension les extrémités, tà pérata, d’un corps ou d’une figure, par opposition à tà mésa, les points médians ; mais la notion de limite a, en outre, un sens métaphysique (voir l’ápeiron d’Anaximandre). Elle est, avec son complément négatif l’ápeiron, l’un des principes formels ultimes de la réalité dans les couples d’opposés des tables pythagoriciennes (Aristote, Met., A5, 986a) ; elle est liée aux images, conjointes chez ces philosophes, de proportion numérique et d’harmonie musicale (Aristote, De Coelo 119, 290M2 ; Platon, Phil.,, 23c-26d), ce qui lui confère une valeur esthétique et par là même éthique (Aristote, EN, 115, 1106b). Dans le Philèbe de Platon, le péras, opposé de façon complémentaire à l’ápeiron, joue, avec le nous et le meiktón, le rôle de principe. (F. Caujolle-Zaslawski.) [NP]