gr. πίστις, pístis: 1) fé, crença (estado subjetivo); 2) algo que inspira crença, prova. Entre os dois gêneros de objetos opostos (o ser e o não-ser), Platão evoca gêneros intermediários, segundo um esquema linear que oferece uma representação dos quatro modos de conhecimento que correspondem aos quatro gêneros de objetos suscetíveis de afetar a alma que os conhece. O gênero de objetos de corpos naturais ou técnicos são conhecidos pela crença ou convicção (pistis). (Luc Brisson)
It remains, then, to see if phantasia is opinion (doxa), for opinion is true or false. But conviction (pistis) accompanies opinion, for it is not possible for someone with an opinion on something not to have conviction about it. Among wild animals, however, none have conviction, but many have phantasia. Again, conviction accompanies all opinion, being persuaded accompanies conviction, and reason (logos) accompanies persuasion (peitho). Among wild animals, however, some have phantasia, but not reason. (Aristotle DA 3.3, 428a18-24; SorabjiPC1:61)
For conviction (pistis) is always a consequence (hepesthai) of the latter (opinion), for a person who has an opinion (doxa) about something always assents (sunkatatithesthai) to its being so as well. For opinion about something is an assent by that person to its being so, and assent is accompanied by conviction (pistis), since opinion is rational assent accompanied by judgement (krisis). But not every case of being appeared to (phantasia) is accompanied by conviction. For there are many non-rational animals, at any rate, who have (the ability to) be appeared to, but not conviction; but if they do not have conviction, then they do not have assent accompanied by judgement either. Furthermore, every opinion involves (61) composition — for it is either affirmative or negative — while not every case of being appeared to is such. For this reason, what is true and (what is) false are not similar in both cases, just as they are not in perception and opinion either. (Alexander DA 67,15-23; SorabjiPC1:61-62)
PÍSTIS (croyance, foi) (grec)
subs. fém.
Un dérivé de la famille du verbe peithomai dont le sens premier est persuader. On trouve un usage de ce terme chez les présocratiques, soit pour désigner ce qui est crédible, ce à quoi on peut se fier (Parménide, D.K. 28 B 8, 50, Empédocle, D.K. 31 B3, B 4, B 114), soit pour désigner une croyance non fondée sur la vérité (Parménide, D.K. 28 B 1, 30), comme le sont les déxai des mortels. Ces deux sens semblent contradictoires, ce qui laisse croire que le terme n’a pas acquis un sens technique précis. Dans l’image de la Ligne, chez Platon, la pistis désigne le deuxième degré de connaissance qui porte sur les réalités sensibles et qui engendre une certitude sensible (Rép. VI 511 e). Platon considère la pistis parfois comme une espèce de la doxa (Rép. VI 511 d 4-5). Parfois il assimile tout simplement pistis et doxa qu’il oppose à épistémè (Gorg. 454 e 4, Tim. 37 b 8). Chez Aristote le terme est surtout utilisé dans sa théorie de la rhétorique comme objet propre de celle-ci. Cependant, Aristote n’a pas dévalorisé la rhétorique comme l’a fait Platon (Rhét. I 1, 1355 a 39-b 21). (Y. Lafrance) (NP)