Plotino – Tratado 10,10 (V, 1, 10) — Toda alma individual guarda nela mesma uma imagem das três hipóstases

10. Convendrá pensar, pues, que más allá del ser está el Uno, tal como hemos querido mostrarlo con nuestro razonamiento y en la medida en que es posible hacerlo. A continuación habrá que colocar el Ser y la Inteligencia, y, en tercer lugar la naturaleza del alma, según lo que ya se ha dicho. Dado que estas tres realidades están en la naturaleza de las cosas hemos de pensar que se dan también en nosotros. Y digo que se dan, no en lo que hay de sensible en nosotros -verdaderamente estas realidades están separadas de todo lo sensible-, sino en lo que es exterior a las cosas sensibles, tomado el término exterior como cuando se dice que esas mismas realidades son exteriores al cielo. Así han de entenderse las partes del hombre que Platón considera como “el hombre interior” ¹. Nuestra alma es, entonces algo divino, algo de naturaleza diferente y que es tal como el alma universal. El alma que posee la inteligencia es perfecta, aunque deba distinguirse entre la inteligencia que razona y la que proporciona los principios del razonamiento. En cuanto a la facultad de razonar del alma no tiene necesidad de un órgano corpóreo para verificar su operación, ya que conserva su acción en un estado puro al objeto de poder razonar también puramente. Se mantiene, por tanto, separada y libre de todo contacto con el cuerpo, con lo que no deberemos engañarnos si la colocamos en el primer inteligible. Porque no hay motivo para preguntarse dónde hemos de situarla, sino que, por el contrario, la colocaremos fuera de todo lugar. Así, pues, el ser en sí mismo, exterior e inmaterial ha de entenderse como un ser aislado del cuerpo y que nada tiene que ver con su naturaleza. Por ello dice (Platón) al referirse al universo que el demiurgo puso el alma fuera y con ella rodeó el mundo, queriendo designar con esto la parte del alma que permanece en lo inteligible ². En cuanto a nosotros, dice que nuestra alma “se yergue por su cabeza hasta las alturas” ³. De ahí que su exhortación para que nos apartemos del cuerpo no se refiera a una separación local -porque esta separación ya ha sido establecida por la naturaleza-, sino que haya de entenderse, como una no inclinación al cuerpo, ni siquiera en imaginación, como ser extraño que es a nosotros. Es ciertamente lo que acontece si se sabe remontar y llevar hasta lo alto esa parte del alma situada en este mundo, a la cual corresponde el cometido de fabricar y modelar el cuerpo, así como el de estar al cuidado de él.

[10] Ainsi, il faut admettre qu’au-dessus de l’Être est l’Un : nous l’avons démontré autant que la raison le désirait, autant qu’il est possible de démontrer quand on traite de pareilles questions. Au second rang sont l’Être et l’Intelligence; au troisième, l’Âme. Mais, s’il y a dans la nature trois principes, comme nous venons de le dire, l’Un, l’Intelligence, l’Âme, il doit y avoir aussi en nous trois principes. Je ne veux pas dire que ces trois principes soient dans les choses sensibles : car ils en sont séparés; ils sont hors du monde sensible, comme les trois principes divins sont hors de la sphère céleste, et ils constituent l’homme intérieur, selon l’expression de Platon (51). Notre âme est donc quelque chose de divin : elle a une nature autre [que la nature sensible] et conforme à celle de l’Âme universelle. Or, l’âme parfaite possède l’intelligence; mais il y a l’intelligence qui raisonne [la raison discursive], et l’intelligence qui fournit tous les principes du raisonnement [l’intelligence pure]. La raison discursive de l’âme n’a besoin pour s’exercer d’aucun organe corporel (52); dans ses opérations, elle conserve toute sa pureté, en sorte qu’elle est capable de raisonner purement. Séparée du corps, elle doit sans hésitation être mise au premier rang des choses intelligibles. Il n’est pas besoin de la placer dans un lieu; il faut la concevoir hors de tout lieu : car, si elle existe par elle-même, hors du corps, d’une manière immatérielle, c’est qu’elle n’est pas mélangée au corps, qu’elle n’a rien de sa nature. Aussi Platon dit-il : « Dieu a répandu l’Âme autour du monde (53). » Il veut faire entendre qu’une partie de l’âme demeure dans le monde intelligible. Il dit aussi, en parlant de notre âme : « elle cache sa tête dans le ciel (54). » Il recommande également de séparer l’âme du corps (55) ; il ne parle pas d’une séparation locale, que la nature seule établit; il veut que l’âme n’incline pas vers le corps, ne s’abandonne pas aux fantômes de l’imagination, et ne devienne pas ainsi étrangère à la raison ; il veut qu’elle tâche d’élever avec elle au monde intelligible sa partie inférieure, qui est établie dans le monde sensible et qui est occupée à façonner le corps (56).

TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES IN THE UNIVERSE MUST CORRESPOND THREE PRINCIPLES IN US.

10. Above existence, therefore, is the One. This has by us been proved as far as could reasonably be expected, and as far as such subjects admit of demonstration. In the second rank are Existence and Intelligence; in the third, the Soul. But if these three principles, the One, Intelligence, and the Soul, as we have said, obtain in nature, three principles must also obtain within us. I do not mean that these three principles are in sense-objects, for they are separate therefrom ; they are outside of the sense-world, as the three divine principles are outside of the celestial sphere, and, according to Plato’s expression, they constitute the “the interior man.” Our soul, therefore, is something divine; it has a nature different (from sense-nature), which conforms to that of the universal Soul. Now the perfect Soul possesses intelligence; but we must distinguish between the intelligence that reasons (the discursive reason), and the Intelligence that furnishes the principles of reasoning (pure intelligence). The discursive reason of the soul has no need, for operation, of any bodily organ; in its operations, it preserves all its purity, so that it is capable of reasoning purely. When separated from the body, it must, without any hesitation, be ranked with highest intellectual entities. There is no need of locating it in space; for, if it exist within itself, outside of body, in an immaterial condition, it is evidently not mingled with the body, and has none of its nature. Consequently Plato says, “The divinity has spread the Soul around the world.” What he here means is that a part of the Soul remains in the intelligible world. Speaking of our soul he also says, “she hides her head in heaven.” He also advises us to wean the soul from the body; and he does not refer to any local separation, which nature alone could establish. He means that the soul must not incline towards the body, must not abandon herself to the phantoms of imagination, and must not, thus, become alienated from reason. He means that the soul should try to elevate to the intelligible world her lower part which is established in the sense-world, and which is occupied in fashioning the body.

X. It has been shown, however, as far as it is possible to demonstrate about things of this kind, that it is requisite to think that beyond being there is the one, such as reason wishes to unfold ; that next to this, being and intellect subsist; and that, in the third place, follows the nature of soul. But, as in the nature of things there are these three hypostases, so likewise it is proper to think, that the above mentioned three subsist with us. I do not mean to assert that they are to be found in sensibles; for they have a separate subsistence; but that they are external to sensibles, and external after the same manner in man also, as the three which we have been considering are external to all heaven. This, however, is such a man as Plato calls the inward man. Our soul, therefore, is likewise something divine, and of a nature different from sensibles, such as is the whole nature of soul. But the soul is perfect which possesses intellect. With respect to intellect, however, one kind is a reasoning intellect, but another imparts the power of reasoning. He, therefore, will not err who places in the intelligible order of things this reasoning intellect of the soul, which is not in want of any corporeal organ to the subsistence of its discursive energy, but which possesses the energy of itself in purity, in order that it may reason purely, in as great perfection as possible. For we must not inquire after a place where we may establish it, but it must be arranged external to all place. For thus that which is from itself, the external, and the immaterial subsist, when they are alone, and have nothing from a corporeal nature. On this account, also, Plato in the Timaeus says, ” that the Demiurgus surrounded the body of the universe with soul,” indicating that part of the mundane soul which abides in the intelligible. Concerning our soul, likewise, concealing his meaning, he says, in the Phaedrus, that it sometimes hides its head in the heavens, and sometimes elevates it beyond them.⁴ The exhortation, too, in the Pinado, to separate the soul from the body, does not relate to a local separation, which is effected by nature, but insinuates that the soul should not verge to imaginations, and to an alienation from itself, by a tendency to body. He also indicates that we should elevate the remaining [i.e. the irrational] form of the soul, and lead it on high together with the superior part of it; and that the part which is established in the sensible region, and is alone the fabricator and plastic maker of body, should likewise be engaged in an employment of this kind.

10. We have shown the inevitability of certain convictions as to the scheme of things:

There exists a Principle which transcends Being; this is The One, whose nature we have sought to establish in so far as such matters lend themselves to proof. Upon The One follows immediately the Principle which is at once Being and the Intellectual-Principle. Third comes the Principle, Soul.

Now just as these three exist for the system of Nature, so, we must hold, they exist for ourselves. I am not speaking of the material order – all that is separable – but of what lies beyond the sense realm in the same way as the Primals are beyond all the heavens; I mean the corresponding aspect of man, what Plato calls the Interior Man.

Thus our soul, too, is a divine thing, belonging to another order than sense; such is all that holds the rank of soul, but [above the life-principle] there is the soul perfected as containing Intellectual-Principle with its double phase, reasoning and giving the power to reason. The reasoning phase of the soul, needing no bodily organ for its thinking but maintaining, in purity, its distinctive Act that its thought may be uncontaminated – this we cannot err in placing, separate and not mingled into body, within the first Intellectual. We may not seek any point of space in which to seat it; it must be set outside of all space: its distinct quality, its separateness, its immateriality, demand that it be a thing alone, untouched by all of the bodily order. This is why we read of the universe that the Demiurge cast the soul around it from without – understand that phase of soul which is permanently seated in the Intellectual – and of ourselves that the charioteer’s head reaches upwards towards the heights.

The admonition to sever soul from body is not, of course, to be understood spatially – that separation stands made in Nature – the reference is to holding our rank, to use of our thinking, to an attitude of alienation from the body in the effort to lead up and attach to the over-world, equally with the other, that phase of soul seated here and, alone, having to do with body, creating, moulding, spending its care upon it.

10. It has been shown that we ought to think that this is how things are, that there is the One beyond being, of such a kind as our argument wanted to show, so far as demonstration was possible in these matters, and next in order there is Being and Intellect, and the nature of Soul in the third place. And just as in nature there are these three of which we have spoken, so we ought to think that they are present also in ourselves. I do not mean in [ourselves as] beings of the sense-world—for these three are separate [from the things of sense]—but in [ourselves as] beings outside the realm of sense-perception; “ outside ” here is used in the same sense as those realities are also said to be “ outside ” the whole universe: so the corresponding realities in man are said to be “ outside ”, as Plato speaks of the “ inner man ”.⁵ Our soul then also is a divine thing and of a nature different [from the things of sense], like the universal nature of soul; and the human soul is perfect when it has intellect; and intellect is of two kinds, the one which reasons and the one which makes it possible to reason. Now this reasoning part of the soul, which needs no bodily instrument for its reasoning, but preserves its activity in purity in order that it may be able to engage in pure reasoning, one could without mistake place, as separate and unmixed with body, in the primary intelligible realm. For we should not look for a place in which to put it, but make it exist outside all place. For this is how it is by itself and outside and immaterial, when it is alone and retains nothing from the nature of body. This is the reason why Plato says of the universe also that the craftsman wrapped the soul round it “ from outside ”, indicating the part of the soul which remains in the intelligible; and he said obscurely about us that the soul is “ on top in the head ”. And his exhortation to separate ourselves is not meant in a spatial sense—this [higher part] of soul is naturally separated—but refers to our not inclining to the body, and to our not having mental images, and our alienation from the body ⁶—if by any chance one could make the remaining form of soul ascend, and take along with us to the heights that of it which is established here below, which alone is the craftsman and modeller of the body and is actively concerned with it.

§5.1.10. It has already been shown that it is necessary to believe that things are this way: that there is the One which transcends Being, which is such as the argument strove to show to the extent that it is possible to demonstrate anything about these matters; that next in line is Being and Intellect; and that third is the nature that is Soul.

And just as in nature these aforementioned three are found, so it is necessary to believe as well that these are in us. I do not mean that they are among sensibles – for these three are separate from sensibles – but that they are in things that are outside the sensible order, using the term ‘outside ’ in the same manner in which it is used to refer to those things that are outside the whole of heaven. In saying that they belong to a human being, I mean exactly what Plato means by ‘the inner human being’.

So, our soul is something divine and of another nature [i.e., other than sensibles], like the nature of all soul; it is perfect by having intellect. One part of intellect is that which engages in calculative reasoning and one part is that which makes calculative reasoning possible. The calculative reasoning part of soul is actually in need of no corporeal organ for its calculative reasoning, having its own activity in purity in order that it also be possible for it to reason purely. Someone who supposed it to be separate and not mixed with body and in the primary intelligible world would not be mistaken. For we should not search for a place in which to situate it; rather, we should make it outside all place. For this is how it is for that which is by itself, outside and immaterial, whenever it is alone, retaining nothing from the nature of the body. Because of this, Plato says that the Demiurge ‘in addition’ encircled the soul of the universe from ‘outside’, pointing to the part of the soul that abides in the intelligible world. In our case, he hid his meaning when he said that it is ‘at the top of our head’.

And his exhortation ‘to be separate’ is not meant spatially – for our intellect is separate by nature – but is an exhortation not to incline to the body even by acts of imagination, and to alienate ourselves from the body, if somehow one could lead the remaining part of the soul upwards, or even carry upward that which is situated in the sensible world, that part that alone acts demiurgically on the body and has the job of shaping it and caring for it.

10. On a déjà montré qu’il faut penser qu’il en va bien ainsi : d’abord, il y a ce qui est situé au-delà de l’être, l’Un, tel que notre exposé entendait le montrer pour autant que la démonstration est possible en pareil cas ; tout juste après, viennent l’être et l’Intellect ; et en troisième lieu vient l’Âme. Tout comme ces trois réalités dont on a parlé sont dans la nature, de même il faut penser qu’elles sont aussi en nous. Je ne dis pas en nous-mêmes en tant que nous sommes dans le sensible, car ces réalités sont séparées du sensible, mais en nous-mêmes dans la mesure où nous sommes à l’extérieur des choses sensibles (« à l’extérieur » s’entend au sens où l’on dit encore que ces réalités sont à l’extérieur du ciel en son entier)⁷ ; ainsi en va-t-il en l’homme de ce que Platon appelle : « l’homme intérieur »⁸. Il s’ensuit aussi que notre âme est chose divine et qu’elle est d’une autre nature que les choses sensibles, tout comme l’âme en sa totalité. Or, l’Âme est parfaite lorsqu’elle possède l’Intellect ; mais l’Intellect est de deux sortes : celui qui raisonne et celui qui permet de raisonner ⁹. Eh bien, cette faculté de l’âme qui raisonne n’a besoin d’aucun organe corporel pour raisonner, car elle garde son activité pure afin de pouvoir raisonner de manière pure, et on ne se tromperait pas en la posant dans le monde intelligible qui tient la première place, comme séparée du corps et non mélangée à lui ¹⁰. En effet, il ne faut pas chercher un lieu où l’installer, mais il faut la poser en dehors de tout lieu. Oui, voici en quoi consiste le fait d’« être en soi », d’être « extérieur » et d’être « immatériel » quand on est seul et qu’on ne doit rien au corps ¹¹. Et voilà pourquoi il dit également que le démiurge prit l’âme qui se trouvait « encore à l’extérieur » de l’univers pour l’en envelopper ¹² ; voulant désigner par là la partie de l’âme qui reste dans l’intelligible. En ce qui nous concerne, en revanche, il s’est exprimé d’une manière obscure, en disant que notre âme est « au sommet dans la tête »¹³. De surcroît, l’exhortation à nous séparer ¹⁴ ne doit pas être entendue en un sens local, car cette partie de l’âme est déjà séparée par nature ; elle incite plutôt à ne pas s’incliner vers le corps, même en imagination, et à lui rester étranger, si d’une façon ou d’une autre on arrive à faire remonter l’autre espèce d’âme et à amener aussi avec nous vers le haut la partie de l’âme qui est établie ici-bas, et qui est la seule à fabriquer et à façonner le corps ¹⁵ en y consacrant son activité.