Plotino – Tratado 27,20 (IV, 3, 20) — A alma não está no corpo (1)

20. Conviene todavía que nos planteemos esta cuestión: ¿se encuentran en un lugar las facultades del alma y lo que nosotros llamamos las partes de ésta? ¿Diremos acaso que las primeras no están en un lugar y las segundas sí, o que ni unas ni otras ocupan lugar alguno? Si no delimitamos un lugar preciso para cada una de las partes del alma y no ponemos a éstas más dentro que fuera del cuerpo, hacemos del cuerpo un ser realmente inanimado. Entonces, claro está, tenemos que preguntarnos cómo se producen las operaciones del alma en las que intervienen órganos corpóreos. Y si concedemos un lugar tan sólo a ciertas partes del alma, y no en cambio a las otras, no podremos decir que estas últimas se dan en nosotros, con lo cual tampoco deberemos afirmar que el alma entera vive en nosotros.

Así, pues, habrá que decir que ni las partes del alma, ni el alma entera, se dan en el cuerpo como en un lugar. Porque el lugar es algo que contiene, y que contiene un cuerpo. El cuerpo, a su vez, está allí donde se encuentra cada una de sus partes, de modo que no puede situarse por entero en un punto cualquiera de su lugar. Y en cuanto al alma, que no es un cuerpo, tiene más carácter de continente que de contenido.

El alma, en efecto, no se da en el cuerpo como en un vaso, pues el cuerpo sería inanimado si contuviese al alma como lo hace un vaso o si constituyese el lugar de ella. A no ser que el alma se entregue al cuerpo, como recogida en sí misma y por una especie de difusión en la que, cuanto más recogiese el vaso del alma, más, en verdad, sería perdido por ella.

Propiamente hablando, además, el lugar es algo que carece de cuerpo y no puede ser, por tanto, un cuerpo. De manera que ¿cómo iba a tener necesidad de un alma? El cuerpo, realmente, se mantendría cercano al alma por sus extremos y no por sí mismo. Pero muchas otras razones se oponen a que el alma se encuentre en el cuerpo como en un lugar. Su lugar, si así fuese, se vería siempre transportado con ella y entonces se daría el caso de que una cosa transportaba su propio lugar. Y no hay que decir que todo ello es menos admisible concebido el lugar como un intervalo. Porque hemos de convenir en que el intervalo es algo vacío, pero no lo es, en cambio, el cuerpo, aunque tal vez lo sea aquello en lo que el cuerpo se encuentra, con lo que el cuerpo mismo podrá encontrarse en el vacío.

Tampoco el alma se encuentra en el cuerpo como en un sujeto; porque lo que se da en un sujeto es un fenómeno que afecta a este sujeto, como por ejemplo el color y la figura, siendo así que el alma permanece separada del cuerpo. No se nos da, pues, lo mismo que una parte en un todo, porque ya es sabido que el alma no es una parte del cuerpo. Si se dijese que el alma constituye una parte de ese todo que es el ser animado, subsistiría la misma dificultad y nos preguntaríamos: ¿cómo se da en el todo? No se encuentra verdaderamente como el vino en el ánfora, ni es como el ánfora o cualquier otro objeto, considerados en sí mismos.

No se da en el cuerpo como un todo en sus partes, porque sería risible decir que el alma es un todo del que el cuerpo son sus partes. No es tampoco como una forma en la materia, porque la forma que se da en la materia no se encuentra separada de ella; además, la forma existe con posterioridad a la materia. Es cierto que el alma produce la forma en la materia, pero resulta, por esto mismo, diferente de la forma. Si se dice que no es una forma engendrada en la materia, sino una forma separada de ella, no aparece claro cómo me encuentra esta forma en el cuerpo.

¿Cómo, pues, se afirma por todos que el alma se encuentra en el cuerpo? Porque el alma no es realmente visible y el cuerpo, en cambio, lo es. Cuando vemos el cuerpo, nos damos cuenta que es algo animado porque se mueve y porque siente; decimos, por consiguiente, que tiene un alma, y diríamos también, según esto, que el alma se encuentra en el cuerpo. Ahora bien, si el alma se hiciese visible y sensible y nosotros la viésemos toda llena de vida, llegando por igual hasta los extremos mismos del cuerpo, no podríamos decir que el alma se da en el cuerpo; tendríamos que decir mejor que el cuerpo se da en el alma, que es el ser principal, como el contenido en el continente y como lo que fluye en lo que por naturaleza no es fluyente.

XX. (113). Les parties de l’âme que nous venons de nommer et les autres parties de l’âme sont-elles dans un lieu, ou les unes sont-elles dans un lieu, et les autres n’y sont-elles pas? Si certaines parties sont dans un lieu, où sont-elles et comment y sont-elles? ou bien aucune partie n’est-elle dans un lieu? Telles sont les questions que nous avons maintenant à résoudre. En effet, si nous n’assignons aucun lieu pour siège à chacune des parties de l’âme, si nous admettons qu’elles ne sont nulle part, pas plus dans le corps que 303 hors du corps, celui-ci restera inanimé, et nous ne pourrons expliquer comment ont lieu les opérations qui se produisent à l’aide des organes. Si, d’un autre coté, nous assignons une place dans le corps à certaines parties de l’âme sans en assigner à d’autres, celles auxquelles nous n’assignerons pas de place sembleront n’être pas en nous, par conséquent notre âme paraîtra n’être pas en nous tout entière.

Il ne faut admettre ni qu’une partie de l’âme, ni que l’âme tout entière est dans le corps comme dans un lieu (ἐν πόσῳ). En effet, le lieu a pour propriété de contenir, et de contenir un corps (περιεκτικὸν σώματος) ; or, là où chaque chose est divisée, il est impossible que le tout soit dans chaque partie; mais, l’âme n’est pas corps, et elle contient le corps plutôt qu’il ne la contient (114).

Elle n’y est pas non plus comme dans un vase (ἐν ἀγγείῳ) : car, dans ce cas, le corps serait inanimé, qu’il contînt l’âme comme un vase ou comme un lieu. Dira-t-on que l’âme est en quelque sorte concentrée en elle-même et communique au corps quelque chose d’elle-même par une transmission de proche en proche (διαδόσει τινί ) (115)? Alors ce qu’elle communiquera à ce vase sera autant de perdu pour elle.

D’ailleurs le lieu (en prenant ce mot dans son sens propre) est incorporel, par conséquent, n’est pas un corps. Quel besoin aurait-il donc de l’âme? En outre [si l’âme est dans le corps comme dans un lieu], le corps approchera de l’âme par sa surface et non par lui-même (116). On peut encore faire d’ailleurs la chose qui portera le lieu avec elle? Ensuite, si l’on définit le corps un intervalle (διάστημα), il sera encore moins vrai de dire que l’âme est dans le corps comme dans un lieu : car l’intervalle doit être vide; or le corps n’est pas le vide, il est dans le vide.

L’âme ne sera pas non plus dans le corps comme [une qualité] dans un sujet (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ) : car l’attribut d’un sujet en est une simple affection (πάθος), comme une couleur, une figure; or l’âme est séparable du corps

Elle ne sera pas non plus dans le corps comme la partie dans le tout (μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ) : car l’âme n’est pas une partie du corps. Dira-t-on qu’elle est une partie du tout vivant? Il restera toujours à déterminer comment elle est dans le tout : car elle n’y sera pas comme le vin est dans une amphore, ou comme un vase est dans un autre, ni comme une chose est en elle-même.

Elle ne sera pas non plus dans le corps comme le tout dans les parties : il serait ridicule d’appeler l’âme un tout, et le corps les parties de ce tout.

Elle ne sera pas non plus dans le corps comme la forme dans la matière (εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ) : car la forme engagée dans la matière n’est pas séparable. Il faut d’ailleurs que la matière existe déjà pour que la forme vienne s’y ajouter ; or c’est l’âme qui produit la forme dans la matière ; elle en est donc distincte. Répondra-t-on que l’âme n’est pas la forme engendrée dans la matière, qu’elle est une forme séparable? Il resterait encore à expliquer comment cette forme est dans le corps, puisque l’âme est séparable du corps (117).

S’il en est ainsi, comment se fait-il que tous les hommes, disent que l’âme est dans le corps? C’est que l’âme n’est pas visible, tandis que le corps est visible. Or, apercevant le corps, et jugeant qu’il est animé parce qu’il se meut et qu’il sent, nous disons qu’il a une âme, et nous sommes par conséquent amenés à penser que l’âme est dans le corps. Mais, si nous pouvions voir et sentir l’âme, reconnaître qu’elle enveloppe le corps tout entier par la vie qu’elle possède, et qu’elle s’y étend également de tous les côtés jusqu’à ses extrémités, nous dirions que l’âme n’est en aucune façon dans le corps, que c’est au contraire l’accessoire qui est dans le principal, le contenu dans le contenant, ce qui s’écoule dans ce qui ne s’écoule pas (118).

IF FUNCTIONS ARE NOT LOCALIZED THE SOUL WILL NOT SEEM ENTIRELY WITHIN US.

20. Are the above-mentioned and other parts of the soul localized in the body, or are some localized, and others not? This must be considered, because if none of the parts of the soul are localized, and if we assert that they are nowhere either in or out of the body, the latter will remain inanimate, and we will not be able to explain the manner of the operations occurring by help of the organs. If, on the other hand, we assign a location in the body to certain parts of the soul, without localizing other parts, the unlocalized parts will seem not to be within us, and consequently not the whole of our soul will seem to be in the body.

SPACE IS CORPOREAL; THE BODY IS WITHIN THE SOUL.

Of the soul neither a part nor the whole is in the body as a locality. The property of space is to contain some body. Where everything is divided it is impossible for the whole to be in every part. But the soul is not body, and the soul contains the body rather than the body contains the soul.

NOR IS THE BODY A VASE, FOR PROXIMATE TRANSMISSION OF THE SOUL.

Nor is the soul in the body as in a vase. In this case, the body would be inanimate, and would contain the soul as in a vase or locality. If the soul be considered as concentrated in herself and as communicating to the body something of herself by “close transmission” (as the Stoics would say), that which the soul will transmit to this vase would for her become something lost.

MANY METAPHYSICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CONCEPTION OF SOUL AS LOCALIZED.

Considering location in the strict sense of the word, it is incorporeal, and consequently cannot be a body. It would no longer need the soul. Besides (if the soul be in the body as if in a locality) the body will approach the soul by its surface, and not by itself. Many other objections can be raised to the theory that localizes the soul in the body. Under this hypothesis, indeed, place would have to be carried around along with the thing in which it will locate. But that which would carry place around with it (would be a monstrosity). Moreover, if the body be defined as being an interval, it will be still less true to say that the soul is in the body as a locality; for an interval should be empty; but the body is not empty, being within emptiness.

NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A QUALITY IN A SUBSTRATE.

Nor will the soul be in the body as (a quality) is in a substrate. The attribute of being a substrate is a mere affection, like a color, or a figure; but the soul is separable from the body.

NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A PART IN THE WHOLE.

Nor will the soul be in the body as a part in the whole; for the soul is not a part of the body. Nor is it a part of the living whole; for this would still demand explanation of the manner of this being within it. She will not be within it as wine in a jar, or as one jar in another, nor as one thing is within itself (as the Manicheans thought).

NOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A WHOLE IN A PART.

Nor will the soul be in the body as a whole is in its parts; for it would be ridiculous to call the soul a whole, and the body the parts of that whole.

NOR WILL THE SOUL BE IN THE BODY AS FORM IN MATTER.

Nor will the soul be in the body as form is in matter; for the form that is engaged in matter is not separable. Moreover, that form descends upon matter implies the preliminary existence of matter; but it is the soul that produces form in matter; and therefore the soul must be distinct from form. Though the soul be not form begotten in matter, the soul might be a separable form; but this theory would still have to explain how this form inheres in the body, since the soul is separable from the body.

THE SOUL IS SAID TO BE IN THE BODY BECAUSE THE BODY ALONE IS VISIBLE.

All men say that the soul is in the body, however, because the soul is not visible, while the body is. Observing the body, and judging that it is animated because it moves and feels, we say that it has a soul, and we are thereby led to suppose that the soul is in the body. But if we could see and feel the soul, and if we could realize that she surrounds the whole body by the life she possesses, and that she extends around it equally on all sides till the extremities, we would say that the soul is in no way in the body, but that on the contrary the accessory is within its principle, the contained within the container, what flows within the immovable.

XX. It is requisite, however, to consider whether these, and what are called the other parts of the soul are in place, or these in short are not, but the other parts are, and if they are where they are, or whether none of them is in place. For if we do not assign a certain place to the several parts of the soul, but admit that each of them is no where, and thus make them to be no more within, than without the body, we shall render the body inanimate, and shall not be able to show how those works are effected which are performed through the corporeal organs. Or if we admit that some of the parts of the soul are in place, but others not, we shall not appear to grant those parts to be in us which we exclude from place, so that neither shall we admit that the whole of our soul is in us. In short, therefore, we must neither assert that any one of the parts of the soul, nor that the whole of it is in body. For place is that which comprehends, and is comprehensive of body ; and where each thing is that is divided, there it is situated in such a way that the whole is not in any thing indiscriminately. Soul, however, is not body, and is not rather that which is comprehended than that which comprehends. Nor yet is it in body as in a vessel; for if it were, the body would become inanimate, whether it comprehended the soul as a vessel, or as place; unless it should be said that the soul is collected in itself, and by a certain distribution transmits something of itself into its vessel the body, and thus as much as the vessel participates, so much will be taken away from the soul. Place, however, properly so called, is incorporeal, and not body. So that in what will it be indigent of soul ? Body also, not by itself, but by the boundary of itself, will approximate to soul. Many other objections, likewise, may be urged against him who asserts that soul is in place. For place will always be co-introduced with soul; and [it may still be asked] what will that be which introduces together with itself place? If place also is interval, much less will soul be in the body as in place. For it is necessary, that interval should be a vacuum. Body, however, is not a vacuum, but perhaps that will be a vacuum in which body is; so that body will be in a vacuum. Moreover, neither will soul be in the body as in a subject. For that which is in a subject, is a passion of that in which it is, as colour and figure. But soul is separable from the body. Nor yet, is soul in the body, as a part in the whole: for soul is not a part of the body. But if some one should say that soul is a part as in the whole animal, in the first place indeed, the same doubt will remain how it is in the whole. For it is not proper to conceive that it subsists either as wine in a vessel of wine, or as a vessel in a vessel; nor in the same manner as a thing is in itself. Nor again, will it be in body as a whole in the parts. For it is ridiculous to say that the soul is a whole, but the body parts. Neither is it as form in matter: for the form which is in matter, is inseparable from matter. And matter now existing, form afterwards accedes to it. But soul produces the form in matter, being itself something different from material form. If, however, it should be said that soul is not a generated, but a separate form, it will not yet be manifest how this form is in body; and soul will be separate from body. How then is it said by all men, that the soul is in the body ? Shall we say it is because not the soul but the body is visible ? Perceiving therefore the body, and conceiving it to be animated because it is moved and has sensible perception, we say that the body” has the soul. Hence, therefore, we say that the soul is in the body. If, however, the soul were visible and sensible, so as to be perceived to be full of life, to comprehend entirely the body in life, and to extend itself equally to the extremities of it, we should no longer say that the soul is in the body, but that in the more principal nature that which is not such subsists, in that which contains, the thing contained, and that which flows in that which does not flow.

20. Here a question rises to which we must find an answer: whether these and the other powers which we call “parts” of the Soul are situated, all, in place; or whether some have place and standpoint, others not; or whether again none are situated in place.

The matter is difficult: if we do not allot to each of the parts of the Soul some form of Place, but leave all unallocated – no more within the body than outside it – we leave the body soulless, and are at a loss to explain plausibly the origin of acts performed by means of the bodily organs: if, on the other hand, we suppose some of those phases to be [capable of situation] in place but others not so, we will be supposing that those parts to which we deny place are ineffective in us, or, in other words, that we do not possess our entire soul.

This simply shows that neither the soul entire nor any part of it may be considered to be within the body as in a space: space is a container, a container of body; it is the home of such things as consist of isolated parts, things, therefore, in which at no point is there an entirety; now, the soul is not a body and is no more contained than containing.

Neither is it in body as in some vessel: whether as vessel or as place of location, the body would remain, in itself, unensouled. If we are to think of some passing-over from the soul – that self-gathered thing – to the containing vessel, then soul is diminished by just as much as the vessel takes.

Space, again, in the strict sense is unembodied, and is not, itself, body; why, then, should it need soul?

Besides [if the soul were contained as in space] contact would be only at the surface of the body, not throughout the entire mass.

Many other considerations equally refute the notion that the soul is in body as [an object] in space; for example, this space would be shifted with every movement, and a thing itself would carry its own space about.

Of course if by space we understand the interval separating objects, it is still less possible that the soul be in body as in space: such a separating interval must be a void; but body is not a void; the void must be that in which body is placed; body [not soul] will be in the void.

Nor can it be in the body as in some substratum: anything in a substratum is a condition affecting that – a colour, a form – but the soul is a separate existence.

Nor is it present as a part in the whole; soul is no part of body. If we are asked to think of soul as a part in the living total we are faced with the old difficulty: How it is in that whole. It is certainly not there as the wine is in the wine jar, or as the jar in the jar, or as some absolute is self-present.

Nor can the presence be that of a whole in its part: It would be absurd to think of the soul as a total of which the body should represent the parts.

It is not present as Form is in Matter; for the Form as in Matter is inseparable and, further, is something superimposed upon an already existent thing; soul, on the contrary, is that which engenders the Form residing within the Matter and therefore is not the Form. If the reference is not to the Form actually present, but to Form as a thing existing apart from all formed objects, it is hard to see how such an entity has found its way into body, and at any rate this makes the soul separable.

How comes it then that everyone speaks of soul as being in body?

Because the soul is not seen and the body is: we perceive the body, and by its movement and sensation we understand that it is ensouled, and we say that it possesses a soul; to speak of residence is a natural sequence. If the soul were visible, an object of the senses, radiating throughout the entire life, if it were manifest in full force to the very outermost surface, we would no longer speak of soul as in body; we would say the minor was within the major, the contained within the container, the fleeting within the perdurable.