Plotino – Tratado 49,1 (V, 3, 1) — É necessário que o que se conhece a si mesmo seja múltiplo?

1. ¿Debe, acaso, contar con diversas partes el ser que se piensa a sí mismo? Así, con una de sus partes contemplaría las demás y podría decirse con razón que se piensa a sí mismo; porque siendo absolutamente simple estaría impedido de volverse hacia sí mismo y de tomar conocimiento de sí. Salvo que pensemos que un ser no compuesto puede llegar a conocerse a sí mismo. Pero hay que aclarar a este respecto que cuando se dice de un ser que se piensa a sí mismo porque es compuesto y porque con una de sus partes conoce todas las demás, no se concibe que tenga un verdadero conocimiento de sí mismo a no ser que se considere como tal la percepción de la forma y de la naturaleza de nuestro cuerpo. Mas, entonces, no sería el todo lo que verdaderamente conociese, porque lo que en él conoce las otras partes no se conocería a sí mismo, con lo cual no encontraríamos el ser que buscábamos, esto es, el ser que se conoce a sí mismo, sino un ser que conoce a otro ser. Habrá, pues, que admitir que un ser simple tiene conocimiento de sí mismo y averiguar cómo ocurre esto, o abandonar por completo la opinión de que un ser puede conocerse realmente a sí mismo. No es posible, sin embargo, abandonar esta opinión, porque muchas cosas absurdas resultarían de ello. Absurdo sería en alto grado no conceder al alma el conocimiento de sí misma, o negárselo de igual manera a la naturaleza de la Inteligencia, pues, sería, en efecto, completamente absurdo que tuviese un conocimiento de las demás cosas que no asentase en el conocimiento y en el saber de sí misma. Porque son la sensación y, si se quiere, la reflexión y la opinión las que perciben las cosas exteriores, pero no desde luego la Inteligencia. Esto es, precisamente, lo que conviene considerar: si la Inteligencia tiene o no un conocimiento de las cosas exteriores. Lo que está claro, en cualquier caso, es que la Inteligencia conoce los seres inteligibles. Pero, ¿conoce tan sólo los inteligibles, o se conoce también a sí misma, dado que conoce realmente esos seres? ¿O conocerá tan sólo de sí misma el hecho de que conoce los inteligibles, sin que ella conozca lo que es; esto es, sabrá únicamente de sí misma que conoce esos seres, pero sin alcanzar a conocer lo que ella misma es? En otro caso, ¿se conocerá a sÍ misma y conocerá también los inteligibles? De qué modo y hasta qué punto es posible este conocimiento es cuestión que conviene examinar.

Pour se penser ou se connaître soi-même, faut-il être composé de diverses parties et contempler l’une par l’autre? Doit-on admettre que ce qui est absolument simple ne peut se tourner vers soi-même pour se connaître? Ne doit-on pas admettre au contraire que même ce qui n’est point composé peut se connaître soi-même? — Si l’on dit qu’une chose peut se connaître elle-même parce qu’elle est composée, et que par une de ses parties elle saisit les autres (comme par la sensation, par exemple, nous percevons la forme de notre corps et sa nature), il n’est pas évident qu’il y ait alors connaissance de soi-même. Dans ce cas, le tout ne sera point connu, à moins que la partie qui connaît les autres auxquelles elle est unie ne se connaisse aussi elle-même; sinon, il y aura là connaissance d’une chose par une autre chose, au lieu de la connaissance d’une chose par elle-même.

Il faut donc admettre qu’un principe simple se connaît lui-même, et chercher comment cela est possible ¹, sinon, il faut renoncer à la véritable connaissance de soi-même. Mais on ne saurait y renoncer sans tomber dans une foule d’absurdités : car, s’il est absurde de refuser à l’âme la connaissance de soi-même, c’est le comble de l’absurdité de la refuser à l’intelligence. Comment aurait-elle la connaissance des autres êtres, si elle ne possédait la connaissance et la science d’elle-même? En effet, les choses extérieures sont perçues par la sensation, et, si l’on veut, par la raison discursive et l’opinion, mais non par l’intelligence. L’intelligence a-t-elle ou non la connaissance de ces choses, c’est un point à examiner. Pour les choses intelligibles, l’intelligence en a évidemment la connaissance. Se borne-t-elle à les connaître, ou bien se connaît-elle aussi elle-même, elle qui connaît les choses intelligibles? Dans ce cas, connaît-elle qu’elle connaît seulement les choses intelligibles, sans pouvoir connaître ce qu’elle est? Tout en connaissant qu’elle connaît ce qui lui appartient, ne peut-elle connaître ce qu’est elle-même qui connaît? Ou bien peut-elle tout à la fois et connaître ce qui lui appartient, et se connaître elle-même? Alors, comment s’opère cette connaissance et jusqu’où va-t-elle? C’est ce qu’il faut examiner.

IS KNOWLEDGE DEPENDENT ON THE COMPOSITE-NESS OF THE KNOWER?

1. Must thought, and self-consciousness imply being composed of different parts, and on their mutual contemplation? Must that which is absolutely simple be unable to turn towards itself, to know itself? Is it, on the contrary, possible that for that which is not composite to know itself? Self-consciousness, indeed, does not necessarily result from a thing’s knowing itself because it is composite, and that one of its parts grasps the other; as, for instance, by sensation we perceive the form and nature of our body. In this case the whole will not be known, unless the part that knows the others to which it is united also knows itself; otherwise, we would find the knowledge of one entity, through another, instead of one entity through itself.

A SIMPLE PRINCIPLE CAN HAVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

While, therefore, asserting that a simple principle does know itself, we must examine into the possibility of this. Otherwise, we would have to give up hope of real self-knowledge. But to resign this would imply many absurdities; for if it be absurd to deny that the soul possesses self-knowledge, it would be still more absurd to deny it of intelligence. How could intelligence have knowledge of other beings, if it did not possess the knowledge and science of itself? Indeed, exterior things are perceived by sensation, and even, if you insist, by discursive reason and opinion; but not by intelligence. It is indeed worth examining whether intelligence does, or does not have knowledge of such external things. Evidently, intelligible entities are known by intelligence. Does intelligence limit itself to knowledge of these entities, or does it, while knowing intelligible entities, also know itself? In this case, does it know that it knows only intelligible entities, without being able to know what itself is? While knowing that it knows what belongs to it, is it unable to know what itself, the knower, is? Or can it at the same time know what belongs to it, and also know itself? Then how does this knowledge operate, and how far does it go ? This is what we must examine.

1. Are we to think that a being knowing itself must contain diversity, that self-knowledge can be affirmed only when some one phase of the self perceives other phases, and that therefore an absolutely simplex entity would be equally incapable of introversion and of self-awareness?

No: a being that has no parts or phases may have this consciousness; in fact there would be no real self-knowing in an entity presented as knowing itself in virtue of being a compound – some single element in it perceiving other elements – as we may know our own form and entire bodily organism by sense-perception: such knowing does not cover the whole field; the knowing element has not had the required cognisance at once of its associates and of itself; this is not the self-knower asked for; it is merely something that knows something else.

Either we must exhibit the self-knowing of an uncompounded being – and show how that is possible – or abandon the belief that any being can possess veritable self-cognition.

To abandon the belief is not possible in view of the many absurdities thus entailed.

It would be already absurd enough to deny this power to the soul or mind, but the very height of absurdity to deny it to the nature of the Intellectual-Principle, presented thus as knowing the rest of things but not attaining to knowledge, or even awareness, of itself.

It is the province of sense and in some degree of understanding and judgement, but not of the Intellectual-Principle, to handle the external, though whether the Intellectual-Principle holds the knowledge of these things is a question to be examined, but it is obvious that the Intellectual-Principle must have knowledge of the Intellectual objects. Now, can it know those objects alone or must it not simultaneously know itself, the being whose function it is to know just those things? Can it have self-knowledge in the sense [dismissed above as inadequate] of knowing its content while it ignores itself? Can it be aware of knowing its members and yet remain in ignorance of its own knowing self? Self and content must be simultaneously present: the method and degree of this knowledge we must now consider.

I. Is it therefore necessary, that intellect should be in itself various, in order that by one of the things contained in itself, having surveyed the rest, it may be thus said to understand itself, as if it would not be able to be converted to, and have an intellectual perception of itself, if it was entirely simple ? Or is it also possible for that which is not a composite, to have the intellection of itself? For that which is said to perceive itself intellectually because it is a composite, and because by one of the things in itself it understands the rest, just as if by sense we should apprehend the form1 of ourselves, and the other nature of the body, will not have a truly intellectual perception of itself. For in a thing of this kind, the whole will not be known, unless that which understands other things that are with itself, understands also itself; since otherwise we shall not have the object of investigation, viz., that which perceives itself, but we shall have one thing perceiving another. It is necessary, therefore, to admit that the intellectual perception of itself is the province of a simple nature, and how this is effected must, if possible, be considered; or we must abandon the opinion that there is something which truly intellectually perceives itself. To abandon, however, this opinion is not easy, since the rejection of it is attended with many absurdities. For if we do not admit that to assign this power to the soul is not very absurd, yet not to ascribe it to the nature of intellect is perfectly absurd; viz., if we grant that it has indeed a knowledge of other things, but has no knowledge and science of itself. For sense, and not intellect, will have an apprehension of. things external; and if you are willing to grant it, this will also be the case with the dianoetic power and opinion. But whether intellect has a knowledge of these or not, it is fit to consider. It is evident, indeed, that intellect knows such things as are intelligible. Does it, therefore, know these alone, or also itself that know these? And does it thus far know itself, that it knows these alone, but does not know what itself is ? Hence, it will perceive that it knows some things belonging to itself, but it will not know what itself is; or it will both know the things which are its own, and itself. And what the mode of this knowledge is, and how far it extends, must be considered.