Igal
7. Podríamos sin duda argüir: pero es a Dios a quien contempla. Mas, si se admite que conoce a Dios, se deberá admitir necesariamente que también se conoce a sí misma. Porque es claro que conocerá todo lo que ha recibido de Dios, todos los dones y todos los poderes que El le ha concedido. Y al aprender a conocerlos se conocerá igualmente así misma, puesto que ella misma es uno de los dones de Dios, y mejor aún el conjunto de los dones de Dios. S, pues, conoce a Dios y conoce sus potencias, se conoce verdaderamente a sí misma al llegar a conocer que proviene de Dios y que ha recibido en sí misma los poderes que a Dios pertenecen. Si, por el contrario, no pudiese ver a Dios con toda claridad, la visión y el conocimiento que tiene de sí misma se debilitarían otro tanto, puesto que la visión y el objeto de la visión son una y la misma cosa y verse a sí mismo es, precisamente, conocerse ¿Qué otra cosa podríamos concederle? El reposo, seguramente. Pero el reposo, no es para la Inteligencia, una salida de sí misma, sino un acto vacío de elementos extraños; pues todo ser que se encuentra en reposo para los demás, no conserva más que su acto propio, sobre todo si se trata de un ser en acto y no de un ser en potencia. El ser de la Inteligencia es, por tanto, su acto, y no hay nada, además, a lo que tienda este acto, dado que la Inteligencia mira hacia sí misma. Así, pues, cuando ella se piensa, desarrolla su actividad en sí misma y hacia sí misma. Y si algo sale de ella, sale sin duda por actuar ella en sí misma. Por lo cual debe actuar en sí misma si quiere actuar sobre algo ajeno o conseguir que provenga de ella algo que le sea semejante. Del mismo modo que, siendo el fuego antes que nada fuego en sí mismo, es capaz de realizar el acto del fuego y hacer igualmente que su huella pueda actuar sobre otra cosa.
Por lo que resulta que la Inteligencia tiene su acto en si misma. Y para el alma es, a su vez, algo interior todo lo que la inclina a la Inteligencia; en tanto lo que la aparta de ésta tiende hacia el mundo de las cosas exteriores. Por una parte, se parece al ser del que ella proviene; y por otra, no guarda semejanza con él, aunque, eso sí, continúe pareciéndose a él en cuanto a su modo de actuar y de producir. Porque al actuar contempla, y al producir realiza formas que son como pensamientos perfectamente ajustados. Todas las cosas resultan ser así huellas del pensamiento y de la Inteligencia. Actúan conforme a su modelo y lo imitan tanto mejor cuanto más cerca se encuentran de él, siendo las más alejadas las que conservan una imagen suya más oscura.
Bouillet
VII. Mais, dira-t-on, l’intelligence pourrait contempler Dieu. — Si l’on admet que l’intelligence connaît Dieu, on est forcé parla d’admettre aussi qu’elle se connaît elle-même : car elle saura ce qu’elle tient de Dieu, ce qu’elle en a reçu, ce qu’elle en peut recevoir. Si elle le sait, elle se connaître par là elle-même, puisqu’elle est une des choses ou plutôt qu’elle est toutes les choses données par Dieu. Si donc elle connaît Dieu, elle connaît aussi les puissances de Dieu, elle connaît qu’elle en procède, qu’elle en tient sa puissance. Si elle ne peut avoir de Dieu une intuition claire, parce que le sujet et l’objet de l’intuition doivent être identiques, par cette raison même l’intelligence se connaîtra, se verra elle même, puisque voir c’est être ce qui est vu. Quelle autre chose en effet pourrions-nous accorder à l’intelligence? Le repos? Le repos, pour l’intelligence, ne consiste pas à être enlevée à elle-même, mais à agir sans être troublée par rien d’étranger. Les choses qui ne sont troublées par rien d’étranger n’ont qu’à produire leur acte propre, surtout quand elles sont en acte, et non simplement en puissance. Ce qui est en acte, et qui ne peut être en acte pour rien d’étranger, doit être en acte pour soi-même. En se pensant, l’intelligence reste tournée vers elle-même, rapporte son acte à elle-même. Si quelque chose procède d’elle, c’est précisément parce qu’elle reste tournée vers elle-même, qu’elle reste en elle-même. Il fallait en effet qu’elle s’appliquât à elle-même, avant de s’appliquer à autre chose ou de produire une autre chose qui lui ressemblât : ainsi, le feu doit d’abord être feu en lui-même, être le feu en acte, pour donner ensuite à d’autres choses des vestiges de son essence. L’intelligence est donc en elle-même un acte. L’âme, en se tournant vers l’intelligence, habite eu son propre sein; en sortant de l’intelligence, elle se porte aux choses extérieures. En se tournant vers l’intelligence, elle devient semblable à la puissance dont elle procède; en sortant de l’intelligence, elle devient différente d’elle; cependant, elle garde encore quelque ressemblance avec elle, soit qu’elle agisse, soit qu’elle produise. En agissant, elle contemple encore; en produisant, elle produit des formes, qui sont comme des pensées éloignées, des vestiges de la Pensée et de l’Intelligence, vestiges qui sont conformes à l’archétype, et qui en offrent une imitation fidèle, ou qui du moins en conservent encore une image affaiblie, s’ils n’occupent que te dernier rang des êtres.
Guthrie
WHATEVER INTELLIGENCE MAY BE THOUGHT TO DO, IT MUST KNOW ITSELF.
7. It may be objected that the Intelligence contemplates the divinity. If, however, it be granted, that the Intelligence knows the divinity, one is thereby 1 forced to admit that it also knows itself; for it will know what it derives from the divinity, what it has received from Him, and what it still may hope to receive from Him. By knowing this, it will know itself, since it is one of the entities given by the divin-itv; or rather, since it is all that is given by the divinity. If then, it know the divinity, it knows also the powers of the divinity, it knows that itself proceeds from the divinity, and that itself derives its powers from the divinity. If Intelligence cannot have a clear intuition of the divinity, because the subject and object of an intuition must be the same, this will turn out to be a reason why Intelligence will know itself, and will see itself, since seeing is being what is seen. What else indeed could we attribute to Intelligence? Rest, for instance? For Intelligence, rest does not consist in being removed from itself, but rather to act without being disturbed by anything that is alien. The things that are not troubled by anything alien need only to produce their own actualization, especially when they are in actualization, and not merely potential. That which is in actualization, and which cannot be in actualization for anything foreign, must be in actualization for itself. When thinking itself, Intelligence remains turned towards itself, referring its actualization to itself. If anything proceed from it, it is precisely because it remains turned towards itself that it remains in itself. It had, indeed, to apply itself to itself, before applying itself to anything else, or producing something else that resembled it; thus fire must first be fire in itself, and be fire in actualization, in order later to impart some traces of its nature to other things. Intelligence, in itself, therefore, is an actualization. The soul, on turning herself towards Intelligence, remains within herself; on issuing from Intelligence, the soul turns towards external things. On turning towards Intelligence, she becomes similar to the power from which she proceeds; on issuing from Intelligence, she becomes different from herself. Nevertheless, she still preserves some resemblance to Intelligence, both in her activity and productiveness. When active, the soul still contemplates Intelligence; when productive, the soul produces forms, which resemble distant thoughts, and are traces of thought and Intelligence, traces that conform to their archetype; and which reveal a faithful imitation thereof, or which, at least, still preserve a weakened image thereof, even if they do occupy only the last rank of beings.
Taylor
VII. It may however, be said, that pure intellect beholds deity. But if it is acknowledged that it knows God, he who grants this, must also necessarily admit that it knows itself. For such things as it possesses from deity it knows, and also what be imparts, and what he is able to impart. But learning and knowing these things, it will likewise through this know itself. For divinity is one of the things imparted, or rather he is all that is imparted. If, therefore, intellect also knows him, and learns the powers that he possesses, it will likewise know itself to be generated from thence; and that it derives from him all that it is able to receive. If, however, it is unable to see him clearly, since to see is perhaps the very thing that is seen, on this account especially that which remains to it, will be to see and know itself, if to see is to be the very thing itself which is seen. For what else can we confer upon it ? By Jupiter, quiet. The quiet of intellect however, is not mental alienation, but is the tranquil energy of intellect, withdrawing itself from other things ; since to other natures also that are at rest from other employments, their own proper energy remains ; and especially to those things whose existence is not in capacity, but in energy.
Where, therefore, existence is energy, and there is nothing else to which energy is directed, there energy is directed to itself. Hence intellect perceiving itself, is thus with itself, and has its energy directed to itself. For if something else is suspended from it, that something else is in itself, because its energy is directed to itself. For it is necessary that it should first be in itself, and afterwards that its energy should be directed to something else, or that something else should proceed from it, assimilated to it: just as fire, which is first in itself, and has the energy of fire, and thus is enabled to produce the vestigie of itself in something else. For again, intellect indeed, is energy in itself; but soul is so in proportion as it tends as it were internally to its own intellect. But so far as it departs from intellect, so far it tends to that which is external. And partly indeed, it is assimilated to that from whence it came; but partly, though it becomes dissimilar, yet here also it retains a similitude to it, whether it acts, or produces. For when it acts, at the same time it contemplates ; and when it produces, it produces forms, which are as it were intellections derived from first intelligibles. Hence, all things are vestigies of intelligence and intellect, proceeding conformably to their archetype; those that are near to it, imitating it in a greater degree; but such things as are last preserving only an obscure image of it.
MacKenna
7. The contemplating of God, we might answer.
But to admit its knowing God is to be compelled to admit its self-knowing. It will know what it holds from God, what God has given forth or may; with this knowledge, it knows itself at the stroke, for it is itself one of those given things – in fact is all of them. Knowing God and His power, then, it knows itself, since it comes from Him and carries His power upon it; if, because here the act of vision is identical with the object, it is unable to see God clearly, then all the more, by the equation of seeing and seen, we are driven back upon that self-seeing and self-knowing in which seeing and thing seen are undistinguishably one thing.
And what else is there to attribute to it?
Repose, no doubt; but, to an Intellectual-Principle, Repose is not an abdication from intellect; its Repose is an Act, the act of abstention from the alien: in all forms of existence repose from the alien leaves the characteristic activity intact, especially where the Being is not merely potential but fully realized.
In the Intellectual-Principle, the Being is an Act and in the absence of any other object it must be self-directed; by this self-intellection it holds its Act within itself and upon itself; all that can emanate from it is produced by this self-centering and self-intention; first – self-gathered, it then gives itself or gives something in its likeness; fire must first be self-centred and be fire, true to fire’s natural Act; then it may reproduce itself elsewhere.
Once more, then; the Intellectual-Principle is a self-intent activity, but soul has the double phase, one inner, intent upon the Intellectual-Principle, the other outside it and facing to the external; by the one it holds the likeness to its source; by the other, even in its unlikeness, it still comes to likeness in this sphere, too, by virtue of action and production; in its action it still contemplates, and its production produces Ideal-forms – divine intellections perfectly wrought out – so that all its creations are representations of the divine Intellection and of the divine Intellect, moulded upon the archetype, of which all are emanations and images, the nearer more true, the very latest preserving some faint likeness of the source.