Plotino – Tratado 9,1 (VI, 9, 1) —Todos os seres são seres em virtude da unidade

1. É em virtude da unidade que todos os seres são seres assim como aqueles que são seres no sentido primeiro do termo que aqueles que são ditos ser de alguma maneira entre os seres. E com efeito, o que poderia ser, sem ser um? Pois, desprovidas de unidade, que se diz delas, as coisas que eis aí não são: certamente, não há exército, se ele não é uno, não há coral ou rebanho, se não são unos. Mas não menos casa ou navio, se não têm a unidade, porque a casa é una e o navio é uno, e se perdessem a unidade, a casa não seria mais uma casa nem o navio um navio. Logo não haveria grandezas contínuas, se a unidade não estivesse presente nelas; pois é um fato que, se elas são divididas, elas mudam de ser na medida em que perdem a unidade. E assim vai da mesma maneira ainda para os corpos das plantas e dos animais; sendo dado que cada um dentre eles é uno, se fossem a unidade em se fragmentando em uma multiplicidade, perdem a realidade que era a sua e que possuíam, e não são mais o que eram; se tornam outras coisas, e estas coisas também não são senão na medida que são unas. E a saúde se produz quando o corpo é coordenado na unidade; a beleza quando a unidade mantém unidas as partes; e a virtude para a alma, quando, se orientando para a unidade e um acordo único, ela se encontra unificada.

— Mas então, posto que é a Alma que conduz todas as coisas à unidade, em as produzindo, em as confeccionando, em lhes dando a figura e a ordem, deve-se dizer, uma vez chegado à Alma, que é ela que dispensa a unidade e que é ela que é a unidade?

— Não é preciso de preferência admitir que, assim como ela dispensa aos corpos muitas outras coisas que são diferentes dela, por exemplo a figura e a forma, sem ser ela mesma o que ela dá, da mesma maneira, se é verdadeiro que ela dá também a unidade, ela a dá como algo de diferente dela, e que é em girando seu olhar para a unidade que ela torna cada coisa una, assim como ela produz o homem em contemplando o Homem e em apreendendo, com o Homem, a unidade que nele está. Com efeito, entre as coisas das quais se diz que elas são unas, cada uma é una na medida em que possui o que ela é, de sorte que as coisas que «são» menos têm menos unidade, enquanto que as coisas que «são» mais têm mais unidade. E a Alma também, que é diferente da unidade, tem mais unidade na medida em que ela é mais verdadeiramente; mas ela não é certamente a unidade ela mesma. Pois a alma é una, e a unidade logo é de certa maneira um acidente; mas a alma e a unidade são duas coisas distintas, assim como o são o corpo e a unidade. E o que é dividido em partes, como um coral, é o que há de mais distante da unidade, enquanto o que é contínuo é mais próximo; a alma está ainda mais próxima, porque ela disto participa ela também. Mas se alguém quiser mostrar que a Alma e a unidade são a mesma coisa, e isso porque, se ela não fosse una, a Alma não poderia mesmo ser. seria necessário dizer então que as outras coisas também são, cada uma, porque elas são unas, mas que a unidade permanece diferente delas: com efeito, o corpo e a unidade não são a mesma coisa, mas o corpo participa da unidade. Seria necessário dizer em seguida que a alma é múltipla, mesmo aquela que é una, embora ela não seja composta de partes. Há com efeito muitas faculdades nela que são mantidas juntas pela unidade como por uma ligadura: raciocinar, desejar, perceber. Certamente a alma, porque ela é ela mesma una, introduz a unidade nas outras coisas também, mas recebe ela mesma a unidade de um outro.

1. Todos los seres tienen su existencia por el Uno, no sólo los seres así llamados en el primer sentido, sino los que se dicen atributos de esos seres L Porque, ¿qué es lo que podría existir que no fuese uno ¹? Si lo separamos de la unidad deja inmediatamente de existir. Ni el ejército, ni el coro, ni el rebaño tendrían realidad alguna si no fuesen ya un ejército, un coro o un rebaño. Del mismo modo, la casa y la nave carecen de existencia si no poseen unidad; porque tanto la una como la otra son una unidad y, si ésta se pierde, dejan también de ser nave y casa.

Las magnitudes continuas no tendrían razón de ser si no poseyesen la unidad. Ahí tenéis un ejemplo: dividís una magnitud, y perdida ya su unidad, cambia necesariamente de ser. Igual acontece con las plantas y con los animales; [386] cada uno de ellos es un cuerpo; pero un cuerpo que, si pierde su unidad, se descompone en múltiples partes, dejando de ser lo que antes era. Lo que surge entonces son tantos seres cuantas partes haya y cada uno de ellos presenta a su vez una unidad.

Se da la salud cuando hay en el cuerpo unidad armónica, la belleza cuando la unidad mantiene unidas las partes, y la virtud en el alma cuando la unión de las partes resulta de un acuerdo. Pues bien, dado que el alma, fabricando y moldeando el cuerpo y concediéndole la forma y el orden, lleva todo a la unidad, ¿convendrá acercarse hasta ella y decir que es ella misma la que dirige este coro de la unidad o incluso que es ya el Uno? O, puesto que el alma otorga a los cuerpos unas cualidades que no posee, como la forma y la idea que son algo diferente a lo que ella es, y asimismo la unidad, que del alma proviene, ¿ha de creerse que esa unidad que el alma da es diferente de ella, y que lo que hace realmente el alma es que cada ser sea uno por la contemplación del Uno, no de otro modo que como ocurre con el hombre, donde se recoge y plasma la unidad por la contemplación del hombre ideal?

De los seres de los que decimos que son un ser hacemos esta afirmación con una referencia concreta a su propia realidad. De modo que cuanto menos ser menos unidad, y cuanto más ser más unidad. Así también el alma, que es diferente del Uno, tiene más unidad en la medida en que posee más ser; pero eso no quiere indicar que ella sea el Uno. Naturalmente que el alma es una, mas la unidad es para ella como un accidente. [387] Alma y uno debemos considerarlos, pues, como dos cosas distintas, como si fuesen cuerpo y uno.

La magnitud discontinua, cual es el caso del coro, está muy lejos de la unidad; la magnitud continua, en cambio, está muy cerca. El alma, por su parte, aún tiene ahí una participación mayor. Si, puesto que el alma no puede existir sin ser una, se quisiera identificar el alma y la unidad, habría que hacer notar ante todo que lo que ocurre con el alma acontece con todos los demás seres, esto es, que no pueden existir sin la unidad y, sin embargo, la unidad es algo diferente de ellos, porque el cuerpo, por ejemplo, no es lo mismo que la unidad, aunque participe desde luego de ella. Además, el alma, que nosotros consideramos una, es múltiple, aunque no se advierten en ella partes componentes. Es múltiple, porque se encuentran en ella diversas facultades, como la facultad de razonar, o la de desear, o la de percibir, todas enlazadas entre sí por el vínculo de la unidad. He aquí, por consiguiente, que el alma da una unidad a los seres, que, a su vez, ella recibe de otro serl.

Tous les êtres, tant les êtres premiers que ceux qui reçoivent le nom d’êtres à un titre quelconque, ne sont des êtres que par leur unité. Que seraient-ils, en effet, sans elle? Privés de leur unité, ils cesseraient d’être ce qu’on dit qu’ils sont. Une armée n’existe point, en effet, si elle n’est une; il en est de même d’un chœur, d’un troupeau. Une maison, un vaisseau non plus ne sont point, s’ils ne possèdent l’unité; en la perdant, ils cesseraient d’être ce qu’ils sont. Il en est de même des quantités continues : elles n’existeraient pas si elles n’avaient pas d’unité : quand on les divise, en perdant leur unité, elles perdent en même temps leur nature. Considérez encore les corps des plantes et des animaux, dont chacun est un : s’ils viennent à perdre leur unité en se fractionnant en plusieurs parties, ils perdent aussitôt leur essence ; ils ne sont plus ce qu’ils étaient, ils sont devenus des êtres nouveaux, qui n’existent eux-mêmes qu’autant qu’ils sont uns. Ce qui fait en nous la santé, c’est que les parties de notre corps sont coordonnées dans l’unité ; la beauté, c’est que l’unité contient tous nos membres ; la vertu, c’est que notre âme tend à l’unité et devient une par l’harmonie de ses facultés.

Puisque l’Âme amène à l’unité toutes choses en les produisant, en les façonnant, en leur donnant la forme, devons-nous, après nous être élevés jusqu’à l’âme, dire qu’elle ne donne pas seulement l’unité, mais qu’elle est elle-même l’Un en soi? — Non. Comme les autres choses que l’âme donne aux corps, telles que la forme, la figure, ne sont nullement identiques à l’âme qui les donne ; de même, elle donne l’unité sans être l’Un : ce n’est qu’en contemplant l’Un qu’elle rend une chacune de ses productions, comme ce n’est qu’en contemplant l’homme en soi qu’elle fait l’homme (à condition cependant qu’elle prenne avec l’idée de l’homme en soi l’unité qui s’y trouve impliquée). Toutes les choses que l’on appelle unes ont chacune une unité proportionnée à leur essence, en sorte qu’elles participent plus ou moins de l’unité selon qu’elles participent plus ou moins de l’être. Ainsi, l’âme est autre chose que l’Un; cependant, comme elle est à un plus haut degré [que le corps], elle participe davantage de l’unité, sans être l’Un même : car elle est une, mais l’unité en elle est contingente. L’âme et l’Un sont deux choses différentes, comme le corps et l’Un. Une quantité discrète comme un chœur est très loin de l’Un; une quantité continue en approche davantage ; l’âme en approche et en participe encore plus. Si, de ce que l’âme ne saurait exister sans être une, on conclut que l’âme et l’Un sont identiques, nous ferons à cela deux réponses. D’abord, les autres choses ont aussi une existence individuelle parce qu’elles possèdent l’unité, et cependant elles ne sont pas l’Un même (car le corps n’est pas identique à l’Un, et il participe cependant de l’Un). Ensuite, l’âme est multiple aussi bien qu’elle est une, quoiqu’elle ne se compose point de parties : car elle possède plusieurs facultés, la raison discursive, le désir, la perception, etc., facultés que l’unité, comme un lien, joint toutes ensemble. L’âme donne sans doute l’unité à une autre chose [au corps], parce qu’elle possède elle-même l’unité; mais cette unité, elle la reçoit d’un autre principe [savoir de l’Un même].

UNITY NECESSARY TO EXISTENCE OF ALL BEINGS.

1. All beings, both primary, as well as those who are so called on any pretext soever, are beings only because of their unity. What, indeed would they be without it ? Deprived of their unity, they would cease to be what they are said to be. No army can exist unless it be one. So with a choric ballet or a flock. Neither a house nor a ship can exist without unity; by losing it they would cease to be what they are. So also with continuous quantities which would not exist without unity. On being divided by losing their unity, they simultaneously lose their nature. Consider farther the bodies of plants and animals, of which each is a unity. On losing their unity by being broken up into several parts, they simultaneously lose their nature. They are no more what they were, they have become new beings, which themselves exist only so long as they are one. What effects health in us, is that the parts of our bodies are co-ordinated in unity. Beauty is formed by the unity of our members. Virtue is our soul’s tendency to unity, and becoming one through the harmony of her faculties.

THE SOUL MAY IMPART UNITY, BUT IS NOT UNITY.

The soul imparts unity to all things when producing them, fashioning them, and forming them. Should we, therefore, after rising to the Soul, say that she not only imparts unity, but herself is unity in itself? Certainly not. The soul that imparts form and figure to bodies is not identical with form, and figure. Therefore the soul imparts unity without being unity. She unifies each of her productions only by contemplation of the One, just as she produces man only by com-templating Man-in-himself, although adding to that idea the implied unity. Each of the things that are called “one” have a unity proportionate to their nature (“being”); so that they participate in unity more or less according as they share essence (being). Thus the soul is something different from unity; nevertheless, as she exists in a degree higher (than the body), she participates more in unity, without being unity itself; indeed she is one, but the unity in her is no more than contingent. There is a difference between the soul and unity, just as between the body and unity. A discrete quantity such as a company of dancers, or choric ballet, is very far from being unity; a continuous quantity approximates that further; the soul gets still nearer to it, and participates therein still more. Thus from the fact that the soul could not exist without being one, the identity between the soul and unity is suggested. But this may be answered in two ways. First, other things also possess individual existence because they possess unity, and nevertheless are not unity itself; as, though the body Is not identical with unity, it also participates in unity. Further, the soul is manifold as well as one, though she be not composed of parts. She possesses several faculties, discursive reason, desire, and perception — all of them faculties joined together by unity as a bond. Doubtless the soul imparts unity to something else (the body), because she herself possesses unity; but this unity is by her received from some other principle (namely, from unity itself).

1. It is in virtue of unity that beings are beings.

This is equally true of things whose existence is primal and of all that are in any degree to be numbered among beings. What could exist at all except as one thing? Deprived of unity, a thing ceases to be what it is called: no army unless as a unity: a chorus, a flock, must be one thing. Even house and ship demand unity, one house, one ship; unity gone, neither remains thus even continuous magnitudes could not exist without an inherent unity; break them apart and their very being is altered in the measure of the breach of unity.

Take plant and animal; the material form stands a unity; fallen from that into a litter of fragments, the things have lost their being; what was is no longer there; it is replaced by quite other things – as many others, precisely, as possess unity.

Health, similarly, is the condition of a body acting as a co-ordinate unity. Beauty appears when limbs and features are controlled by this principle, unity. Moral excellence is of a soul acting as a concordant total, brought to unity.

Come thus to soul – which brings all to unity, making, moulding, shaping, ranging to order – there is a temptation to say “Soul is the bestower of unity; soul therefore is the unity.” But soul bestows other characteristics upon material things and yet remains distinct from its gift: shape, Ideal-Form and the rest are all distinct from the giving soul; so, clearly, with this gift of unity; soul to make things unities looks out upon the unity just as it makes man by looking upon Man, realizing in the man the unity belonging to Man.

Anything that can be described as a unity is so in the precise degree in which it holds a characteristic being; the less or more the degree of the being, the less or more the unity. Soul, while distinct from unity’s very self, is a thing of the greater unity in proportion as it is of the greater, the authentic, being. Absolute unity it is not: it is soul and one soul, the unity in some sense a concomitant; there are two things, soul and soul’s unity as there is body with body’s unity. The looser aggregates, such as a choir, are furthest from unity, the more compact are the nearer; soul is nearer yet but still a participant.

Is soul to be identified with unity on the ground that unless it were one thing it could not be soul? No; unity is equally necessary to every other thing, yet unity stands distinct from them; body and unity are not identical; body, too; is still a participant.

Besides, the soul, even the collective soul for all its absence of part, is a manifold: it has diverse powers – reasoning, desiring, perceiving – all held together by this chain of unity. Itself a unity, soul confers unity, but also accepts it.

I. All beings are being3 through the one, both such as are primarily beings, and such as in any respect whatever are said to be classed in the order of beings. For what would they be, if they were not one? For if deprived of unity, they are no longer that which they were said to be. For neither would an army, or a choir, exist [as such], unless each of them was one. Nor would a herd exist, if it were not one. But neither would a house or a ship have an existence, unless they possess the one; since a house is one thing, and also a ship, which one if they lose, the house will no longer be a house, nor the ship a ship. Continued magnitudes, therefore, unless the one is present with them, will not have an existence. Hence, when they are divided, so far as they lose the one, they change their existence. The bodies, also, of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they fly from the one, in consequence of being broken into multitude, lose the essence which they before possessed, no longer being that which they were, but becoming instead of it other things, and continuing to be these so long as they are one. Health, likewise, then has a subsistence, when the body is congregated into one [i.e., when it possesses symmetry], and beauty then flourishes when the nature of the one confines the parts of the body. Virtue also exists in the soul when the soul tends to unity, and is united in one concord. Since, therefore, the soul conducts all things to one, by fabricating, fashioning, forming and co-arranging them, is it necessary to assert when we have arrived as far as to soul, that she supplies the one, and that she is the one itself? Or must we not say, that as when she imparts other things to bodies, such as morphe and form, it is not herself which she imparts, but things different from herself, thus also it is requisite to think if she imparts the one, that she imparts it as something different from herself; and that looking to the one, she.causes each of her productions to be one, in the same manner as looking to man, she fabricates man, assuming together with man the one contained in man. For of the things which are denominated one, each is in such a manner one as is the being which it possesses.² So that things which are in a less degree beings, possess in a less degree the one; but those that have more of entity have also more of the one. Moreover, soul being different from the one, possesses more of it in proportion as it is more truly soul, yet is not the one itself. For soul is one, and in a certain respect the one which it possesses is an accident. And these are two things, soul and one, in the same manner as body and one. That indeed which is decrete multitude, as a choir, is more remote from the one, but that which is continuous is nearer to it. But soul which has more alliance with, participates more abundantly of the one. If, however, because soul cannot exist unless it is one, it should be said that soul and the one are the same, we reply in the first place, that other things also are what they are in conjunction with being one, but at the same time the one is different from them. For body and one are not the same; but body participates of the one. In the next place, each soul is a multitude, though it does not consist of parts. For there are many powers in it, viz., those of reasoning, appetition, and apprehension, which are connected by unity as by a bond. Soul, therefore, being itself one imparts the one, to other things. But she also suffers [i.e. participates] this one from something else.