Tag: Kenneth Guthrie

  • experience (Guthrie)

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    To see these beauties, they must be contemplated by the faculty our soul has received; then, while contemplating them, we shall EXPERIENCE far more pleasure, astonishment and admiration, than in contemplation of the sense-beauties, because we will have the intuition of veritable beauties. The sentiments inspired by beauty are admiration, a gentle charm, desire, love,…

  • Ennead V,3

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    The Self-Consciousnesses, and What is Above Them. IS KNOWLEDGE DEPENDENT ON THE COMPOSITENESS OF THE KNOWER? 1. Must thought, and self-consciousness imply being composed of different parts, and on their mutual contemplation? Must that which is absolutely simple be unable to turn towards itself, to know itself? ls it, on the contrary, possible that for…

  • Ennead III,7

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    Of Time and Eternity. A. ETERNITY. INTRODUCTION. ETERNITY EXISTS PERPETUALLY, WHILE TIME BECOMES. (1.) When saying that eternity and time differ, that eternity refers to perpetual existence, and time to what “becomes” (this visible world), we are speaking off-hand, spontaneously, intuitionally, and common language supports these forms of expression. When however we try to define…

  • Ennead III,8

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    Of Nature, Contemplation and Unity. (These three subjects are discussed in paragraphs 1-4, 5-7, and 8-16. The plain paragraph numbers are those of the Teubner edition; those in parenthesis are the Creuzer (Didot) edition.) A. OF NATURE. INTRODUCTION: AS A JOKE, IT MAY BE SAID THAT EVEN PLANTS ASPIRE TO CONTEMPLATION. 1. If as a…

  • Ennead III,9

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    Fragments About the Soul, the Intelligence, and the Good. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE EXISTING ANIMAL. 1. Plato says, “The intelligence sees the ideas comprised within the existing animal.” He adds, “The demiurge conceived that this produced animal was to comprise beings similar and equally numerous to those that the intelligence sees in the existing…

  • Ennead IV,1

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    Of the Being of the Soul. It is in the intelligible world that dwells veritable being. Intelligence is the best that there is on high; but there are also souls; for it is thence that they descended thither. Only, souls have no bodies, while here below they inhabit bodies and are divided there. On high,…

  • Ennead IV,2

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    How the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and Divisible Essence. OUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IV. 7. 1. While studying the nature (”being”) of the soul, we have shown (against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal entities, she is not a “harmony” (against the Pythagoreans); we have also shown that…

  • Ennead IV,3

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    Psychological Questions. A. ARE NOT ALL SOULS PARTS OR EMANATIONS OF A SINGLE SOUL? PSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT “KNOW THYSELF,” AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE TEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY. 1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve here not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance, but…

  • Ennead IV,4

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    Questions About the Soul. (Second Part.) SPEECH OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. 1. When the soul will have risen to the intelligible world, what will she say, and what will she remember? She will contemplate the beings to which she will be united and she will apply her whole attention thereto; otherwise, she would…

  • Ennead IV,5

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    Psychological Questions — III. About the Process of Vision and Hearing. IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER AN INTERMEDIARY BODY BE IMPLIED BY VISION. 1. Above we suggested the question whether it be possible to see without some medium such as the air or a diaphanous body; we shall now try to consider it. It has already…

  • Ennead IV,6

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    Of Sensation and Memory. STOIC DOCTRINES OF SENSATIONS AND MEMORIES HANG TOGETHER. If we deny that sensations are images impressed on the soul, similar to the impression of a seal, we shall also, for the sake of consistency, have to deny that memories are notions or sensations preserved in the soul by the permanence of…

  • Ennead IV,7

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    Of the Immortality of the Soul: Polemic Against Materialism. IS THE SOUL IMMORTAL? 1. Are we immortal, or does all of us die? (Another possibility would be that) of the two parts of which we are composed, the one might be fated to be dissolved and perish, while the other, that constitutes our very personality,…

  • Ennead IV,8

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    Of the Descent of the Soul Into the Body. THE EXPERIENCE OF ECSTASY LEADS TO QUESTIONS. 1. On waking from the slumber of the body to return to myself, and on turning my attention from exterior things so as to concentrate it on myself, I often observe an alluring beauty, and I become conscious of…

  • Ennead IV,9

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    Whether All Souls Form a Single One? IF ALL SOULS BE ONE IN THE WORLD-SOUL, WHY SHOULD THEY NOT TOGETHER FORM ONE? 1. Just as the soul of each animal is one, because she is entirely present in the whole body, and because she is thus really one, because she does not have one part…

  • Ennead V,1

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    The Three Principal Hypostases, or Forms of Existence. AUDACITY THE CAUSE OF HUMAN APOSTASY FROM THE DIVINITY. 1. How does it happen that souls forget their paternal divinity? Having a divine nature, and having originated from the divinity, how could they ever misconceive the divinity or themselves? The origin of their evil is “audacity,” generation,…

  • Ennead V,2

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    Of Generation, and of the Order of things that Rank Next After the First. WHY FROM UNITY THIS MANIFOLD WORLD WAS ABLE TO COME FORTH. 1. The One is all things, and is none of these things. The Principle of all things cannot be all things. It is all things only in the sense that…

  • Ennead III,6

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    Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul and and Matter). A. OF THE SOUL. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PASSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT AND THE SOUL. 1. Sensations are not affections, but actualizations, and judgments, relative to passions. The affections occur in what is other (than the soul); that is, in the organized body, and the judgment in…

  • Ennead V,4

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    How What is After the First Proceeds Therefrom; of the One. NECESSITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST. 1. Everything that exists after the First is derived therefrom, either directly or mediately, and constitutes a series of different orders such that the second can be traced back to the First, the third to the second,…

  • Ennead V,5

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    That Intelligible Entities Are Not External to the Intelligence of the Good. (The subject of the quarrel between Amelius and Porphyry.) KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES IMPLIES THEIR PRESENCE. 1. Surely, nobody could believe that the veritable and real Intelligence could be deceived, and admit the existence of things that do not exist? Its very…

  • Ennead V,6

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    The Superessential Principle Does Not Think; Which is the First Thinking Principle, and Which is the Second? BY THINKING, INTELLIGENCE PASSES FROM UNITY TO DUALITY. 1. One may think oneself, or some other object. What thinks itself falls least into the duality (inherent to thought). That which thinks some other object approaches identity less; for…