I. All those who have spoken concerning what is called matter, and who have arrived at a conception of its nature, unanimously assert, that it is a certain subject and receptacle of forms. They dissent, however, from each other, in investigating what this subject nature is; and after what manner, and of what things, it is a recipient. And those, indeed, who alone admit bodies to be beings, and who contend that essence is in these, say, that there is one matter, which is spread under the elements, and that it is essence; but that all other things are, as it were, the passions of matter, and are matter subsisting in a certain way, and thus also are the elements. They, likewise, dare to extend matter as far as to the Gods. And, lastly, they make even the highest1 God to be this matter, subsisting in a certain way. They, likewise, give a body to matter, calling it, body void of quality; and attribute to it magnitude. But others say, that matter is incorporeal; and some of these do not admit that there is only this one matter, but assert that this is the subject of bodies, and that there is another matter prior to this in intelligibles, which is spread under the forms that are there, and under incorporeal essences.
II. Hence we must enquire concerning this intelligible matter, whether it is, what it is, and after what manner it subsists. If, therefore, it is necessary that matter should be something indefinite and formless, but in intelligibles as being the most excellent natures, there is nothing indefinite and without form, matter will not be there. If, also, every thing in the intelligible world is simple, it will not be in want of matter, in order that from it and something else, that which is a composite may be produced. To generated natures, indeed, and to such as make some things from others, matter is necessary, in which also the matter of sensibles is conceived to subsist; but it is not necessary to things which are not generated. Whence, also, does matter proceed, and how does it subsist among intelligibles ? For if it was generated, it was generated by something ; but if it is eternal, there are many principles; and first natures will have a casual subsistence. If, likewise, form should accede, the composite will be a body, so that body will be there.
III. In the first place, therefore, it must be said, that the indefinite is not every where to be despised, nor that which in the conception of it is formless, if it applies itself to things prior to itself, and to the most excellent natures. For thus soul is naturally adapted to apply itself to intellect and reason, being formed by these, and brought to possess a more excellent nature. In intelligibles, however, that which is a composite subsists after a different manner, and not like bodies; since reasons, also, [or productive principles] are composites, and produce a composite in energy, through nature which has an energy directed to form. But if energy is directed to something different from itself, it is derived from something else, and this in a greater degree. The matter, however, of generated natures, always possesses another and another form; but the matter of eternal natures always possesses the same form. Perhaps, also, the matter which is in sensibles subsists in a way contrary to that which is- in intelligibles. For the former is alternately all things, and is always some different thing. Hence, nothing in it ever remains, one thing continually expelling another; and on this account, nothing is ever the same. But in the latter, matter is all things at once, and hence there is not any thing into which it can be changed. Matter, therefore, in intelligibles, is never formless, since neither is the matter in sensibles ever without form ; but each of these subsists after a different manner. Whether matter, however, is eternal or generated, will be manifest when we have shown what it is.
IV. At present, however, it is supposed by us that there are forms or ideas, for this we have demonstrated elsewhere ; and this being admitted we shall proceed in our discussion. If, therefore, there are many forms, it is necessary, indeed, that there should be something common in them; and also that there should be something peculiar by which one is distinguished from another. This something peculiar, therefore, and separating difference, are the appropriate form. But if there is form, there is also that which is formed, about which difference subsists. Hence, there is matter [in intelligibles], which receives the form, and is always the subject of it. Farther still, if the intelligible world is there, but this our world is the imitation of that, and this is a composite, and consists of matter [and form], it is necessary that there also there should be matter. Or how can you denominate it a world [or that which is adorned], unless you look to form ? And how can you look to form, unless you assume that in which form subsists ? For the intelligible world, indeed, is perfectly every where impartible; but in a certain respect is also partible. And if the parts of it are divulsed from each other, the section and divulsion are the passions of matter; for it is matter which is divided. But if the many which are there, are one impartible being, the many subsisting in one, — if this be the case, they are in one matter, of which they are the forms. For this various one, is to be considered as having a multiform nature. It must, therefore, be considered as formless prior to its variety. Hence, if by intellect you take away its variety, its forms, its productive principles, and intellections, that which is prior to these is formless and indefinite, and this is no one of the things which subsist together with and in it.
V. If, however, it should be said, that because it always possesses these things, and both [the subject and the forms] are one, this subject is not matter, neither will the subject of bodies here be matter. For the matter of sensibles is never without form, but there is always the whole body. At the same time, however, this is a composite ; and intellect discovers its twofold nature. For it divides till it arrives at that which is simple, and which is no longer capable of being analyzed. But so far as it is able, it proceeds into the profundity of body. The profundity, however, of each body is matter. Hence all matter is dark, because reason is light, and intellect is reason. Hence, too, intellect beholding the nature of each [i.e. of intelligible and sensible matter], conceives that which is beneath, as under light, to be dark; just as the eye which is luciform, extending itself to the light, and to colours which are illuminations, says, that what is under colours, is dark and material, and concealed by the colours. Nevertheless, that which is dark in intelligibles is different from that which is dark in sensibles; and the matter of the one differs as much from the matter of the other, as the supervening form of the one from that of the other. For divine matter receiving that which defines and bounds it, possesses a definite and intellectual life. But sensible matter becomes, indeed, a certain definite thing, yet neither vital nor intellectual, but an unadorned privation of life. The morphe1 also, is an image, so that the subject likewise is an image. In intelligibles, however, the morphe is truly form, so that the subject also is real. Hence, those who say that matter is essence, if they assert this of intelligible matter, speak rightly. For the subject there is essence, or rather, is the object of intellectual perception, together with that which it contains, and is wholly illuminated essence. To investigate, however, whether intelligible matter is eternal, is similar to the inquiry whether ideas are eternal. For they are generated, indeed, so far as they have a principle of their subsistence; but they are not generated [according to the usual acceptation of the term] because they have not a temporal beginning, but always proceed from something else, not like the natures which are always rising into existence, or becoming to be, as is the case with the world, but they always are, in the same manner as the world which is there [has an eternal subsistence]. For the difference which is there always produces matter; since this which is the first motion is the principle of matter. Hence, it is called difference, because motion and difference were unfolded into light together with it. But the motion and difference which proceed from the first cause of all, are indefinite, and are in want of this cause in order that they may become terminated. They are, however, terminated, when they are converted to it. But prior to this, matter and difference are indefinite, and are not yet good, but are without the light of the good. For if light is from the good, that which receives the light, prior to its reception of it, does not always possess it, hut possesses it, being different from it. since the light is from something else. And thus much concerning intelligible matter, which we have discussed perhaps more than is fit.