XIV. With respect to the souls of other animals, such among these as have fallen from a better, condition, and have proceeded as far as to brutal bodies, these likewise are necessarily immortal. But if there is another species of soul, it is necessary that this also should not be derived from any other source than a vital nature, since this likewise is the cause of life to animals, and besides this, of the life which is in plants. For all these proceeding from the same principle, have an appropriate life of their own. And these souls also are incorporeal, impartible, and essences. If, however, it is requisite that the soul of man being tripartite should be dissolved with the composite, we must say that pure souls which are liberated from the body, dismiss that which adhered to them in generation; but that this is accomplished by others in long periods of time. That also which is dismissed, is the worst part, nor will this be destroyed, as long as that subsists from whence it originates. For nothing which is comprehended in being perishes.
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,14 (IV,7,14) — As almas dos viventes individuais
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,17 (IV,7,17) — Não há uma maneira concebível na qual a alma possa perecer
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,18 (IV,7,18) — Descida no corpo não deve conflitar com a eternidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,19 (IV,7,19) — Todas as almas têm imortalidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,2 (IV,7,2) — Se a alma é incorpórea, devemos estudar a incorporalidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,20 (IV,7,20) — Evidência histórica da imortalidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,3 (IV,7,3) — Nenhuma agregação atômica poderia produzir uma unidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,4 (IV,7,4) — Se a alma não é simples matéria, deve ser uma forma substancial
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,5 (IV,7,5) — Mais três provas da incorporeidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,6 (IV,7,6) — O corpo não pode possuir sensação
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,7 (IV,7,7) — A sensação não pode ser acionada de órgão de sentido para princípio diretor