II. What, therefore, is the nature of this thing [soul] ? If indeed it is a body, it is in every respect capable of being analyzed. For every body is a composite. But if it is not a body, but of another nature, that also must be considered either after the same, or after another manner. In the first place, however, it must be considered into what body this body which they call soul ought to be analyzed. For since life is necessarily present with soul, it is also necessary that this body which is supposed to be soul, if it consists of two or more bodies, should have a connascent life in both, or in each of them ; or that one of these should have life, but the other not, or that neither should be vital. If, therefore, life is present with one of them only, this very thing will be soul. Hence, what body will this be which has life from itself ? For fire, air, water and earth, are of themselves inanimate; and with whichever of these soul is present, the life which it uses is adventitious. There are not, however, any other bodies besides these. And those to whom it appears that there are other bodies the elements of these, do not assert that they are souls, or that they have life. But if it should be said, that though no one of these bodies possesses life, yet the congress of them produces life, he who says this would speak absurdly. And if each of them has life, one will be sufficient. Or rather, it is impossible that a coacervation of bodies should produce life, and things void of intellect generate intellect. Moreover, neither will these, in whatever manner they may say they are mixed, generate either intellect or soul. Hence, it is necessary there should be that which arranges, and which is the cause of the mixture; so that this will have the order of soul. For that which is compounded will not be that which arranges and produces the mixture. But neither will there be a simple body in the series of things, without the existence of soul in the universe ; if reason [or a productive principle] acceding to matter, produces body. For reason cannot proceed from any thing else than from soul.
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,2 (IV,7,2) — A alma não é um corpo e ela não é corporal
- Gêneros do Ser
- Guthrie: Tratado 2 (IV, 7) — Da Imortalidade da Alma: polêmica contra o materialismo
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,1 (IV,7,1) — É a alma imortal?
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,10 (IV,7,10) — A alma pode penetrar o corpo
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,11 (IV,7,11) — A impossibilidade do desenvolvimento estoico do hábito à alma à inteligência
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,12 (IV,7,12) — A alma não é nem harmonia nem enteléquia do corpo
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,13 (IV,7,13) — A alma não é a enteléquia do corpo
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,14 (IV,7,14) — A persistência do cambiante implica no eterno ao fundo
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,15 (IV,7,15) — A alma é incorpória por seu parentesco com o divino
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,16 (IV,7,16) — Mesmo na hipótese estoica a alma deve ser imortal