III. If some one, however, should say that an assemblage of atoms or impartibles produce soul by their union, such a one will be confuted by similitude of passion, and by apposition; since one thing will not thus be generated through the whole, nor will that which is co-passive be produced from bodies which are without passion and incapable of being united. But soul is co-passive with itself. And of impartibles neither body nor magnitude can consist. Moreover, with respect to a simple body, they will not say that it has life from itself so far as it is material. For matter is void of quality. But they will rather say that what is arranged in body according to form possesses life. Hence, if they say that this form is essence, soul will not be both, but one of these; and this will no longer be body. For this will not also consist of matter; since if it did, we must again analyze it after the same manner. But if they assert that this form is a passion of matter and not essence, they must inform us what that is from which this passion and life are derived into matter. For matter will not give form to itself, nor insert soul in itself. Hence, it is necessary that there should be something which is the supplier of life, whether the supply is to matter, or to a certain body, this supplier being external to, and beyond every corporeal nature. Indeed, neither will there be any body, if there is no psychical power. For body [perpetually] flows, and its nature is in [continual] motion. The universe also would rapidly perish if all things were bodies; though some one of them should be denominated soul. For it would suffer the same things as other bodies, since there would be one matter in all of them. Or rather, nothing would be generated, but all things would stop in matter, as there would not be any thing to invest it with form. Perhaps, too, neither would matter have any subsistence whatever. This universe also will be dissolved, if it is committed to the connexion of body, and the order of soul is given to body, as far as to names, viz. to air and a dissipable spirit, and which has not from itself any oneness. For how is it possible, since all bodies are divisible, that this universe if it is committed to any one of them, should not be borne along in a foolish and casual manner ? For what order is there, or reason or intellect, in a pneumatic substance, which is in want of order from soul? But if soul, indeed, has a subsistence, all these will be subservient to it in order to the composition of the world, and the existence of every animal, a different power contributing from a different thing to [the perfection of] the whole. If soul, however, is not present to the whole of things, these will neither have a subsistence, nor any arrangement.
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,3 (IV,7,3) — Refutação das definições epicuriana e estoica da alma
- Igal: Tratado 2,3 (IV, 7, 3) — Refutação das definições epicuriana e estoica da alma
- Igal: Tratado 2,4 (IV, 7, 4) — A alma não é nem sopro nem uma “maneira de ser”
- Igal: Tratado 2,5 (IV, 7, 5) — Na alma, a parte é idêntica ao todo
- Igal: Tratado 2,6 (IV, 7, 6) — Se a alma fosse um corpo, não teria sensação
- Igal: Tratado 2,7 (IV, 7, 7) — Se a alma fosse um corpo, não teria sensação
- Igal: Tratado 2,8 (IV, 7, 8) — Se a alma fosse um corpo não teria pensar
- Igal: Tratado 2,8 (IV, 7, 8) (1) — A alma não é uma quantidade
- Igal: Tratado 2,8 (IV, 7, 8) (2) — A alma não penetraa inteiramente os corpos
- Igal: Tratado 2,8 (IV, 7, 8) (3) — A alma e o intelecto são anteriores à natureza e ao corpo
- Igal: Tratado 2,8 (IV, 7, 8) (4) — Refutação da definição pitagórica da alma como «harmonia»