IV. Compelled by truth, the authors of the above mentioned hypothesis also testify, that it is necessary there should be a certain form of soul prior to and more excellent than bodies. For they introduce a spirit endued with intellect, and an intellectual fire, as if it was not possible there could be a better condition among beings without fire and spirit, and without a place in which it might be established, though they ought to have investigated where bodies are to be placed; for it is necessary that these should be established in the powers of soul. But if they assert that life and soul are nothing else than a spirit or wind, we must enquire what this celebrated spirit introduced by them is, and how it subsists. For they are compelled to fly to this when they admit that there is another efficacious nature besides bodies. If therefore not every spirit is soul, because there are myriads of inanimate spirits, but a spirit subsisting after a certain manner is according to them soul, we ask them whether they say that such a spirit and this habitude is something belonging to beings, or nothing. But if indeed it is nothing, it will be a name alone. And its subsistence after a certain manner will be also merely a name, and thus it will be an accident to beings. Hence, according to them nothing but matter will have an existence, and soul, deity, and every thing [except matter] will be merely names. If, however, habitude is something pertaining to beings, and different from a subject and from matter, and subsists indeed in matter, but is itself immaterial, because it is not again composed from matter; — if this be the case, it will be a certain reason [or productive principle] and will not be body, but of another nature. Farther still, from the following considerations it will be no less manifest that it is impossible for soul to be any body whatever. For it would either be hot or cold, or hard, or soft, or moist, or firm, or black, or white, and all such different qualities as are in different bodies. And if indeed it is hot alone, it will alone heat; if cold alone, it will alone refrigerate. If also it is alone light, it will by its presence cause things to be light; if heavy, it will alone render them heavy; if black, it will blacken; and if white, will cause them to be white. For it is not the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of cold to produce heat. But soul produces different effects in different animals, and contrary effects in the same animal; fixing some things, but diffusing others. And some things indeed it causes to be dense, but others rare, black, white, light and heavy; though from the nature of one body it ought to produce one quality only, and not different qualities. But now it produces many qualities.
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,4 (IV,7,4) — A alma não é nem sopro nem uma “maneira de ser”
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,17 (IV,7,17) — Não há uma maneira concebível na qual a alma possa perecer
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,18 (IV,7,18) — Descida no corpo não deve conflitar com a eternidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,19 (IV,7,19) — Todas as almas têm imortalidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,2 (IV,7,2) — Se a alma é incorpórea, devemos estudar a incorporalidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,20 (IV,7,20) — Evidência histórica da imortalidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,3 (IV,7,3) — Nenhuma agregação atômica poderia produzir uma unidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,4 (IV,7,4) — Se a alma não é simples matéria, deve ser uma forma substancial
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,5 (IV,7,5) — Mais três provas da incorporeidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,6 (IV,7,6) — O corpo não pode possuir sensação
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,7 (IV,7,7) — A sensação não pode ser acionada de órgão de sentido para princípio diretor