V. “With respect to motions also, why are different motions produced by the soul, and ‘not one only, there being but one [natural] motion of every body? But if they assign deliberate choice as the cause of some motions, and reasons [or productive principles] as the causes of others, these indeed are rightly assigned. Deliberate choice, however, does not pertain to body, nor reasons, since they are different, but an elementary body is one and simple. Nor can such a body be full of productive power, except so far as this is imparted to it by that which makes it to be hot or cold. But how can it belong to body to increase at certain times, and to a certain extent, since it is naturally adapted to be increased, except so far as the power of augmenting is assumed in the bulk of matter, and is subservient to that which through it produces the increase ? For if soul being body increases, it is necessary that it should also be increased, viz. by the addition of a similar body, in order that it may be of an equal bulk with that which is increased by it. And that which is added will either be soul, or an inanimate body. And if indeed it is soul, whence and how is it introduced, and how is it added ? But if that which is added is inanimate, how is this animated, how does it accord with the preceding soul, and become one with it, and how does it entertain the same opinions with the former soul ? Will not this added soul, as being foreign, be ignorant of what the other knows ? And in the same manner as with another mass belonging to our frame, there will be an efflux from, and an influx into it, and nothing will continue the same. How, therefore, shall we remember ? And how shall we recognize such things as are appropriate to us, since we shall never employ the same soul ? Moreover, if soul is body, since the nature of body is divided into many parts, each of the parts will not be the same with the whole. If, therefore, soul was a magnitude of a certain quantity, if this quantity should become less, it would no longer be soul; just as the being of every quantity is changed by ablation, from what it was before. But if some one of those things which have magnitude, being diminished in bulk, should remain the same in quality, so far indeed as it is body, and so far as it is quantity, it is different from what it was ; but through quality which is different from quantity it is able to preserve itself the same. What, therefore, will those say who contend that the soul is body? In the first place, indeed, with respect to each part of the soul which is in the same body, is each part soul in the same manner as the whole soul ? And again, is this the case with the part of a part ? For if this is admitted, magnitude will contribute nothing to the essence of the soul; though it is necessary that it should if soul is a certain quantity. The whole soul, likewise, is every where present with the body; but it is impossible for the same corporeal whole to be in many things at the same time, or for a part of it to be the same as the whole. And if they say that each of the parts is not soul, then according to them, soul will consist of things inanimate. Besides, if the magnitude of each soul is definite, it will no longer be soul, if it is either extended or diminished. When, therefore, from one copulation and one seed, twins are begotten, or as in other animals many offspring are produced, most of the seed being distributed into many places, where also each part of the seed is a whole, how is it possible this should not teach those who are willing to learn, that where the part is the same with the whole, this in the very essence of itself transcends the nature of quantity; and ought from necessity to be without quantity. For thus alone it can remain the same, quantity being withdrawn, since it has no need of either quantity or bulk, its essence being something different from either. Hence soul and reasons [or productive principles] are void of quantity.
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,5 (IV,7,5) — O corpo não pode ser o princípio nem da existência nem do movimento
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,17 (IV,7,17) — Não há uma maneira concebível na qual a alma possa perecer
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,18 (IV,7,18) — Descida no corpo não deve conflitar com a eternidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,19 (IV,7,19) — Todas as almas têm imortalidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,2 (IV,7,2) — Se a alma é incorpórea, devemos estudar a incorporalidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,20 (IV,7,20) — Evidência histórica da imortalidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,3 (IV,7,3) — Nenhuma agregação atômica poderia produzir uma unidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,4 (IV,7,4) — Se a alma não é simples matéria, deve ser uma forma substancial
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,5 (IV,7,5) — Mais três provas da incorporeidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,6 (IV,7,6) — O corpo não pode possuir sensação
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,7 (IV,7,7) — A sensação não pode ser acionada de órgão de sentido para princípio diretor