VI. But that if soul is body, it will not be possible to perceive either sensibly or intellectually, or to know scientifically, and that there will neither be virtue, nor any thing beautiful [in human conduct,] will be manifest from the following considerations. Whatever is able to have a sensible perception of any thing, ought itself to be one, and to apprehend every thing by one and the same power. This will also be the case, if many things enter through many organs of sense, or there are many qualities about one thing, and likewise when there is a variegated appearance such as that of the face, through one thing. For one thing does not perceive the nose, and another the eyes, but the same thing perceives at once all the parts of the face. And though one thing proceeds through the eyes, but another through the ears, yet it is necessary there should be one thing at which both these arrive. Or how could the soul say that these are different, unless the perceptions of sense at once terminated in the same thing ? It is necessary, therefore, that this should be as it were a centre, that the senses should on all sides be extended to this, like lines from the circumference of a circle, and that a thing of this kind which apprehends the perceptions of sense should be truly one. For if it were any thing divisible, and the informations of the senses arrived at this as at the two extremities of a line, they must either again concur in one and the same thing as a middle, or there would be another thing there and another, and each would have a sensible perception of each; just as if I should perceive one thing, but you another, even though the object of sense should be one thing, such as the face; or they must be collected into one. And this indeed appears to be the case. For visible forms are collected in the pupils of the eyes; or how through these could the greatest things be seen ? Hence, in a still greater degree the forms which arrive at the ruling part of the soul, become as it were conceptions; and therefore this part also must be impartible. For if it had magnitude, it would be co-divided with the object of sensible perception. Hence, one part of it would perceive a part of the sensible object, and nothing in us would have the apprehension of the whole of a sensible thing. But the whole is one thing. For how can it be divided ? For in the division, equal cannot be adapted to equal, because the ruling part is not equal to every sensible thing. Into how many parts, therefore, must the division of it be made ? Must it be divided into as many parts, as the sensible perception which is introduced to it, is divided into ? And will each of the parts of the soul, therefore, perceive the parts of the sensible object ? Or shall we say that the parts of the soul will not have a sensation of the parts of the thing perceived ? This however is impossible. But if any part whatever perceives the whole of the sensible object, since magnitude is adapted to be divided infinitely, it will happen that infinite sensible perceptions will be produced about each part; so that, for instance, there will be infinite images of the same thing in our ruling part. Moreover, if that which perceives is body, it will not be able to perceive in any other way, than as if certain images were impressed from wax in a seal; whether the sensible forms are impressed in blood, or in air. And if, indeed, they are impressed as in moist bodies, which it is reasonable to suppose they will be, if as in water, they will be confounded, and there will be no memory. But if the impressions remain, either it will not be possible for others to be impressed while they remain, so that there will be no other sensible perceptions, or if others are produced, the former will be destroyed, so that there will not be a remembrance of anything. But if it is possible to remember, and to have a sensible perception of other things after others, the former not impeding the latter, it is impossible for the soul to be body.
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,6 (IV,7,6) — Se a alma fosse um corpo, não teria sensação
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,17 (IV,7,17) — Não há uma maneira concebível na qual a alma possa perecer
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,18 (IV,7,18) — Descida no corpo não deve conflitar com a eternidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,19 (IV,7,19) — Todas as almas têm imortalidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,2 (IV,7,2) — Se a alma é incorpórea, devemos estudar a incorporalidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,20 (IV,7,20) — Evidência histórica da imortalidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,3 (IV,7,3) — Nenhuma agregação atômica poderia produzir uma unidade
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,4 (IV,7,4) — Se a alma não é simples matéria, deve ser uma forma substancial
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,5 (IV,7,5) — Mais três provas da incorporeidade da alma
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,6 (IV,7,6) — O corpo não pode possuir sensação
- Guthrie: Tratado 2,7 (IV,7,7) — A sensação não pode ser acionada de órgão de sentido para princípio diretor