VII. The same thing also may be seen from pain and the sensation of pain; when a man is said to have a pain in his finger or about his finger. For then it is manifest that the sensation of pain is produced about the principal or ruling part; a portion of the spirit being pained, but the ruling part having a perception of the pain, and the whole soul in consequence of this suffering the same thing. How, therefore, does this happen ? They will say by succession, the psychical spirit about the finger suffering in the first place, but imparting the passion to that which is next to it, and afterwards to something else, until the passion arrives at the ruling part. Hence, it is necessary if that which is primarily pained perceives, that there should be another sensation of that which is second, if sensation is produced according to succession. And likewise, that there should be another sensation of that which is the third in order; that there should be many and infinite sensible perceptions of one and the same pain ; and that afterwards all these should be perceived by the ruling part, and besides these, that it should have a perception of its own passion. In reality, however, each of these does not perceive the pain that is in the finger; but one sensation perceives that the part of the palm of the hand which is next to the finger is pained, and another more remote sensation perceives the pain which is in a more remote part. There will also be many pains, the ruling part not perceiving the passion which is in the finger, hut that which is present with itself. And this it will alone know, hut will hid farewell to the others, not perceiving that the finger is pained. If, therefore, it is not possible that sensible perception of a thing of this kind should subsist according to succession, and it does not belong to body, since it is a bulk, that one part of it suffering, another part should recognize the suffering; for in every magnitude this is one thing, and that another; — if this be the case, it is necessary that the power which perceives should be a thing of such a kind, as to be every where itself the same with itself. But this pertains to any thing else rather than to body.
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,7 (IV,7,7) — Se a alma fosse um corpo, não teria sensação (2)
- A alma é um corpo?
- Alma (Plotino)
- Bouillet: Tratado 2 (IV, 7) – DE L’IMMORTALITÉ DE L’ÂME
- Brisson & Pradeau: Somos nossa alma
- Enéada IV, 7 – Sobre a imortalidade da alma
- Enéada IV, 7, 1 — Somos inteiramente ou parcialmente imortais?
- Enéada IV, 7, 10 — A alma é de natureza divina
- Enéada IV, 7, 11 — A alma é imortal, indestrutível, indivisível e imutável.
- Enéada IV, 7, 12 — A alma é imortal, indestrutível, indivisível e imutável. (2)
- Enéada IV, 7, 13 — Como a alma vem ao corpo?