VIII. Moreover, that neither will it be possible to perceive intellectually if the soul is body, may be demonstrated as follows. For if to perceive sensibly is, for the soul using the body to apprehend sensibles, intellectual perception will not be an apprehension of the objects of such perception, through body. For unless this is admitted, intellectual will be the same with sensible perception. Hence, if to perceive intellectually is to apprehend without body, by a much greater priority it is necessary that the nature which thus perceives should not be body. Farther still, if sense indeed is the perception of sensibles, intellection is the perception of intelligibles. If, however, they are not willing to admit this, yet there will be in us intellections of certain intelligibles, and apprehensions of things without magnitude. How, therefore, will intellect if it is magnitude, understand that which is not magnitude, and by that which is partible that which is impartible ? Shall we say it will understand it by a certain impartible part of itself ? But if this be the case, that which understands will not be body. For there is no need of the whole in order to come into contact with the object of its intellection ; since contact according to one certain thing is sufficient. If, therefore, they admit that the first intellections, which is true, are entirely liberated from body, it is necessary that the nature which intellectually perceives the form separate from body of each thing, should know either real being, or that which is becoming to be. But if they say that intellections are of forms inherent in matter, yet they are then only apprehended when by intellect they are separated from body. For the separation [i.e. abstraction] of a circle and triangle, of a bne and a point, is not effected in conjunction with flesh, or in short, with matter. Hence it is necessary that the soul also, in a separation of this kind, should separate itself from the body. And therefore it is necessary that it should not be itself body. I think, likewise, that the beautiful and the just are without magnitude, and consequently the intellection of these is unattended with magnitude. Hence, these approaching to us are apprehended by that which is impartible in the soul, and in the soul they reside in the impartible. How also, if the soul is body, can temperance and justice be the virtues of it, which are its saviours, so far as they are received by it?
Thomas Taylor: Tratado 2,8 (IV,7,8) — Se a alma fosse um corpo não teria pensar
- Enéada IV, 7, 14 — As almas dos viventes individuais
- Enéada IV, 7, 15 — As almas sobrevivem à desaparição dos corpos.
- Enéada IV, 7, 2 — A alma não é um corpo e ela não é corporal.
- Enéada IV, 7, 3 — Refutação das definições epicuriana e estoica da alma
- Enéada IV, 7, 4 — A alma não é nem sopro nem uma “maneira de ser”.
- Enéada IV, 7, 5 — O corpo não pode ser o princípio nem da existência nem do movimento.
- Enéada IV, 7, 6 — Se a alma fosse um corpo, não teria sensação
- Enéada IV, 7, 7 — Se a alma fosse um corpo, não teria sensação (2)
- Enéada IV, 7, 8 — Se a alma fosse um corpo não teria pensar.
- Enéada IV, 7, 9 — A alma é princípio de vida: ela tem o ser e a vida por ela mesma.