XXIV. Souls, however, still having a body undergo corporeal punishments. But where does the soul dwell on its departure from body ? It will not indeed be here, where there is not any thing to receive it. For it is not able to abide in that which is not naturally adapted to receive it, unless the recipient has something of an unwise and insane nature which attracts the soul to it. But the soul is in such a recipient as this, if it has something besides itself; and it there follows where this recipient is naturally adapted to be and to be generated. Since, however, each place is ample, it is necessary that a difference should be produced both from the disposition of the soul, and the justice which has dominion in things. For no one can ever fly from the punishment which it becomes him to suffer for unjust deeds. For the divine law is inevitable, containing at once in itself the power of accomplishing what it has now judged to be fit. In the mean time, he who suffers is ignorantly led to that which it is proper he should suffer, being every where in his wanderings conducted in a circuitous course by an unstable motion, but at length, like one wearied by the resistance which he has made, falling into a place adapted to him, he undergoes an involuntary suffering through a voluntary motion. In the law, however, it is promulgated how much and how long it is necessary to suffer. And again, at the same time a remission of punishment concurs with the power of flying from those places [in which the punishment is inflicted] through a power of harmony by which all things are detained. But to souls that have bodies, it also pertains to undergo corporeal punishments. Souls, however, that are pure, and attract nothing whatever to themselves of body, are also necessarily unconfined by the body. If, therefore, they are not at all in body, for neither have they a body, they are there where essence and being, and that which is divine, subsist, viz. in God. Hence, a soul of this kind will be here, and together with these, and in deity. If, however, you still inquire where it will be, you must also inquire where they are. But in exploring this, do not explore it with the eyes, nor as if you were investigating bodies.
XXV. With respect to memory, it must be considered whether souls on departing from these places recollect [what happened to them on the earth] ; or whether this is the case with some souls, but not with others; and likewise, whether they have a recollection of all things, or of certain things only. And in a similar manner, it deserves to be investigated whether they always remember, or for a certain time near to their departure from hence. If, however, we intend to investigate these things rightly, what that is which remembers must be first assumed. I do not mean that we must inquire what memory is, but what that is in which it is naturally adapted to subsist. For we have elsewhere shown what memory1 is, and it has been frequently mentioned; but it must now be more accurately assumed what that is which is naturally adapted to remember. If, therefore, the power of memory is something adventitious, or something belonging to discipline or passion, remembrance will not happen to beings which are impassive and superior to time. Hence, memory must not be placed in deity, or in being, or intellect. For to these nothing accedes; nor does time, but eternity subsist about being.
Nor is either temporal priority or that which is successive there; hut each of these always subsists as it is, in sameness, receiving no mutation. How, therefore, can that which is in the same and the similar be in want of memory ? For it is not at all disposed in futurity in a way different from what it was before; nor has it one intelligence after another, in order that it may abide in another, or that it may remember another intellection which it formerly possessed. But what prevents it from knowing the mutations of other things, without being changed itself, such as the periods of the world ? Shall we say it is because it intellectually perceives one thing as prior, but another as posterior which is consequent to the mutations of that which is convolved ? Besides, remembrance is different from intellectual perception: and it must not be said that the intellection of itself is recollection. For it does not proceed in its energy for the purpose of detaining it, lest it should depart; for thus it might fear lest the essence of itself should depart from itself. Neither, therefore, must it be said that soul remembers after the same manner, as we say it recollects those things which it innately possesses. But having descended hither, it possesses these innate conceptions, yet does not [always] energize according to them, and especially when it has profoundly descended into body. The ancients, however, appear to have considered memory and reminiscence to be the same thing as for the soul to energize according to those things which it now possesses; so that this is another species of memory. Hence, time is not present with memory thus denominated. Perhaps, however, these things are considered by us lightly, and not accurately. For perhaps it may be doubted, whether memory and reminiscence belong to such a soul as this [which we are now considering] or whether they do not rather pertain to another more obscure soul, or to this animal which is a composite of soul and body. And if they belong to another soul, it may also be doubted when and how it received what it recollects; and a similar doubt will arise if they are said to pertain to the composite of soul and body. Hence, that must be investigated which was the subject of our inquiry from the first, what that is which possesses in us the power of remembering. And if, indeed, it is the soul which remembers, it must be considered what part or power of the soul it is; but if it is the sentient power, as to some it has appeared to be, what the mode is of its subsistence must be investigated, and what ought to be called the animal. And again, whether it is proper to admit that the same thing apprehends both sensibles and intelligibles, or that one thing perceives the former, but another the latter of these.
XXVI. If, therefore, the animal is both at one and the same time in the senses according to energy, it is also necessary that sensible perception should be a thing of this kind. Hence, likewise, it is said to be common, in the same manner as to bore with an auger and to weave; in order that soul may subsist comformably to the artificer, in sensible perception, but the body according to the instrument ; the body indeed suffering and being ministrant, but the soul receiving the impression of the body, or that which is effected through the body. Or the soul must receive the judgment arising from the passion of the body; where, indeed, sense may thus be said to be the common work, but memory will not be compelled to pertain to that which is common, the soul now receiving the impression, and either preserving or ejecting it; unless some one should infer that remembrance also is something common, because we acquire a good memory, and likewise become forgetful from the temperaments of the body. It may also be said, that the body either impedes or does not impede reminiscence, but that remembrance will nevertheless be the province of the soul. And with respect to disciplines, how will the remembrance of these pertain to that which is common [or to the animal which is the composite of soul and body], and not rather belong to the soul ? But if the animal is both at once in such a way that another thing is produced from both, in the first place indeed, it will be absurd to say that the animal is neither body nor soul. For both being changed, [the animal will not be something different from both; nor again, both being mingled, will the soul be in the animal in capacity only; though even in this case, remembrance will nevertheless belong to the soul. Just as in the mixture of honey with wine, if there is still something of sweetness in it, this will be derived from the honey. What then, if it should be said that the soul indeed herself remembers, yet in consequence of being in the body, and therefore not being pure, but as it were affected with quality, she is able to impress in the body the types of sensibles, and to establish as it were a seat in it, for the purpose of receiving forms, and preventing them from gliding away ? To this we reply, in the first place indeed, these types are not magnitudes; nor in the second place, are they like impressions from a seal, or resistances, or figurations, because neither is there any impulsion there, nor does the same thing take place as in wax; but the mode even in sensibles resembles that of intellection. In intellection, however, what resistance can there be ? Or what need is there of body, or corporeal quality in intellectual energy ? Moreover, it is necessary that soul should remember its own motions, such as its tendencies to the objects of its desire, and to things which it has not obtained, and which have not arrived at the body. For how could the body speak of things which have not arrived to it ? Or how can the soul recollect in conjunction with body, that which the body is not at all naturally adapted to know ? But it must be said, indeed, that some things end in the soul; and these are such as enter through the body; but that others pertain to the soul alone, if it is necessary that the soul should be something, and that there is a certain nature and work of it. If, however, this be the case, and it desires, and remembers its desire, it will also remember the attainment, or non-attainment of the object of its desire, since its nature does not rank among things of a flowing condition. For if this is not admitted, we must neither grant that it has a co-sensation, nor a power of following the conceptions of intellect, nor a certain conspiration, and as it were consciousness of itself. For unless the soul naturally possessed these things, it would not obtain them through its union with the body; but it would indeed have certain energies, the works of which would require the assistance of corporeal organs; and of some things it would bring with itself the powers; but of others it would also bring the energies. With respect to memory, however, the body is an impediment to it; since even now also oblivion is produced from the addition of certain things; but through ablation and purification, memory frequently emerges. When the soul, therefore, is alone, it is necessary that the moveable and flowing nature of the body, should be the cause of oblivion and not of memory. Hence, also, body may be understood to be the river of Lethe. Let, therefore, this passion [i.e. memory] belong to the soul.
XXVII. To what soul, however, does memory pertain ? Does it belong to that more divine soul according to which we subsist, or to the other which we derive from the universe ? May we not say, that memory pertains to each of these; but that one kind of memory is peculiar, and another common ? and that when they are conjoined, all the species of memory subsist at once; but that when they are separated, if both should exist and remain, each soul will preserve for a long time the remembrance of things pertaining to itself, but for a short time the recollection of things foreign to its nature ? The image, therefore, of Hercules, is in Hades.2 For it appears to me requisite to think, that this image has a recollection of every thing that has been transacted in life. For to this image life especially pertained. Other souls, however, heing hoth these together, have nothing more to say than what pertains to this life, and in consequence of being the composite of soul and body, know the concerns of the present state of existence, or besides this, something belonging to justice. But we have not yet shown what Hercules himself, who is without the image, will say. What, therefore, will the other soul say that is liberated and alone? For the soul, indeed, which is attracted by body, will recollect every thing which the man did or suffered [in the present life]. In the course of time, however, after death, the recollection of other things also from former lives will arise, so that some of these will be dismissed and despised. For the soul becoming in a greater degree purified from the body, will recollect those things, the remembrance of which she had lost in the present life. But when she becomes situated in another body, she will then indeed departing [from an intellectual] speak of the concerns of an external life. She will, likewise, speak of the things which she has just left, and also of many things pertaining to a superior life. But as many adventitious circumstances will arise in the course of time, she will always be oppressed with oblivion. What, however, will the soul which becomes alone remember ? Or should we not first consider to what power of the soul remembrance belongs ?
XXVIII. Do we, therefore, remember through the powers by which we perceive sensibly and learn ? Or do we remember the objects of desire through the power by which we desire, and the objects of anger through the irascible power? For it may be said, that it is not one thing which enjoys, and another which remembers what that thing enjoyed. The epithymetic power, therefore, is again moved through memory to the objects which it once enjoyed, when they present themselves to its view. For why is it not moved by another object, or not after the same manner ? What hinders us, therefore, from granting to it a sensation of things of this kind ? And why may we not, therefore, attribute desire to the sensitive power, and this in every respect, so that every thing may be named according to that which predominates? Or shall we say, that we ascribe sense to each thing in a different manner ? Thus, for instance, it is sight indeed that perceives, and not the power which desires. But the power which desires is moved by sense, as it were in succession; yet not in such a way as that sense can tell what the quality is of the desire, but so as to suffer without perceiving what it is. Thus also with respect to anger, sight sees the author of the injury, but anger rises in opposition to the injurer; just as when a shepherd sees a wolf among his flock, the dog, though he does not himself see the wolf, yet is excited by impulse, or by the noise [which this circumstance produces]. For the power, indeed, which desires, possesses in itself a vestige of what it formerly enjoyed, not as memory, but as a disposition and passion. But it is another thing which perceives the enjoyment, and possesses in itself the remembrance of what has been done. That it is so, however, this is an argument, that memory frequently does not know what the things are of which desire participates, though they still reside in it.
XXIX. Shall we, therefore, ascribe memory to the sensitive power, and will the sensitive power be the same thing with us as that which remembers ? If, however, the image of the soul remembers, as we have said, the sensitive power will be twofold. And if the sensitive power does not remember, but something else, this something else will have the power of remembering in a twofold respect. Farther still, if the sensitive power is capable of apprehending disciplines, it will also apprehend the objects of the dianoetic power [i.e. the discursive power of reason], or something else will apprehend the objects of each of these. Shall we, therefore, by admitting that the power which apprehends is common, attribute to it the remembrance of both these ? If, however, one and the same thing apprehended sensibles and intelligibles, something to the purpose would perhaps be asserted. But if it is divided in a twofold respect, there will nevertheless be two things. And if we ascribe both to each soul, four things will be produced. In short, what necessity is there that we should remember through the same power by which we perceive, and that both sensible perception and recollection should be effected by the same power, and also that we should remember dianoetic objects through the power by which we energize dianoetically ? For the same persons do not excel in dianoetically energizing and remembering, and those whose sensible perceptions are equally acute, do not remember equally. Some also excel in sensible perception, but others in memory whose sensations are not acute. Again, however, if each is different, it will be requisite that the power also should be different which remembers what sense had before perceived, and it will be necessary to perceive that which it is requisite to remember. Or may we not say that nothing hinders a sensible perception from being a phantasm to him who remembers, and that memory and retention may belong to the power of the phantasy, which is something different from memory. For it is this power in which sense ends; and when sense no longer energizes, the sensible spectacle is present with the phantastic power. If, therefore, the imagination of an absent object is present with this, it will now remember it. And if it remains, indeed, but for a little time, the remembrance will be little; but if for a long time the remembrance will be greater, in consequence of this power being stronger, so that not being easily perverted, it will not be compelled to lose its remembrance. Memory, therefore, belongs to the power of the phantasy, and to remember will consist of things of this kind. We say, however, that souls are differently disposed with respect to memory, either through differently possessing the powers of it, or by frequently or not frequently exercising it; or by corporeal temperaments being or not being inherent, and producing or not producing a change in quality, and causing as it were perturbation. These things, however, must be elsewhere discussed.
XXX. What, however, shall we say of the conceptions of the dianoetic power ? Does the phantastic power pertain also to these? If, indeed, imagination followed every intellection, perhaps this imagination remaining, and being as it were an image of the dianoetic conception, there will thus be a remembrance of the thing known; but if not, something else must be investigated. Perhaps, however, memory will be a reception into the phantastic power of reason following the conception. For a conception is impartible, and not yet having proceeded as it were outwardly, it latently remains within. But reason evolving and educing into the phantastic power from each conception, exhibits the conception as it were in a mirror: and thus the apprehension, permanency, and remembrance of it are effected. Hence, since the soul is always moved to intelligence, when it perceives intellectually, then the apprehension of what it perceives is produced in us. For intelligence is one thing, and the apprehension of intelligence another. And we always indeed perceive intellectually, but we do not always apprehend that we do so.
This, however, is because the recipient not only receives intellections, but also the senses, and this alternately.
XXXI. If, however, memory pertains to the phantastic power, but each soul is said to remember, there will be two powers of the phantasy. The two souls, therefore, being separate, each will possess a phantastic power. But since tbey are with us in the same thing, how will they be two, and in which of them will memory be ingenerated ? For if in both, there will always be twofold imaginations. For it must not be said, that the remembrance of intelligibles pertains to the one, but of sensibles to the other; since thus there will in every respect be two animals, having nothing in common with each other. If, therefore, there is memory in both what will be the difference ? In the next place, what should hinder us from knowing this? Shall we say that we are then ignorant of the difference, when the one power is in symphony with the other; the phantastic powers not being separate, but that which is the more excellent of the two prevailing, one phantasm is produced, since the one follows the other like a shadow, and is subservient to it like a less to a greater light. When, however, there is a contest and dissonance between the two, then the one shines forth through itself; but it is concealed in the other, because in short that there are two souls is concealed from us. For both coalesce in one, and the one is diffused but not the other. The one, therefore, sees all things, and possesses some things indeed, proceeding from it, but dismisses others, as pertaining to the other power. Just as when we have sometimes conversed with persons of a viler character, and afterwards betake ourselves to those who are more worthy, we remember but little of our conversation with the former, but much of it with the latter.
XXXII. What, however, ought we to say concerning the remembrance of friends, and children, and wives; and also of our country, and other things which it is not absurd to recollect? Shall we say that the image of the soul will remember each of these accompanied with passion, but that the superior soul will recollect these impassively? For passion, perhaps, was from the first in this image. And such of the passions as are of an elegant nature, are in the worthy [i.e., the superior] soul, so far as it communicates with the other. It is fit, however, that the inferior soul should also desire the recollection of the energies of the other soul, and especially when it has likewise become itself elegant and worthy. But this inferior soul may from the first become better, in consequence of being disciplined by the more excellent soul. The latter, however, will gladly resign to oblivion the concerns of the former. For it may happen, that the latter soul being worthy, the former which is of an inferior nature, may be forcibly restrained by the superior soul. And in proportion as this more excellent soul hastens to the intelligible, it will forget the concerns of this world, unless the whole of its life here, has been such as to preserve the remembrance alone of things of the most exalted nature. For here also it is beautiful to abandon human pursuits: [and this is the work of perfect virtue]. A forgetfulness, therefore, of such pursuits, is necessary in another life. Hence, he who says that the worthy soul is oblivious, will in such a way as we have mentioned speak rightly. For it will fly from the many, and will collect multitude into one, dismissing that which is infinite. For thus it will not associate with multitude, but expelling it will live by itself: since here also, when it wishes to be in the intelligible world, while an inhabitant of earth, it dismisses all other concerns. Hence, when it is there, it remembers but few things of a terrestrial nature; but it remembers more of them when it is in the heavens. And Hercules, indeed, [when in Hades] may speak of his own fortitude; but in the intelligible world, he will consider these things as trifling, being transferred into a more sacred place, and strenuously engaging even above himself, in those contests in which the wise wish to engage.