IX. The manner, however, in which the soul is ingenerated in the body, must be considered. For this is no less admirable, and no less deserves to be investigated. The mode, therefore, in which the soul enters into the body is twofold. For one of these modes takes place, when the soul being in one body changes it for another, and from an aerial [or fiery], becomes situated in a terrestrial body; which some do not call a transmigration, because that from which the insertion originates is immanifest. But the other mode is a transition from an incorporeal essence to any body whatever; which also will be the first communion of the soul with the body. It will be right, therefore, to consider respecting this communion, what the passion arising from this conjunction then is, when the soul being entirely pure from body, becomes surrounded with the nature of body. Let us, however, first consider how this is effected in the soul of the universe; for perhaps it is proper, or rather is necessary, to begin from hence. For it is requisite that we should explain its ingress into and animation of the body, for the sake of doctrine and perspicuity. Though there never was a time, therefore, in which this universe was not animated, and it is not possible for body to subsist if soul is absent, nor was matter ever unadorned, yet it is possible in conception and in words to separate these from each other. For by these we may analyze every composition. The truth then is as follows : If body had no existence, there would be no progressions of soul; since there is not any other place, where it is naturally adapted to be. If, however, soul intends to proceed, it will generate for itself a place, so that it will generate body. The stability of soul, however, being as it were corroborated in permanency itself, and soul also resembling the effulgence of a great light, a darkness was in the mean time generated in the very extremity of the light, which soul perceiving, gave form to it, since it was likewise the cause of its subsistence. For it was not lawful for any thing proximate to soul, to be destitute of form. Hence, by this obscure nature which was generated by soul, that which is called obscure was received. [The universe] therefore, being generated like a certain beautiful and various edifice, is not separated from its maker [soul], nor yet is mingled with it; but the whole of it is every where considered by its artificer as deserving a providential attention. It is advantageous, therefore, both to its existence and its beauty, to participate as much as possible of its maker; and to the latter this participation is not injurious. For it governs, abiding on high. And the world is animated after such a manner, that it cannot with so much propriety be said to have a soul of its own, as to have a soul presiding over it; being subdued by, and not subduing it, and being possessed, and not possessing. For it lies1 in soul which sustains it, and no part of it is destitute of soul; being moistened with life, like a net in water. It is not, however, able to become that in which it lies; but the sea [of soul] being now extended, the net is also co-extended with it. as far as it is able. For each of the parts is incapable of existing in any other situation than where each is placed. But soul is naturally so great, because it is without quantity. Hence every body is comprehended by one and the same thing. And wherever body is extended, there also soul is. Unless, however, body existed, the attention of soul would not be at all directed to magnitude. For it is of itself that which it is. For the world is so greatly extended, through soul being present with the whole of it. And the extension of the world is bounded, so far as in its progression it has soul for its saviour. The magnitude of the shadow, likewise, is as great as the reason [or productive principle] which is suspended from soul. But the reason was of such a kind as to be able to produce as great a magnitude as the form of it wished might be produced.
X. Thus conceiving, therefore, it is requisite that again betaking ourselves to that which always subsists invariably the same, we should assume all things existing at once, such as the air, light, the sun, and the moon. And, likewise, that we should again consider light and the sun as at once all things, but having the order of things first, second, and third. Here, also, we must consider soul as being always established; and in the next place, we must assume the natures which are first, and those that are in a consequent order, as the extremity of fire in that which is posterior; from the shadow of that fire which subsists at the extremity of things, forming a conception of the fire which rants as the first. In the next place, we must conceive this ultimate fire to be at the same time illuminated, so as to resemble form running into that nature which is hurled towards it, which was first generated, and is entirely obscure. It is, however, adorned according to reason by the power of soul, which possesses in itself wholly a power of adorning by reasons [or productive principles] ; just as the reasons in seeds fashion and give form to animals, as if they were certain little worlds. For whatever comes into contact with soul, is made to be such as the essence of soul is naturally adapted to make it. Soul, however, makes, not by an adventitious decision, nor by waiting for counsel and consideration; for thus it would make not according to nature, but according to adscititious art. For art is posterior to, and imitates soul; producing obscure and imbecile imitations, which are things of a ludicrous nature, and not of much worth, and employing many machines in the formation of images. But soul by the power of essence has dominion over bodies in such a way, that they are generated and subsist, just as she leads them, since they are unable from the first to oppose her will. For in things of a posterior nature which impede each other, matter is frequently deprived of the attainment of the appropriate form which the productive principle [latent] in the seed wished it to have. There, however [i.e., in the universe], the whole form being generated by soul, and the generated natures having at the same time an arrangement, that which is produced becomes beautiful without labour, and without impediment. But in the universe are fabricated, some things indeed which are statues of the Gods, others which are the habitations of men, and others which are adapted to other things. For what else ought to be generated about soul, except those things which it possesses the power of producing ? For the property of fire is to produce heat, and of another thing [cold] to refrigerate. But the peculiarity of soul is, partly to produce something from itself into another thing, and partly to produce something in itself. For in inanimate natures, indeed, that which is from themselves, lies in them as it were in a dormant state; but that which tends to another thing, endeavours to assimilate to itself that which is able to be passive to it. And this is common to each of them, to lead other things to a similitude to itself. That which energizes, however, in soul is something of a vigilant nature, and this is also the case with that which tends from it to another thing. Hence, it causes other things to live which do not live from themselves, and confers on them such a life as it lives itself. The life of soul, therefore, being essentialized in reason, imparts reason to body, as an image of that which it possesses itself. For that which it imparts to body is an image of life. Body, also, receives from soul corporeal morphae, of which soul contains the productive principles. Soul, likewise, comprehends in itself the productive principles of Gods,1 and of all things. Hence, the world also contains all things in itself.
XI. Those ancient wise men, likewise, who wishing that the Gods should be present with them, fabricated temples and statues, appear to me to have directed their attention to the nature of the universe, and to have intellectually perceived, that the nature of soul is every where tractable; and that it may be received the most easily of all things, if any thing is fashioned so as to be passive to it, and is able to receive a certain portion of it. But every thing is disposed to be passive which is in any way imitative, so as to be able like a mirror to seize a certain form. For the nature of the universe has fashioned all things most artificially in imitation of those forms the participations of which it contains in itself. And since every thing is thus generated, the reason [or productive principle] in matter, which was fashioned according to a reason prior to matter, is conjoined to that God, conformably to whom it was generated, and which the soul looks to, and possesses while it fabricates. Hence it was not possible for any thing to be generated destitute of this God; nor again-, is it possible for him to descend hither; since this God is intellect, the sun of the intellectual world. Let this, therefore, be assumed by us as the paradigm of reason. But next to this soul follows, suspended from permanently abiding intellect, and being also itself permanent. Soul, therefore, imparts the terminations of itself which are prior to this visible sun, to this sun ; and causes it through itself as a medium to be conjoined to intellect, becoming as it were an interpreter of the things derived from intellect to the sun, and also of those which revert from the sun to intellect, so far as the former recurs through soul to the latter. For no one thing is veiy remote from another; and yet again, it is remote through difference and mixture. But every thing [in the intellectual region] is in itself, not locally, and each is united to each, and is at the same time separate from each. These, however, [i.e. the mundane spheres] are Gods, because they are never deserted by intellect and soul; and are suspended from the primordial soul, which is as it were departing [from mundane natures]. These, therefore, so far as they are what they are, and so far as they are said to look to intellect [are divine]; the vision of soul itself being directed no where else than to intellect.
XII. The souls of men, however, beholding the images of themselves, like that of Bacchus in a mirror,2 were from thence impelled to descend; vet were not cut off from their principle and from intellect. For they did not descend in conjunction with intellect, but proceeded as far as to the earth, their heads being at the same time established above the heavens. It happened, however, that their descent was more extended, because that which subsists in them as a medium, is compelled to exercise a guardian care, in consequence of the nature into which it arrives requiring solicitous attention. But the father Jupiter, commiserating laborious souls, made the bonds about which they labour mortal, causing them to have periodical cessations of their toil, and a liberation from body, that they also may become situated there where the soul of the universe always resides, without any conversion to these inferior realms. For what the world now possesses is sufficient to it, and will be perpetually through all the following revolutions and periodic restitutions of time, and this established in measures of definite lives, in which these are led to an harmonious agreement with those. At the same time, likewise, all things are arranged by one reason, with reference to the ascent and descent of souls, and every other particular. The symphony, however, of souls with the order of the universe, which nevertheless are not suspended from the universe, hut co-adapt themselves in their descent, and make one concord with the mundane circulation, is testified by this, that their fortunes, lives, and deliberate elections, are signified by the figures of the stars. That the universe, likewise, utters as it were one voice harmonically and aptly, is asserted by the ancients more than any thing else, though obscurely. But this would not be the case, unless the universe was both active and passive through its participation of intellectual forms, in the measures of its periods, orders, and lives; souls evolving themselves according to the genera of discursive progressions, at one time in the intelligible world, at another in the heavens, and at another being converted to these inferior realms. Every intellect, however, is always in the intelligible world, and never departing from its own proper habitation, but established on high, sends through soul these objects of sensible inspection. But soul from its proximity to intellect, is in a greater degree disposed according to the form which flourishes there, and to some of the natures posterior to itself imparts a sameness of subsistence, but to others a subsistence which is different at different times, and a wandering which proceeds in an orderly course.
Souls, however, do not always equally descend, but sometimes more, and at other times less, though they may belong to the same genus. But each soul descends to that which is prepared for its reception, according to similitude of disposition. For it tends to that to which it has become similar; one soul indeed to man, but another to some other animal.
XIII. For justice, which is said to be inevitable, subsists in such a manner in a ruling nature, that every thing proceeds in that order with reference to which it was generated an image of archetypal pre-election and disposition. And that whole form of the soul, is similar to that to which it has in itself a disposition, and which then sends and introduces it where it is proper for it to be situated; not that it may then descend into body, or into this particular body; but that when the prescribed period arrives, souls may as it were spontaneously descend, and enter into that receptacle in which it is necessary for them to reside. A different soul, also, has a different time of descent; which when it arrives, souls descend, as if called by a cryer, enter into an appropriate body, and are similarly affected with those who are moved and borne along by the powers and strong attractions of magicians. They, likewise, resemble the administration which takes place in one animal, which moves each in a certain time, and generates hair, the beard, and the nature of horns, and now impels them to, and causes them to be efflorescent in things of this kind, which they did not possess before. They are also similar to the administration in the growth of trees which vegetate in orderly pre-established periods of time. Souls, however, proceed neither voluntarily, nor from compulsion. For that which is voluntary in them [when they descend] is not as if it were deliberate choice, but resembles a physical leaping, or the natural tendencies to wedlock, or the impulses to certain beautiful actions, to which we are not excited by a reasoning process. A certain particular thing, however, is always accompanied with a certain destiny. And to this thing the present time, but to another the future pertains [as to the accomplishment of the decrees of fate]. The destiny, indeed, of the intellect which is prior to the world, is to remain in the intelligible region, and from thence to impart something [to the sensible universe]. And particulars, falling under the universal law, are from thence sent hither. For in each, that which is universal is inherent. This law, also, does not receive its perfective power externally, but is imparted so as to be in the natures that use it, and to be carried about with them. When the time, likewise, arrives [which the law decreed], then that is effected which it wished to be effected, by those who possess this law. Hence, they themselves accomplish the law which surrounds them, and becomes strong through being established in them; oppressing them as it were with its weight, and producing in them a promptitude and vehement desire of arriving at that place, to which the law within them announces they should come.
XIV. These things, therefore, thus subsisting, this world having many lights, and being illustrated by souls, is adorned by other prior worlds, deriving a different gift from a different world; both from those Gods themselves, and from other intellects, through whom souls are imparted to the universe. And it is probable, that this is obscurely indicated by the fable, in which it is said that Prometheus having fashioned a woman, the other Gods also contributed to her embellishment. It is likewise said, that he mingled earth with water, and inserted the human voice; that he gave her a form resembling that of the Goddesses; that Venus and the Graces imparted something to her; and that a different divinity bestowed on her a different gift.
And lastly, that from the gift, and all the givers, she was called Pandora. For all the Gods gave something to this figment, which was produced by a certain providence.3 But what else is signified by Prometheus warning his brother Epimetheus, not to accept the gift [Pandora], than that the choice of that which is in the intelligible, is more excellent [than of that which is in the sensible world] ? The maker, however, Prometheus, was afterwards bound, because in a certain respect he comes into contact with the thing generated by him. A bond, also, of this kind is external, and the solution of it is by Hercules; because he possesses a liberating power. Of these things, however, any one may form whatever opinion he pleases. But it is evident that the gifts imparted to the world are indicated by this fable, and that it accords with what has been before said.
XV. Souls, therefore, fall from the intelligible world, in the first place indeed, into the heavens, and there receiving a body, they now proceed through it into more terrene bodies, so far as their progressions are more extended in length. And some of them indeed, proceed from the heavens into inferior bodies, but others pass from certain bodies into others; these being such as have not a power sufficient to raise themselves from hence, on account of the great weight and oblivion which they have attracted, and which draw them downward by their oppressive influence.
But souls become different from each other, either through the diversity into which they are introduced, or through the difference of their fortunes and educations; or again, they have a difference from themselves; or they differ in all these respects, or in some of them. And some of them, indeed, entirely fall under the dominion of the fate which is here; but others, at one time are subject to fate, and at another are dependent only on themselves. Others again grant that such things as are necessary must indeed be endured, but that such things as are their own works belong to themselves, and that living according to another legislation which comprehends in itself all beings, they give themselves to another more sacred law. This legislation, however, is a contexture consisting of all the reasons and causes that are here, of psychical motions and the laws derived from thence. It also accords with these, thence receives its principles, and weaves together with them whatever is of a consequent nature. And such things indeed, as are able to save themselves according to their proper habit, it preserves unshaken; but it conducts other things to that condition of being to which they are naturally adapted, so as to be the cause in their descent of the different situations of different things.
XVI. The punishments, therefore, which are inflicted with justice on the wicked, it is proper to refer to the order which leads every thing in a becoming manner. Such things, however, as happen to the good without justice, as punishments, or poverty, or disease, may be said to take place through offences committed in a former life. For these things are woven together, and are pre-signified, so that they are also produced according to reason. Or shall we say that these are not effected according to physical reasons, nor to be ranked among things which have a precedaneous subsistence, but among such as are consequent to them ? As if some edifice should fall, the animal upon which it falls would he killed, whatever it might he. Or as if two certain things moving with an orderly motion, or even one thing thus moving, that which happens to fall at the time, should he broken or trampled on. Or it may be said, that this unjust circumstance is not an evil to him who suffers it, and is useful to the connexion of the whole of things. Or that neither is it unjust, things having a just retribution from antecedent transactions. For it is not proper to think that some things are co-ordinated, but that others are to be referred to the impulse of arbitrary will. For if it is necessary that things should be generated according to causes and physical consequences, and according to one reason and one order, it is also necessary to think that the smallest things are co-ordinated, and woven together. Hence the unjust conduct of one man towards another, is indeed unjust to the doer, and the agent is not without blame, yet being co-ordinated in the universe, it is not unjust with reference to it, nor to him who suffers the injury, but it was thus fit that it should take place. But if he who is injured is a worthy man, the end of these things is good, to him.4 For it is necessary to think, that this co-ordination of things is not without divinity, and is not unjust, but is accurate in the retribution of that which is appropriate; but that it has immanifest causes, and on this account is the occasion of blame to the ignorant.
XVII. That souls, however, first descend from the intelligible into the heavens, may be rationally inferred from the following considerations. If the heaven is in the sensible place that which is most excellent, it will be proximate to the extremities of intelligibles. Hence, the celestial bodies are first animated from thence, and participate of them, as being more adapted to participation. But a terrestrial body is the last of bodies, is naturally adapted to participate of soul in a less degree, and is more remote from an incorporeal nature. All the celestial souls indeed illuminate heaven, and impart as it were much of themselves, and the first procession from themselves to it, but other things become fulgid through posterior natures. The souls, however, which descend below the heavens, illuminate another inferior nature, but their condition is not ameliorated by proceeding to a greater extent. For there is something which is as it were a centre; but after this is a circle shining from the centre; and after this, another circle, which is a light emanating from a light. External to these, however, there is no longer another circle of light, but that which is posterior to them is indigent of its proper light, through the want of a foreign splendour. But let this be a rhombus, or rather a sphere, of such a kind as to participate of the second of these circles, to which it is the next in order, and through proximity to which it becomes resplendent. The great light, therefore, [i.e. intellect] illuminates abiding, and the light which emanates from it proceeds according to [or is characterized by] reason. But the other things co-illuminate, some indeed abiding, but others being abundantly attracted by the splendour of that which is illuminated. In the next place, since the illuminated natures require much guardian attention, like ships in a storm at sea, the pilots of which incessantly watch over them, and neglecting their own concerns, forget that they are frequently in danger of perishing together with the ships; thus also these souls are abundantly hurried away from their own concerns, and afterwards are detained in the bonds of enchantment, being held in durance through their attention to nature. But if each animal was such as the universe, having a body sufficient and perfect, and free from the danger of passivity, in this case, the soul which is said to be present with body, would not be present with it, but entirely abiding on high would impart life to the body [which is suspended from it].
i.e. Of divine souls, each of which is a God according to participation. See the first book of my translation of Proclus ” On the Theology of Plato.” ↩
The meaning of what is here said by Plotinus, will be illustrated by the following remarkable passage from the MS. Commentary of Olympiodorus “On the Phaedo.” “In order,” (says he) ” to the soul’s descent, it is necessary that she should first establish an image of herself in the body; and in the second place, that she should sympathize with the image according to a similitude of form. For every form hastens into a sameness with itself, through an innate convergency to itself. In the third place, becoming situated in a divisible nature, it is necessary that she should be lacerated and scattered together with such a nature, and that she should fall into an ultimate distribution, till through a cathartic life, she raises herself from the extreme dispersion, loosens the bond of sympathy through which she is united to the body, and energizing without the image, becomes established according to her primary life. And we may behold a resemblance of all this, in the fable respecting Bacchus the paradigm of our intellect. For it is said that Dionysius, establishing his image in a mirror, pursued it, and thus become distributed into the universe. But Apollo excited and elevated Bacchus, this God being a cathartic deity, and the true saviour of Dionysius. And on this account he is celebrated as Dionysoter. ” See more on this subject in the second edition of my treatise, ” On the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries,” in Number 16 of the ” Pamphleteer,” for November, 1816. ↩
The recondite meaning of this fable, is thus beautifully unfolded by Olympiodorus in bis MS. Scholia, ” On the Gorgias of Plato: ” “Prometheus is the inspective guardian of the descent of rational souls: for to exert a providential energy is the employment of the rational soul, and prior to any thing else to know itself. Irrational natures, indeed, perceive through percussion, and prior to impulsion know nothing; but the rational nature is able, prior to information from another, to know what is useful. Hence, Epimetheus is the inspective guardian of the irrational soul, because it knows through percussion, and not prior to it. Prometheus, therefore, is that power which presides over the descent of rational souls. But the fire which he stole from heaven, signifies the rational soul itself; because as fire tends upward, so the rational soul pursues things on high. But you will say, why is this fire said to have been stolen? I answer, that which is stolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is foreign. Since, therefore, the rational soul is sent from its proper place of abode on high, to earth as to a foreign region, on this account the fire is said to be stolen. But why was it concealed in a reed? Because a reed is cavernous, and therefore signifies the fluid body in which the soul is carried. Why, however, was the fire stolen, contrary to the will of Jupiter? Again, the fable speaks as a fable. For both Prometheus and Jupiter are willing that the soul should abide on high; but as it is requisite that she should descend, the fable fabricates particulars accommodated to the persons. And it represents, indeed, the superior character, which is Jupiter, as unwilling; for he wishes the soul always to abide on high: but the inferior character, Prometheus, obliges her to descend. Jupiter, therefore, ordered Pandora to be made. And what else is this than the irrational soul, which is of a feminine characteristic? For as it was necessary that the soul should descend to these lower regions, but being incorporeal and divine, it was impossible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium ; hence she becomes united with it through the irrational soul. But this irrational soul was called Pandora, because each of the Gods bestowed on it some particular gift. And this signifies that the illuminations which terrestrial natures receive, take place through the celestial bodies.”
For the irrational soul is an immaterial body, or in other words, vitalized extension, such as the mathematical bodies which we frame in the phantasy or imagination ; and the celestial bodies are of this kind. ↩
Conformably to this, it is divinely said by Plato in the Republic: ” Whatever comes from the Gods to the man who is beloved by the Gods, will all be the best possible, unless he has some necessary ill from former miscarriage. Hence, if the just man happens to be in poverty, or disease, or in any other of those seeming evils, these things issue to him in something good either whilst alive or dead. For never at any time is he neglected by the Gods, who inclines earnestly to endeavour to become just, and practises virtue, as far as it is possible for man to resemble God.” ↩